MAIN  CURRENTS  OF 
MODERN   THOUGHT 


MAIN  CURRENTS  OF 
MODERN    THOUGHT 

A  STUDY  OF  THE  SPIRITUAL 
AND  INTELLECTUAL  MOVE- 
MENTS OF  THE  PRESENT  DAY 


BY 

RUDOLF     EUCKEN 

PROFESSOR  OP  PHILOSOPHY  AT  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF  JENA  ;  AWARDED  THB 
NOBEL  PRIZE  FOR  LITERATURE 


TRANSLATED    BY 

MEYRICK    BOOTH,   B.Sc.,  Pn.D.  JENA) 


NEW  YORK:   CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 
LONDON:    T.   FISHER    UNWIN 


(All  rights  reserved) 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTORY  NOTE         .  ...       9 

AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  THE  ENGLISH  EDITION  .  .    15 

PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION 17 

PREFACE  TO  THE  FOURTH  EDITION  .  .  .  .21 

INTRODUCTION  : 

THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  AFFAIRS  AND  THE  TASK  WITH  WHICH  IT 
PBESENTS  Us  .  .  .  .  .  .  .23 

A.  THE   FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPT  OP 
SPIEITUAL  LIFE 

1.  SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 

(a)  HISTORICAL    .  .......    35 

(6)  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTUBT            .            .           .           .  .44 

(c)  THE  POSITIVE  POSITION       .           .            .           .           .  .53 

1.  Introduction        .            .            .            .            .            .  .53 

2.  The  Fundamental  Concept  of  the  Spiritual  Life          .  .     57 

3.  The  Relationship  between  Man  and  the  Spiritual  Life  .     60 

4.  The  Results  as  they  affect  the  Concept  of  Truth          .  .    62 

2.  THEORETICAL   —    PRACTICAL    (INTELLECTUALISM    — 

VOLUNTARISM). 

(a)  HISTORICAL    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .64 

(6)  VOLUNTARISM  .  .  «  .  ,  .  .70 

(c)  PRAGMATISM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .75 

(d)  OUR  OWN  POSITION  :  ACTIVISM        .  .  .  .  .79 

(e)  INTELLECT  AND  INTELLECTUALISM  .  .  .  .  .81 

1.  The  Invasion  of  Modern  Life  by  Intellectualism          .  .     82 

2.  The  Life-Process  as  the  Foundation  of  Knowledge      .  .     85 

3.  The  Quest  for  Truth  and  its  Motive  Power       .  .  .89 

4.  Consequences  in  the  Sphere  of  Knowledge        .  .  .93 

5.  Consequences  with  regard  to  the  History  of  Philosophy  .    96 

3.  IDEALISM— REALISM. 

(a)  THE  TERMS    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .99 

(6)  THE  CONFLICT  OF  PRACTICAL  IDEALS  ....  101 

1.  Nineteenth-century  Realism       .  .  .  .  .  103 

2.  The  Limitations  of  the  New  Realism  ....  105 

5 


CONTENTS 

MM 

3.  Criticism  of  the  Traditional  Forms  of  Idealism  .  .  107 

4.  The  Problem  of  Reality  .  .  .  .  .  .110 

5.  The  Necessity  for  a  New  Idealism         ....  113 


B.  THE  PEOBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

1.  THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  (METAPHYSICS). 

(a)  HISTORICAL  ........  119 

(6)  THE  RIGHT  OP  AN  INDEPENDENT  PHILOSOPHY     .  .  .  129 

(c)  THE  TENDENCY  TOWARDS  METAPHYSICS     ....  141 

(d)  THE  PURSUIT  AFTER  KNOWLEDGE:  A  GENERAL  SURVEY  .  149 

(e)  ESTIMATION  OF  RATIONALISM  AND  EMPIRICISM     .  .  .  155 

2.  MECHANICAL— ORGANIC    (TELEOLOGY). 

(a)  ON  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  TERMS  AND  CONCEPTS  .  .  165 

(6)  ON  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PROBLEM  ....  169 

(c)  THE  PRESENT-DAY  CONFLICT  .....  182 

1.  The  Philosophical  Aspect  of  the  Problem         .  .  .  182 

2.  The  Scientific  Aspect  of  the  Problem    ....  185 

3.  The  Problem  in  the  Social  Sphere         .  .  .  .  189 

3.  LAW. 

(a)  HISTORICAL    ........  195 

(b)  THE  PROBLEM  OP  LAW  IN  THE  MODERN  WORLD  .  .  201 


C.  THE   WOELD-PEOBLEM. 

1.  MONISM  AND  DUALISM. 

(a)  THE  CONCEPTS  :  HISTORICAL  AND  CRITICAL  REMARKS     .  .  215 

(b)  THE  MONISM  OF  TO-DAY     .  .  ,  ;         .  .  .  230 

2.  EVOLUTION. 

(a)  ON  THE  HISTORY  OP  THE  TERM     .....  240 

(b)  ON  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  CONCEPT  AND  PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  242 

(c)  THE  COMPLICATIONS  AND  LIMITATIONS  OP  THE  MERELY  EVOLU- 

TIONARY DOCTRINE  .  .  .  .  .  .  255 

(d)  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF  A  NEW  TYPE  OF  LIFE    .  .  .  272 


D.  THE   PEOBLEMS  OF  HUMAN   LIFE. 

1.     CIVILISATION  (OR  HUMAN   CULTURE). 

(a)  ON  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  TERM  AND  CONCEPT     .  .  .  281 

(b)  CRITICAL        ........  288 

1.  The  Nature  and  Value  of  Civilisation   .  .  .  .288 

2.  The  Problem  of  the  Content  of  Civilisation      .  .  .  291 

3.  The  Uncertainty  in  the  Relationship  of  Man  to  Civilisation  .  294 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

(c)  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OP  A  TRUE  CIVILISATION      .  ,  .  298 

1.  The  Necessity  of  a  Deeper  Foundation  .  .  .  298 

2.  The  Necessity  of  an  Inner  Development  of  Civilisation  .  802 


2.    HISTORY. 

(a)  TOWABDB  THE  DEVELOPMENT   OF  THE   PROBLEM    .  .  .  808 

(b)  DEMANDS  AND  PROSPECTS    ......  318 

APPENDIX:  THE  CONCEPT  "MODERN"  ....  330 


8.    SOCIETY  AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL  (SOCIALISM), 
(a)  THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  SOCIETY  AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL     .  341 

1.  Historical  .......  341 

2.  The  Problems  of  To-Day : 

a.  The  Inadequacy  of  a  merely  Social  Civilisation     .  .  361 

/3.  The  Inadequacy  of  a  merely  Individual  Civilisation          .  363 

y.  The  Necessity  for  an  Inner  Overcoming  of  the  Antithesis  373 

(6)  THE  SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC  MOVEMENT         ....  374 


4.  THE  PROBLEMS  OP  MORALITY. 

(a)  THE  PRESENT  INSECURE  POSITION  OF  MORALITY  .  .  385 

(b)  MORALITY  AND  METAPHYSICS          .....  388 

(c)  MORALITY  AND  ART  .......  393 

1.  On  the  History  of  the  Problem  .....  393 

2.  The  Problems  of  the  Present  Day  : 

a.  Modern  JSstheticism  .....  400 

/3.  The  Position  of  Art  in  Modern  Life  .  .  .  404 


5.     PERSONALITY   AND   CHARACTER. 

(a)  PERSONALITY  ....,,.  409 

1.  On  the  History  of  the  Term        .....  409 

2.  On  the  History  of  the  Concept  .....  412 

3.  Investigation  of  the  Problem      .....  414 

(b)  CHARACTER    ........  422 

1.  On  the  History  of  the  Term  and  Concept         .  .  .  422 

2.  The  Present  Position  .  425 


6.    THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL. 

(a)  INTRODUCTION  .......  431 

(b)  REMARKS  ON  THE  DETERMINIST  POSITION  .  .  .  434 


CONTENTS 


E.  ULTIMATE   PROBLEMS. 

PAOK 

1.     THE   VALUE   OP  LIFE. 

(a)  INTRODUCTION  :  ON  THE  HISTOBY  OF  THE  TERMS  .  .  447 

(b)  THE  PERPLEXITIES  OF  THE  PRESENT  SITUATION  .  .  .  449 


,     THE      RELIGIOUS      PROBLEM      (IMMANENCE  —  TRAN- 
SCENDENCE). 

(a)  ON  THE  HISTORY  OP  THE  TERMS    .....  462 
(6)  THE  TREND  OP  THE  MODERN  WORLD  TOWARDS  IMMANENCE       .  464 

(c)  THE  COMPLICATIONS  IN  THE  CONCEPT  OP  IMMANENCE      .  .  467 

(d)  THE  REVIVAL  OP  THE  RELIGIOUS  PROBLEM         .  .  .  469 

(e)  THE  DEMANDS  MADE  BY  THE  PRESENT  POSITION  OF  RELIGION  .  471 


CONCLUSION .  .479 

INDEX  .  481 


TRANSLATOR'S   INTRODUCTORY   NOTE 

THE  present  work  is  a  translation  of  the  4th  edition  of  the 
Geistige  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart  (Veit  &  Co.,  1909). 

I  have  endeavoured  throughout  to  render  the  sense  of  the 
original  in  the  simplest  English  I  could  command,  hut  I  have 
not  attempted  to  secure  exact  literal  accuracy.  Considerable 
care  has  been  taken  to  bring  the  terminology  as  far  as  possible 
into  line  with  that  employed  in  the  other  English  translations 
of  Eucken's  works. 

Eucken's  earlier  writings  were  historical,  his  constructive 
works  being  of  comparatively  recent  date.  The  Main  Cur- 
rents of  Modern  Thought  forms  a  link  between  the  two 
periods;  it  starts  from  a  broad  historical  basis  and  presses 
forward  to  positive  construction.  Here  we  may  follow  the 
growth  of  Eucken's  philosophy,  from  its  roots,  lying  far  back 
in  the  historical  work,  to  its  full  flower,  as  seen  in  the  positive 
philosophy  itself.  While  the  Jena  professor's  other  recent 
works  concern  themselves  in  the  main  with  the  general 
exposition  of  his  convictions,  the  present  study  reveals  in 
detail  the  extensive  groundwork  upon  which  these  convictions 
have  been  built  up,  and  in  particular  it  illustrates  the  various 
steps  by  which  the  author  has  been  led  to  adopt  the  concept  of 
the  spiritual  life  as  the  basis  of  his  whole  philosophy. 

Eucken's  method  is  one  of  elimination.  One  by  one  he 
examines  the  various  attempts  at  a  synthesis  of  life  with  which 
the  thought  of  the  day  provides  us.  One  by  one  they  are  found 
to  be  incomplete  or  to  be  involved  in  inner  contradictions,  while 
in  each  case  it  is  seen  that  a  recognition  of  an  independent 
spiritual  life  would  remedy  the  incompleteness  or  remove  the 
contradiction.  Far  from  being  a  mere  assumption  (as  will 


10       TRANSLATOR'S   INTRODUCTORY   NOTE 

certainly  be  supposed  by  those  who  are  suspicious  of  the  term 
"spiritual"),  the  spiritual  life  is  thus  seen  to  be  nothing  less 
than  a  necessity.  Through  its  recognition  alone  can  we  explain 
the  known  content  of  the  universe. 

For  those  who  are  commencing  a  study  of  Euckeu's  thought  a 
few  words  with  regard  to  the  exact  meaning  of  the  concept 
"  spiritual  life  "may  not  be  out  of  place.  As  this  concept  is  the 
key  to  Eucken's  whole  philosophy,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  it  should  be  clearly  understood.  The  matter  is  perhaps 
best  approached  through  a  consideration  of  the  most  popular 
philosophy  of  the  present  day,  namely,  that  general  view  of  life 
which  (whether  it  be  called  agnosticism,  positivism,  empiricism, 
materialism,  or  naturalism)  declares  that  we  know  only  that 
which  is  revealed  to  us  through  the  senses,  that  man  is  not 
essentially  anything  more  than  a  higher  animal,  and  that  there 
is  no  spirit  (man's  entire  psychic  life  being  regarded  as  no  more 
than  a  mere  product  of  natural  forces) ;  the  higher  is  thus 
made  entirely  dependent  upon  the  lower.  Far  different  is  the 
aspect  of  affairs  when  looked  at  from  Eucken's  point  of  view: 
the  living  spirit  (or  the  spiritual  life)  now  stands  at  the  very 
centre  of  the  universe,  and  is  itself  the  most  central  and  positive 
reality  of  which  humanity  can  have  any  knowledge  :  "  a  spiritual 
life  transcending  all  human  life  forms  the  ultimate  basis  of 
reality."  This  life  is  more  primary  than  matter  itself  (the  con- 
cept of  matter  being,  in  reality,  one  of  the  vaguest  and  most 
uncertain  in  the  whole  realm  of  thought) .  The  recognition  of  an 
independent  spiritual  life  is  the  first  step  towards  all  further 
knowledge  and  the  first  necessity  of  any  adequate  view  of  life  as 
a  whole.  The  spiritual  life  is  not  derived  from  any  natural 
basis.  It  is  not  a  product  of  evolution.  It  is  superior  to  all 
time  and  to  all  change  :  "  change  (and  with  it  evolution)  is 
absolutely  out  of  the  question  as  far  as  the  substance  of  spiritual 
life  is  concerned."  It  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  whole  realm 
of  natural  phenomena,  and,  as  Eucken  himself  says,  in  spiritual 
life  we  have  to  do  "  with  something  essentially  different  from 
any  process  following  natural  laws."  The  spiritual  life  works 
within  the  natural  sphere,  but  it  works  as  an  independent 
reality  ;  it  is  itself  superior  to  the  whole  mechanism  of  nature. 


TRANSLATOR'S   INTRODUCTORY   NOTE       11 

This  life  must  be  conceived  of  as  something  quite  distinct  from 
the  human  intellect  and  from  every  kind  of  merely  human 
psychic  life.  The  spiritual  life  is  itself  the  foundation  of  truth 
and  knowledge.  It  is  cosmic,  absolute  and  eternal. 

It  will  at  once  be  asked,  If  the  spiritual  life  be  thus  indepen- 
dent and  absolute,  how  can  man  have  any  part  in  it,  how  can  it 
affect  him  ?  Why,  in  short,  should  we  bother  about  it  at  all  ? 
In  reply  to  this  Eucken  would  maintain  that  man's  relationship 
to  the  spiritual  life  is  the  most  immediate  and  vital  of  all  human 
interests,  for  this  life  is  itself  the  very  centre  of  man' 8  own  being. 
The  spiritual  life  does  not  depend  upon  man,  but  man  depends 
upon  the  spiritual  life.  In  an  external  sense  man  may  be 
natural,  but  in  an  internal  sense  he  is  spiritual,  he  belongs  to 
the  spiritual  reality  which  is  behind  the  whole  universe.  It  is 
the  spiritual  life  within  him  which  distinguishes  man  from  the 
animals  and  forms  the  root  of  his  unique  unifying  capacity, 
as  well  as  of  his  ethical  and  religious  nature.  Spiritual 
reality  thus  works  within  man,  but  it  is  not  of  man.  Man 
attains  to  his  spiritual  self  by  rising  above  his  human  self;  and 
only  by  thus  rising  does  he  become  independent,  for  the  merely 
human  self  is  involved  in  a  network  of  natural  processes  from 
which  the  spiritual  life  alone  is  free.  The  spiritual  life  is  "  a 
cosmic  force  operative  in  man " ;  here  man  finds  a  strength 
greater  than  his  own.  The  ethical  value  of  Eucken's  philosophy 
lies  in  its  recognition  of  a  spiritual  world  of  cosmic  power  and  ab- 
solute and  eternal  values,  a  world  set  above  the  relativity  of  human 
affairs  and  yet  present  to  man  as  an  ethical  imperative.  Nor  is 
the  ethical  point  of  view  lightly  to  be  ignored.  A  satisfactory 
philosophy  of  life  must  make  room  for  man's  ethical  nature ;  as 
Balfour  says  (The  Foundations  oj  Belief,  p.  856)  :  "No  uni- 
fication of  beliefs  can  be  practically  adequate  which  does  not 
include  ethical  beliefs  as  well  as  scientific  ones ;  nor  which 
refuses  to  count  among  ethical  beliefs,  not  merely  those  which 
have  immediate  reference  to  moral  commands,  but  those  also 
which  make  possible  moral  sentiments,  ideals,  and  aspirations, 
and  which  satisfy  our  ethical  needs.  Any  system  which,  when 
worked  out  to  its  legitimate  issues,  fails  to  effect  this  object  can 
afford  no  permanent  habitation  for  the  spirit  of  man." 


12       TRANSLATOR'S   INTRODUCTORY   NOTE 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  our  inner  life  demands  an  authority 
which  shall  be  objective  and  absolute  (that  is,  truly  authoritative), 
and  at  the  same  time  present  within  man  in  such  a  way  that  its 
commands  are  felt  to  be  inwardly  compelling  and  not  forced  upon 
man  by  some  external  power.  I  should  like  to  quote  an  ex- 
tremely significant  passage  from  Principal  P.  T.  Forsyth's  very 
valuable  work  Positive  Preaching  and  the  Modern  Mind  (p.  61) ; 
speaking  of  what  he  calld  the  "  inmost  authority  "  he  says  :  "It 
emerges  and  wells  up  under  psychological  conditions,  but  it  is 
not  a  psychological  product  ...  it  is  not  ourselves,  it  is  objec- 
tive. .  .  .  The  thing  most  immanent  in  us  is  a  transcendent 
thing.  ..."  In  order  to  attain  to  this  inner  spiritual  world 
man  must  fight  a  battle  ;  he  must  overcome  the  resistance  of  his 
non- spiritual  nature,  which  is  in  perpetual  conflict  with  his 
spiritual  self.  The  spiritual  life  is  not  immanent  in  man  in  such 
a  fashion  that  he  can  possess  it  without  effort ;  it  is  present  "  as 
a  possibility  " — it  rests  with  us  to  lay  hold  of  it.  Man  cannot 
participate  in  the  spiritual  life  without  continual  and  active  effort ; 
hence  the  name — Activism — which  Eucken  has  assigned  to  his 
own  type  of  thought.  Eucken' s  philosophy  is  therefore  marked 
by  a  strong  dualism.  There  is  a  sharp  division  within  man's 
own  nature,  a  conflict  of  forces,  a  struggle  for  supremacy,  a  slow 
and  laborious  ascent  to  a  world  of  new  and  permanent  values, 
to  "a  new  stage  of  reality."  We  read  that  "man  stands  at 
once  in  time  and  above  time,"  that  he  lives  "  on  the  boundary 
of  time  and  eternity,  on  the  horizon  where  the  two  run  together," 
and  again  that  "  man  is  the  meeting  place  of  different  stages  of 
reality,  nay,  of  opposed  worlds." 

It  is  not,  however,  Eucken's  intention  that  reality  should 
finally  be  looked  upon  as  falling  apart  into  two  separate  worlds  ; 
on  the  contrary  he  regards  spiritual  life  and  nature  as  being, 
ultimately,  stages  of  a  single  reality.  Man,  however,  occupies 
a  position  at  which  a  transition  from  the  lower  to  the  higher 
stage  has  to  be  effected.  He  must  not  therefore  allow  the 
distinction  between  nature  and  spirit  to  be  obliterated.  At  the 
same  time  Eucken's  ultimate  goal  is  a  monism — not  naturalistic, 
as  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out,  but  spiritualistic  iu 
character. 


TRANSLATOR'S   INTRODUCTORY  NOTE       13 

"  We  have  become  insecure  with  regard  to  all  our  ideals, 
nay,  with  regard  to  our  own  being ;  we  no  longsr  draw  upon  a 
common  groundwork  of  convictions,  of  uniting,  directing,  elevat- 
ing forces.  In  spite  of  all  subjective  activity,  an  inner  decline  of 
life  is  unavoidable  if  this  uncertainty  should  continue  to  spread." 
This  brief  quotation  will  suffice  to  indicate  Eucken's  attitude 
towards  the  life  of  to-day.  He  is  profoundly  convinced  that  the 
peoples  of  to-day,  absorbed  in  the  pursuit  of  material  things, 
intent  upon  bettering  their  environment  and  intoxicated  by  the 
surprising  triumphs  of  technical  science,  have  increasingly  lost 
touch  with  those  central  spiritual  realities  without  which  life 
can  have  no  meaning  or  value.  In  a  single  phrase,  the  interests 
of  the  modern  world  are  in  the  main  peripheral  rather  than 
central.  Eucken  is  not  only  a  philosopher ;  he  is  a  prophet. 
His  aim  is  to  lead  humanity  back  to  central  realities,  to  act 
as  a  centripetal  force  in  a  world  of  centrifugal  tendencies.  He 
seeks  to  call  attention  to  the  great  truth  that  the  whole  fabric 
of  human  civilisation  rests  ultimately  upon  a  spiritual  basis. 
It  is  his  belief  that  the  supreme  need  of  the  age  is  a  compre- 
hensive, positive  philosophy  of  life  to  serve  as  a  rallying  point 
for  the  scattered  and  divided  forces  of  humanity.  The  old 
syntheses  of  life,  which  were  satisfactory  in  their  day  and  genera- 
tion, are  now  breaking  up  and  there  is  need  for  a  new  and  wider 
synthesis.  Eucken  is  convinced  that  only  through  the  recog- 
nition of  an  independent  spiritual  life  can  the  chaos  of  modern 
opinions  be  made  to  give  way  to  a  broad  and  satisfying 
philosophy  of  life. 

In  conclusion  I  should  like  to  express  my  warmest  gratitude 
to  Professor  Boyce  Gibson  (now  of  Melbourne  University),  the 
author  of  Rudolf  Eucken's  Philosophy  of  Life,  who  looked 
through  the  greater  part  of  the  MS.,  making  a  large  number 
of  invaluable  suggestions  and  clearing  up  many  obscure  points. 
As  it  is,  my  task  has  been  a  hard  one,  but  without  his  kind  help 
it  would  have  been  much  more  difficult. 

MEYBICK  BOOTH. 
LETCHWORTH. 

June,  1912. 


AUTHOR'S    PREFACE   TO   THE   ENGLISH 
EDITION 

THE  Main  Currents  of  Modern  Thought  has  met  with  a  most 
friendly  reception  in  Germany  and  in  France,  and  it  would  give 
me  very  great  pleasure  should  it  win  friends  for  itself  within  the 
English-speaking  world.  This  work  aims  in  the  first  place  at 
counteracting  the  spiritual  and  intellectual  confusion  of  the 
present  day.  I  have  sought  to  grasp  the  specific  character  of 
the  age  through  a  study  of  its  more  central  problems ;  and 
with  the  object  of  liberating  these  problems  from  all  that  is 
accidental  and  momentary  I  have  endeavoured  to  illuminate 
them  from  the  standpoint  of  the  historical  development  of 
humanity.  At  the  same  time,  this  historical  treatment  shows 
that  spiritual  evolution  is  a  matter  common  to  all  civilised 
peoples ;  they  have  all  actively  participated  in  this  evolution, 
and  all  are  to-day  called  to  the  performance  of  great  common 
tasks,  by  which  they  are  raised  above  and  beyond  every  national 
and  political  difference.  Nothing  is  more  certain  to  counteract 
the  lamentable  and  dangerous  hostility  of  great  nations  to  one 
another  than  a  better  understanding  of  the  complete  solidarity 
of  the  various  nations  with  regard  to  those  great  questions 
which  concern  humanity  as  a  whole. 

RUDOLF  EUCKEN. 
JBNA, 

June,  1912. 


PREFACE   TO  THE  THIRD   EDITION 

THE  third  edition  differs  even  more  from  the  second  than  did 
the  second  from  the  first.  In  the  first  edition  the  historical 
review  formed  the  foundation  of  the  work,  while  the  discussion 
of  the  problems  themselves  was  quite  a  secondary  matter ;  in 
the  second  edition  the  discussion  became  far  more  independent, 
and  in  the  third  it  obtained  the  full  primacy.  The  book  is 
above  all  an  expression  of  a  specific  philosophical  conviction 
as  a  whole,  and  claims  to  be  considered  in  this  light.  This 
claim  has  had  the  effect  of  essentially  altering  the  mode  in 
which  the  material  had  to  be  presented  ;  in  particular,  it 
demanded  a  more  precise  arrangement  and  division  of  the 
subject  matter,  extending  even  to  the  separate  sections. 

While  carrying  out  these  alterations,  I  believed  myself  able,  at 
the  same  time,  to  retain  the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  earlier 
editions ;  the  correlation  of  historical  fact  with  spiritual  reality 
on  the  one  hand,  and  treatment  under  separate  headings  on  the 
other.  Both  as  a  whole  and  in  certain  special  discussions  (which 
cannot  now  be  anticipated)  the  book  contends  that  the  content 
of  history  is  more  than  an  object  of  scholarly  research,  and  that, 
subject  to  definite  assumptions,  it  may  powerfully  contribute  to 
the  uplifting  of  our  own  work.  To  start  from  special  problems 
secures  the  advantage  of  tangible  points  of  attack,  from  which 
it  is  possible  to  progress  rapidly  to  some  sort  of  conclusion. 
This  method  is  certainly  open  to  an  objection  ;  the  general  con- 
viction underlying  the  whole  does  not  as  such  receive  adequate 
attention,  nor  is  it  set  forth  in  continuous  and  connected 
argument.  This  defect  is  freely  admitted.  It  is,  however,  so 
closely  connected  with  the  mode  of  treatment  here  adopted  that 
it  cannot  be  remedied.  In  this  respect  my  earlier  books  will  be 
found  to  a  certain  extent  supplementary.  The  chief  lack  con- 

2  » 


18         PREFACE  TO  THE   THIRD  EDITION 

sists  in  the  failure  to  provide  an  adequate  epistemological  ground- 
work, and  my  next  book  will  be  devoted  to  a  thorough  discussion 
of  the  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  different  editions  are  held  together,  however,  even  more 
by  a  thoroughgoing  fundamental  conviction  than  by  the  method 
of  treatment ;  by  the  conviction,  namely,  that  the  ground  upon 
which  our  whole  civilised  life  and  scientific  work  stands  is  in- 
secure ;  that  this  life  not  only  contains  an  immense  variety  of 
individual  problems,  but  that  as  a  whole  it  needs  a  drastic  revision 
and  a  thorough  renewal.  It  is  my  belief  that  philosophy  must 
participate  in  this  endeavour ;  nay,  that  philosophy  above  all  is 
here  summoned  to  energetic  co-operation.  This  has  brought  me 
into  opposition  to  the  main  tendency  of  contemporary  German 
philosophy,  which  believes  itself  able  peacefully  to  continue  its 
scientific  work  undisturbed  by  these  questions  and  doubts.  We 
thankfully  and  gladly  recognise  the  valuable  character  of  this 
work,  more  especially  in  the  detailed  development  of  the  separate 
departments  of  knowledge;  it  has  accomplished  and  is  accom- 
plishing much.  But  at  the  same  time  the  right  and  the  necessity 
of  the  more  general  problem  must  be  insisted  upon  with  all 
possible  emphasis.  In  working  in  this  direction  we  shall  not 
allow  ourselves  to  be  in  any  way  affected  by  the  attitude  which 
others  may  adopt  towards  this  problem  ;  we  shall  rely  solely 
upon  the  inner  necessity  of  the  matter. 

Recently,  however,  there  have  been  a  multitude  of  signs 
bearing  witness  to  the  fact  that  increasingly  wide  circles  are 
becoming  interested  in  the  problems  which  we  have  taken  up. 
The  inner  complications  of  our  civilisation,  nay,  of  our  whole 
spiritual  situation,  are  growing  more  and  more  obvious ;  we  are 
becoming  more  and  more  conscious  of  serious  lapses  from  truth, 
of  a  substitution  of  phrases  for  realities  and  stones  for  bread. 
Nothing  less  than  the  happiness  and  meaning  of  our  own 
existence  is  at  stake.  Thus  the  desire  for  classification  and 
consolidation  makes  itself  felt  with  ever-increasing  urgency  and 
philosophy  is  being  more  and  more  imperatively  called  to  lend  its 
aid  in  the  solution  of  these  problems  of  life.  New  life-move- 
ments are  ascending  and  men's  minds  are  being  swayed  by  new 
interests  which  bid  them  pursue  new  aims. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION         19 

These  inner  changes  have  procured  for  my  books  an  increas- 
ing number  oi  friends  and  given  me  the  consciousness  of  a  close 
spiritual  contact  with  the  age,  such  as  I  was  not  previously  able 
to  enjoy.  It  is  with  peculiar  pleasure  that  I  welcome  the  interest 
of  the  young  and  growing  generation,  an  interest  which  has 
grown  with  unexpected  and  increasing  speed.  I  hope  that  this 
interest  may  also  be  extended  to  this  book,  and,  in  particular,  I 
hope  that  it  may  assist  in  a  further  development  of  the  problems 
which  have  here  been  treated  in  mere  outline,  and  frequently, 
there  is  no  doubt,  very  incompletely.  For  what  we  all  see  more 
or  less  clearly  before  us  is  ultimately  nothing  less  than  the  idea 
of  a  new  man  and  a  new  culture.  A  linking  up  of  forces,  an 
overcoming  of  all  that  is  merely  individual,  the  inception  of  a 
comprehensive  movement,  can  alone  enable  us  to  make  any 
progress  in  dealing  with  so  gigantic  a  problem. 

RUDOLF  EUCKEN. 
JENA, 

February,  1904. 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FOURTH   EDITION 

THE  fourth  edition  has  not  been  so  much  altered  in  comparison 
with  the  third  as  was  the  third  in  comparison  with  the  second. 
At  the  same  time  some  important  changes  have  been  made. 
Several  sections  have  been  completely  revised  and  one  (that 
dealing  with  the  Value  of  Life)  has  been  newly  added.  All 
through  there  has  been  an  effort  to  make  the  presentation  more 
easy,  the  content  more  complete,  the  main  theses  more  precise 
in  form,  and  to  grapple  more  directly  with  the  problems  of  the 
age,  thus  giving  the  whole  a  more  convincing  and  forcible  form. 
Far  more  attention,  too,  has  been  given  to  foreign  movements. 
I  hope,  therefore,  that  the  new  edition  as  a  whole  marks  a 
distinct  step  forward. 

RUDOLF  EUCKEN. 
JBNA, 

End  of  Awjust,  1908. 


INTRODUCTION 

THE   PRESENT   STATE   OF  AFFAIRS  'AND  THE 
TASK  WITH  WHICH   IT   PRESENTS  US 

IN  examining  the  life  and  thought  of  to-day  it  is  impossible  not 
to  be  struck  in  the  first  place  by  the  extreme  confusion  which 
prevails  and  the  accompanying  painful  insecurity  as  to  the  real 
aim  of  life.  On  every  side  we  perceive  not  only  a  division  of 
humanity  into  factions,  but  often  a  division  within  the  individual 
himself.  This  state  of  confusion  and  uncertainty  may  at  first 
signt  appear  to  be  the  result  of  historical  traditions  working 
themselves  out.  We  are  surrounded  to-day  by  various  tenden- 
cies which  have  come  down  to  us  from  the  past,  and  these  are 
not  infrequently  hostile  to  one  another ;  they  constitute  the 
heritage  and  burden  that  the  labour  of  thousands  of  years  has 
bequeathed  to  us.  It  is  the  fact  of  thus  being  torn  by  con- 
tradictions which  more  than  anything  else  distinguishes  modern 
culture  from  the  simpler  conditions  of  the  Ancient  World.  The 
Middle  Ages  handed  down  a  whole  philosophy  of  life  containing 
within  itself  modes  of  thought  so  fundamentally  different  as  the 
Grecian  and  the  early  Christian,  the  artistic  and  the  religious, 
the  tendency  to  embrace  life  and  the  tendency  to  reject  it; 
these  were,  however,  rather  pieced  together  than  harmoniously 
combined.  In  opposition  to  this  structural  solution  the  Modern 
World  brought  forth  a  new  life  energy,  the  desire  for  the 
unhindered  expansion  of  force  and  for  complete  dominion  over 
the  material  world.  The  detailed  development  of  this,  however, 
led  at  once  to  a  division  within  the  Modern  World  itself.  On 
the  one  hand,  there  was  the  soul,  with  its  capacity  for  thought, 
demanding  to  rule  the  world  and  human  life  (intellectualism) ; 

93 


24  INTRODUCTION 

on  the  other  was  nature  and  its  mechanism  (naturalism).  The 
nineteenth  century,  being  an  age  of  historical  knowledge  and 
close  speculative  reflection,  threw  such  a  painfully  bright  light 
on  all  these  contradictions  that  it  became  impossible  to  ignore 
them  any  longer. 

And  what  a  wealth  of  experience  is  contained  within  the 
nineteenth  century  itself!  Consider  the  profound  changes  it 
passed  through,  the  separate  phases  of  which,  in  spite  of  having 
outwardly  dropped  into  the  background,  still  remain  inwardly 
near  to  us  and  incline  us  in  opposite  directions :  the  artistic 
spiritual  culture  of  the  German  classical  period,  a  powerful  and 
self-conscious  realism  and  a  reaction  against  this  realism  in  the 
form  of  a  subjectivism  characterised  by  spiritual  self-sufficiency 
and  the  development  of  unchartered  feeling.  How  many  con- 
trasts derived  from  old  and  new  contents  do  we  carry  within 
ourselves,  and  what  a  great  task  lies  before  us  if  we  are  inwardly 
to  master  them  ! 

In  order  to  elaborate  and  harmonise  these  various  tendencies 
a  superior  spiritual  force  is  needful,  but  since  this  force  is 
lacking  we  are  subject  to  all  the  misfortunes  that  are  the 
necessary  consequences  of  man  being  overmastered  by  his 
own  experiences,  of  his  being  dominated  by  the  distracting 
influences  of  existence.  No  steady  aims  guide  our  endearour, 
no  simple  ideas  stand  out  above  the  chaos  and  liberate  us  from 
its  doubt  and  confusion.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  overwhelmed 
by  immediate  impressions,  and  our  life  is  disintegrated  by  ;heir 
contradictions.  So  we  are  tossed  about  by  every  passing  vave, 
the  helpless  victims  of  every  bold  assertion  and  pronounced 
conviction,  as  well  as  of  our  own  whims  and  passions,  the 
playthings  of  shifting  moods  and  situations. 

A  peculiar  tension  is  imparted  to  this  state  of  affairs  by 
the  fact  that  the  changes  which  we  experience  are  ultimately 
reducible  to  a  single  question  and  bring  us  face  to  face  vith 
a  solitary  alternative,  an  alternative  which  permits  of  no 
obscuration  and  demands  a  decision  on  the  part  of  the  whole 
man.  The  quiet  but  continual  and  irresistible  development  of 
modern  work  has  not  only  altered  the  traditional  way  of  life 
in  all  its  details,  it  has  undermined  it  as  a  whole  and  made  it 


INTRODUCTION  25 

untenable.  Openly  or  tacitly,  broadly  or  finely,  sensuously  or 
spiritually,  the  older  type  of  thought  treated  man  as  the 
measure  and  central  point  of  all,  turned  reality  into  a  kingdom 
of  human-like  agencies  and  made  the  welfare  of  man  the  object 
of  all  activity.  Modern  work  as  a  whole  has  fundamentally 
destroyed  this  anthropomorphism.  The  immeasurable  enlarge- 
ment of  the  outer  world,  the  discovery  of  inner  necessities  and 
objective  relationships  within  man's  own  sphere,  and  a  wide 
expansion  of  creative  spiritual  effort  beyond  the  mere  subject 
combine  to  make  this  absorption  in  the  human  unbearably 
narrow ;  they  awaken  at  the  same  time  a  burning  desire  for 
a  wider,  richer,  freer  being,  a  great  thirst  for  a  life  in  relation 
with  the  infinity  and  truth  of  the  whole.  These  changes  force 
themselves  more  and  more  upon  the  attention  of  humanity  and 
imperatively  demand  a  just  recognition. 

But  this  negation  does  not  by  any  means  lead  directly  to 
an  affirination.  The  breaking  down  is  not  accompanied  by  a 
building  up.  The  new  position  opens  up  two  possibilities  which 
are  directly  opposed  to  one  another  and  admit  of  no  recon- 
ciliation. 

Does  this  historical  world-movement  against  absorption  in 
the  merely  human  mean  that  man  must  conceive  of  himself 
as  a  mere  natural  being  and  place  all  his  thoughts  and  activities 
within  the  limits  of  nature?  In  that  case  everything  that  is 
distinctively  and  peculiarly  human  must  be  got  rid  of  as  a 
pernicious  illusion,  and  all  that  gives  meaning  and  value  to 
our  life  must  receive  its  laws  and  forms  from  nature.  Or  does 
this  movement  affirm  that  a  new  world,  a  spiritual  world,  arises 
within  man  himself,  raising  him  above  himself  as  well  as  above 
nature  ?  Does  man  initiate  a  new  stage  of  reality  and  can  his 
spiritual  life  inwardly  enlarge  itself  to  form  a  world  ?  Our 
main  task  would  then  be  to  seize,  appropriate  and  develop  this 
world.  In  this  case  man  must  above  everything  else  firmly 
establish  himself  in  this  position  and  direct  his  whole  attention 
and  effort  not  so  much  backwards  as  forwards.  Thus  man  is 
either  less  or  more  than  he  is  at  the  present  day  apt  to  conceive 
himself  to  be.  A  decision  in  this  respect  one  way  or  the  other 
will  have  the  effect  of  transforming  the  whole  of  life  from  the 


26  INTRODUCTION 

smallest  things  to  the  greatest.  But  although  this  decision 
cannot  be  evaded,  the  lack  of  centralising  force  already  referred 
to  allows  us  to  hesitate  and  vacillate,  we  tend  now  in  this 
direction  and  now  in  that,  according  as  the  influences  vary. 
While  in  general  approving  of  the  one  we  cannot  make  up  our 
minds  to  abandon  the  other.  We  affirm  in  one  direction  what 
we  deny  in  another.  We  are  not  whole-heartedly  devoted  to 
•any  one  position.  The  situation  has  been  often  enough 
described ;  its  rapid  shifting  of  tendencies  and  moods,  its 
lack  of  logic  (as  revealed  by  an  insensibility  to  the  sharpest 
contradictions  and  the  jumbling  up  together  of  quite  different 
ranges  of  thought),  together  with  its  weakness  in  systematic 
thinking,  in  following  up  assertions,  either  in  their  preliminary 
assumptions  or  their  consequences.  In  all  these  respects  we 
perceive  a  serious  lowering  of  the  level  of  inner  life,  nay,  an 
inner  impoverishment  of  life  in  the  midst  of  amazing  peripheral 
progress,  of  undreamt-of  technical  accomplishments,  of  an 
overwhelming  wealth  of  outward  successes. 

It  is  obvious  that  we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  spiritual  crisis 
which  threatens  to  overwhelm  us.  But  this  situation  has  not 
arisen  owing  to  the  perversity  or  sceptical  bias  of  individuals ;  it 
is  a  result  of  the  historical  position  as  a  whole.  Have  we  not 
the  right  to  hope  that  the  necessity  which  produced  such  a  crisis 
also  vouchsafes  us  some  sort  of  means  capable  of  leading  us 
beyond  it? 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  is  no  lack  of  opposition  to  this 
chaotic  state  of  affairs.  There  are  plenty  of  counter-movements, 
plenty  of  attempts  to  build  up  a  uniform  construction  of  life,  a 
uniform  conception  of  reality.  But  unfortunately  these  attempts 
remain  for  the  most  part  under  the  influence  of  that  which  they 
would  like  to  overcome.  The  age  of  self-conscious  specialism 
which  forgot  to  take  any  account  of  the  whole  through  its 
absorption  in  endless  detail  has  now  passed  its  high-water 
mark.  But  the  movement  towards  unity  consisted  at  first 
mainly  in  this,  that  particular  spheres  of  life  and  knowledge 
took  over  the  whole  and  made  of  it  a  picture,  each  according  to 
its  particular  impressions,  experiences,  and  aims.  More  than 
ever  before,  each  of  these  separate  spheres  produced  within  its 


INTRODUCTION  27 

own  particular  circle  a  compact  system  of  knowledge  and  then, 
boldly  pressing  beyond  the  boundaries  of  this  circle,  endeavoured 
to  capture  the  whole  of  reality.  Each  sphere  put  its  own  special 
tasks  before  all  others  and  assigned  universal  validity  to  its 
concepts,  standards,  and  methods.  Thus  each  particular  depart- 
ment became  the  dominating  central  point  of  the  whole  of 
reality :  religion,  and  often  art  as  well,  constructed  its  own 
world,  the  social  movement  produced  its  own  particular  view 
of  life,  and  in  the  intellectual  sphere,  the  natural  sciences,  in 
particular,  frequently  expanded  into  all-embracing  philosophies. 
The  first  to  do  so  was  zoology  under  the  influence  of 
Darwinism.  Now  we  perceive  the  same  attempt  being  under- 
taken by  physics,  physiology,  &c.  The  tendency  towards 
bold  speculative  thought  has  deserted  the  philosophers  to 
find  a  home  with  the  natural  scientists;  in  their  case  there 
is  no  lack  of  bold  raids  into  the  land  of  truth,  and  the  com- 
mingling of  philosophical  assertion  with  capable  research  work 
prevents  many  people  from  realising  the  outrageous  character 
of  the  speculative  attempt. 

Thus  special  points  of  view,  partial  conceptions  of  life,  result, 
and  their  sensuous  immediacy  and  easy  comprehensibility  gain 
them  many  adherents  and  enable  each  to  attain  a  certain  degree 
of  influence.  But  never  more  than  a  certain  degree.  For  the 
truth  of  things  must  eventually  oppose  and  break  through  all 
narrow  and  arbitrary  limitations.  This  will  happen  all  the 
more  readily  in  that  the  different  claims  involved  in  the  various 
movements  soon  come  into  conflict,  and  dispute  among  them- 
selves concerning  their  respective  rights.  It  now  becomes 
apparent  that  the  whole  cannot  well  be  built  upon  a  part,  and 
that  truths  which  are  valid  as  partial  truths  become  erroneous 
when  exaggerated  into  the  whole  truth.  In  so  far  as  these 
part  movements  become  influential  and  obstruct  and  counteract 
one  another,  they  must  increase  the  confusion  which  they  are 
trying  to  remove.  Perhaps  nothing  contributes  so  much 
towards  division  at  the  present  time  as  these  inefficient 
efforts  towards  unity.  Never  has  monism  been  so  talked 
of  as  it  is  to-day,  and  never  has  there  been  so  much 
division  ! 


28  INTRODUCTION 

But  in  spite  of  the  inadequacy  of  these  attempts  they  are 
valuable  for  what  they  teach  us.  In  particular,  we  clearly 
perceive  from  their  failure  that  nothing  can  be  accomplished 
by  starting  from  this  or  that  particular  basis ;  it  is  necessary  to 
seek  a  unity  beyond  the  dispersion  of  particulars.  There  is  no 
hope  of  properly  meeting  the  crisis  unless  we  rise  above  the 
present  situation  as  a  whole  and  make  a  new  beginning.  But 
why  should  this  be  impossible  ?  History,  in  so  far  as  it  affects 
the  inner  life,  does  not  exhibit  a  continual  ascent.  It  shows  us 
not  only  the  rise  and  growth  of  true  spiritual  movements,  but 
ensuing  periods  of  exhaustion,  so  that  we  find  recurring  periods 
when  the  spiritual  life  must  needs  leave  its  active  manifestation 
in  human  existence  and  retire  into  itself  to  take  deeper  and 
stronger  root.  In  this  fashion  alone  can  it  transcend  the  age 
and  prove  effective  in  liberating  the  truth  present  in  the  age 
from  all  the  uncertainties  which  confuse  and  divide  us.  We  are 
again  face  to  face  with  such  a  period.  Through  self-recollection 
we  must  ascertain  the  foundations  of  our  existence,  our  funda- 
mental relationship  to  the  world.  We  must  appeal  from  the 
mere  age  to  the  eternal  in  the  age,  from  the  mere  man  to  the 
superior  forces  and  laws  which  make  man  something  more  than 
a  mere  natural  being. 

Under  these  circumstances  every  one  who  is  alive  to  the 
necessities  of  the  age  must  work,  according  to  his  capacity, 
towards  this  goal,  namely,  the  deepening  of  life  and  the  renewal 
of  human  culture.  The  path  which  we  propose  to  strike  out 
in  this  work  will  be  more  particularly  distinguished  by  three 
characteristics. 

1.  We  shall  in  the  first  place  turn  our  attention  to  the  chief 
movements  characteristic  of  the  age,  the  leading  spiritual  and 
intellectual  tendencies,  as  we  may  shortly  describe  them.  We 
speak  of  movements  or  tendencies,  rather  than  of  concepts  or 
ideas,  in  order  to  make  it  clear  from  the  very  beginning  that  it 
is  not,  in  the  first  place,  a  matter  of  merely  intellectual  processes 
and  that  these  are  not  the  deciding  factors.  Although  outwardly 
the  conflict  may  rage  chiefly  in  the  intellectual  sphere,  yet  behind 
this  are  great  movements  springing  from  life  as  a  whole,  with 
characteristic  contents  of  reality  and  specific  constructions  of 


INTRODUCTION  29 

life  ;  in  the  midst  of  manifold  conflict  and  through  a  variety  of 
different  problems  it  is  possible  that  under  the  influence  of  these 
deeper  movements  a  common  pulsation  may  stir  the  age  ;  so  that 
in  emphasising  these  vital  pre- suppositions  of  thought  we  are 
peculiarly  likely  to  assist  in  forming  a  conception  of  the  age 
as  a  whole,  and  winning  clear  recognition  of  its  specific 
character.  Moreover,  accepting  as  we  do  a  multiplicity  of 
starting-points,  we  gain  at  least  this  advantage,  that  we  make 
the  assertions  and  problems  of  the  age  more  demonstrable  and 
more  easily  comprehensible.  This  plan  has  the  further 
advantage  of  leading  the  discussion  quickly  to  a  definite  point 
at  which  intrinsic  necessities  become  apparent  and  are  able 
to  show  our  thought  its  paths  of  advance.  The  enquiry  will 
show  that  at  every  point  we  come  to  the  same  questions,  and 
indeed  that  one  and  the  same  central  problem  manifests  itself 
through  all  the  varieties  of  circumstance.  It  will  also  show  that 
as  the  battle  for  the  whole  is  being  fought  at  each  point,  so 
the  decision  as  to  the  whole  is  effective  throughout  all  its 
ramifications.  Furthermore,  we  shall  be  the  better  able  to 
feel  confidence  in  our  own  position  the  more  the  experiences 
and  demands  of  the  individual  points  of  attack  press  towards 
it  and  point  it  out  as  the  sole  possibility  of  a  happy  solution. 

2.  On  a  closer  examination  we  discover  that  each  separate 
tendency  asserts  (or  at  any  rate  contains)  a  life-process,  and  this 
it  is  which  we  propose  more  especially  to  examine.  Further,  we 
shall  be  occupied  in  particular  with  the  question  whether  this 
life-process  permits  of  an  independent  spiritual  life.  The 
various  tendencies  usually  recognise  (if  often  unwillingly)  that 
spiritual  life  possesses  a  certain  actuality.  But  we  are  generally 
left  in  complete  darkness  as  to  what  this  involves  and  what  it 
demands  beyond  the  immediate  phenomenon,  to  what  pre- 
liminary suppositions  and  to  what  conditions  it  is  attached.  We 
shall  devote  our  attention  in  the  first  place  to  finding  out  how 
the  movements  of  the  age  are  related  to  the  problem  of  the 
possibility  of  spiritual  life  and  to  seeing  what  these  tendencies 
contribute  towards  this  problem.  We  shall  endeavour  not  to 
lose  ourselves  in  detail,  but  shall  push  forward  rapidly  to  the 
life  which  flows  through  each  movement,  since  this  is  the  last 


30  INTRODUCTION 

point  attainable  and  the  point  from  which  our  thought-world 
must  build  itself  up.  Such  a  study  of  the  life-process  will  bring 
us  most  surely  to  the  point  where  the  various  problems  in 
question  become  the  personal  experience  of  the  individual, 
where  he  can  most  easily  insert  his  personal  experiences  and 
can  least  easily  escape  personal  decision. 

3.  When  the  content  of  the  age  forms  the  point  of  departure 
as  well  as  the  end  in  view,  it  is  well  to  bring  in  a  historical 
survey  in  support  of  the  philosophical  work.  This  has  the  effect, 
in  the  first  place,  of  throwing  light  upon  and  more  clearly 
defining  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  present  by  disclosing  its 
growth  and  its  relationships.  In  attempting  to  understand  and 
value  the  dominating  movements  of  the  age  it  cannot  be  a 
matter  of  indifference  whether  we  recognise  in  them  merely 
temporary  waves  or  enduring  life-tendencies,  whether  the 
present  experience  has  frequently  been  experienced  before  and 
has  a  recurring  and  rhythmic  character,  or  whether  it  reveals 
something  completely  new,  something  unique,  whether  it  is 
more  an  action  or  a  reaction,  more  a  pushing  forward  or  a 
sliding  back.  The  historical  review  will  be  more  or  less  retro- 
spective according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  case.  It  will 
frequently  be  necessary  to  follow  the  chief  phases  of  a  movement 
throughout  the  whole  development  of  European  civilisation,  but 
sometimes  a  study  of  the  immediately  preceding  stage  will  suffice 
to  throw  light  upon  the  present. 

A  brighter  illumination  of  existing  conditions  in  the  light  of 
history  may  prepare  the  way  for  independent  investigation  if  it 
enables  us  better  to  perceive  the  specific  nature  of  things,  to 
become  more  clearly  aware  of  their  limits  and  to  recognise  them 
as  problems.  Not  only  the  present-day  position  but  the 
historical  relationships  themselves  and  history  as  a  whole 
are  converted  into  a  problem  through  the  discovery  of  the 
life-process  operating  in  them.  The  life-process  and  its  develop- 
ment cannot  well  be  thrown  into  relief  amidst  the  chaos  oi 
appearances  until  we  transcend  the  historical  outlook  and  take 
up  a  position  from  which  a  timeless  and  direct  view  is  possible, 
when  the  question  of  the  truth  and  justification  of  the  process 
must  be  forced  upon  our  rttention.  It  is  impossible  to  throw 


INTRODUCTION  31 

a  clear  light  upon  the  whole  unless  original,  personally- 
experienced,  ultimate  facts  are  distinguished  from  facts 
traditionally  accepted.  In  this  manner  we  may  effect  a 
revolution  and  turn  towards  a  direct  contemplation  and  analysis 
of  the  matter.  This  reversal,  with  its  conversion  of  history 
into  the  development  of  a  timeless  life,  alone  makes  it  possible 
clearly  to  see  through  the  content  of  our  existence  from  the 
inside,  to  proceed  from  appearance  to  fact,  from  mere  data  to 
fundamental  truth  and  to  recognise  inner  necessities  and  per- 
sistent tendencies  in  the  movement  of  history:  nay  more,  to 
wrest  any  sort  of  meaning  from  the  whole.  It  is  only  when 
thus  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  permanent  truth  that  the 
significance  of  the  individual  epochs  can  be  measured  and  that 
an  immanent  criticism  of  the  present  day  achievement  can  be 
made.  The  assertion  of  the  age  will  be  tested  with  reference  to 
that  stage  in  the  world's  spiritual  evolution  which  it  historically 
occupies.  If  history  has  already  revealed  more  content  and 
depth  than  this  position  can  contain,  then  progress  will  neces- 
sarily be  forced  beyond  it  and  at  the  same  time  it  may  receive 
guidance  as  to  the  direction  in  which  it  is  to  continue  its  quest. 
When  philosophical  work  and  the  world's  historical  experience 
are  thus  brought  into  close  contact,  criticism  does  not  need  to 
remain  retrospective  and  reflective,  it  can  become  productive  and 
progressive,  it  can  itself  further  the  forward  movement  which  it 
demands. 

Such  an  investigation  must  try,  in  the  first  place,  to  de- 
stroy the  matter-of-course  character  which  is  wont  to  attach  to 
the  movements  of  a  given  age  and  at  the  same  time  must  aim  at 
doing  away  with  the  dogmatism  of  which  they  are  usually  guilty. 
The  first  condition  is  to  see  more  precisely  what  it  is  that  the 
age  undertakes  and  achieves.  To  see  precisely,  means  in  this 
case  to  see  at  the  same  time  the  extent  of  what  has  been 
accomplished,  and  this  alone  makes  it  possible  to  attain  to  a 
judgment  which  is  independent  and  effective,  without  being 
guilty  of  injustice  or  of  substituting  paradox  for  independence. 
Our  chief  aim  is,  then,  to  discover  leading  tendencies,  simple 
fundamental  lines  of  development  amidst  the  multiplicity  and 
apparent  confusion  of  the  various  movements.  And  it  is  from 


32  INTRODUCTION 

this  point  of  view  that  we  may  hope  most  readily  to  free  the 
truth  content  of  the  age,  its  inner  necessities,  from  the  mis- 
leading addition  of  human  error  and  passion,  while  at  the  same 
time  gaining  nuclei  for  our  own  efforts.  Only  those  who  are 
capable  of  inwardly  experiencing  the  age  can  accurately  judge  it. 
No  value  whatever  attaches  to  the  opinions  of  those  whose 
attitude  towards  the  age  is  throughout  merely  captious  and 
critical. 

Finally,  we  may  add  that  in  this,  as  in  the  earlier  editions  of 
the  book,  the  definitions  of  the  chief  concepts  will  receive  care- 
ful consideration.  The  confusion  of  the  present  day  is  due  in  no 
small  degree  to  the  indefinite  use  of  terms.  When  the  same 
expression  is  used  now  in  a  strict  sense,  now  in  a  loose  one,  it 
is  easy  for  statements  to  acquire  illicitly  more  solidity  and  con- 
tent than  is  really  due  to  them,  and  when  the  same  word 
frequently  possesses  essentially  different  meanings  the  aspect  of 
things  easily  becomes  chaotic  and  the  central  decisive  point 
tends  to  be  obscured.  In  every  age  the  agreement  between 
terms  and  concepts  is  no  more  than  approximate,  but  to-day  it 
is  exceptionally  loose.  With  the  object  of  remedying  this 
unfortunate  state  of  affairs  it  is  necessary  briefly  to  review  the 
history  of  the  terms  employed,  so  that  we  shall  devote  a  little 
time  to  this  topic. 


A.  THE   FUNDAMENTAL   CONCEPT   OF 
SPIRITUAL   LIFE 


1.  SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 

(a)   Historical 

THE  relation  of  subject  to  object  is  a  problem  which  to-day 
stands  in  the  very  centre  of  philosophical  work  and  controversy. 
Our  views  of  life,  our  concepts  of  reality,  our  ideas  of  truth, 
nay,  the  main  currents  of  life  itself,  vary  according  as  it  is  the 
subject  or  the  object  which  preponderates.  In  the  one  case  the 
main  trend  of  life's  movement  is  from  man  to  world,  in 
the  other  it  is  from  world  to  man.  All  other  problems  lead 
back  to  this  main  issue,  which  as  it  confronts  us  to-day  bears  the 
impress  of  influences  derived  from  every  stage  of  the  whole 
history  of  philosophy.  The  chief  phases  in  this  historical 
development  must  therefore  be  recalled,  and  as  we  study  them 
we  shall  see  that  they  embody  the  main  alternative  solutions  of 
which  the  problem  in  question  is  susceptible.  And  we  shall  at 
the  same  time  become  aware  of  a  continuous  impulse  constrain- 
ing the  world's  work  to  develop  in  a  certain  definite  direction. 

That  the  matter  itself  contains  peculiar  complications  is 
sufficiently  indicated  by  the  remarkable  history  of  the  expres- 
sions subjective  and  objective.  As  the  centuries  have  passed 
by  their  meaning  has  been  completely  reversed.  Duns  Scotus 
(d.  1808)  first  employed  them  as  technical  terms  and  in  opposing 
senses  :  "  The  word  subjective  was  applied  to  whatever  concerned 
the  subject-matter  of  the  judgment,  that  is,  the  concrete  objects 
of  thought ;  on  the  other  hand  the  term  objective  referred  to 
that  which  is  contained  in  the  mere  obicere  (i.e.,  in  the  present- 
ing of  ideas)  and  hence  qualifies  the  presenting  subject "  (see 
Prantl,  Geschichte  der  Logik  im  Abendlande,  iii.  208).  Philoso- 
phers employed  the  expressions  in  these  senses  until  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries ;  but  the  counter-term  to 


36  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

objective  (which  was  more  commonly  used  than  subjective)  was 
more  often  formaliter  or  realiter.*  The  systems  which  carried 
on  the  scholastic  philosophy  show,  at  this  period,  a  change  in 
the  use  of  objectivus  which  paved  the  way  for  the  more  modern 
terminology,  t 

The  complete  reversal  of  meaning  did  not  take  place,  however, 
until  the  words  were  assimilated  into  the  German  language 
(through  the  Wolffian  school  of  philosophy ;  for  example  in 
A.  F.  Miiller's  Einleitung  in  die  philosophische  Wissenschaft, 
1788 ;  Baumgarten  and  Gottsched) .  At  first  the  terms  subjekti- 
visch  and  objektivisch  (as  they  were  then  written)  were  not  used 
outside  this  school,  and  in  the  conflict  between  Lessing  and 
Goetze  they  were  still  employed  only  as  highly  technical  words. 
It  was  Kantian  philosophy  which  first  brought  them  into  common 
use,  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  they  were 
widely  employed.  It  was  entirely  owing  to  German  influence 
that  their  new  meanings  became  general,  and  at  first  they  were 
frequently  regarded  as  strange. 

The  exact  significance  of  these  terms  in  modern  terminology, 
though  distinct  enough  from  that  they  bore  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
is  in  itself  most  uncertain,  being  swayed  now  by  one  influence, 
now  by  another.  The  first  meaning  of  subjective  is  that  which 
pertains  to  the  mere  individual  act  of  presentation ;  but  it 
frequently  means  (especially  when  employed  by  scientists)  any- 
thing and  everything  which  a  feeling  and  a  thinking  creature 
experiences  in  itself ;  also  all  convictions  extending  beyond  the 
immediate  evidence  of  the  facts  are  called  subjective  and  are 
regarded  as  a  species  of  mere  trimming.  Thus  what  is  deepest 

*  In  the  discussions  between  Descartes  and  Gassendi  there  occur  subjective 
(  =  formaliter  in  »e  ipsis)  and  objective  (=  idealiter  inintellectu).  Bayle  dis- 
tinguishes (ceuv.  div.  1727,  Hi.  334a)  objectivement  dant  notre  esprit  and  rSelle- 
ment  hort  de  notre  esprit,  and  even  so  late  as  Berkeley  we  find  (Eraser's  edition, 
ii.  477) :  "  Natural  phenomena  are  only  natural  appearances.  They  are, 
therefore,  such  as  we  see  and  perceive  them.  Their  real  and  objective  natures 
are,  therefore,  the  same." 

t  Thus  it  occurs  for  example  in  Chauvins's  lexicon  rationale  (1692)  under 
certitude :  objectiva  nonnullis  est  ipsa  necessitat  objecti,  ten  propositio  necessaria 
objectiva.  Aliit  autem  nihil  aliud  est  quam  denominatio  qu<z  sumitur  ab  actu 
intellectut  per  quern  objectum  reprasentatur.  Goclen  (lex.  philos,,  1613)  makes 
ratio  objectiva  =  ret  ipta  quatcnus  definitioni  respondet. 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  37 

and  what  is  shallowest  are  treated  as  of  equal  value.  The  term 
objective  is  also  ambiguous.  Sometimes  it  refers  to  objects  as 
contrasted  with  mental  activity,  sometimes  as  constitutive  of 
mind  itself.  Goethe  aimed  at  objectivity;  so  does  modern 
naturalism. 

The  problem  itself  is  obviously  concerned  with  the  relation- 
ship between  man  and  his  thought-world,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  world  in  which  he  lives,  on  the  other.  In  so  far  as  thought 
is  independent  it  stands  apart  from  the  world,  but  at  the  same 
time  it  can  never  forget  that  it  belongs  to  the  world  and  is 
always  occupying  itself  with  the  world ;  hence  no  sooner  has  a 
gap  been  made  than  there  arises  an  imperative  desire  to  bridge 
it  over,  to  bring  thought  and  the  world  together  again  and  bind 
them  to  one  another.  But  the  more  we  occupy  ourselves  with 
this  task  the  more  complicated  it  appears.  The  ancient  Greek 
world  was  keenly  conscious  of  this  complication,  but  was  more 
able  to  master  it  than  we  moderns  are  in  a  position  to  do.  The 
solution  of  this  problem  as  attempted  by  the  Greeks  at  the 
height  of  the  classical  period  has  had  the  profoundest  effect  upon 
the  history  of  philosophy.  The  position  developed  by  such 
leading  thinkers  as  Plato  and  Aristotle  derived  its  power  of 
conviction  chiefly  on  account  of  having  behind  it  a  complete 
scheme  of  life  and  conduct.  The  peculiar  strength  and  dis- 
tinguishing characteristic  of  the  old  Greek  philosophy  of  life  lay 
in  its  capacity  for  raising  the  primitive  relationship  between  man 
and  nature  to  a  spiritual  level.  It  ennobled  the  relationship, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  avoided  any  sharp  separation.  It 
assigned  man  a  place  in  the  world  while  retaining  for  him  the 
purity  of  spiritual  independence.  Man  and  the  world,  the  inner 
and  the  outer,  had  then  reached  the  stage  above  the  primitive 
one  of  identification,  and  yet  they  were  not  so  sharply  divided 
but  that  a  spiritual  connection  between  them  could  easily  be 
demonstrated.  For  they  both  seemed  of  the  same  order  of 
being  and  inwardly  attached  to  one  another;  each  needed  the 
other  as  a  complement  in  order  to  attain  to  its  own  perfection. 
Nature,  filled  with  inner  life,  attained  its  greatest  height  when 
appropriated  by  man.  The  forces  latent  in  the  latter,  on  the 
other  hand,  could  not  be  fully  developed  except  by  first  coming 


38  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

into  contact  with  the  world.  In  such  a  unification  as  was 
brought  ahout  hy  contemplation  and  love,  life  reached  the  height 
and  blessedness  of  spiritual  creation.  From  such  a  point  of 
view  as  this  it  is  possible,  without  misgiving,  to  conceive  of 
truth  as  the  conformity  of  thought  with  its  object  (adequatio 
intellectus  et  rei).  But  this  view  of  the  matter  could  only 
suffice  for  a  stage  of  life  when  nature  appeared  more  spiritual 
and  humanity  more  natural  than  they  subsequently  did,  when 
the  one  had  not  reached  complete  independence  in  virtue  of  its 
own  distinctive  laws  and  forces  and  the  inner  life  of  the  other 
had  not  so  deepened  as  to  constitute  a  world  of  its  own.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  this  intimate  connection  between  man  and 
the  world,  and  the  accompanying  fruitful  reaction  of  each  upon 
the  other,  helped  to  build  up  a  joyous,  high-minded,  artistic  type 
of  human  culture.  But  it  is  equally  certain  that  this  close 
union  of  spiritual  life  with  a  naive  conception  of  the  world  could 
not  be  permanently  maintained. 

Even  before  the  end  of  the  classical  period,  the  Stoics  and  the 
Neo-Platonists  had  attempted  solutions  on  different  lines,  though 
these  did  not  exert  so  great  an  influence  over  the  Modern  World 
as  did  the  earlier  type  of  thought.  The  latter  experienced  an 
important  revival  in  the  shape  of  mediaeval  scholasticism, 
through  which  it  directly  influenced  the  Modern  World  (the 
characteristic  features  of  which  arose  more  particularly  from  its 
conflict  with  scholastic  philosophy). 

The  new  tendency  first  shows  its  influence  in  a  powerful 
development  of  the  subject,  in  a  defiant  breaking  away  from 
environment,  and  in  a  bold  attempt  to  build  up  a  new  world  and 
reshape  life  by  the  sole  agency  of  man  and  his  thought,  instead 
of  seeking  union  with  the  world  and  adopting  a  receptive  attitude 
towards  it.  Science  altered  the  aspect  of  things  in  a  more 
drastic  manner  than  had  ever  before  occurred.  By  rejecting 
everything  which  did  not  answer  to  its  test,  while  illuminating 
and  linking  up  that  which  remained,  it  brought  the  whole  of 
human  existence  within  the  sphere  of  systematic  thought,  and 
raised  it  to  the  level  of  the  thinkable,  the  conceptual,  the  ideal. 
The  inner  became  conscious  of  its  unity  and  entrenched  itself 
within  its  own  territory,  while  the  outer  world  receded  to  occupy 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  39 

an  inferior  position,  and  lost  all  inner  life,  since  its  function  of 
movement  in  space  did  not  seem  to  need  any  spiritual  principle. 
It  also  lost  in  colour  and  variety,  because  the  whole  range  of 
sense  properties  was  regarded,  not  as  belonging  to  the  objects 
themselves,  but  as  a  mere  garment  with  which  the  spirit  invested 
them.  Thus  nature  came  to  be  conceived  of  as  a  domain  of 
lifeless  matter  and  movement  devoid  of  any  inner  connection 
with  the  soul ;  while  the  latter,  in  its  turn,  was  looked  upon  as 
entirely  self-dependent,  as  standing  by  itself,  master  of  a  thought- 
force  dominating  eternity.  The  soul  was  thus  placed  upon  an 
incomparably  higher  plane. 

That  is  a  great  achievement — perhaps  the  greatest  which  the 
Modern  World  can  boast  of.  But  it  does  not  constitute  the 
whole  of  the  activity  of  the  period.  The  new  period  was  unmis- 
takably characterised  by  another  tendency,  besides  that  making 
for  a  glorification  of  the  subject;  one  that  laid  chief  emphasis 
upon  the  vastness  and  grandeur  of  the  external  world  and 
contrasted  it  with  the  pettiness  of  man ;  a  movement  which 
aimed  at  replacing  the  hollowness,  confusion,  and  narrowness 
of  human  existence  by  a  wider,  richer,  and  purer  life,  derived 
from  contact  with  the  immeasurable  universe.  It  was  a  move- 
ment towards  the  object ;  an  endeavour  to  sink  humanity  in 
the  outer  world,  to  assimilate  the  latter' s  whole  content  with- 
out criticism.  Salvation  is  thus  awaited  from  experience,  from 
a  better  acquaintance  with  the  things  of  the  external  world. 
Man  must  not  seek  in  any  way  to  shape  the  world  according 
to  his  own  ideals.  To  base  his  life  on  truth  he  has  simply  to 
take  his  place  in  the  cosmic  scheme.  Even  the  strengthening 
of  the  subject  itself  indirectly  supports  this  movement,  for  the 
closer  concentration  of  the  subject  in  its  own  sphere  and  its 
consequent  absorption  of  all  those  characteristics  which  it  had, 
as  it  were,  lent  to  the  objects  of  the  external  world,  paves  the 
way  to  making  an  end  of  the  ancient  anthropomorphic  view  of 
life.  Thus  the  object  is  left  free  to  develop  its  own  nature  in 
complete  purity  and  to  link  itself  closer  together  in  its  multi- 
plicity until  it  is  firmly  welded  into  a  complete  whole.  Now 
for  the  first  time,  the  concealing  veil  being  withdrawn,  nature 
attains  to  full  autonomy  and  is  seen  as  a  domain  of  faultless 


40  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

sequences  and  inviolable  law.  In  the  first  instance,  all  this 
works  itself  out  as  appertaining  to  an  objective  world,  apart 
from  man.  But  it  is  bound  finally  to  come  back  to  man, 
to  surround  him,  to  try  to  make  an  absolute  slave  of  him. 
From  this  point  of  view  it  increasingly  appears  as  if  all 
independence  on  the  part  of  the  subject  must  be  a  hollow 
delusion;  it  is  claimed  that  life  should  willingly  adapt  itself 
to  external  things  and  place  itself  entirely  under  their  direction. 
Hence  humanity  becomes  very  closely  dependent  upon  environ- 
ment ;  there  ensues  a  new  type  of  life,  completely  dominated  by 
the  object. 

We  thus  perceive  that  the  modern  period  is  permeated  by  two 
distinct  movements,  each  claiming  the  field  for  itself;  it  is 
hence  inwardly  divided,  and  a  fundamental  unrest  and  tension 
is  brought  into  our  life.  This  twofold  character  of  the  modern 
world  reveals  itself  in  most  of  the  problems  we  are  about  to 
deal  with,  and  presenting  as  it  does  a  difficult  but  imperative 
task,  summons  us  to  spiritual  action.  Neither  a  unity  transcend- 
ing this  division  nor  an  assured  truth  can  be  hoped  for  from  the 
present  situation,  hence  the  latter  must  be  developed  further 
and  a  new  groundwork  of  reality  must  be  disclosed. 

It  was  therefore  no  merely  whimsical  speculation,  it  was  an 
inner  necessity,  which  drove  great  thinkers  to  seek  new  paths 
and  bade  them  oppose  to  the  primitive  view  of  life  and  the  world 
a  reality  based  upon  thought. 

Two  of  these  attempts  to  express  a  new  type  of  life  are  ol 
particular  importance.  With  the  object  of  overcoming  the  oppo- 
sition (between  subject  and  object)  Spinoza  laid  emphasis  upon 
the  object  and  Kant  upon  the  subject.  The  former  recognised 
and  emphasised  what  is  objective  in  the  subject,  the  latter  what 
is  subjective  in  the  object.  Spinoza  aimed  at  binding  man  and 
the  world  together  by  discovering  a  cosmic  force  in  man  and 
separating  it  from  the  merely  human  element:  this  force  is 
thought,  based  upon  nothing  outside  itself,  governed  by  its 
own  necessities,  free  from  all  connection  with  a  sense  environ- 
ment (as  we  see  it,  for  example,  in  the  region  of  mathematics). 
The  petty  human  element,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  purely 
subjective  experience  limited  to  its  own  private  aims  and  moods. 


SUBJECTIVE- OBJECTIVE  41 

The  transition  from  such  prejudice  and  narrowness  to  the  clarity 
and  breadth  of  thought  opens  up  to  man  the  possibility  of  a 
cosmic  life :  for  since  thought  itself  is  conceived  of  as  grounded 
within  a  universal  life  (which  is  also  the  basis  of  the  external 
world),  its  processes  correspond  with  the  truth  in  all  things, 
and  are  capable  of  directly  sharing  their  eternal  and  infinite 
character.  Knowledge  thus  becomes  the  soul  of  life  and 
fulfils  all  our  needs.  In  its  perfected  form  it  takes  the 
shape  of  religion  and  artistic  contemplation.  It  was  thus, 
for  the  most  part,  artistic  and  contemplative  minds  that  were 
attracted  by  the  calm  and  arid  greatness  of  this  type  of  life. 
The  effect  of  this  tendency  of  thought  made  itself  felt  far 
beyond  the  circle  of  actual  discipleship.  It  was  seen  in  the 
cleavage  of  human  nature  into  the  cosmic  and  the  merely 
human,  and  in  an  energetic  resistance  to  the  anthropomorphism 
both  of  thought  and  of  feeling  which  had  become  so  firmly  estab- 
lished during  the  Middle  Ages.  Men  came  to  realise  more 
clearly  the  petty  nature  of  the  happiness  they  had  coveted  and 
the  narrowness  of  the  prevailing  field  of  ideas,  and  once  their 
insufficiency  had  been  felt  and  brought  home  they  could  never 
again  be  accepted  in  the  old  uncritical  way. 

There  still  remains,  however,  the  question,  Does  our  whole 
spiritual  life  begin  and  end  with  thought?  It  is  possible  that 
the  transition  from  the  deceptive  appearances  of  the  senses  to 
the  truth  of  thought  itself  demands  an  act  on  the  part  of  the 
whole  man,  an  act  lying  outside  the  region  of  mere  thought. 
Moreover,  the  assumption  which  underlies  this  solution  (the 
harmony  of  our  thought  with  the  world  about  us,  the  compre- 
hension of  both  within  a  single  cosmic  life)  is  by  no  means 
free  from  doubt ;  and  when  the  cosmic  character  of  our  thought 
becomes  uncertain  the  truth  of  the  life  it  offers  us  is  at  once 
shaken. 

This  consideration  also  actuated  Kant  when  he  decided  to 
follow  an  exactly  opposite  path.  In  his  case  the  world  of 
external  things  retires  to  an  unattainable  remoteness,  and  every 
possibility  of  verifying  a  correspondence  with  it  disappears. 
Hence,  if  we  are  to  retain  any  sort  of  truth  at  all,  truth  must 
be  looked  for  within  the  subject  itself,  and  not  in  a  relationship 


42  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

to  the  object.  This  amounts  to  a  decisive  negation.  But 
Kant  discovers  a  way  from  this  negative  to  a  positive ;  he  draws 
our  attention  to  the  great  collective  achievements  within  the 
sphere  of  human  life,  more  particularly  to  the  formation  of 
a  hody  of  scientific  experience  and  of  a  domain  of  moral  action. 
The  spiritual  element  in  these  achievements  must  be  put  to  the 
credit  of  the  subject,  so  that  the  latter,  by  itself,  must  outgrow 
its  traditional  form.  It  is  now  not  so  much  a  separate  point, 
an  individual  existence,  as  a  spiritual  structure,  a  spiritual 
fabric.  Its  comprehension  of  itself  and  of  its  own  activity 
thereby  becomes  valid  for  every  individual,  and  there  results 
a  new  kind  of  objectivity,*  a  new  concept  of  truth.  The  pre- 
cise content  depends  upon  the  nature  and  significance  of  the 
activity,  and  is  hence  entirely  different  in  the  spheres  of 
theoretical  and  practical  reason.  According  to  Kant,  all  human 
knowledge  must  remain  confined  to  a  world  beyond  which  we 
cannot  reach ;  the  thought-world  that  we  develop  (in  response 
to  the  stimulus  of  the  external  world)  is  valid  only  for  ourselves 
and  our  form  of  presentation ;  our  view  of  life  does  not  range 
beyond  ourselves ;  the  forms  of  thought,  as  well  as  those  of 
sense  perception,  are  and  must  remain  merely  human.  But 
in  the  sphere  of  practical  life  the  position  is  entirely  different. 
Human  action  attains  to  complete  originality  and  is  held 
capable  of  evolving  a  world  of  its  own.  In  this  case  truth 
ceases  to  be  merely  human  and  becomes  absolute ;  the  charac- 
teristic feature  is  the  subordination  of  all  human  particularity 
to  universal  norms.  Man  now  comes  into  direct  contact  with 
the  true  essence  of  reality  ;  in  its  capacity  of  a  moral  being  the 
subject  itself  becomes  the  upholder  of  a  world.  Morality  thus 
becomes  an  independent  sphere  in  the  very  centre  of  life. 


*  This  new  concept  of  objectivity  is  undoubtedly  full  of  complications,  and 
was  sharply  attacked  by  Kant's  opponents.  Thus  Plattner,  for  example,  says 
(Philosophische  Aphorismen  I.  §  699,  Anmerkung) :  "  If,  however,  it  is  intended 
to  be  thereby  demonstrated  that  our  knowledge  has  objective  validity,  then  one 
is  certainly  doing  great  violence  to  the  term  objective  and  employing  it  in  a 
sense  hitherto  unheard  of  in  philosophical  terminology.  It  is  being  used  to 
denote  the  precisely  opposite  concept,  subjective.  No  wonder  that  Herr  Schmid, 
who  is  never  remiss  in  his  devotion  to  truth,  found  it  necessary  to  describe 
Kantian  objectivity  as  subjective  objectivity  (Wurterbuch,  article  Objeetiv)." 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  43 

Knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  withdraws  to  the  periphery, 
its  chief  task  being  to  guard  the  moral  world  from  disturbance. 
The  result  is  a  new  organisation  of  life  in  direct  contrast  to 
that  propounded  by  Spinoza.  Kant  stands  for  activity,  for  the 
creation  of  a  new  world ;  Spinoza  for  restful  contemplation,  for 
searching  out  the  foundations  of  the  world  as  it  already  exists. 
The  former  divides  reality  and  intensifies  every  contrast,  the 
latter  smooths  away  contrasts  within  a  comprehensive  unity. 
The  two  are  at  one,  however,  in  their  desire  to  impart,  in  some 
way,  a  cosmic  character  to  life,  to  lift  man  above  himself  and 
lead  him  on  to  deeper  things. 

Kecent  years  have  seen  a  revival  of  Kantian  modes  of  thought, 
and  the  discussion  of  this  topic  will  be  left  over  to  the  study  of 
the  present  day.  The  immediate  followers  of  Kant  were  the 
sons  of  an  age  which  abounded  in  a  strong  and  joyous  sense 
of  life,  and  they  took  strong  exception  to  the  retention  of  the 
Ding-an-sich  (the  thing-in-itself,  stripped  of  all  that  is  sub- 
jective), and  the  consequent  limitation  of  human  capacity. 
Along  with  the  Ding-an-sich  disappeared  the  division  between 
theoretical  and  practical  reason,  and  there  now  remained  no 
obstacle  to  the  conception  of  life  as  a  single  connected  whole. 
A  spirited  attempt  was  made  to  evolve  all  reality  from  the 
workings  of  the  human  spirit  (more  especially  from  thought 
conceived  of  as  provided  with  inner  movement) .  Plotinus  had 
already  shown  that  it  is  possible  for  thought  to  overcome  the 
contrast  between  subject  and  object  in  its  own  sphere,  by  turn- 
ing round  upon  itself,  by  making  thought  itself  the  subject  of 
thought.  This  only  needed  to  be  developed  in  all  its  conse- 
quences, to  be  freed  from  all  reference  to  the  mere  individual 
and  extended  to  the  whole  sphere  of  the  world's  history,  to  give 
as  a  result  the  Hegelian  system ;  a  system  which  transformed 
the  whole  of  reality  into  a  self-development  of  thought,  con- 
ceived of  truth  as  the  spirit's  awakening  to  self-consciousness, 
and  gave  man  the  right  of  complete  participation  in  this  absolute 
truth  ;  he  must,  however,  abandon  all  narrow  subjectivity  of 
opinion  and  follow  the  necessities  of  the  thought-process  alone. 

This  bold  attempt  not  only  took  its  own  age  by  storm,  but 
the  manner  in  which  it  made  every  factor  plastic  and  welded 


44    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

together  all  the  manifold  elements  of  our  experience  made  a 
deep  impression  upon  the  content  of  spiritual  life.  As  soon 
as  the  first  impetus  lost  force,  however,  a  reaction  was  inevit- 
able. The  free  development  of  the  philosophy  served  to  reveal 
its  limitations.  Certain  serious  questions  soon  became  unavoid- 
able. In  the  first  place  it  was  asked  if  the  process  did  not 
involve  a  demand  for  something  outside  itself,  since  (as  a 
spiritual  process)  it  requires  to  be  re-experienced,  and  for  this 
purpose  a  fulcrum  is  needed  lying  outside  the  process  itself. 
In  the  second  place  the  question  arose  whether  the  exclusive 
transformation  of  life  into  thought  would  not  deprive  reality  of 
all  content  and  leave  it  a  mere  tissue  of  logical  forms  and 
formulae.  Finally,  it  was  asked  whether  the  absolute  character 
of  human  spirituality  had  not  been  too  hastily  conceded. 
Whatever  may  be  the  truth  with  regard  to  these  points,  the 
fact  remains  that  this  system  was  not  so  much  defeated  by 
philosophical  opposition  as  forced  into  the  background  by  the 
actual  direction  taken  by  life  itself. 

This  brings  us  to  the  nineteenth  century. 

(6)  The   Nineteenth   Century 

No  previous  age  had  ever  been  so  conscious  of  the  problem  of 
subject  and  object  and  of  the  contrast  it  involved  as  was  the 
nineteenth  century ;  never  before  had  the  difficulty  been  felt  so 
directly  and  over  so  wide  a  range  of  life.  At  the  same  time, 
scarcely  anything  new  was  attempted  in  the  way  of  overcoming 
the  antithesis.  The  constant  recurrence  to  Kant  sufficiently 
indicates  this. 

A  very  important  movement,  and  the  first  with  which  we  have 
to  deal,  is  that  which  led  humanity  away  from  inner  development 
and  turned  its  attention  towards  the  conquest  of  the  visible 
world  by  the  aid  of  natural  and  technical  science  and  social  and 
political  work.  Pursuing  this  path,  man  becomes  closely  riveted 
to  the  external  world ;  he  looks  for  reality  and  truth  solely  from 
the  concentration  of  his  powers  upon  the  world,  and  all  life  apart 
from  external  things  comes  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  shadow  and 
a  vain  show;  thus  the  centre  of  gravity  of  life  shifts  towards 
the  objective  and  life  finds  its  meaning  in  work  occupied  with, 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  45 

and  conditioned  by,  external  things.  This  work  completely 
emancipates  itself  from  the  mere  individual;  it  develops  an 
independent  and  very  extensive  network  of  relationships,  and 
swells  in  volume  so  unceasingly  that  man  becomes  more  and 
more  a  mere  servant  and  tool.  This  tendency  was  first  illustrated 
in  the  case  of  factory  work,  and  then  it  spread  rapidly  into  other 
spheres  of  life.  The  more  human  thought  and  effort  were  con- 
centrated upon  joint  tasks  of  an  outward  and  visible  character, 
the  more  unimportant  became  all  that  took  place  in  the  soul  of 
the  individual,  the  more  his  condition  became  a  matter  of  in- 
difference, the  more  the  subject  came  to  be  considered  a  mere 
cog  in  the  vast  machinery  of  the  whole,  a  quantity  to  be  set 
aside  with  impunity.  A  scientific  expression  of  this  tendency  is 
to  be  found  in  the  theory  of  Positivism  (in  so  far  as  it  is  logically 
developed  from  its  own  principles  and  not  amalgamated  with 
thought  of  a  different  type). 

The  tendency  we  have  just  indicated  is  still  predominant. 
But  humanity  is  becoming  increasingly  aware  of  its  limitations. 
A  growing  feeling  of  hollowness  forces  itself  upon  us.  Does  not 
this  bear  witness  to  the  irrepressibility  of  the  subject  and  to 
the  impossibility  of  denying  ourselves  all  inner  satisfaction  ? 
An  abrupt  reaction  in  favour  of  the  subject  is  consequently 
noticeable.  The  subject  begins  to  regard  itself  and  its  condition 
as  the  most  important  factors  in  the  situation  ;  there  grows  up 
a  tendency  to  throw  off  all  outward  restraint,  to  make  individual 
feelings  the  only  criterion,  and  finally  to  bring  life  as  far  as 
possible  into  conformity  with  this  standard.  This  reaction  still 
exerts  a  wide  influence  in  literature,  art,  and  social  life.  It 
is,  however,  far  too  devoid  of  real  content  to  be  capable  of 
overcoming  opposition  or  of  satisfying  the  human  soul.  All 
its  appeals  to  individual  forces  cannot  produce  a  connected 
inner  life  or  a  common  truth,  and  in  the  end  it  leads  back  to  the 
very  vacuity  from  which  it  wished  to  free  us.  The  nearest 
scientific  representative  of  this  subjectivism  is  psychologism, 
which  endeavours  to  build  up  a  thought-world  founded  directly 
upon  the  individual  soul ;  for  a  time,  psychologism  proved  very 
influential,  but  it  was  rapidly  followed  by  a  reaction  and  it  is 
now  being  realised  with  increasing  clearness  that  it  will  never  be 


46  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

possible  to  attain  to  a  science,  to  a  domain  of  truth,  if  such  an 
unstable  foundation  be  employed.* 

Outside  the  sphere  of  science,  too,  we  are  becoming  increas- 
ingly conscious  of  the  limitations  of  subjectivism ;  at  the  same 
time,  we  cannot  possibly  return  to  an  objectivity  of  the  kind 
described  above.  Hence  we  remain  in  a  painful  state  of  division, 
while  the  antagonism  between  the  claims  of  work  and  the 
interests  of  the  soul  threatens  to  grow  more  and  more  pro- 
nounced. This  involves  a  disintegration  of  life,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  accept  it  as  a  final  settlement.  Some  method  of 
bridging  the  chasm  must  be  discovered. 

There  is  no  lack  of  efforts  in  this  direction.  The  most 
influential  attempt  is  that  which  aims  at  so  inwardly  broadening 
and  strengthening  the  subject  as  to  enable  it  to  win  a  new 
insight  into  the  universe,  and  with  it  a  new  life :  this  is  to 
take  place,  in  the  main  (though  by  no  means  completely), 
along  Kantian  lines.  A  movement  of  this  description  is 
to  be  met  with  in  theology  as  well  as  in  philosophy,  the 
forms  it  takes  in  the  two  cases  being  different.  In  theology 
the  movement  attempts  to  set  religious  truth  free  from  the 
uncertainties  of  speculation  and  metaphysics  and  to  place 
it  upon  a  firm  basis  in  the  very  centre  of  the  soul's 
being.  (We  are  here  referring  more  particularly  to  the 
line  of  thought  associated  with  the  name  of  Bitschl.) 
Especially  in  the  sphere  of  morality,  in  the  development  of 
moral  personality,  spiritual  life  seems  to  produce  a  kingdom  of 
its  own  and  to  enthrone  itself  in  a  position  of  security  and 
elevation  above  other  phases  of  existence.  According  to  this 
trend  of  thought,  that  which  is  necessary  to  spiritual  self-pre- 
servation needs  no  outward  support.  Its  veracity  is  inwardly 
demonstrated  by  the  enrichment  of  ethical  and  religious  life. 
The  more  exact  development  of  the  thought- world,  in  this  case, 
depends  chiefly  upon  the  Werturteile  (judgments  of  value),  which 
represent  this  central  relationship  to  life  and  are  consequently 

*  The  most  effective  refutation  of  psychologism  is  that  contained  in  Husserl'a 
Logischen  Untersuchungen,  1900  and  1901.  The  profound  influence  which 
psychologism  has  exerted  even  upon  investigators  who  are  opposed  to  it  on 
principle  is  here  demonstrated  in  the  most  convincing  manner  and  forms  an 
important  feature  of  Husserl's  work. 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  47 

superior  to  all  forms  of  theoretical  prooi,  The  moral  and 
religious  life,  following  its  own  internal  necessities,  produces  a 
body  of  convictions,  which  does  not,  however,  claim  to  be  a 
cosmic  philosophy,  and  only  maintains  its  validity  by  continu- 
ally relating  itself  to  the  fundamental  realities  of  the  ethico- 
religious  life. 

This  movement  (which  in  its  more  detailed  exposition  takes 
very  different  forms)  is  undoubtedly  justified  in  so  far  as  it  aims 
at  providing  a  firmer  and  more  direct  foundation  for  men's  ulti- 
mate convictions  than  intellectual  argument  is  capable  of 
offering,  and  in  so  far  as  it  tends  towards  imparting  a  more 
practical  character  to  life.  But  the  manner  in  which  this  is 
attempted  fills  us  with  misgiving.  Feeling  is  generally  regarded 
as  the  core  of  life,  and  the  attempt  is  made  to  raise  a  philo- 
sophical structure  upon  this  basis :  "  Feeling  is  that  spiritual 
function  in  which  the  ego  finds  its  self-immediacy"  (Bitschl : 
Christ.  Lehre  von  der  Rechtfertigung  u.  Versohnung,  iii.  142). 
But  can  it  be  truly  said  that  life  wins  self-immediacy  through 
feeling  ?  Is  not  feeling  sometimes  hollow  and  empty  ?  Feeling 
alone  cannot  evolve  a  content ;  it  acquires  one  in  its  relation- 
ships with  the  rest  of  life.  Since  feeling  is  liable  to  constant 
alteration  and  is  open  to  all  sorts  of  different  interpretations, 
it  is  impossible,  with  it  as  a  basis,  to  impart  either  stability  or 
content  to  life.  The  attempt  to  construct  a  thought-world  with 
the  feeling  subject  as  basis  would  hardly  be  distinguishable  from 
mere  subjectivism  if  the  feeling  were  not  represented  as  being 
a  necessity  and  the  content  which  it  affirms  as  something 
elevated  above  what  is  merely  natural,  human  and  particular. 
But  how  can  this  structure  be  erected  upon  the  basis  of  the 
bare  facts  of  the  soul -life?  However  imperative  a  feeling 
may  seem  to  be,  it  is  so,  primarily,  only  for  a  particular  subject ; 
however  closely  it  may  seem  bound  up  with  a  particular  content, 
the  connection  signifies  more  than  is  contained  in  the  direct  im- 
pression ;  it  is  the  result  of  an  interpretation — which  may  be  a 
wrong  one.  Consequently  the  strength  of  a  feeling  is  no 
guarantee  whatever  of  the  truth  of  any  body  of  thought  which 
may  be  developed  from  it.  Among  other  things,  the  prevailing 
diversity  and  conflict  of  religious  opinion  illustrates  this  point. 


48  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Each  religion  is  confident  of  the  entire  genuineness  of  the 
fundamental  feelings  associated  with  it ;  yet  the  various  reli- 
gions arrive  at  quite  different  truths.  Thus  a  higher  tribunal 
is  necessary  to  decide  between  these  conflicting  claims,  and 
feeling  cannot  act  in  this  capacity.  Man  cannot  arrive  at  truth 
at  all  unless  there  is  born  within  him  a  life  elevated  above  his 
natural  particularity  and  individuality ;  truth  bound  down  to 
such  limitations  as  these  is  no  truth.  It  follows  as  a  corollary 
that  man  can  never  under  any  circumstances  abandon,  or  even 
set  aside,  the  problem  of  his  fundamental  relationship  to  reality. 
This  problem  is  not  one  forced  upon  him  through  after-reflec- 
tion ;  from  the  very  beginning  it  forms  a  portion  of  his  spiritual 
nature.  The  life  of  a  spiritual  being  does  not  begin  and  end 
with  its  subjective  condition  ;  it  includes  the  objective  also,  and 
must  get  into  relationship  with  the  objective;  it  is  driven  to 
insist  that  the  rift  between  subjective  and  objective  shall  be 
overcome,  and  feels  confinement  to  the  merely  subjective  condi- 
tions as  an  intolerable  restriction. 

The  complications  which  the  Ritschlian  tendency  involves 
are  very  easily  forgotten,  because  the  excitation  of  feeling 
is  usually  supplemented  by  a  thought-world  that  has  come  down 
to  us  as  historical  tradition,  and  this  imparts  a  greater  appear- 
ance of  stability  and  content.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  truth  of 
the  historical  tradition  has  first  to  be  demonstrated,  and  from 
this  point  of  view  that  can  only  be  done  through  the  agency  of 
feeling ;  feeling,  too,  must  decide  what  portions  of  the  content 
of  this  tradition  are  to  be  counted  valuable ;  thus,  pursuing 
more  or  less  devious  paths,  we  continually  come  back  to  feeling 
and  find  that  we  are  confined  within  its  sphere ;  the  more  we 
assign  complete  independence  to  feeling,  the  less  content  it  is 
capable  of  offering  us  and  the  more  it  threatens  to  split  up  into 
a  number  of  isolated  states  bereft  of  meaning.  Hence  this 
method  serves  rather  to  increase  our  perplexities  than  to 
diminish  them.  However  far  we  may  hold  ourselves  aloof  from 
this  mode  of  thought,  we  cannot  avoid  recognising  the  invigora- 
tion  of  moral  and  religious  life  which  has  sprung  from  its 
adoption.  But  with  the  theoretical  formulation  of  these  con- 
victions we  cannot  pretend  to  be  satisfied. 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  49 

In  the  sphere  of  philosophy  the  matter  takes  on  an  essentially 
different  complexion.  The  concept  of  value  *  is  now  placed  in 
the  centre  of  an  important  and  fruitful  movement.  Regarding 
it  as  a  whole,  this  movement  represents  the  modern  type  of 
thought  as  opposed  to  the  antique  (more  particularly  in  so  far  as 
the  latter  is  Platonic).  When  the  chief  antithesis  of  reality  is 
that  between  a  permanent  "  being  "  and  a  transitory  "becoming " 
(as  in  the  latter  case) ,  it  is  only  a  short  step  to  conceiving  this 
essential  being  as  at  the  same  time  the  good  and  valuable, 
thereby  uniting  the  two  concepts  so  far  as  this  is  possible. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  good  can  be  regarded  as  detached 
from  all  activity  and  quite  independent  of  all  that  is  human. 
Modern  thought,  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  there  can 
be  no  question  of  a  good  apart  from  a  living  and  active  being, 
and  that  the  good  can  have  value  only  in  proportion  to  its  im- 
portance for  life.  Hence  it  seems  more  appropriate  to  speak  of 
"  values  "  than  of  "  goods."  This  fundamental  idea  can  and 
does  assume  different  forms.  If  the  individual  subject  with  its 

*  Within  the  last  few  decades  an  extensive  literature  has  sprung  up  dealing 
with  the  concept  and  significance  of  value.  It  will  not  be  possible  here  to 
review  or  estimate  this :  we  will  merely  mention  Meinong's  Psychologisch- 
ethische  Untersuchungen  zur  Wert-Theorie  (1894).  It  would  be  desirable  to  have 
a  history  of  the  problem  and  concept  of  value  as  a  whole.  At  present  we  will 
quote  only  the  following  passages  from  Hoffding's  Philosophy  of  Religion : 
"We  are  indebted  to  Kant's  philosophy  for  the  independence  of  the  problem 
of  value  as  apart  from  the  problem  of  knowledge.  He  taught  us  to  distinguish 
between  valuation  and  explanation."  Further,  "  Kant  more  of  ten  speaks  of  pur- 
poses than  of  values.  It  is,  however,  clear  (although  Kant  does  not  properly  pay 
attention  to  it  either  in  his  psychology  or  his  ethics)  that  the  concept  of  purpose 
presupposes  the  concept  of  value,  since  I  could  not  make  a  purpose  of  anything 
the  value  of  which  I  had  not  already  experienced.  When  Kant  speaks  of  the 
'  domain  of  purposes '  in  contrast  to  the  causal  order  of  nature,  he  means 
thereby  what  later  philosophers  called  the  '  domain  of  values.'  Kant's  disciple 
Fries  began  with  the  concept  of  value  (System  der  Philosophic,  Leipzig, 
1804,  §§  238,  255,  330 ;  Neue  Kritik  der  Vernunft,  Heidelberg,  1807,  iii.  14. 
It  was  more  especially  Herbart  and  Lotze,  however,  who  procured  recogni 
tion  for  the  concept  of  value  in  wider  circles.  After  Lotze,  the  theologian 
Albrecht  Bitschl  and  his  pupils  took  up  the  concept."  Poschmann  has 
recently  published  a  work  upon  Fries'  concept  of  value.  The  concept  and  the 
problem  associated  with  it,  is,  however,  by  no  means  exclusively  modern ;  it 
appears  whenever  the  subject  attains  to  greater  independence.  Thus  it  first 
appears  among  the  Stoics,  who  constructed  a  term  for  it  (agm).  Nicholas 
of  Cusa,  the  lirst  modern  thinker,  called  God  the  value  of  values  (valor 
valorum). 

4- 


50  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

sensitivity  and  feeling  is  made  the  sole  basis  of  life,  if  all  events 
are  valued  according  to  their  contribution  towards  the  comfort 
of  the  subject,  and  if  it  is  considerations  of  pleasure  and  pain 
which  decide  in  the  last  instance,  it  is  impossible  to  see  how 
this  movement  can  in  any  way  elevate  or  enrich  life.  For 
pleasure  binds  man  down  to  his  own  unilluminated  subjective 
feeling,  and  in  spite  of  all  outward  success  it  narrows  the  inner 
life.  It  is  inimical  to  any  inner  elevation  of  life,  to  any  direct 
joy  in  men  and  things,  to  any  vital  assimilation  of  the  objective. 
Such  defects  will  be  felt  as  peculiarly  grievous  by  those  who 
realise  the  great  tasks  and  complications  which  are  associated 
with  man's  spiritual  condition ;  for  this  condition  demands  an 
upward  effort,  nay  an  inward  conversion,  and  these  are  im- 
possible if  life  remains  rigidly  bound  down  to  a  mere  subjective 
condition. 

There  is  another  mode  of  thought,  standing  on  an  incom- 
parably higher  level,  according  to  which  Kant's  critical  idealistic 
method  is  transferred  to  a  present-day  basis  and  an  attempt  is 
made  to  develop  it  in  the  light  of  post-Kantian  experience.*  A 
start  is  made  from  the  fact  that  our  life  and  action  does  not 
exhaust  itself  in  the  mere  blind  immediacy  of  events;  our 
spiritual  nature  compels  us  to  make  continual  use  of  our  judg- 
ment. Now  we  form  judgments  according  to  definite  standards, 
which  neither  fancy  nor  failure  in  any  way  affects.  In  these 
standards  are  revealed  values  above  all  mere  utility  and  above 
pleasure  and  pain.  These  values  bring  about  an  inner  elevation 
of  life  and  may  justly  claim  to  possess  an  absolute  character,  t 
We  have  here  to  deal  with  an  important  endeavour  to  provide 
human  life  with  a  basis  and  content  derived  from  within,  to 
raise  it  above  natural  impulses  by  the  aid  of  critical  self- 
contemplation  without  entangling  it  in  the  difficulties  of  specula- 
tive metaphysics,  and  at  the  same  time  to  map  out  a  specific 
task  for  philosophy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  cannot  be  seen  how 

*  This  movement  is  dealt  with  in  a  particularly  clear  and  noteworthy  manner 
in  Windelband's  Prfiludien,  more  especially  in  the  sections  Was  ist  Philosophic  1 , 
Normen  und  Naturgesetze,  Kritische  oder  genetische  Methode. 

t  Miinsterberg,  in  particular,  voices  this  superiority  of  the  values  in  his 
Philosophic  der  Werte  (1908),  a  warm  and  powerful  exposition  of  the  subject. 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  51 

man  can  overcome  the  threatened  division  of  life  arising  from 
the  breach  between  subject  and  object  save  by  recollecting  his 
spiritual  nature  and  seeking  to  deepen  it. 

There  is  only  one  point  with  regard  to  which  we  cherish 
doubts.  Is  it  possible  to  regard  the  matter  as  concluded  when 
it  has  reached  this  point?  Is  there  not  an  inner  necessity 
which  will  compel  the  movement  to  go  further?  In  this 
connection  several  queries  suggest  themselves.  Is  it  possible 
for  the  values  to  attain  a  sufficiently  secure  position  while 
remaining  separate  experiences?  Will  not  their  ultimacy  be 
open  to  attack  so  long  as  they  remain  in  mere  juxtaposition  and 
do  not  join  together  to  make  a  united  whole  ?  *  Further,  will 
the  higher  grade  of  life  revealed  in  the  values  be  able  to  rise  up 
against  and  prevail  over  the  entangling  and  enslaving  power  of 
natural  and  social  self-preserving  tendencies,  unless  it  create  for 
us  a  new  spiritual  self  which  unfolds  and  asserts  itself  in  the 
values  ?  But  this  is  hardly  possible  without  reversing  the  posi- 
tion of  things  as  they  now  are,  and  thus  we  come  back  again  to 
some  sort  of  metaphysics,  however  different  from  the  old  type. 

The  doctrine  of  values  hence  appears  to  us  to  be  a  very 
promising  and  suggestive  movement  rather  than  a  complete 
solution.  For  the  time  being  this  movement  does  not  exert 
much  influence  outside  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  and  humanity 
remains  painfully  wavering  between  work  and  soul,  between  the 
absorption  of  the  subject  by  a  too  powerful  object  and  the 
dissipation  of  the  object  by  a  too  self-sufficient  subject. 

The  complications  of  this  situation  give  rise  to  the  question, 
Is  not  this  whole  division  between  the  subject  and  object  a 
mistake;  is  it  not  a  mistake  to  recognise  an  inner  domain 
existing  parallel  with  the  external  world?  May  we  not  say 
that  in  the  light  of  such  a  conception  as  this  the  aspiration 
towards  truth  involves  an  insoluble  contradiction — for  it  wishes 

*  The  necessity  of  such  a  connection  is  also  emphatically  brought  forward 
by  Miinsterberg ;  he  says  in  the  preface  to  his  Philosophic  der  Werte,  "  The 
values  as  a  whole  must  be  fundamentally  tested  and  uniformly  deduced  from 
a  basal  act.  Our  modern  philosophy  lacks  a  self-contained  system  of  pure 
values.  Only  when  this  has  been  obtained  can  philosophy  again  become  a  real 
life-power,  a  position  which  has  too  long  been  exclusively  occupied  by  natural 
science  "  (vi.). 


52  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

at  the  same  time  to  divide  and  to  unite,  to  keep  apart  and  to 
draw  together.  Of  recent  years  Avenarius  and  Mach,  starting 
from  quite  opposite  points  of  view,  have  come  to  the  identical 
conclusion  that  this  division  should  he  abandoned  as  a  useless 
and  misleading  duplication.  The  placing  of  a  sensation  in  an 
inner  world  (introjection)  seems  quite  as  mistaken  as  the  placing 
of  processes  in  consciousness  in  an  outer  one  (projection) .  These 
writers  give  us  one  world  instead  of  two,  and  they  forbid  us  to 
seek  for  objects  beyond  the  reach  of  our  immediate  experience.* 
This  penetrating  treatment  of  the  problem,  by  virtue  of  its 
simplifying  tendency,  has  made  a  visible  impression  upon  our 
age,  but  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  our  present  task  to  examine  it 
on  its  technical  side.  It  is  certainly  to  its  credit  that,  in  a 
sphere  bordering  on  its  own,  namely,  with  regard  to  the  physio- 
logico-psychological  theory  of  perception,  it  again  opens  up 
questions  that  seemed  to  be  settled  and  exposes  the  problemat- 
ical character  of  the  conventional  scientific  conception  of  nature. 
We  are  prevented,  however,  from  assenting  to  the  main  thesis 
by  the  consideration  that  our  ego  is  in  reality  more  than  a 
current  of  sense  impressions — our  very  knowledge  is  shaped  in 
its  attainment  by  our  independent  work.  Moreover  it  is  neces- 
sary to  call  particular  attention  to  the  fact  that  above  and 
beyond  all  intellectual  processes  there  develops  an  inner  life,  a 
life  which  exhibits,  in  spite  of  all  manifoldness,  a  permanent 
character,  persisting  through  all  changes  and  movements.!  The 

*  See  Mach,  Die  Analyse  der  Empfindungen,  2nd  edit.,  p.  206 :  "  There  is  no 
gap  between  psychical  and  physical,  no  outside  and  inside,  no  sensation  which 
corresponds  to  something  external  and  different  from  itself.  There  are  only 
elements  of  one  kind,  of  which  the  supposed  outer  and  inner  are  compounded ; 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case,  these  elements  are  found 
inside  or  outside.  The  sense-world  belongs  at  the  same  time  to  the  physical 
sphere  and  to  the  psychical."  Page  33 :  "I  see  no  contrast  between  psychical 
and  physical,  but  simple  identity  with  regard  to  these  elements."  See  also 
Wlassak  (in  Zukunft,  1902,  No.  18,  p.  202) :  "  No  unsophisticated  person  finds  a 
tree  present  in  any  sense  as  sensation  in  his  consciousness  ;  such  a  person  will 
invariably  regard  it  solely  as  a  portion  of  his  environment.  This  also  applies 
when  the  tree  is  not  seen,  but  only  recollected ;  the  less  vivid  image,  also,  stands 
in  exactly  the  same  relationship  to  the  person  perceiving  it  as  did  the  tree 
itself." 

t  When  Mach  denies  the  independence  and  permanence  of  the  ego,  this  is 
largely  due  to  the  fact  that  he  confuses  the  consciousnes*  of  the  ego  with  the 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  53 

whole  course  of  history  testifies  to  such  an  independence  on  the 
part  of  the  inward  life;  right  through  all  his  work  and  the 
complexities  of  his  development  man  has  always  drawn  further 
and  further  away  from  the  mere  life  of  the  senses ;  he  has  more 
and  more  converted  outward  events  into  inner  experience,  more 
and  more  resisted  the  mere  influx  of  sensations.  All  this  is  no 
mere  intellectual  phenomenon,  no  mere  attempt  at  explanation. 
It  is  an  unfolding  of  rich  actuality,  the  nearest  and  surest  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge,  and  this  alone  teaches  us  how 
mentally  to  shape  and  reshape  our  sense  impressions.  It  is 
impossible  to  explain  away  such  actuality  as  this  as  a  mere 
illusion  and  set  back  the  clock  of  history.  It  is  equally  im- 
possible to  escape  from  the  necessity  of  this  division  between 
subject  and  object,  between  the  inner  world  and  nature. 

(c)  The   Positive   Position 

1.  INTRODUCTION 

In   which   direction   shall  we  pursue  our  enquiry?     If  this 
division  is  inevitable,  and  if  there  is  no  bridge  from  the  one 

living  ego  itself.  Thus,  for  example,  on  p.  3 :  "  The  apparent  permanence  of 
the  ego  consists  in  the  first  place  only  in  the  continuity,  in  the  slow  change. 
The  basis  of  the  ego  is  made  up  of  the  various  thoughts  and  plans  of  yesterday 
which  are  continued  to-day  and  are  constantly  being  recalled  to  us  by  our 
waking  environment  (hence,  in  dreaming,  the  ego  may  be  very  confused  or 
doubled  or  totally  lacking),  and  the  little  habits  which  long  remain  with  us,  uncon- 
sciously and  involuntarily.  It  would  hardly  be  possible  for  there  to  be  greater 
differences  in  the  egos  of  different  men  than  appear  in  the  course  of  a  year  in 
one  man.  When,  to-day,  I  look  back  upon  my  early  youth,  if  the  chain  of 
recollection  were  not  present  to  my  mind,  I  should  have  to  believe  (apart  from 
a  few  special  points)  that  the  boy  was  another  individual."  And  on  p.  17 : 
"  One  will  no  more  set  such  a  high  value  upon  the  ego,  which  is  subject  to  many 
changes  even  during  the  individual  life,  and  in  sleep  or  during  absorption  in 
contemplation  or  in  some  thought  (precisely  in  the  happiest  moments)  may  be 
partially  or  totally  absent."  But  is  there  not  a  unity  of  a  spiritual  kind  which 
persists  with  living  force  in  the  face  of  all  the  changes  and  obscurations  of 
consciousness,  does  not  all  progressive  scientific  and  artistic  creation  work 
through  this  unity  of  the  spiritual  individuality,  and  is  not  this  same  unity  the 
source  of  all  thoroughgoing  achievement  also  in  the  practical  and  technical 
domain?  As  opposed  to  this  dissipation  of  the  ego,  these  experiences  of  the 
spiritual  life  corroborate  Goethe's  conviction: 

"  Und  keine  Zeit  und  keine  Macht  serttUckelt 
Oeprdgtc  Form,  die  lebeud  $ich  entwickelt." 


54  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

side  to  the  other,  then  no  course  remains  to  us  but  to  accept 
the  opposition  as  part  of  the  life-process  itself,  and  so  to  enlarge 
the  latter,  inwardly,  that  it  need  no  longer  he  referred  by  a 
belated  movement  of  thought  to  some  outlying  environment,  but 
contains  within  itself  a  world.  A  whole  world  must  come  into 
effective  activity  within  man  himself;  a  world  raised  above  this 
contrast,  a  world  directly  accessible  to  us  and  not  refracted 
through  the  particularity  of  the  individual  medium.  Then,  and 
only  then,  can  there  be  any  truth  for  man. 

To  take  up  such  a  position  as  this  may  at  first  sight  appear 
somewhat  extraordinary.  But  in  reality  it  is  not  without  his- 
torical connections  which  only  need  to  be  correlated  for  the  old 
which  is  contained  in  the  apparently  new  to  become  obvious. 
How  did  humanity  come  to  develop  the  ideas  of  the  good  and 
the  true,  and  to  separate  them  from  mere  utility  and  mere 
actuality  ?  How  is  it  possible  for  humanity  to  rise  in  any  way 
above  the  opinions  and  inclinations  of  the  mere  man  ?  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  we  have  here  a  remarkable  phenomenon 
to  deal  with.  We  may  differ  as  much  as  we  like  as  to  what  is 
true  and  what  is  good,  but  it  remains  a  fact  that  we  do  ask  after 
the  good  and  the  true,  however  uncertain  our  answers  may  be. 
And  this  is  in  itself  an  important  fact,  rich  in  consequences. 
It  involves  breaking  through  the  mere  details  of  actual  ex- 
perience ;  it  bears  witness  to  an  inward  breadth  of  our  being, 
which  perceives  and  seeks  its  own  in  what  is  apparently  foreign 
to  it.  For  it  is  certain  that  man  cannot  be  earnestly  con- 
cerned about  something  that  has  no  manner  of  relationship 
to  his  life  and  being — which  does  not  in  fact  belong  to  him. 
He  cannot  possibly  be  interested,  even  in  the  slightest  degree, 
in  what  is  entirely  external  to  him.  Now  in  seeking  the  true 
and  the  good,  man  seeks  a  world  outside  his  own  immediate 
sphere.  Must  we  not  then,  according  to  our  very  nature, 
participate  in  a  wider  sphere,  must  not  our  life  contain  the 
whole  world,  if  we  are  so  powerfully  attracted  and  so  excited 
to  activity  by  its  content  ?  It  is  true  that  in  this  case  we  must 
alter  the  concept  of  ourselves.  But  concepts  must  be  sub- 
ordinate to  facts,  not  facts  to  concepts ;  therefore  why  should 
we  resist  such  an  alteration  ? 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  55 

To  give  a  more  definite  shape  to  this  idea  of  the  world-nature 
of  man  remains  a  very  difficult  task.  But  in  this  respect,  as  in 
others,  the  most  notable  philosophical  work  of  recent  centuries 
has  clearly  enough  shown  us  the  way.  One  of  Kant's  greatest 
achievements  was  the  separation  of  the  enquiry  into  the  possi- 
bility of  spiritual  contents  from  the  mere  psychological  explana- 
tion. For  example,  he  distinguished  between  the  question,  How 
does  the  individual  man  arrive  at  knowledge,  morality,  &c.  ?  and 
the  question,  Upon  what  inward  conditions  does  the  existence 
of  science  and  morality  depend  ?  Thus,  both  the  ethical  and 
logical  points  of  view  become  independent  of  the  psychological. 
At  first  this  may  appear  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  new  method ; 
but  this  method  would  fall  to  the  ground  in  the  absence  of 
a  new  life  beyond  the  detached  experiences  of  our  merely 
psychical  existence — a  life  issuing  from  the  whole  of  things, 
a  cosmic  life.  The  specialised  developments  of  such  a  life 
possess,  however,  no  firm  and  stable  basis  if  they  do  not 
reconcentrate  the  whole  within  theu»selves.  They  must  be 
recognised  as  heralding  a  new  stage  of  cosmic  development 
which  supervenes  not  below  but  above  the  opposition  between 
subject  and  object. 

Modern  art,  as  seen  in  its  most  important  manifestations, 
moves  by  another  path  towards  a  similar  goal.  We  admire 
the  objectivity  of  a  Goethe,  and  when  Heinroth  described  his 
thought  as  objective,  the  master  himself  expressed  his  apprecia- 
tion of  the  tribute.  Such  an  objectivity  does  not  in  the  least 
mean  the  suppression  and  absorption  of  the  subject  by  the 
object,  the  mere  reproduction  of  the  outward  impression  made 
by  a  thing.  It  involves  a  meeting  of  objective  and  subjective 
upon  the  common  ground  of  the  inner  life  and  the  permeation  of 
each  by  the  other.  The  things  themselves  thus  receive  a  soul 
and  become  capable  of  accurately  recommunicating  their  own 
real  nature,  while  human  life  receives  a  content  in  place  of  its 
original  emptiness.  In  this  case  the  things  are  not  coloured, 
as  it  were,  with  a  subjective  mood;  they  are  made  to  yield 
up  their  own  true  meaning.  The  poet  "thereby  appears  as 
a  magician  bringing  the  otherwise  dumb  beings  to  speech ;  to 
his  soul  the  whole  infinitude  of  the  world  is  revealed,  and  he 


56  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

enables  all  manifoldness  to  realise  its  own  specific  nature,  at  the 
same  time  perceiving  all  that  is  living,  essential,  and  effective 
in  the  things  themselves."  (See  Problem  of  Human  Life, 
p.  472.)  Goethe  calls  this  a  synthesis  of  spirit  and  world, 
"  giving  us  a  most  blessed  assurance  of  the  eternal  harmony 
of  existence " ;  in  reality  this  synthesis  does  not  take  place 
between  the  soul  and  the  external  world,  but  within  a  soul 
enlarged  to  the  dimensions  of  an  inner  world,  between  sides  and 
poles  of  its  life.  Hence  there  are  not  merely  two  kinds  of 
artistic  creation,  but  three ;  in  addition  to  the  contrasting 
subjective  and  objective  treatments,  there  is  a  superior  method 
which  we  have  called  a  "  sovereign"  or  supreme  method.  (See 
The  Truth  of  Religion,  trans,  by  Dr.  Tudor  Jones,  published  by 
Williams  and  Norgate.)  This  sovereign  treatment  alone  rises 
above  both  soulless  objectivity  and  formless  subjectivity.  It 
occupies  a  position  of  its  own,  according  to  which  the  life- 
process  does  not  seek  a  world  which  has  evolved  independently 
of  it,  but  evolves  one  out  of  itself.  Only  thus  can  it  obtain 
a  content — by  means  of  the  creative  synthesis  of  a  new  world, 
not  by  copying  an  already  present  existence.  Should  not  that 
which  possesses  such  indisputable  reality  in  the  sphere  of  art  be 
valid  also  for  spiritual  life  as  a  whole  ?  Could  art  concern 
itself  about  this  matter  at  all  if  some  spiritual  totality  did 
not  stand  behind  it  ?  Hence  we  should  confidently  follow  the 
path  thus  indicated  to  us,  and  bravely  persevere  in  it  to  the  end, 
however  far  it  may  lead  us  away  from  the  usual  conception  of 
life  and  the  cosmos.  For  there  is  no  doubt  whatever  that 
it  is  only  by  opposing  the  customary  conception  that  it  is 
possible  to  build  up  a  world  from  within  and  to  impart  a 
distinctive  form  to  our  life  and  work. 

Let  us  consider  the  following  three  problems  from  this  point 
of  view,  and  see  to  what  results  we  are  led : — 

1.  The  fundamental  concept  of  the  spiritual  life. 

2.  The   relationship   between  man  and   the  spiritual   life 

(with  a  historical  review). 
8.  The  problem  of  truth. 

We  shall  thus  develop  the  preliminary  assumptions  of  that  to 
which  (in  its  results)  every  man  must  in  some  fashion  hold  fast. 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  57 

2.  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPT  OF  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE 

Life  of  a  spiritual  nature  is  considered  to  be  a  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  man.  This  life  it  is  which  raises  him  above 
the  level  of  the  merely  animal  world  ;  it  must  therefore  be 
something  more  than  that  natural  life  of  the  soul  which  he  pos- 
sesses in  common  with  animals.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  even  a 
superficial  consideration  immediately  shows  us  an  essential 
difference.  In  the  animal  world  mental  life  is  nothing  more 
than  a  derivative  phenomenon  accompanying  the  nature-process 
and  serving  its  ends ;  skill  and  intelligence,  however  highly 
developed,  are  nothing  more  than  mere  tools  employed  in  the 
preservation  of  the  individual  or  the  race.  Being  a  mere  tool, 
intelligence  cannot  attain  to  inner  continuity,  secure  self- 
dependence,  or  any  content  of  its  own.  But  it  is  just  these 
things  which  are  characteristic  of  the  spiritual  stage  of  life.  A 
new  life-process  now  appears ;  the  inner,  formerly  occupying  a 
modest  position  on  the  outskirts  of  a  strange  world,  now  claims 
to  stand  alone  and  to  construct  a  reality  of  its  own.  From  this 
point  of  view,  spiritual  life,  united  together  to  form  a  whole,  may 
be  looked  upon  as  inner  life  which  has  become  independent  and 
acquired  a  content.  Reality,  otherwise  split  up  in  an  im- 
measurable multiplicity  and  ensnared  in  countless  dependent 
relationships,  here  attains  an  inner  continuity  and  a  life  which 
alone  can  really  be  called  a  self-life. 

A  statement  of  this  sort  at  once  gives  rise  to  a  question.  Is 
this  self-life  directed  towards  forming  a  separate  domain  of  its 
own,  apart  from  external  reality,  in  isolated  security  and  con- 
tentment, or  does  it  still  retain  a  connection  with  the  world  as  a 
whole  ?  Only  the  latter  view  corresponds  with  the  conditions  of 
life.  For  in  working  to  realise  itself,  spiritual  life  is  still 
occupied  with  the  world.  It  cannot  find  itself  without  drawing 
the  world  to  itself.  It  can  have  no  rest  until  it  has  completely 
overcome  the  world  and  assimilated  it.  Therefore  its  whole  con- 
tent is  at  the  same  time  a  positive  assertion  ;  it  claims  to  be  the 
last,  the  whole,  the  all-containing,  the  core  of  the  whole  of 
reality.  But  this  cannot  be  true  unless  the  further  development 
which  it  brings  about  in  things,  through  assimilating  them, 


58  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

leads  these  things  to  the  height  ol  their  own  heing,  unless  the 
content  of  spiritual  life  signifies  the  reality  of  the  things  them- 
selves. Spiritual  life  becomes  in  itself  an  intolerable  contradiction 
if  it  stands  apart  from  and  confronting  the  world  and  not  within 
it,  and  if  reality  does  not  perfect  itself  in  turning  to  spiritual  life. 

The  recognition  of  this  renders  our  world  fluid  and  transforms 
it  into  a  region  of  upward  movement.  The  lower  stages  are 
formed  by  nature,  from  which  the  natural  soul-life  springs. 
This  natural  life  exhibits  a  thoroughgoing  contradiction ;  it 
develops  a  certain  inner  life  which  is  at  the  same  time  stultified 
through  complete  dependence  on  an  outward  life,  through  the 
denial  of  any  self-life.  Every  thoughtful  observer  must  see  over- 
whelming evidence  of  this  contradiction  in  the  great  cycle  of 
animal  life,  so  senseless,  so  devoid  of  meaning  in  spite  of  its 
wealth  of  life  and  feeling.  Spiritual  life  marks  the  commence- 
ment of  the  solution  of  this  contradiction,  since  life  is  now 
directed  inwards  towards  itself  and  not  merely  outwards. 

Since  it  thus  forms  a  stage  in  the  life  of  the  whole,  spiritual 
life  cannot  be  a  mere  property  of  separate  points,  an  aggregate 
produced  by  subsequent  combination  on  the  part  of  separate 
manifestations ;  it  must  rather  be  a  whole  from  the  very  com- 
mencement, an  independent  and  self-contained  life.  Such  a 
whole  possesses  a  unity  which  transcends  all  manifoldness,  and 
hence  the  contrast  between  subject  and  object.  This  whole 
develops  itself  through  the  agency  of  the  antithesis  of  subject 
and  object,  of  power  and  resistance,  but  it  remains  superior  to  it, 
and  holds  both  sides  together  even  while  they  are  divided  ;  in 
the  spiritual  sphere,  neither  side  can  develop  itself  and  find  its 
own  highest  level  without  the  assistance  of  the  other.  It  is  not 
really  so  much  a  question  of  opposition  between  the  two  sides  as 
between  the  position  of  unity,  of  complete  activity,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  position  of  division,  of  one-sided  and  empty  life, 
on  the  other.  From  the  point  of  view  of  spiritual  life,  the  mere 
subject  is  just  as  much  an  outward  thing  as  is  the  object.  It  is 
not  the  relationship  of  the  one  side  to  the  other,  but  the  creative 
synthesis  alone,  that  produces  an  inwardness  and  at  the  same 
time  a  complete  and  self-contained  reality.  Such  a  reality  can 
never  come  from  without. 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  59 

It  will  not  be  possible  to  overcome  tbe  contradiction  between 
subject  and  object  in  this  manner  if  we  begin  with  a  given  state 
of  being.  It  is  an  indispensable  condition  that  we  should  start 
with  the  life-process  itself.  If  the  former  course  be  followed, 
then  either  the  world  or  the  subject  is  fixed  upon  as  self-existing 
and  self-contained ;  it  then  becomes  impossible  to  pass  from  the 
one  to  the  other,  and  we  remain  under  the  dominion  of  an  ever- 
lasting antithesis.  Within  the  life-process,  however,  each  can, 
from  the  very  beginning,  be  related  to  the  other,  and  the  con- 
dition of  each  side  can  be  measured  by  comparison  with  what 
takes  place  and  is  accomplished  in  the  whole ;  then  the  stubborn 
contrast  disappears  and  the  division  is  replaced  by  a  superior 
connection. 

A  word  of  historical  explanation  may  serve  to  elucidate  and 
define  this  conception  of  spiritual  life.  The  Enlightenment 
recognised,  side  by  side  with  the  mechanism  of  nature,  no  reality 
other  than  the  juxtaposition  of  separate  souls ;  there  was  no 
mention  of  a  spiritual  world — only  of  a  world  of  spirits.  Kant 
was  the  first  to  originate  the  tendency  which  dominated  the 
spiritual  work  of  the  nineteenth  century,  namely,  the  recognition  of 
a  spiritual  life  as  distinct  from  the  mere  workings  of  the  soul ; 
for  according  to  Kant  we  have  to  deal  with  a  common  and 
fundamental  spiritual  structure,  superior  to  all  merely  individual 
differences ;  this  forms  a  network  embracing  every  spiritual 
manifestation,  dominating  it,  and  giving  it  its  characteristic 
shape.  But  the  matter  was  not  carried  to  completion,  the  new 
material  was  not  welded  together  to  form  a  compact  and  inde- 
pendent whole,  and  the  spiritual  was  not  clearly  defined.  Kant's 
speculative  followers  elevated  the  spiritual  life  to  a  position  of 
complete  independence,  but  at  the  same  time  they  unhesitatingly 
treated  human  spiritual  life  as  absolute,  and  regarded  it  as  the 
parent  of  all  reality.  They  could  not  very  well  do  this  without 
replacing  spiritual  life  as  a  whole  by  some  special  activity,  and 
they  came  to  rely  more  and  more  upon  thought.  A  conception 
of  the  world  resulted  which  was  far  too  narrow  and  too 
anthropomorphic,  while  reality  threatened  to  practically  vanish 
by  becoming  a  mere  restless  process. 

Spiritual  life,  on  the  contrary,  is  definitely  raised  above  human 


60  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

existence.  Man  does  not  originate  spiritual  life,  but  he  is 
capable  of  attaining  to  participation  in  it,  and  at  the  same 
time  in  a  higher  stage  of  reality.  Spiritual  life  does  not  appear 
as  a  special  manifestation,  as  a  special  aspect  of  life,  but  as 
self-contained  life,  itself  giving  rise  to  reality ;  a  life  which  our 
human  activity  is  far  from  penetrating,  but  towards  which  it 
strives  as  a  great  goal. 

3.  THE  EELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  MAN  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE 

"When  spiritual  life  thus  becomes  independent  and  elevates 
itself  above  what  is  merely  human,  the  relationship  between 
man  and  spiritual  life  ceases  to  be  an  apparently  obvious  fact 
and  becomes  a  difficult  problem.  How  can  man,  who  at  first 
appears  to  be  an  infinitesimal  point,  participate  in  a  self- 
contained  world,  in  a  world  as  a  whole,  such  as  the  spiritual 
life  now  represents  ?  It  is  certain  that  he  can  only  do  so  if 
the  spiritual  life  has  existed  within  his  being,  as  a  possibility, 
from  the  commencement,  if  it  is  in  some  way  directly  connected 
with  him.  It  will  not  do  for  spiritual  life  to  be  communicated 
to  him  through  the  medium  of  his  special  nature  (thus  becoming 
alienated  from  itself)  ;  it  must  in  some  fashion  be  present  to 
him  as  a  whole  in  all  its  infinity ;  it  must  hence,  working  from 
within,  open  up  to  him  (if  at  first  only  as  a  possibility)  a  cosmic 
life  and  a  cosmic  being,  thus  enlarging  his  nature.  In  the 
absence  of  such  an  indwelling  spirituality  humanity  can  have 
no  hope  of  making  any  progress.  If  in  laying  hold  of  spiritual 
life  he  did  not  discover  his  own  true  self,  the  former  could 
never  be  a  power  to  him.  If  spiritual  life  did  not  present 
an  unchanging  pole,  if  it  was  not  an  arbitrating  power 
assigning  goals  and  standards  to  all  human  undertakings, 
man  would  be  a  helpless  victim  of  ever- changing  appearances 
and  would  never  be  able  to  attain  to  any  truth;  spiritual 
life  alone,  and  not  mere  humanity,  can  ensure  absolute 
constancy.  This  participation  of  man  in  spiritual  life  alters 
the  whole  aspect  of  his  being.  It  only  becomes  possible 
by  going  beyond  immediate  human  existence,  so  that  man's 
life  acquires  a  deeper  spiritual  basis.  At  the  same  time 
there  separates  itself  from  the  empirical  psychological  method 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  61 

(which  concerns  itself  with  the  immediate  processes  of  the  soul- 
life)  a  noological  method  which  has  to  do  with  the  above  spiritual 
basis  and  its  self- activity. 

In  this  twofold  aspect,  man  appears  to  be  in  himself  a  problem 
and  a  contradiction.  In  his  case,  a  spiritual  life  is  at  the  same 
time  a  fact  and  a  task,  a  repose  that  can  never  be  disturbed  and 
an  endeavour  that  cannot  be  satisfied,  an  inward  core  and  a 
remote  goal;  man  himself  appears  great  in  his  relationship  to 
spiritual  life,  but  small  as  an  isolated  individual;  his  life 
becomes  an  incessant  search  after  his  own  being,  and  in  this 
sense  alone  can  it  give  rise  to  true  history.  How  could  there 
be  such  a  thing  as  genuine  history  if  all  effort  was  solely  depen- 
dent upon  external  causes  and  was  not  directed  and  governed 
from  within  by  a  definite  purpose  ? 

The  sphere  of  human  history  illustrates  the  gradual  over- 
coming of  original  disintegration  and  helplessness  by  spiritual 
life.  This  occurs  through  a  species  of  crystallisation,  which, 
under  exceptionally  favourable  circumstances,  may  occur  within 
the  life-process  ;  complexes  of  spiritual  activity  join  up  together 
and  endeavour  to  assert  their  supremacy  through  the  construc- 
tion of  a  characteristic  system  of  life,  an  edifice  of  spiritual 
reality.  There  is  no  better  example  of  this  than  Greek  creative 
thought  in  its  characteristic  comprehension  of  life  and  the  uni- 
verse ;  a  synthesis  of  this  sort  stands  for  the  exclusive  truth  of 
its  particular  life-content  and  divides  existence  into  "  For"  and 
"Against."  It  cannot  endure  anything  that  is  strange  or  hostile. 
Thus  movement  and  conflict  are  produced,  and  these  lead  to 
experiences  which  drive  life  forward ;  the  way  is  paved  for  new 
concentrations,  which  in  turn  experience  the  same  fate.  In  such 
fashion,  through  the  growth  and  decay  of  the  separate  phases, 
the  content  of  truth  as  a  whole  continues  to  grow.  But  this 
holds  good  only  if  all  movement  is  comprehended  within  a  basic 
and  directing  spiritual  life ;  in  the  absence  of  the  latter  there 
would  be  no  possibility  of  securing  the  prevalence  of  any  sort  of 
truth  whatever  in  face  of  the  obstinate  resistance  and  numerous 
barriers  which  human  conditions  offer.  From  this  point  of  view 
the  historical  process  appears  as  a  progressive  development  of 
inner  life — of  a  substantial,  not  a  subjective  kind.  This  involves 


62  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

an  ever-increasing  separation  from  the  immediate  situation  of 
humanity,  dominated  as  it  is  by  contradiction,  and  hence  devoid 
of  either  complete  inwardness  or  true  reality. 

There  is  also  a  place  within  this  movement  for  that  con- 
tradiction which  is  so  inadequately  described  by  the  expressions 
"  subjective  "  and  "  objective."  Spiritual  life  is  at  the  same 
time  self-life  and  cosmic  life ;  a  self  unfolds  and  becomes  a 
cosmos,  while  the  cosmos  gains  a  self — each  belongs  to  the 
other.  In  spite  of  this  mutual  relationship  the  fact  remains 
that  in  the  historical  process  life  tends  sometimes  more 
towards  concentration,  sometimes  more  towards  expansion ; 
now  we  see  an  aspiration  towards  inner  life  and  a  deepening 
of  the  self,  now  a  desire  to  attain  width  and  sink  the  self  in 
outward  things.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  the  danger  of  an 
invasion  of  life  by  merely  human  elements,  on  the  other  of  its 
domination  by  a  soulless  world.  Perhaps  there  is  a  periodicity, 
now  one  tendency  taking  the  lead,  now  the  other.  But  right 
through  every  species  of  change  persists  the  movement  of 
spiritual  life  towards  a  unity  transcending  contradiction.  A 
subjective  or  objective  tendency  within  the  spiritual  life  is 
fundamentally  different  from  a  subjective  or  objective  tendency 
as  opposed  to  spiritual  life :  the  latter  represents  a  subjectivity 
which  aims  at  constructing  a  world  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
mere  subject  and  an  objectivity  which  fancies  it  can  attain  to  a 
truth  in  mere  things  by  an  elimination  of  the  spiritual  element. 
Both  these  tendencies  must  rapidly  sink  into  nothingness  unless 
they  surreptitiously  draw  upon  that  superior  spiritual  life  which 
they  refuse  to  recognise. 

4.  THE  RESULTS  AS  THEY  AFFECT  THE  CONCEPT  OF  TRUTH 
Whatever  transformations  are  thus  effected  must  exert  an 
influence  upon  the  concept  of  truth  and  impart  some  character- 
istic alteration  to  its  form.  Truth  no  longer  signifies  an 
agreement  with  an  external  object,  but  an  upward  movement 
towards  a  life  superior  to  all  human  desire  or  subjectivity ;  a 
life  which,  through  active  creation,  comprehends  the  antithesis 
between  subject  and  object.  We  are  now  concerned  with  a 
transformation  of  existence  into  self- activity,  which,  with  its 


SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE  63 

reshaping  capacity,  is  essentially  different  from  all  mere 
manifestation  within  a  given  existence.  This  striving  towards 
truth  has  nothing  to  do  with  any  passive  state  of  being  existing 
independently  of  all  life ;  rather  does  reality  lie  within  life, 
attainable  only  through  life.  This  life  that  we  are  now 
discussing  is,  however,  no  merely  human  affair,  for  it  represents 
the  independent  self-life  of  the  whole  of  reality,  which  here 
alone  attains  to  contents  and  values.  Truth  is  not  a  mere 
means  for  the  enhancement  of  this  life :  truth  forms  a  part 
of  its  being.  All  intellectual  truth  that  is  such  on  principle, 
rests  ultimately  upon  a  spiritual  truth  as  a  whole,  and  all 
essential  progress  in  the  knowledge  of  truth  upon  a  widening 
and  extension  of  life.  Truth  cannot  be  obtained  at  any  one 
moment.  Man  gradually  penetrates  into  its  depths  as  a 
result  of  the  great  work  of  universal  history  as  it  goes  on 
from  age  to  age  with  its  experiments,  experiences,  and 
transformations.  It  would  hardly  be  possible  to  conceive 
of  anything  more  foolish  than  the  claim  set  up  by  certain 
philosophical  systems  to  exhaust,  at  a  given  period,  the  whole 
wealth  of  truth  and  to  solve  every  riddle.  That  we  remain 
thus  in  a  state  of  quest,  and  at  the  same  time,  unavoidably, 
in  error,  cannot  in  any  way  disturb  us  if  we  possess  the 
conviction  that  all  human  effort  has  a  world  of  spiritual 
life  behind  it  which  can  be  ours  only  through  freedom, 
but  which  is  independent  of  our  self-will. 


2.     THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 

(INTELLECTUALISM— VOLUNTARISM) 
(a)  Historical 

THE  question  we  have  just  dealt  with  is  very  closely  connected 
with  the  present  one  of  intellectualism  and  voluntarism.  But 
here  the  discussion  takes  a  more  directly  spiritual  turn,  while 
formerly  it  was  concerned  with  the  relationship  of  man  to  the 
cosmos.  Here,  too,  we  have  contrasting  types  of  life;  here,  too, 
a  movement  thousands  of  years  old. 

An  important  difference  is  that  our  own  age  approaches  the 
present  problem  in  a  spirit  of  greater  confidence.  With  us 
the  tendency  to  lay  the  chief  emphasis  in  life  upon  will,  as 
that  which  alone  can  give  life  warmth,  power,  and  firmness,  is 
undoubtedly  preponderant.  How  has  it  come  to  pass  that  such 
an  ancient  source  of  division  so  suddenly  finds  us  united  ?  Let 
us  see  if  history  can  offer  any  explanation. 

The  terms  intellectualism  and  voluntarism  are  of  quite  modern 
origin.  The  former  is  first  met  with  in  the  philosophical  con- 
flicts of  the  early  nineteenth  century  :  for  example,  in  Schilling's 
Bruno  (Werke,  iv.  809)  it  is  employed  as  the  opposite  of 
materialism.  Voluntarism  is  as  recent  as  the  last  few  decades.* 
The  expressions  practical  and  theoretical,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  be  traced  back  to  the  zenith  of  Greek  philosophy. 

*  This  term  was  constructed  by  TSnnies,  who  wrote  about  it  as  follows  in  the 
Viennese  Zeit  (March  23,  1901) :  "  These  terms  (i.e.  Voluntarismus  and  volun 
taristisch)  were  first  made  use  of  by  the  author  of  this  article  in  his  treatise, 
Zur  Entwickelungsgeschichte  Spinozas  (Spinoza's  History  of  Evolution)  in  the 
Vierteljahrsschrift  filr  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic,  1883.  Wundt  took  them 
from  Paulsen  (who  soon  adopted  them)  and  brought  them  into  use  through  his 
authority.  The  concept  of  '  voluntaristic '  psychology  has  become  more  and 
more  widely  current." 

M 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  65 

Aristotle  first  contrasts  theoretical  and  practical  reason  (vouc 
OtupriTiKos  and  TTPUKTIKOQ)  :  the  former's  task  is  to  know  the 
world  as  a  whole  with  its  eternal  laws,  while  the  latter  con- 
cerns itself  with  merely  human  and  transitory  affairs.  It  ia 
not,  however,  confined  to  knowledge  of  particulars  (the  bearing 
of  general  principles  upon  special  cases) ;  it  has  principles 
proper  to  itself.  At  the  same  time  its  general  importance  is 
rated  decidedly  below  that  of  theoretical  reason.  The  position 
is  the  same  in  the  Scholastic  system  of  thought  and  speech : 
when  Thomas  Aquinas  talks  of  cognitio  practica  he  means 
neither  more  nor  less  than  knowledge  bearing  upon  action. 
In  recent  times  Ch.  Wolff,  more  than  any  one  else,  helped  to 
establish  a  division  of  philosophy  into  theoretical  and  practical, 
and  gave  the  former  unqualified  first  place.*  Kant  followed 
him,  both  in  his  language  and  in  his  division  of  philosophy, 
but  with  the  very  important  difference  that  he  reversed  the 
position  ;  practical  philosophy — as  that  which  "  freedom  makes 
possible " — now  takes  the  lead,  and  is  made  to  create  an 
independent  sphere  of  thought :  "  Practical  reason,  in  Kant's 
philosophy,  annexes  territory  which  had  previously  belonged  to 
theoretical  reason,  since  it  originates  postulates,  that  is, 
theoretical  first  principles,  which  the  critique  of  pure  reason 
held  to  be  doubtful "  (Trendelenburg,  Logische  Unter- 
tuchungcn,  3rd  edit.,  ii.  457).  Since  reason  was  held  by 
Kant  to  attain  complete  independence  only  in  this  sphere,  it 
followed  that  here  we  drew  nearest  to  truth  itself — in  fact, 
nowhere  else  could  humanity  find  an  absolute  truth.!  From 
Kant's  position  it  is  only  a  step  to  Fichte's:  "  Practical  reason 

•  Thus  for  example  in  the  Logica,  §  92 :  Palam  igitur  ett,  philosophiam 
practicam  univertam  ex  Metaphysica  principia  petere  debere.  §  93  :  Meta- 
physica  philosophiam  practicam  prcecedere  debet. 

t  The  manner  in  which  Kant  deduced  convictions  from  practical  reason  is 
not  without  its  doubtful  side,  and  it  met  with  a  good  deal  of  opposition.  Thus 
Harms,  for  example,  says  (Getch.  der  Philosophie  teit  Kant,  p.  247):  "Kant 
calls  ideas  postulates  of  practical  reason.  They  are,  however,  not  postulates 
of  practical  reason  at  all ;  they  are  postulates  of  theoretical  reason  in  the 
knowl'  .h'e  of  practical  reason,  of  reason  applied  to  conduct  in  the  moral  life 
of  the  spirit.  In  Kant's  philosophy  the  term  practical  reason  is  itself 
ambiguous,  for  on  the  one  hand  it  means  reason  applied  to  conduct,  on  the 
other,  the  knowledge  of  practical  reason." 

5 


66  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

is  the  root  of  all  reason."  Thus  one  period  reduces  the 
practical  to  a  mere  application  of  the  theoretical,  while  another 
exalts  it  to  the  position  of  a  source  of  new  truths. 

A  fundamental  opposition  runs  through  the  history  of  these 
terms :  namely,  that  between  cosmic  knowledge  and  moral 
conduct  (which  is  the  most  usual  meaning  of  practical  reason). 
The  question  is,  which  should  govern  our  lives  and  control  our 
convictions?  The  answer  decides  our  position  with  regard  to 
reality  and  at  the  same  time  the  form  which  reality  takes. 
We  have  here  two  types  of  life  in  direct  opposition  to  one 
another,  the  one  tending  more  especially  towards  hreadth  and 
clarity,  the  other  towards  warmth  and  strength ;  order  dis- 
tinguishes the  one,  freedom  the  other. 

The  Greek  thinkers,  without  exception,  assign  the  first  place 
to  intellect.  They  differ  only  as  to  the  greater  or  less  extreme 
to  which  they  carry  out  their  fundamental  idea.  This  high 
valuation  of  the  intellect  was  the  natural  expression  of  the 
Greek  conviction  that  man  belonged  to  an  unchangeable  cosmic 
scheme,  forming,  as  it  were,  a  magnificent  framework  of  undis- 
puted reality  to  our  human  existence.  There  remained  nothing 
to  do  except  to  create  a  philosophy  of  this  cosmos,  free  from 
the  littlenesses  of  everyday-life  and  all  the  confusion  of  human 
circumstance.  We  may  mention  Aristotle,  who  gave  purest 
expression  to  Greek  culture,  as  upholding  the  absolute 
superiority  of  the  life  of  speculative  enquiry  over  practical  life 
(which  latter  only  occupied  people  with  transitory  things  and 
made  them  dependent  upon  their  environment)  :  true  happi- 
ness can  only  follow  in  the  track  of  philosophical  research. 
Further,  the  trend  towards  morality,  which  took  place  under 
the  Stoics,  did  not  mean  so  much  a  separation  of  life  from 
thought  as  an  absorption  of  practical  energy  by  thought,  a 
raising  of  thought  to  the  status  of  reasoned  action.  The  last 
flash  of  the  Greek  spirit,  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus,  reveals 
an  elevation  of  thought  to  complete  sovereignty  and  world- 
creative  power.  In  its  very  decline  the  ancient  Greek  world 
emphasised  more  than  ever  its  belief  in  that  intellectual  power 
which  gave  to  its  cultural  work  an  immeasurable  breadth  and 
a  marvellous  clearness. 


THEORETICAL-PRACTICAL  67 

It  lay  in  the  very  nature  of  Christianity  to  reject  this 
valuation.  When  the  chief  problem  of  life  is  the  relationship 
of  man  to  God ;  when,  along  with  the  appearance  of  new 
depths,  men  become  conscious  of  difficult  complications  and 
even  dark  abysses  in  the  human  soul,  and  when,  in  consequence, 
the  chief  task  becomes  that  of  spiritual  ascent  and  renewal,  then 
the  attention  of  humanity  will  not  be  directed  towards  cosmic 
knowledge  but  towards  the  condition  of  the  soul,  and  beyond 
that  to  the  building  up  of  a  new  scheme  of  human  relationships. 
This  means  the  complete  rooting  up  of  intellectualism. 

But  this  inner  transformation  did  not  express  itself  to  any 
great  extent  as  a  shaping  force  determining  the  general  con- 
ditions of  life.  Moreover,  that  which  filled  men's  hearts  did 
not  supply  the  strength  to  create  a  corresponding  thought- world. 
Augustine  alone  made  serious  progress  in  this  direction.  Con- 
sider, for  example,  his  reference  of  all  reality  to  the  will  (nihil 
cdiud  quam  voluntates)  and  the  leading  position  which  he  gives 
to  the  will  in  his  psychology  (as  the  uniting  force  in  the  soul). 
But  even  Augustine  did  not  develop  the  Christian  view  of  life 
into  a  complete  system  with  a  corresponding  thought-world. 

It  has  thus  come  to  pass  that  the  development  of  Christianity 
has  been  powerfully  and  enduringly  influenced  by  a  system  of 
thought  which  it  had  intended  to  replace.  Christianity  suffers 
to  this  day  from  a  division  between  inner  feeling  and  outward 
form.  Christian  dogma  stands  under  the  influence  of  Greek 
intellectualism.  Assuming  that  divine  doctrine  replaced  secular 
doctrine,  we  still  have  to  face  the  fact  that  right  knowledge  was 
regarded  as  the  standard  for  testing  the  truth  and  value  of  life. 
At  the  height  of  the  scholastic  period  we  see  Greek  intel- 
lectualism more  powerful  than  ever ;  logical  reasoning  advances 
into  the  remotest  depths  of  the  Christian  thought- world.*  There 
was  no  lack  of  opposing  tendencies  laying  stress  on  the  will, 
such  as  Duns  Scotus'  I  nominalism  (mysticism  with  a  practical 

*  It  was  only  in  an  outward  sense  that  mediaeval  philosophy  was  the  hand- 
maid of  theology.  In  an  inward  sense  it  would  be  much  nearer  the  mark  to 
say  that  philosophy  moulded  theology. 

t  He  says,  for  example  (see  Stockl,  Phil.  d.  Mittelalt.,  ii.  788):  tides  non 
ett  habitus  speculativut,  nee  credere  est  actus  speculative,  nee  visio  sequens  credere 
est  visio  speculative!,,  sed  practica.  Nata  est  enim  ista  visio  confannit  fruitioni. 


68  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

tendency),  and  the  Reformation  enabled  this  trend  of  thought  to 
achieve  a  great  victory.  Luther  tried  with  all  his  might  to 
liberate  Christianity  from  the  power  of  Greek  intellectualism, 
whether  Aristotelian  or  Neo-Platonic ;  he  believed  that  Greek 
thought  had  volatilised  or  obscured  the  real  substance  of 
Christianity.  Melancthon  calls  the  "heart  and  its  emotions" 
"the  most  essential  and  chief  part  of  man." 

But  notwithstanding  the  development  of  will,  Protestantism 
did  not  find  the  power  to  convert  its  innermost  sources  of 
strength  into  a  system  of  life ;  it,  too,  ended  in  again  paying 
homage  to  the  power  of  intellectualism.  If  speculation  was 
permanently  dispensed  with,  knowledge  of  another  kind — a 
knowledge  of  historical  data — but  all  the  same  knowledge, 
appeared  to  be  indispensable  to  the  rescue  of  souls.  The 
conception  of  belief,  too,  took  a  strongly  intellectualistic  turn ; 
the  new  church  became  first  and  foremost  a  congregation  based 
upon  doctrine,  a  school  of  the  pure  word.  A  new  orthodoxy 
came  into  existence,  at  least  equal  to  that  of  the  Greeks  in  self- 
righteousness  and  intolerance. 

The  Modern  World  from  the  very  outset  unreservedly  and 
joyously  took  up  the  task  of  thought.  It  looked  to  thought  in 
hope  of  breaking  away  from  the  yoke  of  historical  tradition. 
Thought  promised  to  bring  clarity  into  a  chaos  that  had  become 
intolerable.  Men  believed  that  thought  could  break  through  the 
tissue  of  trivial  human  interests  and  open  up  the  prospect  of  an 
infinite  cosmos.  As  compared  with  the  Greek  method,  thought 
has  now  passed  from  quiet  contemplation  to  something  more 
akin  to  restless  work,  belligerent  advance ;  from  assimilating  a 
given  world  it  has  come  to  building  up  a  new  one  ;  thought  of 
this  kind  dominates  the  Enlightenment  down  to  its  every  detail 
— not  only  the  speculative  school  with  its  bold  cosmic  philosophy, 
but  also  the  empirical  with  its  tendency  towards  practical  life. 
Here,  also,  salvation  is  expected  entirely  from  definite  and 
clearly  defined  knowledge.  The  type  of  knowledge  is  no  longer 
what  it  was — nevertheless  it  is  still  knowledge.*  Like  all  great 
movements,  the  Enlightenment  carried  within  itself  its  own 

•  See  for  example  Locke  (at  the  commencement  of  the  Estay)  :  "Our 
business  here  is  not  to  know  all  things,  but  those  which  concern  our  conduct." 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  69 

antidote.  The  enhanced  and  excessive  emphasis  laid  upon 
knowledge  necessarily  gave  rise  to  doubts  as  to  the  extent  to 
which  knowledge  of  the  world  is  possible  and  as  to  the  power  of 
knowledge  over  mankind.*  But  a  mere  reaction  has  never  yet 
been  able  to  dominate  men's  minds,  and  a  positive  turn  had  to 
be  given  to  this  tendency  before  it  was  capable  of  directing 
humanity  into  a  fresh  path. 

Such  a  change  was  effected  in  the  philosophical  sphere  by 
Kant.  His  influence  in  this  matter,  both  in  a  positive  and 
negative  sense,  was  incomparably  the  greatest  which  had  yet 
attached  to  any  scientific  work.  Never  before  had  the  capacity 
for  more  knowledge  been  so  keenly  and  thoroughly  tested,  and 
the  conditions  of  its  successful  attainment  so  accurately  ascer- 
tained. The  result  was  a  violent  upheaval,  the  destructive 
effect  of  which  was  more  than  compensated  for  by  the  raising  of 
moral  action  to  the  status  of  a  moral  world  and  the  recognition 
of  this  world  as  the  core  of  all  reality.  This  upheaval  brought 
intellectualism,  for  the  first  time,  face  to  face  with  an  opposing 
movement  of  equal  force;  a  movement  which  had  been  in 
existence  for  thousands  of  years,  but  had  not  previously  been 
scientifically  classified  and  systematised.  Intellectualism,  never- 
theless, raised  its  head  again  in  the  shape  of  Hegel's  Panlogism 
— raised  it  as  boldly  as  ever ;  but  this  was  only  rendered  possible 
by  lightly  passing  over  the  true  significance  of  Kant's  work,  and 
soon  there  came  the  reaction  with  gathered  force.  Since  then 
the  prevailing  tendency  of  the  age  has  been  against  intel- 
lectualism. This  may  be  noticed  in  the  influence  of  Schopen- 
hauer, with  his  doctrine  of  the  will ;  also  in  the  religious  and 
theological  tendency  which  aims  at  laying  chief  emphasis  upon 
the  claims  and  tasks  of  practical  life.  We  see  it  in  the  pre- 
ference of  humanity  in  general  for  attacking  practical  social 

*  This  is  to  be  seen,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  Pascal,  and  even  better  in 
that  of  Bayle,  the  most  important  sceptic  of  the  Enlightenment.  The  latter 
says,  for  example  (ceuv.  div.  1727,  iii.  89&)  :  Ce  ne  sont  pat  Us  opinion* 
generates  de  I'esprit  qui  nous  ddterminent  d  agir,  mais  let  passions  prisentes  du 
cceur.  Bayle's  faithful  disciple,  Frederick  the  Great,  agreed  with  him  in 
believing  that  life  derived  its  strength  and  fixity  solely  from  morality  :  Let 
teiences  doivent  etre  consider&es  comme  des  moyens  qui  nous  donnent  plus  de 
capacity  pour  remplir  nos  devoirt  (see  Zeller,  Fricdrich  d.  <3.  alt  Philosoph, 
p.  183). 


70  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

questions  rather  than  pondering  over  cosmic  problems — the 
former,  indeed,  force  themselves  upon  our  attention  with 
increasing  persistency.  Within  the  special  sphere  of  science, 
psychology  in  particular  tends  to  strengthen  the  new  tendency, 
because  it  reveals  the  extent  to  which  the  world  of  ideas  is 
dominated  by  the  power  of  instincts  and  interests,  and  would 
even  like  to  demonstrate  that  the  will  directs  the  movements  of 
this  world. 

This  high  valuation  of  the  will  is  accompanied  by  a  desire  to 
attribute  every  possible  evil  in  modern  life  to  the  predominance 
of  reason.  We  are  uncertain  as  to  the  main  direction  which  our 
effort  should  take  and  our  spiritual  life  rests  upon  no  sure 
foundation  :  it  is  stated  that  the  intellect  is  responsible  for  this 
state  of  affairs  ;  in  its  desire  to  have  proof  for  everything,  it 
will  allow  us  to  possess  only  what  comes  to  us  indirectly,  and  the 
certainty  of  direct  life  is  thus  rendered  impossible.  We  live  in  a 
chaos  of  different  opinions  and  different  values,  and  this,  we  are 
told,  is  due  to  the  dominion  of  the  reasoning  activity,  which 
causes  individuals  to  rely  solely  on  their  own  powers  of  reflection 
and  hence  inevitably  drives  them  farther  apart  from  one  another. 
It  is  complained  that  things  holy  and  divine  no  longer  command 
reverence,  and  the  explanation  is  sought  in  the  undue  develop- 
ment of  human  self-consciousness,  itself  chiefly  brought  about  by 
the  intellect,  with  its  sense  of  power  and  its  overweening  pride  of 
knowledge.  If  the  intellect  is  thus  mainly  responsible  for  all 
our  errors,  release  from  its  tyranny  should  result  in  a  general 
increment  of  health  throughout  the  whole  of  life.  Has  modern 
voluntarism  the  power  to  procure  such  a  release  ? 

(6)  Voluntarism 

Voluntarism  is  not  a  simple  phenomenon ;  each  important 
historical  epoch  has  had  its  own  special  voluntarism,  which  has 
taken  a  form  determined  by  the  leading  tendency  of  the  age. 

In  the  sphere  of  religious  thought,  this  tendency  was  repre- 
sented by  the  view  that  not  only  God's  revelation  but  man's 
acceptance  of  it  was  a  self-originated  act  of  will.  This  view 
emphasised  the  independence,  spontaneity,  and  pure  actuality  of 
religious  life.  It  rejected  all  attempts  to  make  religion  intelli- 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  71 

gible  by  reference  to  its  broader  context.  The  opposition 
between  intellectualism  and  voluntarism  is  clearly  shown  in  the 
well-known  comparison  of  Thomas  Aquinas  with  Duns  Scotus ; 
the  former  said  that  God  ordained  good  because  it  was  good,  the 
latter  that  good  was  good  because  God  ordained  it.  Voluntarism 
did  full  justice  to  the  specific  qualities  of  religion,  its  indepen- 
dence and  its  uniqueness.  At  the  same  time  a  danger  arose — 
namely,  that  of  a  separation  of  religion  from  the  rest  of  life,  an 
absence  of  all  points  of  connection.  Since  a  complete  spiritual 
penetration  and  assimilation  of  the  content  of  truth  was  not 
achieved,  it  was  easy  for  the  immediacy  of  religious  experience 
to  turn  to  shallow  and  obstinate  certainty  of  conviction,  the 
spontaneity  and  freedom  to  blind  self-will.  One  cannot  help 
thinking  of  Plotinus'  saying,  that  he  who  strives  to  rise  above 
reason  is  in  no  little  danger  of  becoming  unreasonable. 

In  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  voluntarism  takes  on  a  different 
complexion.  It  is  now  a  question  of  shifting  the  centre  of 
gravity  of  life  from  knowing  to  willing  (more  especially  to 
willing  in  its  connection  with  the  moral  life) .  A  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  our  capacity  for  obtaining  knowledge  supplied  the 
chief  impetus  in  this  direction;  since  our  knowledge  did  not 
appear  capable  of  penetrating  to  real  fundamentals,  it  did  not 
seem  in  a  position  to  furnish  a  sure  foundation  for  life.  Unless 
truth,  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  was  to  be  completely 
abandoned,  another  source  of  truth  had  to  be  found,  and  after 
the  disturbance  of  religious  faith  there  seemed  to  be  no  other 
save  man's  moral  conduct.  Kant  interpreted  the  moral  life  in 
such  a  deep  sense  that  it  became  the  revelation  of  a  new  world ; 
a  world  forming  the  last  depth  of  reality.  This  world,  however, 
could  not  be  theoretically  made  plain  to  everyone,  any  more  than 
could  moral  conduct  itself.  It  could  not  be  exhibited  as  a 
present  possession,  and  was  capable  of  carrying  conviction  only 
to  those  who  recognised  the  fundamentally  moral  nature  of  life 
and  took  up  their  human  responsibilities.  Deeds  thus  precede 
knowledge,  and  what  results  from  them  in  the  shape  of  decisive 
conviction  is  not  of  the  nature  of  theoretical  knowledge,  but  is  a 
practical  postulate.  We  all  know  that  the  consequences  of  this 
teaching  were  deep,  revolutionary,  and  intensely  stimulating. 


72  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

It  is  difficult  to  pass  judgment  upon  this  phase  of  the  problem, 
because  fruitful  and  necessary  truths  are  here  so  closely  com- 
bined with  questionable  interpretations.  A  clearly  expressed 
and  outstanding  truth  is  the  dependence  of  our  ultimate  con- 
victions upon  the  operations  of  the  inward  life  and  the  reality 
manifested  in  and  through  these,  and  not  upon  conditioning 
factors  situated  in  the  external  world.  This  view  puts  an  end  to 
all  attempts  at  penetrating  to  an  inner  nature  of  things  by 
means  of  speculation  and  then  interpreting  reality  from  this  new 
standpoint.  Closely  connected  with  this. truth  is  another ;  that 
the  content  of  inner  life  is  not  ready-made  property,  acquired 
without  effort,  but  must  germinate  within  us  and  gradually  un- 
fold itself.  The  way  in  which  a  given  person  sees  the  world 
will  depend  upon  the  degree  of  this  inner  development.  We 
thus  see  why  it  is  that  humanity  in  its  struggle  after  truth 
becomes  inwardly  divided  against  itself,  and  why  it  is  that  the 
personal  factor  is  so  important. 

As  soon  as  we  pass  from  considering  this  position  in  a  general 
way  to  examining  its  results  when  systematically  worked  out, 
we  find  ourselves  in  a  region  filled  with  doubt.  It  is  one  thing 
to  attach  a  central  importance  to  the  fundamental  facts  of  the 
inward  life,  and  to  rely  upon  them  as  determining  data  in  our 
quest  for  knowledge  :  it  is  another  to  exalt  them  to  the  position 
of  a  direct  source  of  knowledge.  The  one  is  as  necessary  as 
the  other  is  impossible.  The  facts  of  the  inward  life,  just  as 
they  are,  cannot  be  immediately  made  use  of  as  a  secure 
foundation.  They  must  first  of  all  be  clarified  and  illuminated 
by  the  methods  of  philosophy.  What  is  subsequently  found  to 
be  fundamental  and  established  as  true  has  universal  validity 
and  its  accompanying  inner  compulsory  force ;  it  is  impossible 
for  it  to  be  dependent  upon  a  personal  assent. 

Some  mathematical  truths  are  so  difficult  to  understand  that 
only  very  few  people  are  capable  of  fathoming  them.  Does  this 
interfere  in  the  slightest  degree  with  their  universal  validity  ? 
Following  the  same  line  of  argument,  if  the  truths  of  life  do 
not  carry  complete  conviction  until  a  corresponding  life  has  been 
developed,  and  if  a  decision  of  the  whole  man  is  necessary  in 
order  to  approach  them,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  are  in  any 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  73 

sense  reduced  to  mere  possibilities,  which  one  may  accept  or  not 
as  one  pleases.  They  continue  fully  to  retain  their  character  as 
necessary  truths  possessing  universal  validity.  The  subjectivity 
does  not  lie  in  truth  itself,  but  in  the  relationship  of  humanity  to 
it.  Nothing  can  be  completely  true  that  is  inwardly  connected 
with  any  subjective  factor.  Looking  at  the  matter  from  this 
point  of  view,  we  are  compelled,  on  principle,  to  reject  the  con- 
ception of  practical  reason  as  one-sided  and  misleading.  There 
are  not  two  reasons,  one  theoretical  and  the  other  practical, 
existing  side  by  side.  There  is  one  reason  and  one  alone,  con- 
cerned with  the  whole  of  life.  The  conception  of  self-activity 
is,  however,  to  be  included  in  that  of  reason,  as  one  of  its 
essential  attributes.  Reason  must  not  be  conceived  of  as 
a  thing  utterly  detached ;  it  is  the  representative  of  a 
completely  independent  life — of  reality  self-poised  and  self- 
contained.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  life  there  could  be  no 
truth  at  all. 

Moreover,  Kant's  conception  of  practical  reason  is  a  much 
more  exalted  one  than  that  usually  in  vogue.  It  is  a  concep- 
tion which  revolutionises  the  whole  of  life,  brings  about  a 
shifting  of  the  centre  of  gravity  towards  original  creative  work, 
and  (in  a  particular  direction)  gives  life  a  cosmic  character 
possessing  strict  universal  validity.  If  this  is  anything  it  is 
metaphysics,  although  not  of  the  kind  we  deal  with  in  onto- 
logical  speculation.  But  in  proportion  as  this  metaphysical 
character  becomes  obliterated,  the  sphere  of  practical  reason 
ceases  to  be  the  whole  reality  with  all  its  depth,  and  becomes 
one  of  a  number  of  separate  spheres,  thus  less  and  less  ful- 
filling the  function  of  universally  valid  truth.  Hence  life  based 
upon  such  practical  reason  tends  to  narrow  practical  and  moral 
life  and  to  isolate  it  from  the  rest  of  human  culture,  with  the 
result  that  the  former  becomes  subjective  and  impressionable,  the 
latter  superficial  and  merely  utilitarian  in  its  aims — life  as  a 
whole  deteriorating  through  this  division.  The  work  of  human 
culture  should  never  become  separated  from  men's  ultimate  con- 
victions, for  the  wider  the  gap  between  them,  the  more  impossible 
is  it  for  our  life  to  be  spiritually  controlled  and  permeated  and 
for  any  real  greatness  to  be  achieved. 


74  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

In  the  life  of  to-day,  voluntarism  presents  itself  in  yet  another 
aspect ;  namely,  as  a  scientific  theory,  which  comes  to  the  front, 
in  the  first  place,  in  psychology  as  a  movement  which  aims  at 
demonstrating  the  dependence  of  the  life  of  ideas  upon  the 
instincts  and  desires,  and  the  conditioning  of  its  entire  course  by 
a  voluntary  phase — as  is  seen  more  particularly  in  Wundt's 
theory  of  apperception.  Much  new  and  valuable  knowledge  has 
been  won  along  these  lines  and  our  general  insight  into  the 
whole  matter  has  been  deepened.  It  is,  however,  distinctly 
questionable  whether,  in  this  case,  we  have  not  often  to  do  less 
with  an  opposition  between  intellect  and  will  than  with  one 
between  a  central  and  a  peripheral  activity  of  the  soul,  extend- 
ing through  the  whole  of  life. 

The  shape  which  voluntarism  (with  the  accompanying  undue 
preponderance  of  practical  activity)  takes  in  the  life  of  to-day 
must  be  considered  from  the  broadest  standpoint.  Speaking  in 
a  general  way,  it  may  be  said  that  it  reveals  itself  in  the  pre- 
vailing view  that  the  practical  satisfaction  of  man  (of  man  in 
relation  to  his  immediate  environment)  is  the  one  and  only  true 
goal — the  pursuit  of  knowledge  being  looked  upon  as  a  mere 
means  to  this  end  and  indeed  a  foolish  waste  of  time  unless 
devoted  to  the  promotion  of  human  well-being.  That  such  is 
the  general  tendency  of  modern  life  has  been  already  pointed  out 
in  the  historical  sketch.  Humanity  has  become  weary  of  strug- 
gling over  cosmic  problems.  Questions  of  inner  development, 
of  the  development  of  the  whole  man  to  a  world-embracing 
personality,  are  pushed  far  into  the  background  by  the  unceasing 
growth  of  political,  economical,  and  technical  problems.  The 
struggle  for  economical  self-preservation,  in  particular,  more  and 
more  absorbs  all  our  powers  and  increasingly  causes  life  and 
conduct  to  be  looked  upon  as  mere  matters  of  utility.  Such  a 
state  of  affairs  leaves  no  sort  of  room  for  knowledge  to  retain 
any  self-value.  The  pragmatic  movement  in  particular  (which, 
starting  in  America  and  England,  has  more  and  more  occupied 
the  attention  of  the  civilised  world)  attempts  to  develop  a 
specific  theory  of  knowledge  with  this  practical  point  of 
view  as  centre.  Let  us  examine  this  subject  a  little  more  in 
detail. 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  75 

(c)  Pragmatism 

Pragmatism  is,  as  yet,  so  little  known  in  Germany  that  before 
proceeding  further  it  will  be  well  to  make  a  few  explanatory 
remarks.  We  will  take  as  our  main  basis  a  series  of  lectures 
by  William  James,  delivered  with  the  object  of  elucidating 
pragmatism.*  The  expression  pragmatism  was  first  used  as  a 
philosophical  concept  in  its  present  sense  by  Charles  Pierce  in 
the  American  magazine  The  Popular  Science  Monthly  (1878). 
Twenty  years  later  James  took  the  matter  up  and  developed 
it  in  brilliant  fashion.  Among  other  exponents  may  be  men- 
tioned Dewey  (Chicago)  and  Schiller  (Oxford),  the  latter  being 
the  originator  of  the  expression  "  humanism."  It  is  inter- 
esting, from  a  social  and  historical  point  of  view,  to  notice  that 
now  for  the  first  time  we  see  America  taking  the  lead  in  a 
philosophical  movement ;  it  is  in  America,  too,  for  the  most 
part,  that  pragmatism  has  become  a  widespread  tendency.  In 
Europe  this  movement  has  been  more  influential  in  England 
and  in  Italy  than  elsewhere. 

Speaking  of  the  relationship  between  pragmatism  and  other 
tendencies  of  thought,  James  says  (p.  51):  "  Pragmatism  repre- 
sents a  perfectly  familiar  attitude  in  philosophy,  the  empiricist 
attitude,  but  it  represents  it,  as  it  seems  to  me,  both  in  a  more 
radical  and  in  a  less  objectionable  form  than  it  has  ever  yet 
assumed";  and  further  (p.  58):  "It  agrees  with  nominalism, 
for  instance,  in  always  appealing  to  particulars ;  with  utili- 
tarianism in  emphasising  practical  aspects ;  with  positivism  in 
its  disdain  for  verbal  solutions,  useless  questions,  and  meta- 
physical abstractions."  Pragmatism  claims  credit  for  being  a 
method,  and  not  a  system.  This  method  consists  in  bringing 
the  pursuit  of  knowledge  into,  close  relationship  with  human 
existence  and  its  development.  Nothing  is  to  be  reckoned  true 
that  cannot  be  justified  from  this  point  of  view.  The  true  thus 
becomes  a  portion  of  the  good  (p.  76) :  "  The  true  is  the  name 

*  Pragmatism  (translated  into  German  by  Wilhelm  Jerusalem  (1908).)  Jeru- 
salem's article  called  Der  Pragmatismus  :  eine  neue  philosophische  Methods 
(Deutsche  Liter aturzeitung,  January  25,  1908)  is  also  worthy  of  notice. — 
Tr.  note  :  The  references  given  in  this  chapter  are  to  the  English  original  of 
Pragmatism  (1907). 


of  whatever  proves  itself  to  be  good  in  the  way  of  belief,  and 
good,  too,  for  definite  assignable  reasons."  Again  (p.  194) : 
"All  our  theories  are  instrumental,  are  mental  modes  of  adap- 
tation to  reality,  rather  than  revelations  or  gnostic  answers  to 
some  divinely-instituted  world-enigma."  In  pursuance  of  this 
line  of  thought  "  humanism  "  looks  upon  truths  as  products  of 
the  human  race :  "  Truth  makes  no  other  kind  of  claim  and 
imposes  no  other  kind  of  ought  than  health  and  wealth  do.  All 
these  claims  are  conditional  "  (p.  230). 

Such  a  conception  as  this  must  give  a  thoroughly  peculiar 
turn  to  scientific  enquiry  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  now  directed 
not  so  much  towards  establishing  principles  as  towards  following 
up  the  consequences  involved  in  their  development.  We  no 
longer  consider  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  apart  from 
mankind,  but  refer  everything  to  humanity  and  estimate  it 
according  to  its  value  for  humanity. 

What  does  this  signify,  and  what  kind  of  a  transformation 
does  it  bring  about?  These  questions  are  best  answered  by 
a  consideration  of  the  examples  brought  forward  by  James 
himself. 

The  conflict  between  materialism  and  spiritualism  appears 
in  quite  a  new  light,  and  is  brought  to  a  decision  by  estimating 
the  services  rendered  by  each  to  the  cause  of  humanity,  and  not 
by  dwelling  upon  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the  principles 
involved  in  the  two  tendencies.  By  materialism  is  understood 
(in  this  connection)  that  species  of  thought  which  explains  the 
higher  phenomena  by  means  of  the  lower  and  represents  the 
destinies  of  the  world  as  being  controlled  by  its  blind  compo- 
nents and  unconscious  forces :  by  spiritualism,  that  which 
assigns  the  controlling  power  to  the  higher  elements,  thereby 
making  spirit  something  more  than  a  mere  witness  and  reporter 
of  the  course  of  events  and  recognising  it  as  capable  of  active 
participation  in  the  same.  Let  the  question  now  be  asked, 
Which  of  these  two  conceptions  best  promotes  human  life? 
There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  answer.  The  final  practical 
conclusions  of  materialism  are  completely  cheerless,  while 
spiritualism,  with  its  affirmation  of  a  moral  order  throughout 
the  universe,  gives  full  liberty  to  our  hopes  (p.  108)  :  "  Spiritual- 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  77 

istic  faith  in  all  its  forms  deals  with  a  world  of  promise,  while 
materialism's  sun  sets  in  a  sea  of  disappointment."  The  reli- 
gious problem  is  discussed  along  the  same  lines :  instead  of 
dealing  with  speculative  principles,  the  matter  is  approached 
from  the  point  of  view  of  human  needs  (p.  299) :  "  On  prag- 
matistic  principles,  if  the  hypothesis  of  God  works  satisfactorily 
in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word,  it  is  true.  Now,  whatever  its 
residual  difficulties  may  be,  experience  shows  that  it  certainly 
does  work,  and  that  the  problem  is  to  build  it  out  and  deter- 
mine it  so  that  it  will  combine  satisfactorily  with  all  the  other 
working  truths." 

He  who  has  made  himself  at  home  within  the  movement  will 
readily  understand  that  it  is  quite  capable  of  gaming  wide 
influence  in  contemporary  circles.  By  assigning  first  place  to 
what  had  formerly  been  regarded  as  only  of  occasional  and 
secondary  importance,  things  are  seen  in  a  manner  which  seems 
to  make  them  peculiarly  simple  and  easy  of  comprehension.  It 
is  obvious  that  a  great  simplification  must  ensue,  because  all 
problems  not  related  to  the  maintenance  of  human  life  are 
dropped  as  unprofitable;  at  the  same  time  this  relationship 
seems  to  provide  an  entirely  impartial  standard  of  valuation  for 
the  various  assertions,  thus  enabling  the  matter,  in  each  case, 
to  be  raised  above  mere  party  strife.  Truth  becomes  more 
direct  and  fruitful,  more  plastic  and  adaptable,  by  being  thus 
thrown  into  the  centre  of  the  stream  of  life  and  called  upon  to 
take  an  active  share  in  the  forward  movement.  Such  a  solution 
seems  to  be  particularly  suitable  for  a  time  like  our  own,  so 
divided  in  its  convictions.*  The  positive  side  of  the  work,  more- 
over, receives  essential  support  from  an  incisive  criticism  of  the 
traditional  concept  of  truth. 

Notwithstanding  the  stimulating  power  of  such  a  movement, 
supported  as  it  is  by  brilliant  and  distinguished  thinkers,  we 
are  compelled  to  regard  it,  when  we  consider  it  as  a  whole  and 
in  its  ultimate  bearings,  as  an  error.  The  powerful  impression 

*  James  remarks  in  this  connection  (p.  194)  :  "  Certainly  the  restlessness  of 
the  actual  theoretic  situation,  the  value  for  some  purposes  of  each  thought- 
level,  and  the  inability  of  either  to  expel  the  others  decisively,  suggest  this 
pragmatistic  view." 


78  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

produced  by  pragmatism  is  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  fact 
that  it  reverses  the  conventional  way  of  looking  at  things.  But 
what  if,  in  the  process,  the  idea  of  truth  itself  is  reversed  and 
ends  by  standing  on  its  head?  And  this  is  what  actually 
happens.  The  essence  of  the  conception  of  truth,  and  the  life  and 
soul  of  our  search  after  truth,  is  to  be  found  in  the  idea  that  in 
truth  man  attains  to  something  superior  to  all  his  own  opinions 
and  inclinations,  something  that  possesses  a  validity  completely 
independent  of  any  human  consent ;  the  hope  of  an  essentially 
new  life  is  thus  held  out  to  man,  a  vision  of  a  wider  and  richer 
being,  an  inner  communion  with  reality,  a  liberation  from  all  that 
is  merely  human.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  good  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  of  humanity  becomes  the  highest  aim  and  the  guiding 
principle,  truth  sinks  to  the  level  of  a  merely  utilitarian  opinion. 
This  is  destructive  of  inner  life.  All  the  power  of  conviction 
that  truth  can  possess  must  disappear  the  moment  it  is  seen  to 
be  a  mere  means.  Truth  can  only  exist  as  an  end  in  itself. 
"Instrumental"  truth  is  no  truth  at  all. 

We  must  not  be  understood  to  assert  that  the  influence  of 
different  doctrines  upon  human  conditions  is  an-  unimportant 
theme.  It  is  certain  that  much  stimulus  and  illumination  may 
be  derived  from  a  more  careful  study  of  this  influence  and  an 
examination  of  its  causes.  But  what  we  are  here  concerned 
with  is,  in  the  first  instance,  something  merely  phenomenal; 
what  is  essential,  or  non-essential,  right  or  wrong,  has  still 
to  be  made  clear. 

Pragmatism  disintegrates  truth  by  reducing  it  to  a  crowd  of 
separate  truths,  and  even  claims  credit  for  doing  so.  But  can 
we  be  sure  that  these  separate  truths  will  dwell  peacefully  and 
harmoniously  side  by  side,  that  there  will  be  no  conflict  between 
them  ?  In  the  case  of  conflict  how  is  arbitration  to  take  place  ? 

Finally,  the  chief  aim  and  end  of  pragmatism — the  success 
and  enrichment  of  human  life — is,  as  an  end,  by  no  means  free 
from  objection.  By  human  life  is  here  meant  civilised  life  on 
the  broad  scale ;  but  in  order  to  regard  this  life  as  so  surely 
good,  one  must  be  inspired  by  the  optimistic  enthusiasm  for 
human  culture  which  was  more  characteristic  of  earlier  ages 
than  it  is  of  our  own.  Is  this  life,  when  taken  as  in  itself  the 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  79 

final  thing,  really  worth  all  the  trouble  and  excitement,  all  the 
work  and  effort,  all  the  sufferings  and  sacrifices  that  it  costs  ? 
"When  we  examine  this  life,  with  its  vanity  and  show  and  its  inner 
emptiness,  when  we  consider  how  it  is  penetrated  through  and 
through  by  impurity  and  pretence,  does  it  not  seem  a  fearful 
contradiction?  Shall  the  quest  after  truth  be  made  a  means 
for  the  preservation  of  this  exceedingly  dubious  life  ?  We  can- 
not conceive  of  any  belief  more  hazardous  than  a  faith  in  life 
so  baseless  as  this. 

(d)   OUT  own  Position :   Activism 

In  the  introduction  to  the  German  edition  of  William 
James's  Pragmatism,  Jerusalem  refers  to  the  approximation 
of  my  own  position  towards  that  of  the  pragmatists,  and 
remarks:  "  Eucken's  activism  rests  upon  definite  metaphysical 
assumptions,  while  pragmatism  is  purely  empirical  "  (p.  vii). 
It  is  true  that  I  sympathetically  welcome  an  effort  which 
aims  at  bringing  truth  into  closer  relationship  with  life  and 
regarding  it  as  more  than  a  merely  intellectual  matter ;  at 
the  same  time  I  am  fully  in  agreement  with  the  rejection 
of  that  conception  of  truth  which  makes  it  consist  in  con- 
formity with  an  entity  existing  side  by  side  with  ourselves. 
The  question  remains,  What  is  meant  by  life?  Here  we 
must  recognise  a  wide  gap  between  the  tendencies  indicated 
by  the  above  two  concepts,  "empirical"  and  "metaphysical." 
In  the  former  case  life  stands  for  the  actual  condition  of  man, 
for  the  human  state  (whether  it  be  the  individual  or  the  race 
that  is  referred  to,  does  not  make  any  ultimate  difference).  On 
the  other  hand,  when  we  speak  of  seeking  a  closer  connection 
between  truth  and  life,  we  mean  the  life  of  the  spirit  as  a 
self- sufficient  life  (Beisichselbstsein  des  Lebens),  which  forms, 
with  its  own  contents  and  values,  something  essentially  new 
over  against  all  merely  human  conditions,  and  requires,  more- 
over, a  complete  reversal  of  the  immediate  state  of  affairs. 
Pragmatism  and  activism  attach  very  different  meanings  to 
the  union  of  truth  with  life.  The  former  regards  truth  as 
merely  the  means  towards  a  higher  end  (which  seems  to  us 


80  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

subversive  of  inner  life),  while  the  latter  makes  it  an  essential 
and  integral  portion  of  life  itself,  and  hence  can  never  consent 
to  it  becoming  a  mere  means. 

If  we  measure  the  achievements  of  various  tendencies  of 
thought  in  the  struggle  for  truth  by  the  fruitfulness  of  their 
contributions  to  the  development  of  life,  we  arrive  at  essentially 
different  results,  according  as  we  take  up  the  one  standpoint 
or  the  other.  In  the  one  case  the  standard  is  usefulness  to 
humanity,  with  all  the  relativity  which  this  implies ;  in  the 
other,  it  is  the  preservation  and  content  of  spiritual  life,  and 
the  various  tendencies  of  thought  must  here  be  valued  by  the 
measure  of  their  success  in  substantially  deepening  and  broaden- 
ing this  life.  The  difference  between  these  two  positions  may 
become  so  marked  as  to  amount  to  complete  opposition.  A 
tendency  of  thought  may  call  upon  men  to  make  sacrifices 
which  their  human  nature  will  find  hard ;  it  may  make  their 
lives  difficult  rather  than  easy — indeed,  all  truly  great  thought 
has  this  effect — but  at  the  same  time  it  can  enlarge  and  enrich 
intellectual  and  spiritual  life.  On  the  other  hand,  what  tends 
to  promote  comfortable  human  existence  may  be  extremely 
oppressive  to  the  life  of  the  spirit.  Modern  life  clearly  shows 
us  that  an  age  full  of  pleasure  and  rich  in  achievement  may  be 
empty  enough  spiritually.  [For  a  further  discussion  of  the 
concept  of  truth  the  reader  is  referred  to  my  Grundlinien 
einer  neuen  Lebensanschauung  (1907)  ;  (Life's  Basis  and  Life's 
Ideal,  trans.  A.  Widgery,  pub.  A.  &  C.  Black).] 

In  company  with  the  pragmatists  we  wish  for  a  conversion 
of  life  into  activity,  but  we  think  this  cannot  be  realised  so 
long  as  we  start  from  life  as  we  find  it  with  all  its  rigid 
limitations ;  it  can  only  take  place  through  a  reversal  of  this 
existence,  through  going  back  to  a  new  starting-point  and 
developing  a  new  life.  That  this  is  a  species  of  metaphysics 
we  do  not  deny ;  in  fact  we  emphatically  demand  metaphysics, 
since  it  is  only  by  a  reversal  of  the  immediate  condition  of 
things  that  an  original  and  self-active  life  is  made  possible, 
and  hence  spiritual  life  cannot  maintain  itself  without  some 
sort  of  metaphysics.  In  this  way  we  again  come  back  to  the 
necessity  of  an  independent  spiritual  life  as  a  new  stage  of 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  81 

reality,  as  the  unfolding  of  the  depths  which  reality  contains 
within  its  own  nature. 

Taking  into  account  all  the  above  considerations,  it  does 
not  appear  as  if  the  contrast  between  intellectualism  and 
voluntarism  really  went  to  the  root  of  the  matter.  It  is  not 
sufficient  to  transfer  the  chief  emphasis  in  life  from  one 
activity  of  the  soul  to  another.  This  brings  about  no  really 
essential  change  in  life,  no  enhancement  of  life ;  it  does  not 
raise  us  above  the  old  fixed  limits.  The  real  contrast  is  that 
between  a  free,  self-active  life  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  one  which,  however  eager  or  diligent,  is  inwardly 
enslaved.  But  once  this  is  recognised,  the  whole  matter 
takes  on  an  essentially  new  complexion. 

(e)  Intellect  and  Intellectualism 

The  distinctive  character  of  the  activistic  position  is  perhaps 
most  easily  explained  by  a  consideration  of  its  attitude  towards 
intellectualism  and  intellectual  work.  It  is  under  no  induce- 
ment whatever  to  diminish  in  any  way  the  importance  of 
intellectual  work.  It  cannot  look  upon  the  latter  as  an 
accessory  to  the  central  things  of  life,  as  something  that 
could  be  quite  well  dispensed  with.  The  desired  reconstruction 
of  life,  the  direction  of  life  towards  self-activity,  will  never  by 
any  chance  be  accomplished  and  maintained  without  energetic 
intellectual  work.  In  this  connection  we  may  refer  to  history, 
which  witnesses  that  whenever  the  quest  of  knowledge  has 
been  held  in  high  honour  it  has  always  figured  as  an  essential 
portion  of  life,  a  portion  which,  if  undeveloped,  would  prevent 
life  itself  reaching  its  full  stature ;  it  has  never  appeared 
in  the  character  of  a  mere  accompaniment  of  life  or  of  an 
explanation  following  upon  a  "  given "  and  finished  state  of 
affairs.  We  see  this  exemplified  in  Plato,  in  the  Fathers 
of  the  Church  (such  as  Clement  and  Origen),  and  in  Spinoza 
and  Leibniz.  It  was  universally  believed  that  knowledge  first 
made  it  possible  for  the  spiritual  content  of  life  to  reach  its 
fullest  development  and  to  become  the  complete  property  of 
humanity.  Even  if  the  claims  of  knowledge  to  be  the  whole 

G 


82  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  life  were  pressed  to  the  point  of  error,  it  was  at  any  rate 
recognised  that  knowledge  was  no  mere  copy  of  reality  :  it  did 
not  exist  side  by  side  with  life,  but  within  life.  However 
decisively,  in  consequence,  we  must  reject  the  idea  of  making 
the  intellect  a  scapegoat  for  everything  we  dislike  in  modern 
life,  he  who  desires  an  independent  and  self-sufficing  spiritual 
life  and  believes  that  if  human  life  is  to  possess  a  true  content 
it  must  be  derived  from  this  source,  is  thereby  saved  from  any 
tendency  to  impart  an  intellectualistic  form  to  life  ;  he  is  much 
more  likely  to  be  extremely  sensitive  to  the  way  in  which  the 
Modern  World  in  particular  (including  our  own  age)  has  been 
swamped  by  intellectualistic  movements.  His  regard  for 
spiritual  life  as  a  whole  will  prevent  him,  however,  from 
agreeing  with  the  verdict  passed  by  the  voluntarists  upon 
this  inundation.  But  let  us  first  examine  this  development 
of  the  power  of  intellectualism.  We  shall  then  be  able  to 
judge  whether  or  no  the  attempted  counter-movement  is  really 
strong  enough  to  cope  with  it. 

1.   THE  INVASION  OF  MODEKN  LIFE  BY  INTELLECTUALISM 

In  the  first  place  we  are  influenced  by  the  various  forms 
of  intellectualism  which  have  come  down  to  us  from  the  past. 
There  is  the  intellectualism  of  the  classical  epoch,  when  spirit 
and  intellect  were  usually  regarded  as  interchangeable  terms. 
Another  form  manifested  itself  in  the  life  of  the  Christian 
Church,  which  in  spite  of  opposing  tendencies,  persisted  for  the 
most  part  in  giving  its  belief  the  character  of  an  intellectual 
activity.  The  Modern  World,  too,  looked  more  especially  to 
intellectual  activity  to  bring  about  that  up-levelling  of  life 
towards  which  it  worked.  This  tendency  has  been  maintained 
right  down  to  the  present  day,  and  is  shown  not  only  in 
tendencies  originating  in  the  inner  life,  such  as  speculation, 
enlightenment,  and  so  forth,  but  even  more  clearly  in  that 
type  of  thought  which  is  shaped  by  the  study  of  nature.  For 
natural  scientists  are  still  accustomed  to  identify  spirit  and 
consciousness  and  to  interpret  spiritual  life  as  a  mere  reflection 
of  an  external  world.  Hence,  from  their  point  of  view,  all  moral 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  83 

elevation,  and  indeed  our  whole  salvation,  is  to  be  expected,  in 
the  first  place,  from  a  rectification  of  concepts.* 

Nothing  could  hear  clearer  witness  to  the  power  of  in- 
tellectualism  than  the  fact  that  the  counter-movements  have 
often  hecome  intellectualistic  themselves  and  ended  by  con- 
tributing to  its  influence.  A  new  content  was  desired ;  but 
it  was  presented  in  the  old  form,  and  therefore  fell  at  once 
into  the  power  of  the  enemy.  So  it  was  throughout  the 
whole  history  of  Christianity ;  and  so  it  has  continued  to  be 
right  into  the  nineteenth  century.  Schelling,  towards  the 
latter  end  of  his  career,  struggled  with  all  his  might  to  tear 
up  the  deeply  rooted  rationalism  of  his  time  and  replace  it  by 
a  positive  and  irrational  mode  of  thought.  But  his  new  thought 
was  expressed  as  a  mere  doctrine.  To  accept  this  doctrine  and 
to  be  converted  to  these  principles  was  to  place  one's  life  upon 
a  basis  of  truth.  If  this  is  not  rationalism  and  intellectual- 
ism,  what  is  it?  Very  likely  many  present-day  opponents  of 
intellectualism  are  doing  exactly  what  Schelling  did ! 

Intellectualism  has  firmly  rooted  itself  in  habits  of  thought 
both  old  and  new,  and  the  influence  which  it  thus  exerts  is  even 
more  dangerous  than  any  we  have  referred  to  above,  because  it 
is  more  subtle  and  penetrates  more  deeply.  From  the  earliest 
times  the  essential  task  of  knowledge  has  been  taken  to  be 
the  abstracting  of  universals  from  the  limitless  multiplicity  of 
appearances  :  in  the  ancient  world  this  was  in  complete  accord- 
ance with  the  prevailing  view  of  reality  as  a  whole,  since  simple 
and  unchangeable  forms  seemed  to  constitute  its  fundamental 
structure ;  but  now  that  this  latter  view  is  no  longer  held,  the 
corresponding  conception  of  the  task  of  knowledge  is  discredited. 

*  This  is  seen  with  especial  clearness  in  the  greatest  realistic  system  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  philosophy  of  Comte.  We  can  only  mention  a  few 
characteristic  passages  from  the  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive  (4th  ed.  1877) : 
in  i.  40-41,  we  read :  Le  m6canisme  social  repose  finalement  sur  des  opinions  ; 
according  to  iv.  113,  the  unsatisfying  position  of  present-day  affairs  is 
mainly  due  to  intellectual  anarchy,  so  that  our  first  necessity  is  a  philosophic 
convenable;  the  deepest  root  of  political  corruption  is  declared  to  be 
Vimpuissance  et  le  discredit  des  idAes  generates.  Comte  in  fact  regarded 
the  epochs  of  history  as  corresponding  to  stages  of  knowledge.  Modern 
monism,  too,  believes  itself  capable  of  raising  the  whole  level  of  life  by 
means  of  a  rectification  of  concepts  (see  chapter  on  "  Monism  and  Dualism  "). 


84  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

In  order  to  pick  out  the  main  characteristics  of  experience  and 
unite  manifoldness  into  a  whole,  far  more  is  involved  and  far 
more  is  demanded  than  any  mere  abstracting  of  points  of 
resemblance.* 

Along  with  this  intellectualistic  over- valuation  of  the  search 
for  universals  there  goes  a  remarkable  cult  of  the  abstract 
concept — a  cult  which  became  particularly  prominent  during 
the  nineteenth  century.  What  a  power  is  exercised  to-day  by 
such  excessively  vague  concepts  as  reason,  civilisation,  law, 
value,  progress,  humanitarianism  !  Their  chief  recommendation 
seems  to  lie  in  their  indefinite  character,  which  relieves  us  from 
making  disagreeable  decisions.  Frequently  they  serve  as  blank 
cheques  for  each  individual  to  fill  in  at  pleasure.  At  the  same 
time  we  criticise  Hegel,  whose  concepts  at  any  rate  imparted  a 
definite  content  to  a  connected  thought- world. 

The  influence  of  intellectualistic  thought  is  to  be  seen  also  in 
the  popular  inclination  to  conceive  of  our  conduct  after  the 
fashion  of  a  logical  conclusion,  as  the  subsumption  of  a  par- 
ticular case  under  a  general  law.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  scientific 
work  itself  would  not  be  able  to  go  very  far,  and  in  particular  it 
would  not  achieve  anything  new,  if  the  logical  forms  were  not 
mere  vessels,  filled  and  made  vital  by  the  thought-process.  Out- 
side the  scientific  world  the  perversion  becomes  even  more 
obvious ;  when,  for  example,  political  life  and  legal  proceedings, 

*  The  term  abstraction  itself  manifests  this  alteration ;  in  accordance  with  it 
the  term  has  passed  through  two  chief  phases,  a  logical-metaphysical  and  a 
psychological,  the  former  going  back  to  Aristotle,  the  latter  to  Locke.  Abstract 
(l£  atyaipkaudQ  \eyo/j.eva)  is  the  name  given  by  Aristotle  to  forms  existing  apart 
from  matter — more  particularly  the  mathematical  quantities.  This  meaning 
was  retained  during  the  Middle  Ages  (abstrahere  formam  a  materia  intellectu). 
It  was  not  until  the  Modern  World  that  abstraction  was  looked  upon  as  involv- 
ing a  gradual  selection  of  common  properties  from  the  multiplicity  of  appear- 
ances. The  older  meaning  survived  the  sway  of  the  ancient  doctrine  of  forms ; 
thus,  for  example,  in  Baumeister's  definitiones  philosophic^  ex  systemate  Wolfii 
collects  (def.  DCCXXXV)  it  runs  :  abstrahere  ea  dicijnur,  si  ea,  qua  in  percep- 
tione  distinguuntur,  tanquam  a  re  percepta  sejuncta  intuemur.  In  Kant's  Logik 
(viii.  92,  Hartenst.)  abstraction  means  "the  separation  of  all  the  distinctive 
elements  from  the  given  ideas,  so  as  to  leave  only  what  is  common."  Hence  he 
will  not  say  "to  abstract  something  "  (abstrahere  aliquid),  but  "  to  abstract  from 
something,"  and  gives  it  as  his  opinion  that  "one  should  really  call  abstract 
concepts,  abstracting  concepts  (conceptus  abstrahentes)."  The  uncertainty  in 
modern  terminology  is  largely  due  to  the  confusion  of  these  two  meanings. 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  85 

and  indeed  all  human  actions,  are  interpreted  as  the  application 
of  general  principles  to  particular  cases.  To  do  this  is  to  force 
everything  into  a  rigid  pattern  and  destroy  originality  and  in- 
dividuality. It  is  also  one  of  the  roots  of  the  much  attacked 
bureaucracy  of  to-day  (which  seems  to  grow  unceasingly,  how- 
ever, in  spite  of  all  attacks). 

Finally,  we  must  not  forget  that  intellectualism,  with  its  ten- 
dency to  identify  thought  and  spirit  and  to  treat  the  world  mainly 
as  a  subject  of  contemplation,  has  sunk  very  deeply  into  our  speech 
(more  particularly  in  the  sphere  of  science) .  Although  it  might 
appear  that  the  mere  terms  did  not  commit  us  very  far,  as  a 
matter  of  fact  they  may  very  easily  lead  us  under  the  yoke  of 
intellectualism. 

Intellectualism  thus  surrounds  us  on  every  side ;  it  holds  us 
captive  within  the  close  meshes  of  its  encircling  net.  No  sub- 
jective feeling  can  free  us  from  it;  even  the  assertion  of  a 
directly  opposite  view  may  very  easily  lead  us,  as  we  have  seen, 
more  or  less  directly  back  into  the  old  path.  There  is  only  one 
way  of  giving  the  matter  a  new  turn.  It  is  by  recognising  that 
intellectual  work  itself  does  not  become  positive  and  productive 
until  it  becomes  an  integral  portion  of  an  inclusive  spiritual  life, 
both  receiving  from  that  life  and  contributing  to  its  advance- 
ment, until  it  is  guided  by  the  resultant  drift  of  great  spiritual 
organisations  and  impelled  by  the  energies  which  originate  from 
these  sources.  That  this  really  is  so  can  be  proved  both  directly 
and  indirectly :  all  genuine  intellectual  accomplishment  has  stood 
in  close  relationship  with  movements  of  spiritual  life  as  a  whole ; 
on  the  other  hand,  whenever  the  work  has  allowed  such  rela- 
tionships to  lapse  it  has  rapidly  sunk  to  empty  formalism  or 
uncertain  reflection.  Such  a  maintenance  of  the  dependence 
of  the  intellect  upon  the  whole  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the 
recognition  of  its  importance  and  significance  within  the  whole. 

2.  THE  LIFE-PROCESS  AS  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

Those  who  assign  but  small  importance  to  knowledge,  and  see 
in  it  nothing  more  than  a  mere  registration  of  appearances,  will 
not  be  inclined  to  waste  time  in  the  investigation  of  its  exact 
nature  and  its  relationship  to  spiritual  life  as  a  whole.  But 


86  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

those  who  seek  in  knowledge  an  illumination  and  an  inner 
assimilation  of  reality  will  realise  that  this  is  a  very  difficult 
problem.  How  is  it  possible  for  us  to  master  and  appropriate 
an  unfamiliar  reality  if  we  do  not  possess  a  capacity  suitable  to 
such  a  task,  a  force  with  which  to  meet  the  resistance  of  things  ? 
How  can  an  experience  become  of  value  to  us  if  it  does  not  link 
itself  to  a  movement  coming  from  within  and  carry  it  forward, 
and  how  can  it  provide  us  with  an  answer  if  no  question  has 
first  of  all  been  put  to  it  ?  But  where  can  the  power  necessary 
to  carry  out  this  achievement  be  found  if  the  whole  life-process 
does  not  complete  an  inner  concentration,  combine  its  several 
activities  together  into  a  whole,  and  draw  upon  this  whole  for 
assistance  in  its  struggle  against  the  environment?  Such  a 
movement  as  this  would  impart  a  specific  character  and  direc- 
tion to  knowledge  as  to  every  other  manifestation.  When  life 
is  thus  linked  together  to  form  a  characteristic  whole,  a  sphere 
of  existence  peculiar  to  this  whole  is  marked  off  from  the  rest  of 
life,  a  specific  form  being  imparted  to  experience  and  to  the 
fundamental  relationship  between  man  and  reality  and  man 
and  his  sphere  of  work.  The  aims  and  methods  of  knowledge 
will  follow  these  lines.  It  would  be  impossible  for  any  one  to 
understand  the  special  and  distinctive  greatness  of  Greek 
philosophy  without  perceiving  it  to  be  a  scientific  application 
of  the  same  synthesis  of  life  which  lay  behind  the  whole  of 
Greek  culture.  This  synthesis  was  not  obtained  independently 
of  intellectual  work — on  the  contrary,  it  stood  in  incessant  need 
of  its  assistance ;  but  it  was  not  a  work  of  knowledge  alone,  of 
a  knowledge  trusting  entirely  in  its  own  power.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  it  is  only  a  knowledge  grounded  in  a  synthesis  of  life, 
and  drawing  upon  its  rich  resources,  which  can  possess  settled 
tendencies  and  develop  along  inevitable  lines ;  only  such  a 
knowledge  is  capable  of  grasping  its  object  and  penetrating  to 
its  centre ;  only  such  a  knowledge  can  make  reality  into  a  living 
whole.  Why  does  scholasticism,  in  spite  of  all  the  diligence 
and  ingenuity  that  went  to  its  construction,  make  such  an 
impression  of  poverty  ?  Why  has  it  been  comparatively  unfruit- 
ful, in  a  spiritual  sense,  in  spite  of  its  extensive  opportunities  ? 
It  is  because  it  has  lacked  the  shaping  force  of  a  characteristic 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  87 

life,  and  has  hence  been  unable  to  impart  to  its  concepts  an 
inner  warmth  and  a  power  of  imperative  conviction.  The  newer 
philosophy  was  predestined  to  secure  the  victory  over  scholasti- 
cism, if  only  because  a  new  life  worked  in  it  and  through  it. 
The  same  reason  explains  the  distinction  between  creative 
thinkers  like  Leibniz  and  Kant  and  capable  schoolmen  like 
Wolff  and  Herbart ;  the  former  bring  to  light  new  syntheses 
of  life,  and  their  work  produces  an  enrichment  of  reality.  They 
do  not  merely  take  to  pieces  and  rearrange  given  material ;  they 
do  not  merely  speculate  about  reality.  They  are  producers  of 
new  reality,  parents  in  the  spiritual  world.  There  is  no  stronger 
corroboration  of  this  connection  between  knowledge  and  spiritual 
life  as  a  whole  than  the  experiences  within  the  sphere  of  logic 
itself,  which,  on  account  of  the  unchangeability  and  universal 
validity  of  its  laws,  is  apt  to  look  upon  itself  as  superior  to  any 
dependence  or  relationship.  The  inviolability  of  these  laws  is 
clear  and  indisputable.  But  laws  and  forms  cannot  as  such 
engender  living  thought.  Heal  human  thinking  is  by  no 
means  a  mere  uniform  application  of  these  laws  of  thought ; 
over  and  beyond  such  application  it  preserves  a  characteristic 
quality  which  penetrates  and  dominates  every  detail,  and 
can  come  only  from  the  whole  of  a  life-process.  From 
this  point  of  view,  thought,  in  its  finer  structure,  differs 
with  the  vital  synthesis  it  expresses.  Thus  Greek  science 
down  to  the  very  details  of  logical  method  received  a  character- 
istic formation  from  the  general  artistic  tendency  of  Greek 
life,  the  close  relationship  between  thought  and  contemplation, 
the  desire  for  direct  and  rapid  synthesis  combined  with  an 
aversion  to  anything  indefinite,  the  acceptance  of  the  elements 
of  life  as  given  and  unchangeable.  Consider,  too,  how  strongly 
the  intellectual  cast  of  the  later  classical  period  and  of  the 
Middle  Ages  shows  the  influence  of  a  new  life  dominated  by 
religion  ;  the  whole  of  our  visible  existence  has  now  become  the 
mere  symbol  of  an  invisible  order,  the  concepts  have  lost  their 
hard  and  fast  character,  the  statements  their  rigid  exclusiveness. 
This  allegorical  rendering  feels  and  sees  a  higher  world  beyond 
the  present  condition  of  sense-existence,  but  without  degrading 
the  latter  to  the  position  of  an  indifferent  phenomenon.  Thus 


88  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

one  and  the  same  object  is  image  and  substance — sensual  and 
spiritual  in  one.  This  almost  visionary  tendency  of  thought, 
dominated  as  it  is  by  moods  and  intuitions,  is  not  conscious  of 
the  untenable  contradictions  into  which  it  lapses,  at  once  bind- 
ing and  loosing,  affirming  and  denying.  The  mediaeval  concep- 
tion of  the  Church,  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  &c.,  rest 
however  on  this  type  of  thought.  Scholasticism  at  its  height 
became  clearer  and  more  restrained,  but  since,  in  spite  of  its 
energetic  development  of  syllogistic  method,  it  lacked  an  inde- 
pendent synthesis  and  a  corresponding  vigour  of  thought-energy, 
it  also  lacked  the  decisiveness  of  disjunctive  procedure,  the  power 
to  keep  incompatible  alternatives  apart :  totally  different  worlds 
(such  as  the  Aristotelian,  with  its  welcome,  and  the  ancient 
Christian,  with  its  repudiation,  of  the  world,  or — within  Christi- 
anity itself — the  ecclesiastical  order  and  the  mysticism  which  put 
itself  above  all  order)  are  here  found  existing  side  by  side  in  the 
most  peaceable  fashion.  The  system  is  so  cleverly  arranged  and 
graded  that  so  long  as  a  direct  collision  is  avoided  the  several 
components  seem  to  be  in  complete  harmony;  elements  which 
vigorous  thought  would  at  once  perceive  to  be  incompatible 
appear  compatible.  We  may  mention,  as  a  further  example, 
that  the  logical  method  of  modern  science,  with  its  keener 
analysis  and  more  clear-cut  divisions,  its  breaking  up  even  of 
elements,  and  its  endeavour  to  penetrate  the  infinite,  shows, 
clearly  enough,  a  close  connection  with  the  modern  ideal  of 
power  and  movement.  If,  in  research  of  the  modern  kind,  we 
see  the  type  of  all  research  we  are  simply  identifying  a  par- 
ticular species  of  spiritual  life  with  the  spiritual  life  itself. 
Just  as  each  clearly  defined  epoch  has  its  own  particular  kind  of 
logic,  so  has  every  independent  thinker  ;  without  a  characteristic 
logic  there  can  be  no  characteristic  mode  of  thought  and  no 
characteristic  construction  of  life.  The  more  powerful  this  con- 
struction the  deeper  will  its  influence  penetrate,  until  it  reaches 
the  simplest  elements  and  activities  of  thought. 

Thus  the  work  of  thought  will  become  richer,  more  individual 
and  more  concrete  by  being  associated  with  life  as  a  whole.  At 
the  same  time  new  problems  and  tasks  arise.  It  must  be  shown 
what  knowledge  accomplishes  for  life  as  a  whole ;  it  must  be 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  89 

more  closely  demonstrated  how,  in  the  development  of  know- 
ledge, the  separation  of  the  accidental  from  the  essential,  the 
linking  up  of  particulars,  the  emergence  of  universal  validity, 
are  brought  ahout.  At  first  sight  it  might  seem  as  if  the 
universal  validity  of  knowledge  was  particularly  threatened 
through  the  intimate  connection  subsisting  between  knowledge, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  diverse  organisations  of  life  on  the 
other.  It  may  be  asked,  Will  not  this  result  in  the  disintegra- 
tion of  truth  (which  will  become  a  multiplicity  of  truths)  and  in 
the  complete  triumph  of  a  destructive  relativism  ?  That  would 
only  be  the  case  if  all  syntheses  of  life  stood  side  by  side,  as 
of  equal  value,  and  their  several  achievements  did  not  work 
towards  a  single  comprehensive  synthesis  by  reference  to  which 
everything  was  to  measure  itself.  Could  not  such  a  synthesis 
be  ever  present,  as  the  first  object  of  effort,  and  at  the  same  time 
serve,  from  the  very  beginning,  for  the  specific  shaping  and 
directing  of  life  and  consequently  of  thought  also  ?  It  is  no 
objection  to  an  idea  that  its  formulation  should  stir  up  new 
problems.  If  the  problems  are  real  they  will  tend  to  strengthen 
the  fundamental  point  of  view  rather  than  militate  in  any  way 
against  it. 

8.  THE  QUEST  FOR  TRUTH  AND  ITS  MOTIVE  POWER 

In  the  struggle  for  truth,  what  are  really  the  most  powerful 
and  decisive  factors  ?  Every  consideration  must  help  to  con- 
vince us  that  here  we  find  ourselves  face  to  face  with  genuine 
problems.  An  examination  of  disputes  between  persons  of 
opposing  convictions  makes  it  very  clear  that  mere  reasons 
and  proofs  are  not  decisive.  How  should  it  be  otherwise  in  that 
larger  arena  where  mind  clashes  with  mind  in  the  great  struggles 
of  human  thought?  Each  disputant  translates  the  arguments 
of  the  other  into  his  own  language  and  his  own  methods  of 
thought,  and  puts  a  completely  different  complexion  upon  them. 
The  result  is  two  monologues  carried  on  side  by  side.  The 
controversy  seldom  reaches  the  level  of  real  dialogue.  In  reality 
arguments  owe  their  power  of  conviction  not  to  their  logical  or 
dialectical  value,  but  to  the  content  and  force  of  the  spiritual 
life,  the  spiritual  concentrations,  the  life-energies,  which  they 


90  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

have  to  draw  upon.  In  the  discussion  of  questions  of  principle, 
each  disputant  is,  at  the  hottom,  defending  himself  and  his  own 
inherent  character.  It  is  from  such  spiritual  self-preservation 
that  power,  warmth,  and  passion  first  stream  into  the  intel- 
lectual movement.  Fruitful  expression  and  the  possibility  of 
a  mutual  understanding  do  not  become  possible  until  spiritual 
kinship  has  prepared  a  common  ground.  Aristotle,  Augustine, 
Thomas  Aquinas,  and  Voltaire  were  all  first-rate  logicians,  but 
does  anybody  suppose  that  they  would  have  convinced  one 
another  had  they  argued  together  for  an  eternity  ?  Only  a 
shallow  and  unstable  man  can  change  his  spiritual  character 
in  response  to  mere  argument.  Standing  upon  the  basis  of 
merely  intellectual  considerations  a  man  could  never  possess 
his  own  being  in  joy  and  security;  he  would  be  in  perpetual 
fear  of  the  advent  of  some  more  powerful  controversialist  who 
would  overcome  him  and  force  him  into  a  contrary  position. 

The  study  of  history  shows  us  that  it  has  not  been  isolated 
figures  of  thought,  or  mere  ideas  as  such,  which  have  dominated 
men's  minds  and  aroused  their  passion ;  it  has  been  the  specific 
concentrations  of  life,  the  spiritual  energies.  We  are  often  told 
by  conscious  and  unconscious  adherents  of  Hegelian  thought 
that  ideas  produce  their  consequences  with  overwhelming  neces- 
sity, and  that  nothing  stirs  us  up  so  profoundly,  nothing  drives 
us  forward  so  irresistibly,  as  a  logical  contradiction.  Conse- 
quences and  contradictions  can  certainly  acquire  an  irresistible 
power  over  men,  but  this  is  not  due  to  purely  logical  causes. 
Consequences  may  lie  very  near  and  yet  not  be  fulfilled,  contra- 
dictions may  be  close  at  hand  and  never  be  felt.  It  is  all  a 
question,  in  this  case,  whether  the  problems  do  or  do  not 
become  associated  with  the  task  of  spiritual  self-preservation, 
and  whether  or  not  vital  energies  unfold  themselves  through  the 
problems  to  form  a  region  of  spiritual  existence.  It  is  only 
when  intellectual  life  is  thus  assimilated  and  enters  integrally 
into  the  life  it  expresses  that  its  consequences  are  imperative 
and  its  contradictions  unbearable.  The  power  of  logic  is  derived 
in  the  first  place  from  the  degree  of  unification,  the  power  of 
gathering  life  together  into  a  whole,  with  which  it  is  associated, 
rather  than  (as  is  often  wrongly  imagined)  from  its  own  resources. 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  91 

The  patient  endurance  of  a  condition  of  mental  contradiction  is 
always  an  indication  of  a  feeble  concentration  of  life ;  it  is 
characteristic  of  the  mental  life  of  children,  of  primitive  his- 
torical epochs,  and  of  the  condition  of  average  humanity,  and 
contrasts  with  the  demands  which  issue  from  our  spiritual 
freedom.  This  weakness  is  only  indicated,  not  caused,  by 
the  defect  in  the  logic. 

In  the  spiritual  condition  of  to-day  there  is  nothing  more 
paralysing  and  vexatious  than  the  prevailing  insensibility  to 
contradictions  in  thought.  It  reveals  a  great  lack  of  cen- 
tralising energy,  of  genuine  personal  life,  and  of  that  self- 
activity  which  maintains  itself  amid  the  busiest  employment. 
Life,  as  it  stands  to-day,  is  full  of  fundamental  contradictions. 
These  are  often  softened  down  by  superficial  compromises, 
and  (if  only  the  harshness  of  direct  conflict  can  be  to  some 
extent  avoided)  they  may  appear  to  be  altogether  cancelled. 
Or  again,  in  spite  of  real  contradictions,  different  types  of 
thought  may  be  unhesitatingly  forced  together  and  mixed  up 
with  one  another.  For  example,  the  two  fundamentally  different 
points  of  view  represented  by  the  old  ethical-religious  idealism, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  development  of  human  culture  on 
modern  lines,  on  the  other,  have  frequently  had  to  submit  to 
such  treatment.  An  extraordinary  mixture  of  the  most  funda- 
mentally different  attitudes  towards  life  is  to  be  seen  in  the  works 
of  the  more  advanced  modern  writers.  Any  one  with  an  ear  for 
harmony  of  thought  must  be  keenly  conscious  of  the  dissonance 
in  the  works  of  Nietzsche,  which  exhibit  a  mixture  of  modern 
and  antique,  romantic  and  classic,  artistic  and  dynamic  thought. 
However,  the  mass  of  so-called  educated  people,  who  are  without 
really  vigorous  personal  life,  do  not  in  the  least  object  to  spiritual 
dissonances;  they  look  upon  them  as  providing  variety  and 
mental  entertainment;  the  more  contradictions,  the  more 
"original"  and  "interesting"  is  the  writer! 

Nothing  shows  the  dependence  of  thought  upon  the  energy  of 
spiritual  life  more  palpably  than  the  developments  of  religion. 
Effective  religious  movements  have  always  come  about  owing  to 
unbearable  contradictions  making  the  position  at  the  time  being 
intolerable ;  and  owing,  more  especially,  to  the-  demand  for  an 


92  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

increased  inwardness  coming  into  sharp  conflict  with  the  outward 
institutions,  customs,  and  formulas  which  the  course  of  time  and 
the  attempt  to  suit  human  conditions  had  brought  forth.  But  to 
what  a  small  extent  has  the  perceiving,  enduring,  and  over- 
coming of  such  contradictions  been  prompted  by  mere  logical 
considerations  !  At  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  for  example, 
the  contrast  between  the  outward  character  of  the  religion 
offered  by  the  Church  and  the  desire  of  earnest  souls  for  some- 
thing more  inward,  was  obvious  to  every  one;  the  greatest 
scholar  of  the  age,  Erasmus,  was  not  less  aware  of  it  (as  we  see 
from  his  works)  than  was  Luther.  Why,  then,  did  Luther  and 
not  Erasmus  become  the  great  leader  of  the  Reformation? 
Certainly  not  because  he  was  the  greater  logician,  for  in  this 
respect  he  was  much  inferior  to  Erasmus.  It  was  because  the 
existing  situation,  with  the  contradictions  it  involved,  could  not 
remain,  for  him,  a  mere  matter  of  calm  contemplation  and  intel- 
lectual reflection ;  it  became  a  personal  affair,  causing  him  acute 
pain,  a  state  of  things  which  he  felt  to  be  simply  unendurable. 
The  matter  touched  him  so  nearly,  that  he  felt  a  solution  of  the 
conflict  to  be  an  imperative  necessity,  to  affect  the  very  centre  of 
his  life.  His  spiritual  self-preservation  demanded  it,  with  an 
elemental  passion  which  swept  aside  every  other  consideration. 
The  power  of  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  imparted  to  this 
simple  man  the  capacity  and  the  right  to  attack  a  great 
traditional  order  which  had  become  sacred  to  the  hearts  of  men 
and  to  venture  upon  the  construction  of  a  new  one.  This 
fundamental  spiritual  necessity  drove  Luther  forward  at  all 
costs,  and  made  him  a  hero,  beside  whom  Erasmus,  with  all  his 
superior  knowledge,  refinement,  and  intellectual  acuteness,  seems 
insignificant. 

In  spiritual  conflicts  it  is  not  isolated  intellectual  consider- 
ations that  carry  the  day,  but  basic  life-processes  and  the 
content  of  the  spiritual  reality  which  they  comprehend.  Thus 
the  different  thought- systems  are  to  be  referred  back  to  these 
processes  and  all  real  progress  depends  upon  a  broadening  of 
this  spiritual  reality.  Antiquated  mental  syntheses  are  not  over- 
come through  the  sudden  advent  of  a  superior  set  of  reasons,  but 
by  a  perception  of  the  limitations  of  the  life  which  they  express. 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  93 

Then  new  concentrations,  or  at  any  rate  new  movements,  will 
appear  and  a  fresh  active  life  will  make  the  old,  in  spite  of  its 
apparent  security,  seem  hollow  and  obsolete  ;  even  if  it  continues 
to  preserve  its  outward  appearance  the  old  will  lose  its  spiritual 
authority  ;  even  where  it  believes  its  rule  to  be  safe,  it  is  already 
defeated.  That  the  decisive  point  thus  shifts  itself  from  the 
ideas  to  the  energies,  from  intellectual  considerations  to  creative 
developments  of  life,  must  contribute  to  the  deepening  of  work 
and  the  consolidation  of  effort.  We  arrive  at  an  incomparably 
larger  conception  of  history  when  we  regard  it  as  a  conflict  of 
life-power  with  life-power,  rather  than  of  doctrine  with  doctrine  ; 
the  problem  becomes  altogether  more  difficult  and  more  funda- 
mental, since  it  becomes  a  question  of  unearthing  the  roots  of 
the  doctrines,  discovering  the  innermost  sources  of  power,  and 
getting  at  the  decisive  crux  of  the  conflict.  But  we  shall  be 
supported  and  inspired  in  our  work  by  the  conviction  that  human 
life  is  enriched  by  more  primitive  forces  and  more  fundamental 
necessities  than  any  which  mere  intellectual  work  has  of  itself 
the  capacity  to  produce. 

4.  CONSEQUENCES  IN  THE  SPHERE  OP  KNOWLEDGE 

Such  relationship  between  the  work  of  knowledge  on  the  one 
hand  and  spiritual  life  as  a  whole  with  the  construction  of  a 
spiritual  reality,  on  the  other,  must  have  deep-reaching  con- 
sequences for  the  development  of  knowledge.  Within  the 
necessarily  limited  scope  of  this  section,  we  can  only  deal  with 
these  consequences  in  so  far  as  their  result  is  to  facilitate  the 
solution  of  certain  important  problems  which  would  otherwise 
remain  beyond  the  reach  of  any  successful  treatment. 

There  is  still  much  uncertainty  as  to  how  philosophy  can  find 
an  independent  task  as  compared  with  the  separate  sciences. 
The  solution  so  often  given,  that  philosophy  has  to  unify  the 
results  of  the  various  separate  sciences,  is  inadequate.  For  such 
a  unification  is  either  a  mere  juxtaposition  (in  which  case  the 
word  science  is  being  very  loosely  employed  to  describe  such  an 
encyclopedia)  or  else  it  implies  construction  and  transformation, 
and  this  cannot  be  achieved  in  the  absence  of  a  new  principle. 
Now  this  new  principle  can  neither  be  obtained  from  outside  nor 


94  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

can  it  arise  from  mere  intellectual  processes  ;  it  must  lie  in  the 
life-process  as  a  whole.  Now,  at  last,  we  come  to  the  farthest 
point  accessible  to  us.  The  fundamental  relationship  between 
man  and  reality,  together  with  the  significance  of  his  life  and 
being,  must  be  determined  by  the  nature  and  experiences  of  this 
vital  process.  From  this  point  of  view  only  can  we  link  the 
separate  sciences  together,  appraise  them  rightly,  and  develop 
their  results.  This  fundamental  process  is  not  found  upon  the 
surface  of  things;  it  must  be  extricated  and  brought  to  expression, 
and  it  is  the  task  of  that  central  philosophical  discipline  which 
bears  the  ancient  name  of  metaphysics  to  do  this ;  the  other 
disciplines  have  then  to  spread  the  new  light  in  their  several 
separate  departments.  Such  a  conception  also  explains  the  close 
connection  between  philosophy  and  human  personality,  without 
degrading  the  former  to  the  position  of  a  mere  expression  of 
individual  character.  Moreover,  in  order  to  penetrate  to  this 
fundamental  progress  a  deep,  broad,  powerful  life  is  necessary  ; 
to  this  extent,  the  measure  of  life  is  ultimately  the  measure 
of  thought. 

This  way  of  looking  at  the  matter  brings  us  essentially  nearer 
to  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  truth.  There  can,  to-day,  be  no 
manner  of  doubt  that  if  truth  be  conceived  of  as  a  correspondence 
of  our  thought  with  an  external  world,  then  we  must  finally 
abandon  all  hope  of  truth.  But  the  more  confident  this  denial, 
the  more  doubtful  the  affirmation  which  is  to  meet  and  replace  it. 
Now  by  connecting  this  problem  with  the  life-process,  a  new 
light  is  thrown  upon  it.  There  is  no  intellectual  truth  apart 
from  a  spiritual  truth  as  a  whole,  but  this  means  nothing  less 
than  the  transformation  of  the  world  into  cosmic  life,  an  appre- 
hension of  reality  from  within.  And  the  assumption  under- 
lying this  is  that  a  spiritual  life  transcending  the  human  forms 
the  ultimate  basis  of  reality.  Man's  own  task  is  a  continuous 
strife  and  upward  endeavour,  a  pushing-on  and  climbing-up,  an 
increasing  struggle  against  unspiritual  and  half-spiritual  resis- 
tances. In  this  struggle,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  fruitful 
knowledge  whatever  that  is  not  rooted  in  life-syntheses.  But  in 
spite  of  their  actuality,  these  syntheses  are  in  the  first  place 
nothing  more  than  attempts,  and  it  is  only  in  conflict  with  the 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  95 

inner  and  outer  world  that  they  can  prove  their  capacity.  In 
this  work  of  adjustment,  knowledge  plays  a  leading  part ;  it  is 
essential  to  clarification  and  examination,  indispensable  to  the 
establishing  of  universal  validity,  to  the  rejection  of  all  that  is 
human  in  the  petty  sense  of  the  word  and  to  the  development  of 
the  cosmic  character  of  spiritual  life.  But  it  cannot  exert  this 
critical  function  without  separating  itself  to  a  certain  extent  from 
that  which  is  merely  specific  in  these  syntheses ;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  critique  cannot  lead  us  any  further  if  it  does  not  assist 
in  the  development  of  a  new  and  a  higher  synthesis. 

In  this  connection  there  arises  the  further  problem  of  a  sound 
starting-point  for  the  development  of  knowledge.  Ever  since  the 
direct  connection  between  man  and  the  sensuous  world  was  lost 
this  question  has  been  unavoidable.  Knowledge  has  sought  in 
vain  for  a  firm  basis  within  itself.  Again  and  again  dogmatic 
assumptions  have  been  detected  in  what  was  looked  upon  as 
primary  and  unquestionable.  There  is  only  one  way  in  which 
this  firm  basis  can  be  obtained.  The  whole  of  life  must  be 
linked  up  into  a  unity,  and  at  the  same  time  it  must  be  trans- 
formed into  personal  action.  In  this  way  alone  can  axiomatic 
certainty  be  attained  and  shared  by  knowledge.  For  man,  who 
is  engaged  in  the  struggle,  this  unity  remains  a  perpetual 
challenge ;  it  is  only  at  the  end  of  the  journey  (an  end  which 
lies  immeasurably  far  away)  that  this  unity  can  be  fully  realised. 
But  the  effort  after  unity  would  itself  be  impossible  if  the 
challenge  which  to  man  appears  so  unrealisable  were  not  the 
fundamental  reality  of  the  spiritual  life. 

It  is  an  old  objection  to  philosophy  that  through  all  its  long 
history  it  has  done  nothing  more  than  heap  opinion  upon 
opinion  until  it  becomes  impossible  even  to  become  acquainted 
with  them  all ;  at  the  same  time  there  is  no  certainty  that  the 
later  opinions  are  more  reliable  than  the  earlier  ones.  Philo- 
sophy certainly  retains  an  element  of  freedom  and  personal 
decision  ;  along  with  religion,  morality,  art,  and  all  noble  things, 
it  always  demands  the  active  participation  of  the  individual,  and 
cannot  be  imposed  upon  any  one  from  without.  But  it  is  not  on 
this  account  a  mere  accumulation  of  human  opinions.  The 
knowledge  of  its  close  connection  with  man's  endeavour  to  reach 


96  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

spiritual  reality  securely  protects  it  from  this  aspersion.  Its 
historical  development  is  thus  brought  into  the  closest  relation- 
ship with  the  evolution  of  spiritual  life  in  humanity,  and  as  the 
critical  developments  of  this  evolution  disclose  fundamental 
facts,  they  also  drive  philosophical  work  along  new  paths.  It 
is  no  longer  possible  for  us  to  regard  the  great  problems  of  life 
from  the  Greek  point  of  view,  for  Christianity  has  brought  about 
profound  transformations  in  the  life-process ;  it  has  discovered 
in  it  such  difficult  conflicts  and  such  fruitful  profundities  that  a 
return  to  the  older  standpoint  would  be  unthinkable.  We  have 
outgrown  the  Middle  Ages  also,  since  the  Modern  World 
created  a  sharper  line  of  separation  between  the  world  and  man 
and  aroused  the  inner  life  to  greater  independence.  Do  not 
these  and  similar  experiences  show  the  thinker  in  closest  re- 
lationship with  history  and  with  humanity  as  a  whole  ?  This 
does  not,  however,  involve  the  loss  of  his  independence.  En- 
vironment can  do  no  more  for  humanity  than  provide  possibilities 
and  incentives ;  to  produce  therefrom  a  reality  possessing  a  well- 
defined  character  demands  forceful  progressive  action,  and  this 
is  always  a  matter  of  individual  initiative.  Thus  the  two 
factors  mutually  interact,  while  the  whole,  which  includes 
both,  grows  unmistakably  richer  and  stronger. 

5.  CONSEQUENCES  WITH  REGARD  TO  THE  HISTORY  OF 
PHILOSOPHY 

The  recognition  of  such  relationship  between  philosophy  and 
life  as  a  whole  must  also  exert  a  powerful  influence  upon  our 
treatment  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  It  can  no  longer  be  con- 
sidered adequate  to  describe  and  catalogue  the  various  philo- 
sophical systems  just  as  they  are ;  it  is  now  our  duty  to  unearth 
the  fundamental  life-contents,  and  thus  set  the  words  of  the 
thinker  in  a  more  comprehensive  context.  The  main  problem 
is  not  so  much  to  determine  what  a  philosopher  did  say  as  how 
he  came  to  say  it.  We  must  fix  the  type  of  spiritual  life  that 
he  expresses.  It  thus  becomes  necessary  to  elucidate  the  re- 
lationship between  the  thinker  and  his  historical  and  human 
environment  (though  not  according  to  the  current  sociologico- 
historical  method,  which  puts  the  cart  before  the  horse  and 


THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL  97 

derives  the  inner  from  the  outer,  the  great  things  from  a  sum- 
mation of  small  ones,  the  eternal  from  the  temporal).  Hence- 
forth the  significance  of  individual  achievements  will  be 
measured  according  to  their  success  in  opening  up  new  depths, 
in  broadening  spiritual  reality.  In  this  sense  all  great  thought 
is  a  pressing  forward,  a  reformation,  and  a  creation. 

Although  this  relation  of  philosophical  tendencies  to  their 
deeper  origins  makes  the  treatment  of  philosophical  history  in 
some  respects  more  complicated,  in  others  it  is  conducive  to 
simplification.  Measured  according  to  the  above  standards,  only 
quite  a  few  manifestations  can  really  be  regarded  as  creative,  and 
as  really  adding  to  the  content  of  life.  Only  quite  a  few  types 
stand  out  from  amidst  the  apparently  chaotic  mass  of  material, 
and  these  occur,  in  their  essentials,  again  and  again  through  all 
the  variations  of  context  and  expression.  The  real  core  can  thus 
be  more  sharply  divided  from  what  is  merely  accessory.  That 
which  is  revealed  by  a  first  examination'  is  for  the  most  part  the 
mere  fringe  of  things :  subtle  definitions  and  explanations, 
scholarship  of  one  kind  and  another,  more  or  less  intelligent 
reasoning — material  which  may  provide  occupation  for  the 
human  mind,  but  which  cannot  actually  enrich  spiritual  life. 
We  are  both  richer  and  poorer  than  we  generally  think ;  poorer 
in  the  extent,  richer  in  the  content,  of  our  possessions. 

Finally,  the  process  of  searching  for  the  ultimate  and  radical 
may  serve  to  prevent  the  over-valuation  of  the  mere  systematic 
form,  a  practice  which  easily  leads  us  away  from  what  is  more 
essential.  At  the  same  time  we  do  not  wish  to  undervalue 
systematic  form.  A  systematic  correlation  binds  the  several 
principles  closer  together  and  makes  contradictions  less 
possible ;  it  tends  towards  the  organisation  and  uniform  de- 
velopment of  the  thought-world.  But  all  this  can  occur  only  if 
a  living  and  inspiring  content  is  presupposed,  and  this  can 
result  only  from  syntheses  and  energies  of  life  as  a  whole :  if 
such  a  content  be  lacking,  no  amount  of  logical  power  or  of 
ingenuity  in  construction  and  arrangement  can  prevent  the 
system  from  degenerating  into  a  meaningless  framework. 
Wolff's  system  was  much  more  fully  developed  than  Leibniz's, 
but  was  the  former  the  greater  philosopher  ?  Augustine  never 

7 


98  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

worked  out  his  thoughts  systematically,  owing  to  the  contra- 
dictory nature  of  his  personality,  but  he  so  enriched  and 
enlarged  the  spiritual  world  as  to  influence  human  thought  as 
few  heside  him  have  done.  Let  us  fix  our  attention  in  the  first 
place  upon  essentials,  upon  creative  power,  upon  the  centre  of 
motive  force,  and  not  assign  undue  importance  to  mere  form. 

Further  discussion  would  have  little  value ;  more  detailed 
explanations  would  remain  no  more  than  fragments  from  a  larger 
sphere  of  thought.  We  have  devoted  some  attention  to  this 
subject,  because  it  seemed  important  to  point  out  that  in  the 
very  interests  of  knowledge  itself  we  are  driven  to  seek  some- 
thing more  than  mere  knowledge.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
obvious  that  we  are  not  being  driven  towards  voluntarism.  It 
is  possible  that  many  of  those  who  call  themselves  voluntarists 
aim  at  something  not  far  from  our  own  goal.  We  are  glad  to 
welcome  this  agreement.  But  however  the  matter  may  stand 
with  regard  to  individuals,  we  must  not  allow  ourselves  to  lose 
sight  of  the  essential  difference  between  a  mere  shifting  of  the 
interest  within  the  soul-life  itself  and  an  elevation  above  all 
empirical  soul-life  whatsoever. 


3.  IDEALISM— REALISM 

(a)  The  Terms 

THE  terms  idealism  and  realism  have  now  become  so  hackneyed 
that  they  have  almost  lost  all  definite  meaning  and  scientific 
value.  Nevertheless,  they  still  stand  for  an  ancient  and  per- 
manent contrast  and  present  a  vital  issue  for  modern  thought. 
This  heing  the  case,  it  will  he  useful  for  us  to  commence  with  a 
brief  discussion  of  the  terms  themselves. 

The  term  "idealist"  first  appears  in  philosophy  towards  the 
end  of  the  seventeenth  century.*  When  Leibniz  uses  the  word 
in  the  sense  in  which  he  has  previously  used  the  term  "  forma- 
list," i.e.,  in  opposition  to  materialist  (see  186a,  Erdm.),  he  has 
in  mind  philosophers  like  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  saw  the 
essence  of  a  thing  in  its  form.  At  the  same  time  the  modern 
meaning  of  the  word  "  idea  "  began  to  make  itself  felt.  From 
meaning  a  typical  form  it  began  (at  first  in  the  French  language) 
to  mean  a  mere  presentation  existing  only  in  the  mind. 
Descartes  and  Locke,  though  not  without  contradictions,  helped 
to  introduce  this  meaning  into  philosophy,  when  idealism  came 
to  signify  a  system  which  allowed  reality  only  to  the  realm  of 
ideas  and  hence  denied  the  reality  of  the  external  world.  The 
term  was  applied  more  especially  to  Berkeley's  doctrine — usually 
in  a  depreciatory  sense,  as  implying  a  dissipation  of  reality. 
For  example,  Wolff  called  the  idealists,  the  materialists,  and 
the  sceptics  the  "  three  pernicious  sects  "  (see  Wolff,  von  seinen 
Schriften,  p.  583).  Until  about  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 

*  For  further  particulars  see  Vaihinger  in  the  Stratsburger  Abhandlungen  zur 
Philosophic,  p.  94  ff .  In  the  theory  of  art  the  use  of  the  term  seems  to  reach 
further  back.  At  any  rate,  I  have  received  a  friendly  intimation  to  the  effect 
that  so  far  back  as  Pacheco's  Arte  de  la  Pintura  (Seville,  1649)  idealist  was 
used  to  describe  an  artistic  tendency ;  but  I  am  not  at  present  able  to  cor- 
roborate this. 


century  philosophers  were  as  universally  determined  to  defend 
themselves  against  idealism  as  they  were  later  to  call  themselves 
idealists.*  As  opposed  to  this  conception  of  idealism,  realism 
was  looked  upon  in  the  eighteenth  century  as  standing  for  the 
existence  of  a  world  outside  thought.!  Herhart  and  his  followers 
have  preserved  this  use  of  the  terms  through  the  nineteenth 
century  down  to  the  present  day. 

Idealism  and  realism,  like  so  many  other  terms,  were  essen- 
tially affected  by  the  Kantian  philosophy.!  Kant  himself  at 
first  employed  the  traditional  terminology  and  hence  classifies 
idealism  with  scepticism  (for  example,  in  the  preface  to  the 
2nd  ed.  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason).  The  term  tran- 
scendental (also  formal  or  critical)  idealism  was  coined,  not 
with  reference  to  Plato,  hut  to  Berkeley;  to  the  latter's 
"empirical,"  "material,"  or  "psychological"  idealism,  Kant 
opposes  a  new  idealism  which  does  not  in  any  way  deny  or 
even  doubt  the  existence  of  things  outside  the  mind,  but 
explains  the  forms  of  perception  and  thought  to  be  merely  sub- 
jective. Hence  all  objects  which  can  possibly  be  experienced  by 
us  become  mere  phenomena,  "  which  have  no  ground  of  existence 
outside  our  thought."  This  modification  of  meaning  contains 
the  germ  of  a  fruitful  development,  in  so  far  as  the  bearer  of  the 
forms,  the  subject  of  knowledge,  is  not  so  much  the  individual  man 
in  his  own  particularity  as  the  common  structure  of  our  being, 
the  spiritual  organisation  of  humanity.  Since  the  problem  thus 
detached  itself  from  psychology  to  be  taken  up  by  a  philosophy 
of  mind,  it  soon  became  possible  for  all  those  to  call  themselves 
idealists  (in  the  widest  sense)  who  maintained  the  superiority  of 
spiritual  activity  over  the  forces  of  the  external  world.  Thus 
Schiller  writes  to  W.  von  Humboldt  (Brief weeks  el,  p.  485) : 

*  Wolff  (see  De  differentia  nexus  rerum  sapientis  et  fatalis  necessitatis, 
p.  75)  will  on  no  account  hear  of  Plato  being  called  an  idealist.  Plato  certainly 
called  the  material  world  a  mere  appearance,  but  by  that  he  did  not  mean  to 
imply  (as  do  the  idealists)  that  it  existed  only  as  an  idea. 

•f-  In  the  Middle  Ages,  as  is  well  known,  realism  meant  the  opposite  of 
nominalism ;  its  adherents  were  usually  called  reales.  Bealista  is  first  men- 
tioned by  Prantl  (Geschichte  der  Logik,  iv.  221)  as  occurring  in  Petrus  Nigri 
(ea.  1475). 

J  For  particulars  see  Trendelenburg,  Logische  Untersuchungen,  3rd  ed., 
ii.  512  ff. 


IDEALISM— REALISM  101 

"After  all,  we  are  both  idealists  and  would  be  ashamed  to  have 
it  said  of  us  that  things  shaped  us  and  not  we  the  things."  * 
No  one  exerted  more  influence  than  Fichte  towards  establishing 
this  meaning  of  the  term. 

The  German  Revival  of  Humanism  (this  newest  phase  of  the 
Renaissance)  employed  the  term  in  a  manner  clearly  related  to 
the  above,  though  giving  it  at  the  same  time  a  characteristic 
complexion.  Thus  the  thoughtful  article  with  which  F.  A. 
Wolf  commenced  the  Museum  der  Altertumswissenschaft  (1807) 
explains  that  "  the  direction  of  the  spirit  towards  the  ideal "  is 
the  "first  condition  of  all  higher  development";  by  this  he 
understands,  according  to  his  favourite  saying,  "  it  is  not  suitable 
for  free  and  magnanimous  souls  to  be  always  seeking  after  the 
useful "  (Aristotle,  Politics,  1338,  b.  2),  that  the  tendency  of 
life  should  be  towards  the  beautiful,  not  the  useful,  towards  the 
harmonious  development  of  all  spiritual  powers  for  their  own 
sakes,  not  for  the  sake  of  any  result.  No  one  did  more  than 
Goethe  towards  furthering  this  conception  of  idealism,  which  he 
supported  by  his  personality  as  well  as  his  life-work,  although 
in  other  connections  he  very  justly  called  himself  a  realist.  In 
the  speech  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  philosophical  and 
artistic  meanings  became  merged  into  one.  Idealism  came  to 
mean  the  recognition  of  self-activity  and  of  the  intrinsic  value  of 
the  spiritual  life,  and  hence,  in  place  of  the  academic  discussion 
of  idealism  and  realism  in  connection  with  the  theory  of  know- 
ledge which  prevailed  during  the  eighteenth  century,  we  have  an 
ancient  and  permanent  human  question. 

(6)  The  Conflict  of  Practical  Ideals 

The  contrast  between  idealism  and  realism  may  be  formulated 
in  various  ways,  but  in  essentials  the  problem  remains  unchanged. 

*  Schiller  examines  these  terms  in  a  particularly  detailed  manner  in  his 
treatise  Ueber  naive  u.  sentimentalischer  Dichtung.  He  regards  a  realist  as  one 
who  is  governed  by  the  necessity  of  nature,  an  idealist  as  one  governed  by  the 
necessity  of  reason.  This  change  of  meaning  was  objected  to  by  the  systematic 
philosophers.  Thus  Plattner  says  (Phil.  Aphorismen,  i.  412) :  "  The  concept 
idealism  is  beginning  to  be  used  altogether  too  broadly.  It  has  usually  been 
denned  in  the  past  as  that  system  which  denies  the  reality  of  everything  except 
spirit."  ...  "As  idealism  is  now  understood,  every  one  is  an  idealist  who 
looks  upon  the  external  world  as  an  appearance ;  in  other  words,  all  philo- 
sophers, without  exception,  are  idealists." 


102  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Is  the  real  centre  of  gravity  of  our  life  to  be  sought  in  the  visible 
or  in  an  invisible  world  ?  Are  the  chief  ends  of  our  existence  to 
be  realised  in  the  former  or  in  the  latter  sphere?  Is  the  life 
which  develops  in  humanity  a  continuation  of  nature,  or  can  it 
only  be  comprehended  as  an  essentially  new  and  higher  stage  of 
reality?  Is  all  spiritual  manifestation  a  mere  accompaniment 
or  tool  of  a  life  which  is  essentially  natural  ?  Has  man  no  other 
goal  than  the  cultivation  and  preservation  of  worldly  interests,  or 
does  human  life  acquire  a  meaning  and  a  value  only  through 
participation  in  an  order  superior  to  all  merely  human  conditions  ? 
If  we  divide  reality  into  higher  and  lower  stages  (according  to 
the  common  view),  is  the  higher  derived  from  the  lower  or  does 
the  higher  furnish  the  key  to  the  understanding  of  the  lower  ? 
The  contrast  which  underlies  and  pervades  all  these  different 
formulations  divides  life  so  fundamentally,  from  the  largest  things 
down  to  the  smallest,  in  thought  and  in  action,  in  value  and  in 
content,  that  its  effects  make  themselves  felt  throughout  every 
branch  of  life.  This  applies  to  the  concept  of  reality  itself. 
The  idealist  is  bound  to  protest  with  all  his  might  against  the 
measurement  of  this  concept  in  terms  of  the  realistic  standard. 
This  is,  however,  what  takes  place  when  the  idealistic  world  is 
treated  as  a  mere  accessory,  as  a  sort  of  embroidery  to  a  world 
already  given  and  well-established.  The  idealist  contends  that 
without  his  thought-world  the  bare  concept  of  a  world  and  a 
reality  at  all  would  be  impossible,  and  that  the  sense-world 
derives  its  content  and  value  entirely  from  the  thought-world. 
The  fate  of  idealism  is  often  similar  to  that  of  religion.  So 
long  as  the  latter  dominated  life  its  world  was  regarded  on  all 
sides  as  the  nearest  and  most  incontestable.  Augustine  over- 
came every  doubt  by  appealing  to  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being. 
St.  Thomas  Aquinas  called  the  supernatural  world  the  father- 
land (patria).  The  idea  of  a  life  beyond  and  with  it  that  of 
transcendence  did  not  come  to  the  front  in  the  religious  world 
until  after  the  commanding  position  of  religion  had  been  shaken 
and  its  content  had  lost  its  real  force.  When  religion  is  looked 
upon  from  the  outset  as  transcendent  it  is  already  virtually 
abandoned.  In  the  same  way  idealism  is  already  a  lost  cause 
when  men  think  of  its  world  as  something  strange  and  remote, 


IDEALISM— REALISM  103 

something  which  cannot  be  attained  to  without  laborious  mental 
effort. 

But  if  we  set  the  contrast  thus  sharply  before  us  we  entirely 
abandon  the  possibility  of  mediation,  even  that  of  the  so-called 
realistic  idealism,  in  so  far  as  it  stands  for  such  a  compromise. 
The  idealist  should  and  must  master  the  facts  which  constitute 
the  basis  of  realism,  and  it  is  equally  the  realist's  duty  to  under- 
stand idealism.  What  really  happens,  however,  when  they  do 
thus  study  one  another,  is  that  each  colours  the  situation 
according  to  his  own  convictions,  thus  increasing  the  contrast 
rather  than  bridging  it  over. 

1.  NINETEENTH-CENTURY  REALISM 

During  the  nineteenth  century  the  old  conflict  entered  upon  a 
new  phase,  into  the  meaning  of  which  it  is  essential  to  enquire. 
Up  to  the  period  of  which  we  are  speaking  the  course  of  human 
culture  had  run  strongly  in  an  idealistic  direction.  This  is  true 
more  particularly  of  traditional  religious  life,  but  the  new  culture, 
too,  had,  until  then,  attacked  the  problems  of  life  for  the  most 
part  from  within  and  had  tried  to  make  outward  circumstances 
subordinate  to  the  requirements  of  thought.  It  is  true  that  an 
opposing  tendency  of  a  realistic  nature  was  never  absent,  but 
this  was  not  so  much  a  definite  attempt  to  deal  with  the  problem 
as  a  whole  as  an  obstinate  resistance  on  the  part  of  individuals 
who  were  too  much  interested  in  the  joys  and  sorrows  of  the  sense- 
world  to  be  able  to  raise  themselves  to  the  level  demanded  by 
the  idealists.  An  opposition  thus  consisting  of  a  number  of  petty 
individual  forces  had  correspondingly  narrow  limits.  It  may 
have  exerted  a  depressing  and  disintegrating  influence,  but  it 
was  quite  incapable  of  setting  up  a  new  system  of  life  and 
thereby  shaking  idealism  to  the  foundations.  Now  this  was 
the  task  undertaken  by  nineteenth-century  realism.  This 
realism  maintained  that  the  immediate  world  is  sufficient  for 
man,  that  it  can  furnish  him  with  all  his  aims  and  satisfy  all 
his  desires,  and  do  this  without  putting  life  upon  a  lower  level. 
Such  an  undertaking  was  something  more  than  a  new  arrange- 
ment or  new  interpretation  of  the  traditional  situation ;  it 
recruited  its  strength  chiefly  from  the  fact  that  the  world  of 


104  MAIN  CURRENTS  OP  MODERN  THOUGHT 

immediate  human  existence  had  come  to  mean  more  to  us  than  it 
had  ever  done  before.  It  is  only  because  it  offers  a  new  reality, 
opposed  to  that  of  the  idealists,  that  the  new  realism  can  hope 
to  win  over  humanity.  It  is  more  a  battle  between  rival 
realities  than  between  rival  doctrines.  This  is  a  corroboration 
of  the  contention  contained  in  the  foregoing  section,  that  philo- 
sophical conflict  is  not  so  much  concerned  with  the  interpreta- 
tion of  an  existing  situation  as  with  its  formation. 

A  great  many  different  movements  combined  together  in  the 
nineteenth  century  to  produce  an  enrichment  of  immediate 
reality.  Man  acquired  a  new  and  infinitely  deeper  knowledge  of 
nature's  workings,  and  nature  became  more  and  more  a  subject 
of  human  occupation  and  interest.  The  ensuing  increase  in 
knowledge  was  quickly  converted  by  technical  skill  into  improve- 
ments directly  affecting  human  life,  which  became  immensely 
enriched,  accelerated,  and  strengthened.  An  amazing  growth 
of  human  capacity  tended  more  and  more  to  remove  the 
inflexible  character  of  fate.  Difficulties  themselves,  being 
regarded  as  challenges,  as  impulses  to  new  activity,  lost  their 
bitterness.  At  the  same  time,  human  society  gave  rise  to  more 
and  more  difficult  tasks.  Men  became  increasingly  convinced  of 
the  importance  of  the  form  in  which  society  is  moulded  and  of 
the  possibility  of  effecting  a  real  improvement  of  existing  con- 
ditions, so  as  to  place  society  upon  a  higher  level  and  secure  a 
more  universal  happiness.  A  ready  recognition  of  the  charac- 
teristic and  distinguishing  qualities  of  different  nations  arose, 
and  the  development  of  national  character  encouraged  the 
growth  of  corresponding  feelings  and  forces.  Within  the  State, 
individual  forces  secured  a  larger  sphere  for  their  expansion  and 
manifestation.  In  the  economical  world  the  tendency  towards 
a  more  equal  distribution  of  wealth  coincided  with  difficult 
problems  in  connection  with  the  technical  organisation  of  labour, 
thereby  stirring  up  an  immeasurable  depth  of  feeling  :  the  power 
of  material  conditions  was  now  for  the  first  time  clearly  per- 
ceived and  fully  appreciated  ;  the  inner  condition  and  happiness 
of  human  life  seemed  to  depend  upon  the  answers  given  these 
problems.  These  different  movements  complemented  and  accele- 
rated one  another,  both  the  results  and  the  problems  of  this  new 


IDEALISM— REALISM  105 

life  binding  humanity  ever  more  firmly  to  the  immediate  world 
surrounding  it. 

Moreover  man  himself,  the  doer  of  the  work,  develops  his 
own  nature  through  the  work  that  he  does;  and  by  "man" 
we  mean  man  as  he  lives  in  the  flesh,  not  as  he  stands  trans- 
figured in  a  philosophical  system.  History  and  society,  as  they 
now  appear,  both  contribute  towards  this  result.  Their  forces 
come  more  intimately  together,  space  and  time  no  longer 
separating  them  so  effectively;  they  unite  in  a  common  work 
and  become  conscious  of  a  pervasive  complete  solidarity. 
Humanity  stands  before  us  as  a  great  whole.  It  unites  forces 
that  were  formerly  scattered,  forming  enduring  relationships 
which  bind  individuals  together  and  immeasurably  enrich  the 
capacity  of  life  as  a  whole.  Humanity  thus  presents  itself  as  an 
object  of  reverence  and  faith,  an  object  which  seems  capable  of 
absorbing  the  whole  ethical  and  practical  activity  of  man. 

This  new  method  of  thought  must  reshape  every  department 
of  life  (such  as  art  and  science)  in  characteristic  fashion.  In 
every  direction  it  must  produce  the  same  effect,  it  must  make 
every  form  of  activity  closely  dependent  upon  the  external  world. 
From  this  point  of  view,  only  contact  with  things  can  lead 
human  forces  to  living  reality  and  away  from  mere  ghostly 
possibilities ;  on  the  other  hand,  a  separation  from  concrete 
things,  an  entrenchment  of  the  soul  in  its  own  inner  life,  must 
make  all  our  efforts  lifeless,  shadowy,  and  unreal.  The  basis 
and  motive  power  of  this  tendency  is  the  desire  for  genuine 
reality,  and  to  its  supporters  all  the  older,  idealistic  views  of  life 
seem  like  wreaths  of  early  morning  mist,  doomed  to  vanish 
before  the  victorious  light  of  the  on-coming  day. 

2.  THE  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  NEW  KEALISM 

Is  the  light  of  this  day  free  from  shadow?  Shall  we  un- 
doubtingly  accept  the  new  tendency?  The  actual  fate  of  the 
realistic  movement  shows  us  that  the  matter  is  not  free  from 
complications.  Realism,  it  is  true,  has  not  only  carried  the 
opinion  of  humanity  with  it,  with  overwhelming  force ;  it  has 
also  given  an  immense  impetus  to  work,  accelerated  our  whole 
existence,  aroused  us  to  a  more  manly  overcoming  of  difficulties 


106  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

and  to  a  more  victorious  attack  upon  all  that  is  irrational. 
At  the  same  time  the  growth  of  the  movement  has  pro- 
duced problems  which  take  us  beyond  the  boundaries  marked 
out  by  realism  and  endanger  the  independence  of  the 
realistic  sphere.  The  realistic  system  could  justly  pose  as 
the  one  all-sufficing  reality  only  if  the  simple  progress  of 
the  world's  work  itself  solved  every  difficulty ;  only  if 
all  independent  inner  life  more  and  more  completely  dis- 
appeared and  man  became  transformed  into  a  mere  instrument 
for  doing  work.  But  no  such  transformations  have  taken  place. 
On  the  contrary,  the  actual  course  of  events  has  clearly  shown 
us  that  mere  work  by  no  means  absorbs  the  whole  man.  To 
begin  with,  work  has  come  more  and  more  to  mean  a  bitter 
struggle  for  existence,  a  struggle  between  individuals,  classes, 
and  peoples ;  the  contrasts  have  become  sharper  and  sharper 
and  the  field  of  conflict  larger  and  larger.  The  passions  which 
this  struggle  has  aroused  show  clearly  enough  that  standing 
behind  the  work  are  sensitive  beings,  craving  for  happiness  and 
demanding  from  their  work  some  personal  compensation,  even 
though  the  work  itself  lose  by  giving  it.  Is  there  any  way  of 
meeting  the  perils  arising  out  of  this  demand,  save  by  drawing 
upon  the  inner  life — that  is,  upon  a  quantity  which  strict  realism 
cannot  logically  recognise  ? 

The  complications,  moreover,  go  beyond  the  conflict  of  the 
forces  which  work  disengages  and  seem  to  be  inseparably  bound 
up  with  the  very  nature  of  work.  Work  never  develops  more 
than  a  portion  of  human  faculty,  and  the  more  specialised  the 
work  the  smaller  the  portion  :  the  field  which  a  given  individual 
can  cover  becomes  continually  narrower  and  more  limited. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  realism  this  neglect  of  all  but  a 
few  special  capacities,  this  stultification  of  the  man  as  a  whole, 
must  be  a  matter  of  indifference,  since  from  this  standpoint  life 
is  no  more  than  contact  with  environment.  But  it  cannot  be 
a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  actual  man,  who  suffers  loss  and 
pain.  There  is  obviously  more  in  him  than  the  realist 
recognises — or  logically  can  recognise.  Moreover,  work  indis- 
solubly  connects  man  with  his  achievement,  with  some  result ; 
from  this  point  of  view  all  effort  is  wasted  which  produces 


IDEALISM— REALISM  107 

no  tangible  result.  This  has  the  effect  of  turning  the  mind 
entirely  towards  what  is  outward  and  making  the  soul  indifferent 
to  its  own  welfare  ;  indeed,  realism  cannot  even  allow  the 
existence  of  inner  states  of  soul.  This  continual  striving  after 
result,  success,  and  recognition  must  more  and  more  absorb  men 
and  repress  all  independent  psychical  life  (it  has  in  reality  thrust 
it  far  into  the  background).  We  cannot  welcome  such  a 
situation.  We  are  conscious  of  a  painful  vacuity,  and  having 
this  consciousness  our  work  no  longer  satisfies  us  ;  in  spite  of 
all  its  successes  it  leaves  the  soul  homeless.  For  humanity  as 
a  whole  this  complete  absorption  of  existence  in  work  means 
an  impoverishment  of  the  spiritual  content  of  life.  The  absence 
of  common  ideas  and  convictions  to  inwardly  unite  humanity 
results  in  the  disappearance  of  a  common  thought-world  and 
the  infliction  of  a  severe  injury  upon  the  whole  of  mankind,  for 
without  such  a  thought-world  our  life  can  have  no  independent 
value,  no  true  greatness,  and  no  soul. 

These  are  no  mere  abstract  philosophical  considerations. 
They  are  the  undeniable  experiences  of  modern  humanity.  Can 
any  one  possibly  deny  that,  in  spite  of  the  brilliant  triumphs  of 
modern  labour  and  ingenuity,  there  has  arisen  amongst  us  a 
profound  and  growing  discontent  not  unmixed  with  pessimism  ? 

The  nineteenth  century,  more  than  any  other  epoch,  enlarged 
the  whole  aspect  of  life  and  improved  human  conditions.  One 
would  have  expected  it  to  close  with  a  proud  and  joyful 
consciousness  of  strength.  The  fact  that  it  did  not  do  so  points 
to  an  error  in  the  type  of  life  which  dominated  the  period. 
This  error  is  to  be  found  in  the  desire  of  realism  to  eliminate 
the  soul.  And  the  soul  will  not  allow  itself  to  be  eliminated. 
The  very  attempt  to  deny  the  soul  only  arouses  it  to  greater 
activity. 

8.  CRITICISM  OF  THE  TRADITIONAL  FORMS  OP  IDEALISM 

Experience  of  this  sort  compels  a  revision  of  the  whole 
question.  It  is  incumbent  upon  us  to  determine,  as  far  as  is 
possible,  in  what  respects  each  view  is  right  or  wrong.  The 
desire  for  complete  reality  in  life  could  hardly  have  manifested 
itself  in  such  a  powerful  tendency  as  realism  has  shown  itself 


108    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

to  be  if  the  traditional  forms  of  idealism  had  not  been  lacking 
in  such  reality.  There  is  no  doubt  they  did  suffer  from  this 
lack  and  were  no  longer  firmly  rooted  in  the  real  inner  life  of 
humanity.  There  were  two  main  forms  of  idealism  :  a  religious 
form  which  still  makes  itself  felt  through  the  various  types  of 
Christianity,  and  an  artistic  form  which,  originating  in  ancient 
Greece,  constitutes  a  tendency  that  has  often  been  repressed  but 
never  quite  crushed. 

The  religious  interpretation  of  life  bases  human  existence 
upon  a  deeper  order  of  reality  ;  it  raises  humanity  above  time  to 
eternity,  above  a  life  absorbed  in  external  things  to  a  life  of 
pure  inwardness.  In  spite  of  all  weakening  this  tendency  still 
constitutes  an  immense  power.  Even  where  it  is  denied  it  still 
works  on  in  secret.  But  this  form  of  life  no  longer  positively 
convinces  the  modern  man ;  it  does  not  speak  directly  to  his 
soul.  This  state  of  affairs  has  come  about  through  the  forma- 
tion of  a  broad  gap  between  the  traditional  form  of  religion  and 
the  modern  thought-world.  Even  those  who  hope  to  be  able  to 
bridge  this  gap  can  no  longer  possess  the  directness  and 
complete  certainty  of  the  old  faith.  When  religion  is  not  the 
most  certain  thing  it  is  very  apt  to  be  the  most  uncertain. 

Religion  has  suffered  an  even  greater  loss  of  power  through 
the  alienation  of  the  modern  man  from  the  personal  religious 
experience  of  the  early  Christians.  In  the  early  days  men  were 
driven  to  religion  by  an  acute  consciousness  of  human  weakness 
and  an  experience  of  immovable  limitations  and  clashing  contra- 
dictions :  men  felt  that  their  spiritual  selves  could  not  be  saved 
without  recourse  to  another  world.  Hence  deep  natures  like 
Augustine  felt  this  other  world  to  be  their  nearest  and  most 
secure  possession,  the  absolutely  solid  foundation  of  life ;  the 
world  of  our  present  existence  only  retained  any  value  at  all  in 
so  far  as  it  symbolised  or  reflected  the  other  world. 

The  modern  period,  on  the  other  hand,  originated  in  and 
received  its  characteristic  impress  from  a  youthful  feeling  of 
strength,  a  mighty  impulse  towards  life.  From  this  point  of 
view  man  began  to  regard  life  as  an  immeasurable  task,  in 
attacking  which  he  develops  himself,  inwardly  and  outwardly. 
Rigid  limits  and  final  renunciations  seem  to  be  things  of  the 


IDEALISM— REALISM  109 

past,  and  the  world  appears  to  be  moving,  through  its  own 
development,  towards  a  state  of  the  highest  perfection.  Perhaps 
the  matter  is  not  quite  so  simple  as  the  disciples  of  modern 
thought  are  apt  to  imagine  ;  perhaps  the  development  of  the 
future  will  make  us  conscious  of  our  limitations,  aye,  of  our 
incapacity  !  But  at  present  the  consciousness  of  strength  holds 
the  field,  nor  is  there  any  direct,  spontaneous,  overwhelming 
impulse  towards  religion.  Religion  therefore  loses  its  imperative 
force  and  secure  truth. 

Idealism  of  the  artistic  type  is  in  even  greater  danger  of 
becoming  unreal.  It  seeks  to  perfect  the  world,  not  from  any 
superior  standpoint,  but  by  means  of  an  activity  inherent  in  the 
world  itself.  The  meeting  of  inner  and  outer,  of  soul  and  world, 
gives  rise  to  a  conformation  which  appears  to  unite  together  all 
the  manifoldness  of  life,  assigning  proper  limits  to  each  separate 
element  and  cementing  the  parts  together  into  one  harmonious 
and  homogeneous  whole.  Every  merely  natural  force  is  thereby 
ennobled,  and  the  spiritual,  from  being  an  obscure  and  indefinite 
possibility,  becomes  a  reality  as  clear  as  the  day.  By  such  an 
achievement  as  this,  the  artistic  synthesis  creates  a  life  at  once 
active  and  noble.  It  raises  the  level  of  human  existence  and 
refines  the  texture  of  the  soul ;  it  proves  itself  to  be  indispens- 
able to  the  complete  shaping  of  spiritual  life.  But  has  it  the 
body  and  strength  to  provide  life  with  a  complete  content  ?  Is 
it  not  probable  that  only  those  with  a  special  natural  gift,  with 
a  marked  creative  capacity,  will  find  the  centre  of  life  in  such  a 
movement  as  this  ?  Is  there  not  the  danger  of  producing  an 
aristocracy  which  is  not  only  exclusive  but  rejoices  in  being 
exclusive  ?  Moreover,  must  not  a  man,  a  people,  or  an  age 
have  already  attained  to  a  very  rich  life  in  order  to  experience 
and  achieve  great  things  in  the  work  of  artistic  construction  ? 
Must  not  depth  of  soul  be  possessed  before  it  can  be  expressed  ? 
In  the  absence  of  such  depth  the  artistic  life  remains  confined  to 
the  surface  and  readily  degenerates  to  mere  dilettantism,  losing 
all  real  content.  And  when  the  difficult  complications,  bitter 
contradictions  and  appalling  abysses  of  human  existence  come 
at  last  to  be  fully  recognised  (and  the  experience  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  drives  us  in  this  direction),  can  art,  in  its  own 


110    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

strength,  really  claim  to  remove  every  difficulty,  light  up  every 
dark  place,  and  replace  all  sorrow  by  joy  ?  If  it  cannot  do  this, 
however,  it  will  be  severely  tempted  to  minimise  what  is  irra- 
tional and  discordant,  and  to  represent  human  existence  as  being 
more  harmonious  than  it  really  is.  The  sense  of  truth  is  thus 
roused  to  opposition  and  the  realists  feel  that  they  are  champion- 
ing the  cause  of  truth. 

Even  more  obvious  is  the  right  of  realism  to  oppose  that  type 
of  popular  idealism  which,  despite  all  attacks  on  its  foundation 
and  all  criticisms  of  detail,  clings  to  the  general  tendency  of 
idealism  without  giving  it  any  clear  form  or  definite  basis.  This 
sort  of  idealism  works  up  enthusiasm  about  the  "  higher " 
without  in  the  least  knowing  what  this  "  higher  "  is.*  It  exalts 
the  "  good,"  "true,"  and  "beautiful"  without  deigning  to 
provide  any  sort  of  explanation  of  their  contents.  It  is  hence 
easily  understood  that  the  traditional  idealistic  forms  of  life 
could  not  satisfy  the  newly  awakened  impulse  towards  truth. 
Although  realism  energetically  represents  this  impulse,  it  is 
another  question  whether  it,  either,  can  fully  satisfy  it. 

4.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  REALITY 

From  the  point  of  view  of  realism  a  reality  in  life  is  only 
attainable  by  a  continual  linking-up  of  action  with  our  visible 
environment ;  if  such  a  linking-up  does  in  truth  produce  reality 
for  man  is  open  to  the  gravest  doubt.  For  it  can  only  be  a 
question  of  a  reality  experienced,  or  capable  of  being  experienced, 
by  man ;  any  other  reality  lies  outside  his  sphere  and  cannot 

*  "  Higher  "  seems  to  have  been  first  employed  more  particularly  during  the 
Sturm-  und  Drangzeit  of  German  literature  as  the  favourite  expression  for  a  new 
and  presumably  higher  trend  of  thought.  The  romantic  school  frequently  used 
"higher"  to  distinguish  their  own  aims  and  conceptions  from  those  of  the 
average  person.  Schleiermacher's  youthful  works  may  be  cited  as  an  example. 
It  was  customary  to  speak  of  the  "  higher  "  life,  "  higher  "  feelings,  "  higher  " 
education,  "higher"  morality,  &c.,  until  the  term  fell  into  ridicule  ("higher 
nonsense").  Kant's  clear  and  thorough  methods  of  thought  were  fundamen- 
tally opposed  to  the  use  of  such  a  term.  When  Feder  credited  him  with  a 
"higher"  idealism  he  retorted  (iv.  121,  Hart):  "In  Heaven's  name  not 
higher.  High  towers  and  the  metaphysically  great  men  who  resemble  them 
(much  wind  blows  about  both)  are  not  for  me.  My  place  is  the  fruitful  bathos 
of  experience." 


IDEALISM— REALISM  111 

possess  any  interest  for  him.  This  connection  of  action  with 
environment  gives  rise  to  a  wealth  of  deeds  and  accomplishments, 
but  these  are  not  personal  experiences  ;  something  accomplished 
does  not  become  an  experience  until  it  has  been  referred  to  a 
unity  and  comprised  within  the  soul-life  as  a  whole.  Realism 
has  not  the  means  of  explaining  such  a  soul-life  as  this,  although 
it  is  compelled  to  draw  upon  it  for  its  own  purposes.  Realism 
does  not  develop  its  characteristic  world  with  its  own  resources ; 
if  compelled  to  rely  upon  its  own  means  alone,  it  would  destroy 
every  inner  relationship  and  every  system  of  life,  and  hence 
itself  as  a  whole.  It  rests  upon  the  tacit  assumption  of  a  soul- 
life  comprehending  manifoldness,  and  with  it  overcoming  the 
opposition  between  subject  and  object.  The  statement  that  the 
surrounding  world  means  far  more  for  man  than  idealism  of 
the  usual  type  admitted,  and  that  he  can  obtain  far  more  from  it, 
cannot  be  substantiated  in  the  absence  of  such  an  assumption. 
And  what  does  this  really  mean  if  not  that  realism  is  encom- 
passed by  an  idealistic  thought-world?  Realism  cannot  constitute 
a  system  of  life  at  all  without  the  assistance  of  idealism.  When, 
under  these  circumstances,  the  soul  is  deprived  of  all  independence 
and  derived  as  far  as  possible  from  outside,  a  crying  contradiction 
results,  and  even  if  this  is  concealed  after  a  fashion  it  is  soon 
revealed  by  the  incessant  appearance  in  the  concept  and  doctrine 
of  elements  which  have  no  proper  place  in  realism. 

Let  us  consider  the  system  of  the  greatest  realistic  thinker — 
Comte.  In  laying  his  foundations  he  took  every  possible  care  to 
remove  from  his  concepts  everything  that  was  in  any  way  derived 
'  from  idealism.  But  as  soon  as  the  stage  of  design  and  criticism 
was  passed  and  the  work  of  execution  and  positive  construction 
began,  the  matter  assumed  a  different  aspect.  The  more  the 
constructive  work  progresses,  the  more  the  original  quantities 
alter  and  become  idealistic  in  conception.  In  particular,  the 
critical  transition  from  knowledge  to  action  is  brought  about 
Bolely  by  such  an  alteration,  physical  compulsion  being  con- 
verted into  moral  obligation.  A  whole  system  of  life  is  the  final 
result,  but  this  is  only  built  up  by  continually  calling  in  the 
assistance  of  that  very  opponent  whose  destruction  was  regarded 
as  essential  to  the  preservation  of  truth. 


112    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Does  any  one  maintain  that  a  divided  world  like  this  can 
satisfy  the  needs  of  spiritual  life,  and  more  particularly  the 
demands  of  ethics  ?  In  this  connection  we  may  again  refer  to 
Comte,  and  again  we  find  him  suddenly  changing  his  position — 
but  this  time  in  a  reverse  sense.  The  point  of  departure  is  now 
idealistic — the  conclusion  realistic.  The  man's  deep  nature  was 
sensitive  to  the  dark  side  of  his  age,  which  he  regarded  from  a 
thoroughly  idealistic  point  of  view ;  he  took  the  matter  so 
seriously  that  nothing  short  of  energetic,  original,  creative  effort, 
nothing  less  than  the  possibility  of  a  complete  renewal,  seemed 
capable  of  meeting  the  situation.  But  the  realistic  material 
with  which  he  approaches  this  task  is  inadequate ;  his  recom- 
mendations resolve  themselves  into  interpretations  of  nature, 
together  with  suggested  alterations  in  social  organisation;  by 
such  means  humanity  is  to  accomplish  the  desired  upheaval,  the 
victory  of  good  over  evil.  Nothing  but  a  crassly  optimistic  view 
of  humanity  could  conceal  the  glaring  contrast  between  the 
greatness  of  the  task  and  the  inadequacy  of  the  means.  How- 
ever, this  is  typical  of  realism  :  it  either  takes  a  shallow  view  of 
life  or  it  involves  itself  in  contradictions  which,  logically  thought 
out,  lead  to  its  own  destruction.  Can  our  desire  for  truth  and 
our  thirst  for  reality  be  satisfied  by  a  system  of  life  which 
becomes  more  self-contradictory  the  more  it  endeavours  to  do 
justice  to  the  whole  content  of  human  life  ? 

These  abstract  considerations  are  supported  by  the  actual 
experience  of  humanity.  The  movement  towards  realism  took 
place  in  a  spiritual  atmosphere  completely  saturated  with  ideal- 
ism. For  however  much  the  various  special  forms  of  idealism 
may  have  suffered  disintegration,  the  general  development  of 
civilisation,  as  the  result  of  many  centuries  of  labour,  has  given 
rise  to  a  type  of  thought,  feeling,  and  valuation  which  bears  the 
general  impress  of  idealism  though  no  longer  definitely  associ- 
ated with  any  of  its  special  forms.  Idealism  has  thus  penetrated 
the  whole  of  our  life  and  passed  into  our  innermost  souls.  The 
realistic  order  of  life  has  not  escaped  its  influence,  and  continu- 
ally draws  upon  it  for  rectification,  mitigation,  or  complementary 
matter.  But  the  further  realism  progresses  towards  independ- 
ence and  the  more  it  becomes  conscious  of  its  own  true  character, 


IDEALISM— REALISM  113 

the  more  completely  must  it  endeavour  to  rid  itself  of  these 
idealistic  elements  :  it  cannot  do  this,  however,  without  narrow- 
ing and  destroying  itself,  and  hence  outward  victory  carries  with 
it  inner  defeat.  Were  the  whole  affair  a  mere  theatrical  per- 
formance it  would  be  possible  to  contemplate  this  dialectical 
development  of  the  movements  of  history  with  the  completest 
equanimity  and  even  to  derive  pure  pleasure  from  the  gigantic 
conflict  of  rival  systems  of  thought.  But  the  issue  at  stake  is 
the  destiny  of  man,  the  reasonableness  or  otherwise  of  his  exist- 
ence, the  gaining  or  losing  of  a  soul.  And  that  is  no  matter  for 
disinterested  contemplation. 

5.  THE  NECESSITY  FOR  A  NEW  IDEALISM 

Although  realism,  with  its  surface-culture,  cannot  satisfy  us, 
the  content  of  life  has  now  undergone  far  too  great  an  altera- 
tion for  a  mere  return  to  the  old  idealism  to  be  possible.  The 
irrational  element  in  life  (within  and  without)  is  far  more 
obvious  to  us  than  it  was  to  the  idealists  of  the  old  school  ;  the 
enormous  accumulation  of  rigid  facts  and  the  blind  indifference 
of  the  natural  world  to  the  aims  of  spiritual  life  are  so  closely 
present  to  our  minds  that  we  cannot  pass  over  them  so  lightly 
as  could  the  older  idealists.  Idealism  must  be  deepened  and 
more  firmly  rooted  if  it  is  to  meet  these  increased  perplexities 
and  overcome  these  new  obstacles.  This  will  only  be  possible  if 
it  be  realised  that  the  question  at  issue  is  not  the  accomplish- 
ment of  any  special  tasks  or  the  development  of  life  in  special 
directions.  What  is  at  stake  is  the  attainment  of  any  true  and 
essential  life  at  all.  For  if  there  is  no  depth  of  reality  in  which 
our  everyday  life  can  take  root  and  find  sustenance  there  can  be 
no  true  personal  life,  and  hence  no  real  life  whatever.  At  the 
same  time  spiritual  life  must  be  more  sharply  separated  from, 
and  elevated  above,  what  is  merely  human  :  the  world  of  nature, 
the  sphere  of  visible  existence,  surrounds  us  with  almost  over- 
whelming pressure  ;  our  spiritual  activity  would  be  powerless  to 
resist  it,  did  it  not  represent  a  new  stage  of  reality,  the  life  of 
the  spiritual  world  as  a  whole,  and  have  its  resources  to  draw 
upon.  Otherwise  idealism  has  no  firm  basis  and  no  definite 
right.  Only  if  an  absolutely  independent  spiritual  world  (eine 

8 


114    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

lei  sich  selbst  befindliche  Geistesweli)  works  in  us  and  has  the 
power  to  fill  our  life  does  the  demand  essential  to  idealism 
become  comprehensible  and  possible  ;  the  demand,  namely,  that 
the  characteristics  and  goods  of  the  new  world  should  be  held 
immeasurably  superior  to  all  human  aims  and  independent  of  all 
human  desires  and  opinions,  and  the  everyday  concerns  of 
human  life  ;  only  then  is  it  possible  for  the  spiritual  world  not 
to  receive  its  truth  from  humanity  but  for  humanity  on  the 
contrary  to  measure  the  amount  of  truth  its  life  contains  by 
comparison  with  the  truth  of  the  spiritual  world.  To  make 
humanity  the  measure  of  goodness  and  truth  is  to  inwardly 
destroy  both.  But  how  are  we  to  get  beyond  humanity  if  our 
immediate  existence  is  regarded  as  the  whole  of  reality  ?  *  In 
spite  of  all  confusing  and  weakening  influences  there  is  one 
question  that  will  always  make  itself  heard  and  demand  an 
answer :  Must  our  effort  be  devoted  solely  to  the  furtherance  of 
human  welfare,  to  the  betterment  of  things  within  a  given  exist- 
ence, or  do  we  not  rather,  in  directing  ourselves  towards  the  life 
of  the  spirit,  enter  into  a  new  kind  of  reality — a  reality  which  is 
at  the  same  time  a  realm  of  true  values  ?  If  the  spiritual  life 
has  no  intrinsic  superiority  to  merely  human  affairs,  no  idealism 
can  exist,  and  along  with  it  disappears  the  whole  meaning  and 
value  of  our  life,  leaving  us  an  existence  entirely  devoid  of 
content. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  supremacy  of  the  spiritual  life  be 
recognised,  no  deficiency  on  the  side  of  humanity  can  in  any 
way  endanger  spiritual  things.  The  fundamental  fact  of  all 
development  then  remains  secure  and  remote  from  all  disturbing 
influences.  Spiritual  life  (as  it  develops  within  our  sphere) 
may  be  invariably  mixed  with  what  is  merely  human  ;  ideas 
may  not  usually  exert  influence  unless  assisted  by  interest ; 
further,  spiritual  life,  upon  human  ground,  may  have  developed 
from  obsolete  beginnings  and  have  moved  slowly  forwards, 
suffering  many  reactions — all  this  (from  the  point  of  view  we 

*  In  this  connection  we  may  recall  the  words  of  Kant  (iii.  260,  Hart.) : 
"With  regard  to  moral  laws,  experience  is  (unfortunately!)  the  mother  of 
pretence  and  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  reprehensible  to  allow  laws  relating  to 
what  I  ought  to  do  to  be  determined  or  limited  by  what  is  done." 


IDEALISM— REALISM  115 

have  described)  does  not  in  the  least  endanger  the  fundamental 
facts  of  spiritual  life.  It  may  even  be  said  that  the  resistance 
on  the  part  of  humanity,  the  reluctant  recognition  of  spiritual 
necessities  and  the  appearance  of  spirituality  with  which  human 
conduct  loves  to  veil  itself,  can  only  strengthen  the  conviction 
that  more  is  working  within  humanity  than  is  derived  from  man 
as  he  actually  exists. 

If  the  best  intellectual  and  spiritual  work  of  to-day  is  again 
tending  towards  idealism,  it  is  only  to  be  hoped  that  the  move- 
ment will  not  be  satisfied  with  weak  compromise  :  it  must  be 
clearly  pointed  out  that  it  is  a  question  of  "  either-or,"  and  the 
indispensable  reversal  must  be  demanded  in  no  uncertain  voice. 
Idealism  must  not  merely  stand  on  the  defensive  ;  it  must  press 
forward.  It  must  be  positive  and  not  merely  critical.  Only  in 
this  way  can  a  true  spiritual  culture  be  successfully  opposed  to 
the  increasing  superficiality,  shallowness,  and  pretentiousness  of 
a  merely  human  culture.  Only  in  this  way  can  a  victorious 
resistance  be  offered  to  the  crushing  force  with  which  nature, 
history,  and  society  now  threaten  to  oppress  and  overwhelm 
humanity.  Without  faith  in  the  greatness  and  value  of 
humanity  there  can  be  no  progress — but  this  faith  must  have  a 
firm  foundation. 


B.     THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


1.  THOUGHT   AND    EXPERIENCE 

(METAPHYSICS) 

(a)  Historical 

A  FEW  preliminary  remarks  on  terminology  will  be  necessary. 
The  term  "  experience  "  has  grown  increasingly  ambiguous  with 
the  lapse  of  time.  Different  thinkers  use  it  in  so  many  different 
senses  that  it  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  a  definite  term.  In 
spite  of  all  the  work  which  has  been  done  in  connection  with 
the  subject,  no  verbal  distinction  is  made  between  everyday, 
pre-scientific  experience  and  scientific  experience.  The  con- 
ception of  scientific  experience  (ejU7r«/oia  fi&oSiKii)  is  as  old 
as  the  Stoics.  The  modern  philosophers  of  the  school  of  experi- 
ence showed  a  tendency  to  create  a  distinction  by  using  the 
Greek  expression  "empiricism,"  "empirical,"  and  "empiricist  " 
for  the  lower  type  of  experience.  The  German  scholastic 
philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century  also  endeavoured  to  dis- 
tinguish between  "  empirical  "  or  "  common  "  experience  and 
"learned"  experience.  Kant,  too,  often  used  "empirical" 
in  this  sense.  Comte,  the  most  important  representative  of 
the  school  of  experience  during  the  nineteenth  century,  pro- 
tested energetically  against  "  empiricism."  This  distinction 
did  not,  however,  attain  universal  recognition,  and  the  only 
one  that  was  generally  accepted  was  that  between  Empiriker 
("  empiricist  ")  for  the  lower  type,  and  Empirist  (no  historical 
English  equivalent)  for  the  higher,  a  distinction  probably  derived 
from  Kant's  philosophy. 

Of  greater  importance  is  the  history  of  the  kindred  expres- 
sions a  priori  and  a  posteriori.  The  chief  phases  of  the 
struggle  for  knowledge  are  to  be  seen  reflected  in  the  changes 

119 


120    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  meaning  undergone  by  these  expressions.  The  influence  of 
these  changes  is  to  be  felt  even  to-day.  The  expressions  are 
derived  from  the  Aristotelian  method  of  describing  the  general 
as  the  (conceptually)  earlier  and  the  particular  as  the  later, 
although  they  found  no  definite  place  in  speech  until  the  height 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  According  to  Albertus  Magnus,  to  prove  a 
thing  ex  prioribus  was  to  prove  it  from  principle ;  exposterioribus, 
from  consequences :  Prantl  (Geschichte  der  Logik  im  Abendlande, 
iv.  78)  mentions  Albert  of  Saxony  (a  fourteenth-century  scholar) 
as  employing  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  in  the  same  sense. 
The  terms  retained  these  meanings  until  the  modern  period,* 
and  they  are  not  yet  extinct. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  question  of 
the  origin  of  knowledge  became  very  pressing,  and  the  theory 
of  method  began  to  give  way  to  the  theory  of  knowledge.  This 
is  more  particularly  to  be  seen  in  the  case  of  Leibniz.  With 
Leibniz  a  priori  means  originating  in  reason ;  a  posteriori, 
derived  from  experience.  This  distinction  could  be  interpreted 
relatively  or  absolutely,  in  a  superficial  or  a  deeper  sense.  At 
first,  a  priori  knowledge  meant  nothing  more  than  knowledge 
deduced  from  accepted  premises,  prior  to  an  actual  examination 
of  the  matter  in  question,  that  is,  knowledge  based  on  a  mere 
process  of  inference ;  t  in  this  case  the  ultimate  origin  of  know- 
ledge remains  unexplained. 

But  in  Leibniz's  works  (and  afterwards  in  those  of  his  followers) 
a  priori  has  already  come  to  mean,  in  addition,  that  which  is 
independent  of  all  experience,  belonging  to  reason  alone.  I 

*  They  are  thus  used  in  the  so-called  Port  Eoyal  Logic  (L'art  de  penser) : 
Soit  en  prouvant  les  effets  par  les  causes,  ce  qui  s'appelle  dtmontrer  a  priori, 
soit  en  dtmontrant  au  contraire  les  causes  par  les  effets,  ce  qui  s'appelle  prouver  a 
posteriori. 

f  Thus  B.  Wolff  says  (Psychologia  Empirica,  §  434) :  Quod  experiundo 
addiscimus,  a  posteriori  cognoscere  dicimur :  quod  vero  ratiocinando  nobis  inno- 
tescit,  a  priori  cognoscere  dicimur.  And  §  435 :  Quicquid  ex  iis  colligimus, 
qua  nobis  jam  innotuere,  cum  ante  ignotum  esset,  id  ratiocinando  nobis  innotescit, 
adeoque  idem  a  priori  cognoscimus. 

J  Leibniz  contrasts  the  knowledge  acquired  by  la  pure  raison  ou  a  priori 
with  experimental  philosophy  gut  precede  a  posteriori  (see  Erdm.  778  6). 
Lambert  says  in  the  Neuen  Organon,  §  639 :  "It  should  accordingly  be 
understood  that  in  absolute  strictness  the  term  a  priori  can  be  applied  only  to 
that  which  is  entirely  independent  of  experience." 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  121 

This  whole  line  of  development  culminated  in  Kant's  philo- 
sophy. For  Kant  regarded  experience  itself  as  possible  only 
through  the  agency  of  a  system  of  a  priori  concepts  and  principles. 
But  Kant,  too,  not  infrequently  uses  the  word  in  the  looser 
sense.  At  about  this  period  these  terms  began  to  be  used 
outside  the  sphere  of  systematic  philosophy,  and  a  priori 
acquired  a  perfectly  definite  German  meaning.* 

It  is  a  clear  case  of  the  looser  use  of  the  word  when  modern 
empiricism  (with  the  help,  more  particularly,  of  the  theory  of 
evolution)  tries  to  derive  the  a  priori  element  from  experience. 
A  priori  then  comes  to  mean  that  which  the  individual  does 
not  himself  acquire ;  it  stands  for  that  which  has  been  handed 
down  to  him  as  a  product  of  the  experience  of  humanity  as  a 
whole  prescribing  definite  paths  for  his  thought  to  follow. 
Hence  humanity  as  a  whole  (but  not  each  separate  individual) 
draws  solely  upon  experience.  This  is  a  totally  different 
problem  from  that  of  Kant's  absolute  a  priori,  and  it  is  a 
gross  misunderstanding  to  believe  that  Darwin  and  Spencer 

*  In  earlier  times  a  priori  was  translated  by  von  vornen  her  (from  aforetime). 
This  is  already  found  in  Luther's  Tischreden  (see  Forstemann's  edition,  iv.  399), 
and  it  was  in  use  as  recently  as  the  eighteenth  century.  Campe  refers  to 
Lessing's  Ernst  u.  Folk  as  the  original  source  of  von  vornherein  (from 
aforetime),  and  I  do  not  myself  know  of  its  occurrence  in  any  earlier  work. 
This,  however,  defines  the  term  only  in  the  looser  and  merely  relative  sense. 
Understood  in  the  absolute  sense,  a  priori  is  equivalent  to  rein  (pure),  which 
also  has  a  lengthy  history.  Since  the  time  of  Anaxagoras's  vovf  Kc&apoc  (see 
Aristotle,  De  anima,  405  a,  16 :  povov  yovv  <j>r]<iiv  avrbv  (i.e.,  rbv  vovv)  r&v 
OVTUV  airXovv  tlvat  icai  a/uyf;  re  (cai  icajanov)  "pure"  was  employed  by  the 
ancients  in  the  sense  of  the  simple,  unsullied,  unmixed  nature  of  the  spiritual 
as  contrasted  with  the  mixed  nature  of  the  sense  world.  The  Neo-Platonists 
(and,  following  their  example,  the  Middle  Ages),  carried  the  concept  over  into 
the  sphere  of  knowledge  and  described  as  pure  a  knowledge  free  from  all  sense 
imagery  (cp.  for  example  Scotus  Erigena,  De  div.  nat.,  657  D,  658  B). 
Descartes,  too,  describes  the  intellectio  pur  a  as  one  qitee  circa  nullas 
imagines  corporeas  versatur.  In  this  sense  the  Wolffian  school  understood 
reinen  Verstand  (pure  understanding),  while  their  reine  Vernunft  (pure  reason) 
stood  for  what  is  opposed  to  experience  and  hence  corresponded  to  the 
a  priori  (see  Wolff,  Psych.  Emp.,  §  495:  ratio  pura  ett,  si  in  ratiocinando 
non  admittimus  nisi  definitiones  ac  propositiones  a  priori  cognitas).  Gottsched 
also  follows  this  terminology  (see  for  example  Erste  Grilnde  der  geiamten 
Weltweisheit,  1739,  p.  485 ;  reiner  Verstand  =  without  sense  images ;  p.  486, 
reine  Vernunft  =  reasoning  unmixed  with  principles  derived  from  experience. 
Thus  Kant's  use  of  reine  Vernunft  corresponds  with  the  academic  usage  of 
his  time. 


122    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

can  be  employed  to  refute  Kant,  a  misunderstanding  which 
reveals  an  inability  to  think  accurately  about  such  problems. 

Such  a  change  and  such  an  uncertainty  in  the  use  of  ex- 
pressions would  naturally  lead  us  to  suspect  the  existence  of 
complicated  problems.  The  history  of  philosophy  corroborates 
such  an  opinion ;  it  reveals  a  struggle  lasting  thousands  of  years 
and  continually  growing  in  importance.  But  in  spite  of  its  pas- 
sionate nature  this  struggle  was  not  fruitful  because  it  did  not 
centre  round  the  true  core  of  the  problem.  People  disputed 
as  to  whether  knowledge  was  derived  from  external  things  or 
from  the  self-activity  of  thought ;  but  this  cannot  be  decided 
unless  the  actual  subject  and  matter  of  our  knowledge  be 
already  placed  beyond  the  reach  of  doubt.  It  must  not  be 
continually  necessary  to  refer  the  question  ivhence  ?  back  to 
the  question  what  ?  Yet  this  is  what  really  takes  place. 
We  are  by  no  means  united  as  to  the  actual  nature  of  our 
knowledge.  The  conflicting  parties  base  their  proofs  upon 
fundamentally  different  conceptions,  hence  the  proofs  are  valid 
only  for  those  who  already  stand  upon  the  same  basis.  The 
historical  development  thus  becomes  a  series  of  monologues, 
and  the  opponents,  instead  of  getting  into  fruitful  contact, 
simply  confirm  one  another  in  their  previous  opinions.  The 
subject  and  matter  of  knowledge  cannot  be  ascertained  without 
going  back  to  ultimate  questions,  and  in  particular  to  that 
fundamental  problem  with  which  our  investigation  is  so  per- 
petually coming  into  contact ;  the  problem  whether  the  life 
and  activity  of  man  is  solely  a  continuation  of  a  natural  process, 
or  whether  it  introduces  a  new  stage  of  reality.  Within  the 
sphere  of  knowledge  itself  the  dispute  as  to  the  origin  of 
knowledge  gives  rise  to  another  question;  is  it  possible  or 
necessary  to  have  an  independent  philosophy  along  with  the 
separate  sciences  ?  Hence  this  problem  also  enters  into  the 
discussion. 

Although  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  knowledge  has  been 
connected  with  philosophy  since  the  days  of  Plato,  it  did  not 
take  a  leading  place  until  the  Modern  Period.  Then,  for  the 
first  time,  spiritual  life  and  external  environment  became  dis- 
tinctly separated,  and  each  was  thus  compelled  to  clearly  define 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  123 

itself  and  definitely  reveal  its  own  capacity.  They  did  not 
become  more  widely  separated  on  account  of  any  increase  of 
philosophical  penetration,  but  because  the  fundamental  content 
of  life  itself  became  divided,  forming  two  opposite  tendencies. 
On  the  one  hand  the  self-contained  inner  life,  the  outcome  of 
the  labour  of  centuries  and  of  multifarious  experience,  acquired 
such  a  powerful  self-consciousness  as  to  declare  itself  the  centre 
of  all  things,  and  thereupon  to  venture  the  reconstruction  of  the 
universe  through  the  labour  of  the  intellect  and  in  terms  of 
thought ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  sense-world,  throwing  off  the 
veil  which  had  obscured  it  during  the  Middle  Ages,  asserted 
itself  as  a  force  independent  of  humanity,  and  revealed  such  a 
powerful  and  solid  structure  and  such  a  depth  and  richness  of 
life  that  it  appeared  to  completely  dominate  human  existence 
and  provide  the  content  both  for  life  and  knowledge. 

This  contrast  is  too  sharp  for  any  friendly  mediation  to  be 
possible.  The  real  heart  of  the  matter  must  lie  either  on  the 
one  side  or  the  other,  and  our  conception  of  knowledge  will 
fundamentally  differ  according  as  we  adopt  the  one  position  or 
the  other.  In  this  way  the  systems  of  rationalism  and  empiri- 
cism, with  their  opposing  views  of  reality,  come  into  existence. 

Empiricism  takes  up  a  position  based  upon  the  consciousness 
of  the  individual.  It  shows  with  convincing  clearness  that  the 
content  of  this  consciousness  is  not  ready-made,  but  is  slowly 
built  up  from  separate  impressions  under  the  guidance  of 
environment.  From  this  point  of  view  the  only  function  of 
philosophy  is  to  refer  knowledge  back  to  consciousness.  Only 
as  empirical  psychology  has  it,  under  these  circumstances,  any 
raison  d'etre  at  all.  In  the  end,  knowledge  becomes  a  mere 
association  of  sensations  and  ideas  devoid  of  any  inner  con- 
nection :  no  attempt  whatever  is  made  to  throw  any  light  upon 
reality  itself.  It  remains  questionable  whether  this  can  really 
be  called  science  at  all.  Is  it  possible,  in  such  a  way  as  this, 
to  get  beyond  the  mere  individual  and  attain  to  anything  which 
shall  be  the  common  property  of  humanity?  The  question 
is  a  legitimate  one,  and  much  good  reason  has  been  given  for 
answering  it  in  the  negative. 

The  rationalist  position  is  entirely  different.    It  is  based  upon 


124    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  fact  of  science.  Rationalism  regards  the  true  nature  of 
science,  properly  understood,  as  affording  evidence  for  the  con- 
viction that  it  is  not  given  to  humanity  from  without,  but  must 
proceed  from  thought  itself  as  the  outcome  of  its  self-activity. 
The  formal  properties  of  scientific  knowledge,  in  particular, 
seem  to  be  incapable  of  being  derived  from  outside.  What 
source  can  we  assign  to  the  eternal  and  universally  valid  truths 
which  support  the  fabric  of  science  other  than  the  intrinsic 
nature  of  the  spirit  ?  On  these  lines,  knowledge  reduces  itself 
essentially  to  the  complete  working  out  of  what  is  inherent  in 
the  rational  nature  of  man,  and  the  procedure  of  science  and 
of  philosophy  in  particular  becomes  at  root  analytic.  To  Leib- 
niz philosophy  appeared  to  be  a  kind  of  universal  mathematic 
which  kept  forcing  the  preliminary  assumptions  of  knowledge 
further  and  further  back  and  converting  the  whole  of  reality 
more  and  more  into  rational  equations.  But  when  a  systematic 
structure  of  science  is  built  up  in  this  way,  the  world  tends 
more  and  more  to  become  a  domain  of  mere  forms  and  rela- 
tions. Reality  threatens  to  become  utterly  thin  and  bloodless. 
Thus  empiricism  seems  unable  to  give  to  its  limitless  material 
any  dominating  form,  while  rationalism  fails  to  provide  the  form 
with  a  satisfying  content. 

Kant  strove  with  all  his  might  to  overcome  this  contrast,  both 
sides  of  which  were  represented  in  his  own  nature.  He  belonged 
to  the  rationalistic  side  in  so  far  as  he  energetically  sought  to 
raise  knowledge  beyond  the  mere  association  of  ideas  and  make 
it  into  a  connected  whole;  but  his  rationalism  received  an 
empirical  impress  in  this  sense,  that  he  did  not  represent 
thought  as  giving  rise  to  knowledge  through  its  own  pure 
self-activity  ;  knowledge  must  always  depend  upon  matter  being 
presented  to  the  mind.  Thus  thought  cannot  attain  to  a  world 
of  things,  but  only  to  a  domain  of  appearances.  Related  to 
empiricism,  too,  was  a  strong  sense  for  facts,  insisting  as  he 
always  did  upon  an  exact  conception  of  what  is  individual  and 
characteristic  :  rationalism  was  always  inclined  to  round  things 
off  in  order  to  make  them  fit  neatly  into  its  systems  of  thought. 
Kant's  thought  was  as  pronouncedly  qualitative  as  that  of 
Leibniz  was  quantitative.  The  former  thought  in  contrasts, 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  125 

the  latter  in  stages.  Kant's  judicial  method  of  procedure 
possessed  not  only  the  advantage  of  treating  the  problem  more 
systematically  than  it  had  ever  heen  treated  hefore,  but  it  made 
a  peculiarly  penetrating  attempt  to  define  man's  characteristic 
capacity  for  knowledge.  But  in  spite  of  the  greatness  of  the 
treatment,  which  initiated  a  new  epoch  in  the  study  of  the 
whole  problem,  the  new  answer  at  once  raised  new  questions 
and  doubts.  Can  thought  be  bound  to  a  strange  world  and 
at  the  same  time  retain  its  independence  ?  The  extreme  com- 
plication of  the  problem  is  revealed  by  the  fact  that  Kant's 
investigation  is  less  direct  and  more  artificial  in  dealing  with 
the  connection  between  the  function  of  thought  and  the  im- 
pressions of  the  senses  than  it  is  in  any  other  portion  of  his 
work.  Moreover,  the  verdict  is  one  that  is  not  satisfactory  to 
either  party.  Kant's  exaltation  of  the  work  of  thought  un- 
avoidably points  beyond  bondage  to  the  "  thing-in-itself "  and 
limitation  to  a  domain  of  appearances,  and  thus  cannot  be 
accepted  by  the  rationalists  ;  the  empiricists,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  enquire  (nay,  they  must  enquire)  if  this  fabric  of  forms, 
which,  according  to  Kant,  first  makes  experience  possible,  has 
not  been  gradually  evolved  through  experience  (which  would 
put  an  essentially  different  complexion  upon  his  explanation). 
The  uncertain  situation  in  which  such  conflict  places  knowledge 
would  be  much  more  acutely  felt  if  Kant's  practical  philosophy 
did  not  strengthen  and  complement  the  world  of  thought.  But 
we  must  not  imagine  that  the  basis  of  the  practical  philosophy  is 
beyond  the  reach  of  doubt. 

Hence  it  cannot  surprise  us  that  the  further  developments  of 
philosophy  tended  to  lead  beyond  the  Kantian  solution  of  the 
problem  of  knowledge,  and  that  the  opposition  between  thought 
and  experience  became  more  acute  than  ever.  This  state  of 
affairs  was  partly  brought  about  by  the  growth  of  a  social 
and  historical  conception  of  reality,  such  as  Kant  had  no 
idea  of,  but  which,  more  than  any  other  movement,  was 
responsible  for  the  character  of  the  nineteenth  century.* 

*  The  following  reference  to  the  preface  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reaton 
shows  (among  others)  how  Kant  denied  that  the  doctrine  of  principles  could 
undergo  historical  modification  (thus  following  the  example  of  the  older  rational- 


126    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Both  parties  seized  hold  of  this  new  method  of  thought,  and 
with  its  assistance  tried  to  accomplish  that  which  had  not 
hitherto  been  successfully  achieved.  History  assumed  fundamen- 
tally different  aspects  when  regarded  from  the  two  contrasting 
points  of  view.  The  rationalists  viewed  it  as  a  single  move- 
ment driven  forward  by  inner  necessity.  The  empiricists  saw 
in  it  nothing  more  than  the  accumulation  of  an  endless  series  of 
events.  Through  its  association  with  history,  rationalism  de- 
veloped into  a  speculative  construction  which  represented  the 
thought-process  as  producing  the  whole  of  reality  in  the  course 
of  its  unfolding.  More  and  more  it  attempted  to  convert  the 
whole  of  fact  into  a  product  of  reason.  It  had  no  place  for 
experience,  simply  as  experience.  The  analytical  procedure  of 
the  more  old-fashioned  type  of  rationalism  gave  way  to  a  syn- 
thetical method.  Philosophy  took  the  form  of  a  world-embracing 
logic,  and  was  held  to  have  shaped  the  whole  course  of  history ; 
it  appropriated  all  real  knowledge  to  itself,  allowing  the  indi- 
vidual sciences  no  shred  of  independence.  The  historical  ten- 
dency affected  empiricism  in  an  exactly  opposite  manner ; 
seizing  upon  the  scientific  conception  of  evolution,  it  made 
use  of  it  to  deduce  all  the  supposed  real  possessions  of  the 
spirit  from  experience.  From  this  point  of  view  knowledge  took 
the  form  of  an  increasing  adaptation  to  environment,  which 
adaptation  was  looked  upon  as  becoming  ever  more  and  more 
serviceable  and  economical  under  the  influence  of  the  struggle 
for  existence :  all  the  fundamental  tendencies  and  forms  which 
our  thought  exhibits  (which  in  the  case  of  a  single  individual 
seem  a  priori)  are  believed  to  have  thus  resulted.  The  whole 
inward  and  logical  structure  of  knowledge  is  replaced  by  a  mere 
array  of  facts.  Explanation  becomes  simply  description.  There 
is  no  room  here  for  an  independent  philosophy  ;  natural  science 
has  become  the  only  true  knowledge  ;  the  selection  and  arrange- 
ment of  the  more  important  results  of  science  is  the  only  work 
left  for  philosophy  to  do. 

ism) :  "  Now  metaphysics,  according  to  the  conception  of  it  that  we  are  about 
to  elaborate,  is  the  sole  science  which  may  promise  such  a  completion  (and  that 
in  a  short  while  with  but  a  little  united  effort)  that  nothing  shall  remain  for 
posterity  except  a  mere  didactic  arrangement  according  to  its  aims  ;  it  will  be 
impossible  for  it  to  add  in  any  way  to  the  content." 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  127 

The  real  work  of  the  nineteenth  century  followed  a  path 
between  these  two  opposite  tendencies.  During  the  early  part 
of  the  century,  the  highly  strung  self-consciousness  of  humanity 
and  its  occupation  with  problems  of  inner  culture  tended  in 
favour  of  rationalism.  Later  on,  the  immense  increase  of 
interest  in  the  external  world  and  the  boundless  wealth  of 
information  —  scientific,  historical,  political  and  practical — 
which  now  poured  in  upon  mankind,  promoted  the  cause  of 
empiricism.  During  the  former  period  man  felt  himself  to  be 
the  centre  of  reality  and  believed  his  spiritual  activity  to  be 
fully  capable  of  illuminating  any  initial  obscurities.  During  the 
latter  period  he  was  overwhelmed  by  the  consciousness  of  his 
own  insignificance ;  driven  from  the  centre  to  the  periphery, 
he  can  no  longer  hope  to  produce  reality  himself ;  he  can  only 
humbly  await  its  revelation.  Not  only  necessity  of  this  kind, 
but  also  an  inner  desire,  drives  men  to  depend  upon  experience : 
it  is  the  desire  for  more  directness,  more  actuality,  and  a  greater 
richness  of  life  than  is  offered  by  the  world  of  rationalistic 
thought,  with  its  confinement  of  reality  within  a  framework 
of  isolated  concepts  and  forms.  The  rationalistic  procedure  is 
felt  to  be  an  impoverishment  and  dissipation  of  life.  As  a 
reaction  against  this,  in  Dilthey's  words,  "  an  insatiable  desire 
for  reality  has  become  the  strong  soul  of  present-day  science."* 

There  was  naturally  no  lack  of  attempts  at  reconciliation  and 
adjustment.  A  resumption  of  Kantian  methods  of  thought 
demonstrated  that  experience,  however  useful  it  may  be,  can 
never,  of  its  own  power,  produce  scientific  knowledge — this 
requires  the  constant  assistance  of  thought.  In  the  same  way, 
it  may  be  shown  that  the  individual  sciences  contain  preliminary 
suppositions  which  go  beyond  the  sciences  themselves  and  cannot 
be  justified  by  their  methods.  A  counter-movement  of  this  kind 
was,  however,  negative  rather  than  positive.  It  could  point  to 
unsolved  problems  beyond  the  world  of  experience,  but  it  could 

*  James  justly  remarks  (Pragmatism,  p.  16) :  "  For  a  hundred  and  fifty 
years  past  the  progress  of  science  has  seemed  to  mean  the  enlargement  of  the 
material  universe  and  the  diminution  of  man's  importance.  Th«  result  is 
what  one  may  call  the  growth  of  naturalistic  or  positivistic  feeling."  See 
also  p.  14 :  "  Never  were  as  many  men  of  a  decidedly  empiricist  proclivity  in 
existence  as  there  are  at  the  present  day." 


128    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

not  open  up  a  new  sphere  of  life  and  thought ;  it  supplied  no 
impulse  towards  a  specific  philosophical  method  and  an  indepen- 
dent philosophy.  Philosophy,  in  this  connection,  had  no  other 
function  than  that  of  supplying  the  individual  sciences  with 
a  critical  and  reflective  background,  an  interesting  occupation 
for  specialists,  but  one  hardly  contributing  towards  the  elevation 
of  spiritual  life.  Nor  could  such  a  philosophy,  in  the  absence  of 
a  dominating  principle,  reach  beyond  the  subjectivity  of  the 
merely  individual  standpoint.  For  humanity  it  meant  the  loss 
of  a  world  of  common  ideas  and  convictions  such  as  it  had 
possessed  for  thousands  of  years.  The  enormously  rapid  exten- 
sion of  environment  during  this  period  produced  a  wave  of 
optimism  which  caused  mankind  to  overlook  almost  entirely  the 
awful  significance  of  this  loss  and  the  disintegration  and  inner 
impoverishment  which  threatened  to  follow  upon  it.  Such  happy 
oblivion  could  not  last.  The  desire  for  a  connected  thought- 
world  and  an  inner  unity  in  life  is  so  deeply  rooted  that  it  cannot 
be  long  suppressed.  The  beginning  of  a  reaction  is  to  be  seen 
clearly  enough  to-day.  The  separate  sciences  themselves  de- 
mand greater  unity :  their  own  constructive  progress  leads  to  a 
closer  examination  of  underlying  principles  and  preliminary 
assumptions,  and  this  results  in  the  discovery  of  connections 
with  other  spheres  of  knowledge,  and  hence  stimulates  a 
movement  towards  solidarity.  The  demand  for  a  synthesis  is 
again  heard  on  every  side.  The  synthesis  is  not,  however, 
genuine  if  the  connection  established  be  nothing  more  than  a 
juxtaposition.  It  does  not  really  go  to  the  root  of  the  matter 
unless  it  discovers  common  ideas  and  convictions,  and  to  do  this 
it  must  take  up  a  commanding  position ;  in  other  words,  there 
must  be  an  independent  philosophy. 

In  the  same  direction  there  works  an  even  stronger  force — 
that  of  our  common  life.  The  disadvantages  of  being  com- 
pletely dependent  on  the  external  world  and  of  converting  life 
wholly  into  work  are  becoming  increasingly  evident.  The 
absence  of  a  uniting  principle  to  fall  back  upon  can  no 
longer  be  ignored ;  only  a  superior  unity  can  convert  life  into 
self-life  and  thus  enable  us  to  make  it  truly  our  own.  We 
cannot  fail  to  be  conscious  of  spiritual  emptiness  in  the  midst 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  129 

of  an  overwhelming  wealth  of  impressions,  and  of  uncertainty 
about  life  as  a  whole  side  by  side  with  so  much  certainty  in 
details.  Under  these  circumstances,  all  spiritual  life  and  the 
whole  meaning  and  value  of  our  existence  become  subject  to 
doubt.  The  ground  beneath  our  feet  becomes  totally  insecure. 
It  is  imperatively  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  foundations 
of  our  existence  and  fight  a  battle  for  the  preservation  of  the 
human  soul.  When  such  problems  press  for  solution  we  cannot 
remain  content  with  mere  experience.  We  are  driven  to  seek 
new  possibilities  and  thoroughly  to  revise  our  relationship  to 
reality.  Philosophy  again  enters  the  arena,  not  as  a  mere 
aid  to  the  elaboration  of  experience,  but  bringing  with  it  a 
thought-world  of  its  own  and  armed  with  power  to  create 
and  construct  anew. 

(b)  The  Right  of  an  Independent  Philosophy 

At  the  very  commencement  of  our  investigation  stands  the 
question  of  the  independence  of  philosophy,  for  the  whole 
aspect  of  knowledge  depends  upon  the  answer  given  to  this 
question.  But  how  are  we  to  obtain  an  answer  ?  In  the  case 
of  the  problem  of  knowledge  there  is  no  direct  relationship  with 
the  past ;  there  is  no  evident  thread  of  connection  which 
merely  requires  to  be  pursued  further.  This  has  already  been 
made  clear  by  our  general  historical  survey,  and  it  is  corrobo- 
rated by  the  peculiar  position  of  affairs  at  the  present  day.  We 
are  more  conscious  to-day  of  our  departure  from  former  achieve- 
ments of  humanity  than  of  any  agreement  with  them.  Con- 
nections are  broken  off  rather  than  indicated.  The  development 
of  spiritual  life  drove  nature  and  soul  inwardly  further  and 
further  apart ;  it  thereby  prevented  knowledge  directly  compre- 
hending both  and  compelled  it  to  decide  for  the  one  or  the  other. 
It  thus  came  to  pass  that  fundamentally  different  conceptions  of 
the  world  came  into  being,  each  claiming  to  represent  truth. 
But  neither  was  strong  enough  altogether  to  capture  the  field,  so 
that  thought  continued  to  oscillate  between  the  two  poles. 

Such  an  experience  as  this  seemed  to  point  to  the  need  for  a 
friendly  understanding,  for  an  adjustment  of  conflicting  claims. 
This  seemed  most  likely  to  be  obtained  by  recognising  different 

9 


130    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

factors  in  knowledge  and  allocating  some  to  the  one  sphere  and 
some  to  the  other.  This  took  place  in  the  Kantian  distinction 
between  form  and  matter.  But  this  solution  suffered  shipwreck 
owing  to  the  difficulty,  nay,  impossibility,  of  bringing  together 
for  common  service  such  essentially  different  factors  as  sensation 
and  logical  activity — factors  belonging  to  quite  different  cate- 
gories. It  appears  impossible  to  retain  the  two  together,  and 
equally  impossible  to  decide  in  favour  of  the  one  rather  than  the 
other.  In  addition  to  historical  experience  of  this  kind  we 
must  take  into  account  the  conflicting  impressions  and  impulses 
of  the  present  day.  We  are  becoming  more  and  more  con- 
scious of  the  inner  emptiness  of  a  life  and  thought  occupied 
solely  with  the  world  of  experience,  but  at  the  same  time  ex- 
perience surrounds  us  with  ever-increasing  pressure.  We  want 
more  independence  of  thought,  but  our  dislike  of  speculative 
systems  causes  us  to  tremble  at  each  step  forward  and  to  distrust 
every  kind  of  metaphysics. 

Such  a  perplexing  position  compels  us  to  face  the  problem 
outright  and  boldly  attempt  to  deal  with  it  after  our  own 
fashion.  Let  us  begin  with  the  question  of  what  it  is  which 
impels  man  to  strive  beyond  the  world  of  experience  and  lends 
power  to  his  aspiration.  Is  it  thought  itself  which  by  its  nature 
leads  him  along  this  path,  at  the  same  time  providing  him  with 
the  ability  to  follow  it  ?  This  explanation  has  been  put  forward 
from  the  earliest  times  and  is  still  frequently  heard.  It  is  said 
that  thought  involves  demands  which  the  world  of  experience 
does  not  satisfy.  At  the  same  time  an  inner  necessity  of  thought 
itself  compels  it  to  insist  on  satisfaction.  So  it  is  driven  to 
transform  this  world,  nay,  even  to  construct  a  new  one,  for  its 
own  inner  necessity  means  more  to  it  than  any  impressions 
received  from  outside.  This  would  be  simple  and  convincing  if 
only  the  necessities  upon  which  thought  insists  did  not  claim 
validity  outside  the  sphere  of  thought,  and  if  the  world  it  pro- 
jects did  not  claim  to  represent  the  truth  of  the  things  them- 
selves. These  claims  are,  however,  made,  and  in  making  them 
thought  steps  outside  its  own  domain.  It  cannot  justify  itself  in 
its  action  except  by  artificial  suppositions,  which  when  followed 
up  only  lead  to  greater  difficulties.  Is  it  possible  in  this  case  to 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  131 

escape  the  objection  that  thought  is  simply  projecting  human 
conceptions  into  the  outer  world  ?  This  supposed  necessity  of 
thought  is  a  thing  standing  entirely  on  its  own  hasis,  since  it 
rejects  and  must  reject  every  species  of  external  support  and 
rest  ultimately  upon  a  feeling  of  imperativeness,  of  an  abso- 
lutely irresistible  compulsion.  But  is  there  really  such  a  com- 
pulsion and  does  not  this  feeling  unavoidably  lead  to  subjectivism 
and  individualism  ?  As  a  matter  of  fact  prominent  philosophers 
put  forward  diametrically  opposite  claims  as  logically  necessary. 
Hegel  maintains  that  thought  sets  all  reality  in  movement. 
Herbart  would  remove  all  movement  from  reality.  The  former 
welcomes  contradiction  as  the  driving  and  uplifting  force  in 
the  world  process,  the  latter  will  not  tolerate  any  contradiction 
whatsoever.  Which  of  these  demands  represents  the  genuine 
thought  necessity  ?  Which  are  we  ourselves  to  regard  as 
binding  ? 

There  is  only  one  condition  on  which  mere  thought  could 
explain  the  world.  Thought  must  contain  the  whole  of  reality 
within  itself  or  produce  it  by  its  activity.  Thus  self-knowledge 
on  the  part  of  thought  becomes  a  knowledge  of  the  world,  and 
the  life-process  contains  its  truth  in  itself  and  needs  no  external 
corroboration.  The  logic  of  facts  has  driven  philosophy  in  this 
direction  again  and  again,  from  Plotinus  down  to  Hegel,  for  to 
follow  this  path  has  seemed  the  only  way  of  overcoming  the 
division  between  thought  and  being.  But  the  Modern  World, 
through  its  experience  of  the  Hegelian  system,  has  become 
clearly  conscious  of  the  difficulties  which  beset  the  absorption  of 
the  whole  of  reality  by  thought  and  of  the  ensuing  danger  of 
the  conversion  of  the  world  into  a  mere  shadowland  of  formal 
concepts.  This  experience  has  made  an  impression  that  will  not 
soon  be  obliterated. 

If  thought  neither  coincides  with  being  nor  provides  us  with 
any  means  of  attaining  to  a  being  external  to  itself,  then  no 
knowledge  at  all  is  possible  from  the  basis  of  thought  alone,  and 
in  particular  there  is  no  possibility  of  constructing  an  indepen- 
dent thought- world  side  by  side  with  the  world  of  experience. 
All  hope  of  success  rests  upon  thought  entering  into  wider 
relationships  and  hence  winning  a  different  relation  to  reality. 


132  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

And  this  is  what  it  really  does.  Thought  does  not  constitute 
from  the  outset  the  whole  intellectual  sphere  of  man ;  the  mind 
is  at  first  busy  with  the  associations  of  particular  ideas  and  with 
the  weaving  of  their  mechanical  network.  Thought  with  its 
tendency  towards  the  objective,  its  inner  laws,  its  synoptical 
comprehension  of  manifoldness  (in  contrast  to  the  successive 
unfolding,  characteristic  of  chains  of  ideas),  has  to  assert  itself 
against  these  associations  and  establish  itself  on  an  independent 
basis.  It  can  do  this  (and  in  fact  is  a  living  force  at  all)  only  as 
a  portion  and  an  expression  of  a  new  stage  of  life  which  first 
arises  in  man.  This  brings  us  to  the  concept  of  spiritual  life,  as 
we  have  learnt  to  know  it,  in  distinction  from  the  mere  life  of 
the  soul.  In  spiritual  life  we  recognise  a  new  development  of 
the  universe  in  which  it  unfolds  a  depth  and  gathers  itself 
together  to  form  a  world-life.  To  participate  in  spiritual  life 
means  therefore  to  participate  in  a  world-life.  The  experiences 
which  the  movements  and  changes  of  the  spiritual  life  give  rise 
to  do  not  belong  to  any  atomic  self,  but  are  appreciated  only  as 
revelations  of  reality  as  a  whole.  Moreover  this  new  life  has 
shown  itself  superior  to  the  contrast  between  subject  and  object ; 
it  is  no  half-being  needing  to  be  complemented  from  without, 
but  as  fully  active  life  it  is  raised  above  this  contrast.  It  carries 
within  itself  the  tracings  of  an  independent  reality,  and  its 
movement  is  a  struggle  towards  the  complete  development  of 
this  reality.  This  spiritual  life,  and  not  mere  man  or  the 
separate  individual,  is  the  basis  of  thought  and  of  all  aspiration 
towards  knowledge.  Knowledge  appears  in  a  new  light  when  it 
is  directed  neither  towards  itself  nor  towards  what  lies  beyond 
itself,  but  essentially  and  from  the  outset  is  directed  towards  the 
spiritual  life,  by  which  it  is  itself  encompassed.  Knowledge 
cannot  become  world-knowledge  unless  the  spiritual  life  whence 
it  issues  itself  constitutes  the  core  of  reality. 

Such  a  foundation  in  spiritual  life  with  its  accompanying 
universality  is  peculiar  to  all  knowledge ;  but  it  is  not  difficult 
to  see  the  nature  of  the  special  task  which  in  this  case  falls  to 
the  lot  of  philosophy.  All  aspiration  towards  knowledge  rests 
upon  a  relationship  of  whole  to  whole.  But  this  relationship 
may  remain  in  the  background  as  a  silent  presupposition,  and 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  133 

the  work  may  concern  itself  with  separate  spheres  or  separate 
relationships.  It  is  necessary  to  have  a  special  science  which 
treats  the  matter  as  a  whole  and  ahove  everything  else  fully 
elucidates  the  fundamental  fact  and  seeks  to  explain  its  content 
and  its  relationship  to  the  surrounding  world.  This  science  is 
philosophy.  Spiritual  life  is  certainly  not  a  mere  juxtaposition 
of  separate  points  but  an  inner  whole ;  and  it  is  just  as  certainly 
to  be  expected  that  philosophy  shall  open  up  a  new  aspect  of  the 
world,  and  that  whatever  be  the  contribution  received  from  the 
particular  sciences  it  shall  be  able  to  meet  this  with  an  inde- 
pendent contribution,  and  thus  from  its  own  basis  convert  the 
given  facts  anew  into  problems. 

Hence  the  corner-stone  of  all  philosophical  thought  and  the 
axiom  of  axioms  is  the  fact  of  a  world-embracing  spiritual  life. 
The  very  fact  that  a  new  stage  of  reality,  above  nature,  is 
recognised  at  all,  alters  the  aspect  of  the  cosmos  and  sets  Nature 
herself  in  a  different  light.  But  spiritual  life  is  not  only  some- 
thing more  as  compared  with  nature  ;  as  certainly  as  it  signifies 
the  movement  of  reality  towards  its  own  inner  nature  and  the 
self-immediacy  of  life,  it  must  claim  to  be  the  last  and  final 
stage  ;  as  such,  however,  it  must  insist  upon  judging  everything 
and  understanding  everything  from  its  own  point  of  view  and 
measuring  everything  according  to  its  own  standard.  This 
claim  necessarily  leads  to  the  question  how  far  the  spiritual  life 
present  in  man  is  equal  to  such  a  task.  The  difficulties  must 
be  considered  and  the  possibility  of  overcoming  them  examined. 
The  specific  character  of  man  results  from  the  combination  of 
greatness  with  limitations. 

All  this  provides  philosophy  with  a  special  task  and  vouch- 
safes it  an  independent  view  of  the  cosmos.  Its  work  thereby 
acquires  certain  characteristic  features,  and  with  three  of  these 
in  particular  we  shall  now  proceed  to  deal. 

1.  When  philosophy  attempts  to  pass  from  the  whole  of 
spiritual  life  to  the  whole  of  reality,  its  work  does  not  lie  within 
a  given  sphere.  It  must  first  create  this  sphere.  It  does  not 
find  its  world  ;  it  must  make  it.  The  whole  that  it  seeks  never 
comes  to  meet  it  from  outside,  but  must  be  shaped  from  within. 
It  demands  a  creative  synthesis.  This  philosophical  conception 


134    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  the  world  is  impelled  to  achieve  independence  more  particu- 
larly by  the  fact  that  the  existence  which  it  seeks  to  synthesize 
cannot  be  assimilated  without  undergoing  a  transformation. 
The  material  offered  is  far  too  miscellaneous  in  character  to  be 
fitted  together  just  as  it  is.  More  especially  the  meeting  of 
nature  and  the  inner  world  within  a  single  reality  imperatively 
drives  us  to  effect  a  transformation  of  first  appearances.  A 
tendency  towards  metaphysics  is  immovably  rooted  more  particu- 
larly in  modern  thought,  if  only  for  the  reason  that  the  Modern 
World  has  clearly  brought  out  the  contrast  between  nature  and 
the  soul,  a  contrast  which  necessarily  becomes  intensified  to  an 
unbearable  contradiction  when  the  attempt  is  made  to  gather 
the  whole  together.  At  the  same  time  philosophical  activity  is 
concerned  with  the  question  how  much  of  the  whole  range  of 
our  life  and  thought  is  to  be  taken  up  in  this  synthesis  and  to 
contribute  to  its  construction.  For  not  everything  that  we 
know  of  is  present  in  this  philosophical  synthesis.  Further,  the 
dominating  central  point,  which  gathers  the  rest  around  it  and 
gives  characteristic  shape  to  the  whole,  must  always  be  first 
determined,  and  may  be  sought  in  different  directions.  In  this 
respect  different  periods  vary  greatly.  After  the  mediaeval  con- 
struction of  spiritual  life  had  completely  surrendered  the  latter 's 
whole  sphere  to  religion,  the  Enlightenment  emphasised  the 
desire  for  a  greater  breadth  of  reality;  it  found  this  in  the 
juxtaposition  of  nature  and  individual  souls,  a  juxtaposition 
which  could  not  be  comprised  within  a  dominating  unity  without 
violence.  The  Kantian  movement  produced  the  concept  of  an 
independent  spiritual  life,  and  with  its  historical  and  social 
development  made  it  the  core  of  the  whole.  But  it  converted 
spiritual  life  more  and  more  into  mere  thought,  and  thus  its 
range  of  reality  became  too  small  and  a  reaction  was  inevitable. 
This  reaction  threatened  again  to  draw  spiritual  life  out  of  the 
philosophical  sphere  and  hence  to  fall  back  upon  the  conception 
of  reality  which  was  characteristic  of  the  Enlightenment ;  at 
the  same  time  the  lack  of  a  dominating  central  point  was  very 
keenly  felt,  for  in  reality  this  can  only  be  supplied  by  an  inde- 
pendent spiritual  life. 

The   amount   of  reality  which   can    be    brought   within  the 


THOUGHT   AND   EXPERIENCE  135 

philosophical  synthesis  and  the  position  of  the  vital  centre  of 
the  synthesis  are  continually  recurring  problems,  and  this 
clearly  illustrates  the  very  great  freedom  of  philosophical  work. 
In  spite  of  all  relationships  with  the  particular  sciences,  its 
tendency  towards  bold  and  original  construction  drives  it  to 
speculation.  In  this  task  the  assistance  of  intellectual  fancy 
is  indispensable,  but  the  forms  which  imagination  constructs 
cannot  be  made  real  to  man  without  borrowing  from  the  very 
world  of  experience  beyond  which  philosophy  takes  us. 

All  this  is  full  of  dangers,  but  without  danger  no  great  under- 
taking is  possible.  If  philosophy  aims  at  converting  our  whole 
existence  into  freedom  and  transferring  us  from  a  given  world 
to  a  self-constructed  world  of  our  own,  then  it  must  also  accept 
the  risks  of  freedom.  Nevertheless,  according  to  our  view,  the 
venture  of  philosophy  assumes  quite  a  different  complexion  from 
that  it  bore  in  the  system  based  upon  pure  conceptual  con- 
struction. For  in  our  case  the  effort  is  directed  in  the  first 
place  towards  a  Jact,  a  fact  upon  which  thought  itself  rests, 
the  fact  of  a  world- embracing  spiritual  life ;  what  it  con- 
tains must  be  made  manifest  as  a  fact,  it  must  be  exhibited,  not 
deduced.  How  it  stands  with  regard  to  the  surrounding  world, 
what  resistance  it  finds  in  it,  and  how  it  must  further  develop 
itself  in  order  to  overcome  this  resistance — these  are  all  ques- 
tions of  actuality,  though  it  is  certainly  an  actuality  which  can- 
not come  to  us  from  without,  but  has  continually  to  be  obtained 
anew  through  an  integration  of  life,  through  the  struggle 
upwards  to  the  vision,  which  ever  sees  life  as  a  whole  and 
measures  it  accordingly.  This  involves  a  free  act  which  cannot 
be  forced  upon  any  age  or  any  individual,  but  is  not  therefore 
by  any  means  a  matter  of  individual  liking  and  taste. 

2.  It  is  philosophy  which  first  justifies  the  endeavour  to  reach 
beyond  a  mere  acquaintance  with  things  to  a  real  knowledge  of 
them.  For  knowledge  is  nothing  other  than  an  absorption  into 
one's  own  life,  a  finding  of  oneself,  a  self-knowledge.  Such 
knowledge  can  never  be  afforded  us  by  the  realm  of  sense- 
experience,  which  does  no  more  than  provide  a  juxtaposition 
of  events  ;  nor  is  it  attainable  through  the  reshaping  of  things 
within  the  subjective  life  of  the  soul,  the  self-consciousness  of  the 


136    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

mere  natural  man.  For  a  self-consciousness  such  as  this  merely 
projects  its  own  subjective  limitations  into  the  external  world, 
making  it  merely  human,  like  itself;  hence  even  in  its  most  perfect 
form  this  subjective  limitation  of  the  world  is  not  essentially 
different  from  that  childish  personification  of  the  environment 
which  was  characteristic  of  the  early  stages  of  human  history. 
It  is  only  spiritual  life,  seeking  and  finding  itself  in  things,  which 
reveals  an  inwardness  not  forced  upon  things  from  without  but 
contained  in  their  own  being;  with  encompassing  power  this 
life  converts  outer  resistances  into  inner  obstacles,  and  trans- 
forms the  struggle  with  them  into  an  inner  experience. 

Now,  it  is  philosophy  which  makes  itself  responsible  for  this 
movement  towards  inner  illumination,  towards  an  understanding 
of  reality.  It  is  another  question  how  far  man  can  succeed  in 
such  a  spiritualisation  of  the  world,  and  how  far  it  can  be  accom- 
plished within  given  conditions,  but  the  mere  fact  that  the 
problem  of  knowledge  is  raised  at  all  signifies  a  complete  change 
of  position  and  makes  it  impossible  to  be  satisfied  with  any  mere 
acquaintance  with  things.  No  obstacle  and  no  doubt  can  alter 
the  fact  that  with  man  there  begins  an  illumination  of  reality. 
How  could  he  think  at  all  about  the  world  as  a  whole  if  his 
thought  did  not  spring  from  the  world  as  a  whole  ?  Thus  the 
very  movement  of  reality  drives  us  irresistibly  beyond  all  mere 
collecting  and  classifying  of  phenomena  to  the  winning  of  a 
soul.  Even  limitations  could  not  be  felt  as  such  if  human  life 
and  thought  were  not  in  some  way  superior  to  them.  It  is  the 
special  mission  of  philosophy  to  champion  this  desire  for  soul. 
It  can  attack  the  task  of  presenting  the  true  inwardness  of 
reality  with  peculiar  effectiveness  when  spiritual  life  is  clearly 
recognised  as  the  vehicle  of  this  endeavour,  and  the  whole  breadth 
of  existence  is  put  into  relationship  with  it. 

8.  Finally,  it  is  philosophy  which  exhibits  in  its  clearest  form 
the  relationship  between  the  struggle  for  knowledge  and 
spiritual  life  as  a  whole,  and  this  imparts  more  security,  power, 
and  importance  to  the  struggle.  Philosophy  needs  this  life 
because  only  the  resources  and  powers  of  this  life  raise  it  above  a 
position  of  fruitless  reflection  and  lift  it  from  tentative  seeking  to 
secure  creation ;  the  spiritual  life  needs  philosophy  because  only 


THOUGHT   AND   EXPERIENCE  137 

through  philosophy   does    it  attain   its  full  illumination,  uni- 
fication,  and  originative  power. 

In  order  to  see  how  philosophy  springs  from  life  as  a  whole 
and  takes  on  different  forms  according  to  the  specific  conditions 
of  life,  we  need  only  compare  different  ages  and  types  of  human 
culture.  How  fundamentally  different,  for  example,  is  the 
nature  and  purpose  of  philosophy  in  the  Indian  and  in  the 
European  and  adjacent  Asiatic  systems  of  human  culture ! 
This  difference  is  in  close  correspondence  with  the  different 
types  of  life.  In  the  former  case  we  have  not  so  much  a  pene- 
tration and  overcoming  of  the  world  as  a  separation  and 
liberation  from  it,  not  an  enhancement  of  life  in  order  to  main- 
tain it  even  in  the  face  of  the  hardest  resistance,  but  an  abate- 
ment, a  softening  of  all  hardness,  a  dissolution,  a  fading  away, 
a  profound  contemplation,  but  one  not  translated  into  deeds ;  in 
the  second  case,  on  the  other  hand,  we  see  a  powerful  life- 
impulse,  a  determined  attachment  to  existence  in  spite  of  every 
obstacle,  a  continual  affirmation  of  life  in  spite  of  every  upheaval 
and  apparent  destruction,  a  pressing  forward  through  all  limita- 
tions to  the  construction  of  new  worlds  and  the  production  of 
new  forms  of  life.  At  the  same  time,  philosophy  becomes  more 
a  penetration  of  the  world,  a  wrestling  with  its  resistances,  a 
progress  through  the  overcoming  of  these  resistances. 

It  is,  however,  unnecessary  to  go  far  afield  to  perceive  the 
close  connection  between  philosophical  work  and  the  general  con- 
dition of  spiritual  life.  The  experience  of  the  nineteenth  century 
itself  shows  it  with  perfect  clearness.  How  was  it  that  purely 
speculative  systems  could  exercise  such  an  irresistible  influence 
over  our  fathers  while  they  affect  us  as  something  utterly  alien, 
and  even  the  most  energetic  attempts  at  resuscitation  give  them 
no  real  power  of  conviction  ?  The  answer  is  that  since  then  the 
whole  position  of  life  and  its  fundamental  mood  have  essentially 
changed.  At  that  time  man,  with  his  spiritual  creativeness,  felt 
himself  to  be  at  the  centre  of  the  universe ;  just  as  this  power 
of  creation  seemed  to  convert  all  reality  into  reason,  so  its  con- 
cepts might  hope,  by  a  courageous  advance,  to  open  up  the  last 
depth  of  the  universe ;  thus  a  complete  possession  of  the  truth 
did  not  seem  too  bold  a  desire.  To-day,  on  the  other  hand, 


138    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

we  are  ruled  by  a  consciousness  of  the  extreme  littleness  of 
man  as  compared  with  the  immeasurable  world,  and  we  feel  our- 
selves to  be  at  the  periphery  of  things  rather  than  at  the  centre  ; 
to-day,  spiritual  life  does  not  gather  itself  together  to  united 
creation ;  to-day,  too,  we  are  hampered  by  severe  complications 
in  the  human  sphere  itself.  If  a  philosophical  endeavour  is  to 
make  itself  felt  at  all  in  such  a  situation,  we  must  first  assemble 
all  our  forces  ;  it  seems,  indeed,  as  if  it  would  be  impossible  to 
do  more  than  press  slowly  and  cautiously  forward,  commencing 
at  the  margin  of  things. 

Just  as  philosophy  draws  upon  life  as  a  whole,  so,  too,  it 
influences  life  as  a  whole.  Every  great  philosophical  achieve- 
ment involves  a  striving  upward  on  the  part  of  the  whole 
spiritual  life ;  it  is  no  product  of  mere  intellectual  ingenuity,  but 
a  work  and  a  strengthening  of  the  whole  spiritual  nature,  also  a 
self-preservation  of  world-embracing  personality.  It  is  character- 
istic of  really  great  philosophical  achievements  that  in  them 
something  more  is  accomplished  than  a  mere  classification  of 
concepts  or  an  enlargement  of  intellectual  horizon  ;  their  work 
results  in  a  further  development  of  the  life-process  itself,  in  a 
growth  of  spiritual  reality.  Philosophy  by  no  means  delivers 
mere  impressions  of  ready-made  things  ;  it  takes  part  itself  in 
the  work  of  construction ;  thus,  according  to  its  innermost 
nature,  it  is  by  no  means  a  cool  contemplation  but  a  matter  of 
powerful  life-feeling.  Only  such  a  connection  with  life  as  a 
whole  explains  the  position  and  importance  of  philosophy  in 
human  existence,  which  otherwise  involves  an  enigmatic  con- 
tradiction ;  for,  seen  from  the  outside,  philosophy  appears  to  be 
a  medley  of  systems  which  seem  mutually  to  contradict  one 
another  and  to  neutralise  one  another's  effects ;  moreover,  these 
systems  have,  as  a  rule,  been  rather  rejected  than  approved  of  by 
humanity ;  yet  at  the  same  time  we  see  spiritual  life  undergo  im- 
poverishment and  decay  where  it  renounces  all  relationship  to 
philosophy — religion  affords  a  particularly  good  illustration  of 
this ;  how  narrow,  how  inadequate  it  becomes  when  it  rejects 
all  philosophy  !  The  contradiction  disappears  when  the  close 
connection  of  philosophy  with  life  as  a  whole  is  recognised. 
Now,  its  chief  accomplishment  is  not  the  deliverance  of  ready- 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  139 

made  doctrines,  but  the  inner  elevation  of  the  life-process,  the 
gain  of  independence  and  originality,  the  ability  to  see  things 
more  as  a  whole,  more  inwardly,  more  in  their  essential  nature. 
This  union  of  philosophy  with  life  serves  also  to  explain  its 
divergence  into  different  tendencies,  but  without  setting  all  these 
tendencies  on  the  same  footing  and  thereby  abandoning  the 
claim  to  reach  universally  valid  truth.  Moreover,  our  philosophic 
preferences  and  decisions  vary  with  the  life-centre  we  adopt  and 
with  the  relations  in  which  the  life  we  shape  from  that  centre 
stands  to  reality  as  a  whole.  In  the  first  place,  it  must  be 
asked  whether  it  is  possible  to  make  a  synthesis  of  life  at  all  or 
whether  life  must  remain  a  mere  sequence  of  events.  In  the 
latter  event  there  can  be  no  sort  of  philosophy  whatsoever.  In 
attempting  a  synthesis,  however,  the  chief  question  will  be,  Is  the 
main  basis  of  thought  to  be  found  in  the  natural  existence  to 
which  the  average  life  of  the  community  belongs  or  in  a  superior 
domain,  that  of  life  in  a  state  of  spiritual  freedom,  with  spiritual 
contents  and  values  ?  The  former  position  is  represented  by 
naturalism  with  its  empiricism,  the  latter  by  idealism  with  its 
insistence  upon  &n  a  priori.  At  a  further  point  the  idealistic  path 
itself  divides  into  two,  the  problem  which  gives  rise  to  this 
division  being  that  of  the  attitude  of  the  ascending  spiritual  life 
towards  the  resistances  offered  to  it  by  the  condition  of  the 
world.  Pure  idealism  believes  itself  able,  through  a  full  develop- 
ment of  its  own  power,  to  overcome,  directly,  all  resistance  and 
to  effect  a  complete  assimilation  of  what  is  apparently  hostile  : 
such  a  type  of  thought  will,  however,  tend  towards  speculative 
construction  and  an  undervaluation  of  experience.  When,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  resistance  is  looked  upon  as  so  excessive 
that  it  cannot  be  overcome  by  spiritual  power,  pessimism  will 
result,  and  will  give  rise  to  a  scepticism  with  regard  to  the 
possibilities  of  knowledge  :  the  task  of  philosophy  is  here  under- 
stood in  an  idealistic  sense,  so  that  the  position  must  be  classed 
as  idealistic ;  but  since  the  task  is  declared  to  be  absolutely 
impossible  of  accomplishment,  life  is  left  to  bear  the  painful 
pressure  of  a  fundamental  contradiction.  When  the  difficulties 
and  resistances  are  recognised,  but  at  the  same  time  a  further 
development  of  life  is  believed  to  be  possible — a  development 


140    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

which  shall  leave  life,  at  any  rate  in  its  innermost  core,  free  from 
these  paralysing  influences — a  position  results  which  may  be 
called  positive  idealism :  it  impels  us  towards  a  metaphysic 
which  remains  entirely  distinct  from  any  merely  conceptual  con- 
struction. From  this  point  of  view,  pure  idealism  appears  to  be 
abstract,  to  fail  in  properly  penetrating  into  actual  reality  and  in 
adequately  estimating  its  resistances.  The  resulting  main  types 
of  philosophical  thought  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  equivalent 
possibilities  and  go  on  existing  peacefully  side  by  side.  One 
alone  may  be  permitted  to  reckon  as  the  full  expression  of  truth. 
At  the  same  time  such  a  connection  with  life  makes  it  obvious 
that  man's  decision  will  be  dependent  essentially  upon  his  own 
situation  and  experience  as  well  as  upon  the  work  and  mood  of 
the  period  in  question  ;  thus,  in  spite  of  the  certainty  that  there 
is  really  only  one  truth,  we  shall  find  it  hardly  possible  ever  to 
unite  in  embracing  it. 

We  need  have  no  fear  lest  such  a  close  linking-up  of 
philosophy  with  life  as  a  whole  should  abandon  the  former  to 
the  shifting  phases  of  history  and  leave  it  at  the  mercy  of 
a  destructive  relativism ;  for  this  would  take  place  only  if 
spiritual  life  were  no  more  than  a  product  of  historical  and 
social  development,  a  merely  human  phenomenon.  In  reality  all 
historical  and  social  spirituality  is  only  the  development  of  a 
timeless  spiritual  life,  superior  to  all  merely  human  existence. 
Human  culture  has  only  one  soul  and  is  only  genuine  in  as  far 
as  it  participates  in  such  a  spiritual  life.  Something  timeless 
assists  in  every  great  historical  event,  something  superhuman  in 
every  spiritual  ascent  of  man.  It  is  the  peculiar  mission  of 
philosophy  to  work  out  this  timeless,  superhuman  element — in  a 
word,  this  absolute.  Not  only  has  philosophy  the  greatest  width 
of  vision,  but  owing  to  the  freedom  of  its  thought  it  can  most 
readily  press  forward  to  fundamental  facts  and  to  a  contem- 
plation of  things  sub  specie  ceterni  :  by  means  of  a  thorough 
transformation  it  can  lift  our  life  above  the  mere  stream  of 
things  and  give  it  an  independent  basis ;  it  can  criticise  all 
existing  achievements  by  referring  them  to  the  fundamental 
process  and  the  inner  necessities,  thus  measuring  them,  as  well 
as  assigning  them  new  tasks  from  this  standpoint.  In  thus 


THOUGHT   AND   EXPERIENCE  141 

transforming  immediate  existence,  philosophy  does  no  more  than 
give  expression  to  a  fundamental  necessity  of  spiritual  life, 
assisting  to  place  the  latter  in  a  position  of  full  independence 
and  originality.  The  mere  fact  of  striving  in  this  direction  at  all 
involves  an  alteration  in  life's  direction  and  brings  with  it  a 
liberation  ;  it  changes  the  aspect  of  life  and  of  the  whole  of 
reality.  This  movement  confronts  us  with  absolute  demands 
and  compels  us  to  realise  the  inadequate  nature  of  our  posses- 
sion while  revealing  a  vision  of  greater  depths  beyond — for  this 
reason,  if  for  no  other,  it  is  of  importance.* 

(c)  The  Tendency  towards  Metaphysics 

Philosophy,  as  we  have  seen,  does  not  acquire  a  specific  task 
except  in  so  far  as  it  transcends  the  world  of  sense-experience ; 
and  the  task  is  not  imposed  upon  it  from  without,  but  springs 
from  its  own  nature.  Hence,  from  the  very  commencement,  its 
work  involves  considerable  tension,  and  this  becomes  intensified 
to  the  point  of  sharp  contradiction  through  the  special  experi- 
ences of  the  human  world.  The  fashion  in  which  spiritual  life 
exhibits  itself  in  the  sphere  of  human  interests  is  such  as  com- 
pletely to  contradict  its  own  being.  He  who  clearly  recognises 
this  contradiction  cannot  avoid  making  a  decision ;  he  must 
either  abandon  spiritual  life  or  he  must  assign  it  a  position  in 
opposition  to  the  immediate  world  and  make  it  the  vehicle  of  a 

*  We  may  at  this  point  introduce  a  quotation  from  that  penetrating  thinker, 
Steffensen,  although  his  trend  of  thought  is  not  completely  identical  with  our 
own.  In  the  Gesammelte  Vortrage  und  Aufsatee,  p.  6,  he  says :  "  It  (i.e., 
philosophy)  does  not  draw  its  fame  from  itself,  or  from  its  works,  or  from  the 
peculiar  power  or  purity  of  its  passion,  but  from  the  clear  and  lofty  atmosphere 
in  which  it  places  the  object  to  which  it  devotes  itself  and  the  significance  of 
which  it  seeks  to  learn.  Therefore  without  danger  it  may  confess  its  own 
powerlessness,  be  silent  for  awhile,  and  go  about  its  work  very  undemon- 
stratively;  its  ancient  and  honourable  existence  nevertheless  bears  witness 
before  men  of  a  complete  knowledge  shining  in  upon  the  changeful  appearances 
of  this  world  and  the  pettiness  of  our  everyday  thoughts.  The  concepts  and 
standards  of  empirical  science  stand  to  the  knowledge  towards  which  philosophy 
endeavours  to  ascend,  as  do  the  distances  upon  our  earth  to  the  immensities  of 
stellar  space ;  the  most  powerful  convictions  in  the  realm  of  common  knowledge, 
when  philosophy  compares  them  with  the  certainty,  which,  though  only  vaguely 
apprehended,  forms  its  own  starting-point,  seem  no  more  than  shifting  and 
momentary  opinions.  A  standpoint  which  discloses  to  oar  view  so  vast  a 
horizon  will  know  how  to  assert  its  independence." 


world  of  its  own.  Spiritual  life  cannot  dominate  reality  and 
draw  it  to  itself  without  possessing  full  independence;  within 
the  human  sphere,  however,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  nature, 
it  constitutes  a  merely  derivative  phenomenon,  while  from  the 
point  of  view  of  historical  existence  it  appears  as  a  product  of 
social  life.  Spiritual  life  proceeds  from  the  whole  to  the  indivi- 
dual, while  in  immediate  existence  all  combination  is  a  joiiiing- 
up  of  separate  elements ;  spiritual  life  is  distinguished  by  self- 
activity  and  originality,  while  immediate  existence  shows  a 
thoroughgoing  concatenation  and  hence  a  constraint  affecting  all 
its  activity ;  spiritual  life  represents  its  truth  as  superior  to  time, 
while  human  life  runs  its  course  in  time  and  must  follow  its 
movement.  Now  spiritual  life  cannot  possibly  operate  within 
us  as  a  world-force  without  also  giving  rise  to  a  specific  view  of 
the  world ;  hence  we  must  stand  fast  by  this  view,  and  if,  in  so 
doing,  we  meet  with  thoroughgoing  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
immediate  world,  the  matter  must  be  carried  through  in  spite  of 
the  opposition.  When  the  superiority  to  the  world  thus  becomes 
enhanced  to  the  point  of  opposition,  speculation  becomes  meta- 
physics. Since  the  latter  gives  the  characteristic  features  of 
philosophy  in  general  a  more  marked  stamp  and  sets  them  forth 
more  distinctly  it  will  particularly  strengthen  the  reversal  of  the 
cosmic  view  inherent  in  the  former.  It  will  at  the  same  time 
make  it  known  that  the  given  world  cannot  be  wholly  disposed 
of  as  the  mere  unfolding  of  a  spiritual  form  of  being,  but  that  it 
offers  resistance  to  this.  This  resistance,  however,  must  give 
rise  to  difficult  complications  and  severe  conflicts.  Into  our 
conception  of  the  world  as  a  whole  there  must  then  enter  a 
historical  element ;  nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  metaphysics 
than  the  recognition,  or  at  any  rate  the  suggestion,  of  such  an 
element. 

Meanwhile  our  problems  increase.  The  gulf  between  the 
aims  of  the  spirit  and  the  means  at  man's  disposal  broadens. 
The  undertaking  must  appear  a  reckless  venture  unless  a  meta- 
physic  of  life  stands  behind  the  metaphysic  of  thought.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  all  life  bears  in  itself  the  problem  which  meta- 
physics brings  to  clear  expression.  For  all  genuine  spiritual  life 
is  developed,  in  the  human  sphere,  not  only  as  transcending  but 


THOUGHT   AND   EXPERIENCE  143 

also  as  contradicting  the  immediate  world ;  morality,  for  example, 
is  not  only  something  more  than  natural  self-preservation,  but  it 
must  assert  itself  in  direct  opposition  to  a  worldly  routine  of 
selfish  interests  and  petty  aims,  and  in  a  hard  struggle  against 
this  routine  it  must  construct  its  kingdom.  Such  a  kingdom, 
however,  must  possess  its  own  view  of  the  world.  This  doubt- 
less brings  difficult  complications  with  it,  but  these  are  forced 
upon  us  ;  we  have  not  created  them  ourselves.  It  is  impossible 
to  escape  these  difficulties  by  returning  to  the  direct  moral 
phenomenon  and  fixing  upon  moral  personality,  for  instance,  as 
a  secure  basis.  For  such  a  personality,  with  the  unity  of  life 
and  originality  in  action  which  are  necessary  to  it,  does  not  only 
stand  in  sharp  contradiction  to  the  mere  juxtaposition  and 
fettered  state  of  the  immediate  world,  but  it  directly  involves  a 
cosmic  standpoint,  it  stands  for  the  presence  of  a  new  order  of 
things,  hence  it  itself  possesses  a  cosmic  character.  This  cosmic 
character,  however,  does  not  become  vividly  present  to  man  il 
there  be  no  vision  of  reality  to  support  it ;  thus  it  is  that  the 
self  s  very  effort  to  preserve  itself  drives  us  to  metaphysics.  We 
thus  see  that  in  metaphysics  a  conflict  is  waged  for  the  main- 
tenance of  an  independent  philosophy.  If  it  does  not  advance 
into  metaphysics  philosophy  falls  asunder.  The  rejection  of 
metaphysics  signifies  either  that  the  movement  towards  philo- 
sophy has  not  enough  strength  to  pursue  its  way  in  defiance 
of  the  resistances  of  the  immediate  world,  or  that  a  shallow 
optimism  has  caused  the  resistances  to  be  underrated. 

As  the  task  becomes  magnified  the  resistances  also  increase. 
The  obstacles  which  the  construction  of  an  independent  philo- 
sophy has  always  had  to  overcome  will  in  this  case  become  even 
more  serious.  The  forward  march  and  the  safeguarding  of 
positions  already  won  alike  assume  a  heroic  character;  the 
demands  of  thought  cannot  here  be  expressed  in  pure  con- 
ceptual form,  but  in  all  which  goes  beyond  the  mere  indication 
of  an  outline  will  be  driven  to  seek  the  help  of  metaphor.  But 
if  fancy  in  this  way  acquires  a  wider  field  of  play,  the  whole  will 
never  on  this  account  become  a  mere  image;  in  spite  of  any 
inadequacy  on  the  part  of  the  representation,  necessities  may 
operate  which,  from  a  spiritual  point  of  view,  are  the  most 


144    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

original  and  certain  things  in  our  whole  life.  The  very  inade- 
quacy of  the  representation  may  make  us  only  the  more  con- 
scious of  the  certainty  of  the  fundamental  fact. 

All  depth  of  spiritual  life  has  a  symbolic  character.  That 
which  originally  ascends  within  it  and  from  this  position  supports 
the  whole  of  reality,  only  fits  imperfectly  into  the  human  and 
psychical  forms.  What  is  accomplished  in  the  soul  of  man  is 
only  true  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  this  deeper  basis  and 
illuminated  from  thence.  It  lapses  into  falsity  as  soon  as  it 
becomes  separate  from  its  source  and  endeavours  to  be  more 
than  a  mere  means.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  case  of 
religion,  which  threatens  to  deteriorate  into  mere  mythology 
when  its  concepts  and  forms  are  not  unceasingly  referred  back 
to  the  fundamental  spiritual  process  and  inspired  from  thence. 
The  highest  art,  too,  we  frequently  find  to  have  been  ruled  by 
the  consciousness  that  creative  power,  through  all  its  media  of 
representation,  exhibits  something  deeper,  something  which  may 
indeed  be  stimulated  and  vivified,  but  cannot  be  adequately 
expressed.  "I  have  never  regarded  what  I  have  wrought  and 
accomplished  as  being  more  than  symbolical.  At  bottom  it  has 
been  a  matter  of  comparative  indifference  to  me  whether  I  made 
pots  or  pans  " — so  runs  the  confession  of  Goethe  (see  the  Con- 
versations with  Eckermanri) .  On  every  hand  there  is  the  same 
contradiction ;  the  life-process  in  its  innermost  essence  is  raised 
above  what  is  merely  human  to  independent  spirituality  and 
absolute  truth,  and  yet  in  its  development  it  is  incapable  of  over- 
coming the  limitations  of  the  human  sphere.  This  carries  with 
it  everywhere  the  demand  for  a  firm  retention  of  the  necessary 
in  spite  of  all  inadequacy,  for  a  maintenance  of  the  fundamental 
fact  in  spite  of  all  complications  associated  with  its  execution. 

Here  is  an  easy  point  of  attack  for  all  doubt  and  faint-hearted 
belief,  and  nowhere  more  than  here  will  men's  minds  be  divided. 
As  long  as  the  matter  is  considered  coolly  and  critically  from  a 
detached  point  of  view,  doubt  will  easily  have  the  upper  hand. 
It  will  only  be  possible  to  overcome  such  doubt  when  the  task  is 
taken  up  as  the  very  essence  of  our  own  life  and  treated  as  a 
matter  of  spiritual  self-preservation.  In  the  case  of  such  a  sharp 
alternative  as  here  lies  before  us  there  can  be  no  compromise. 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  145 

If  metaphysics  thus  shares  the  fate  of  all  spiritual  life  which 
aims  at  being  independent,  its  especial  task  consists  in  exposing 
the  contradiction  with  full  clearness  and  sharpness,  so  that  life  is 
stirred  up  out  of  all  dull  indifference  and  imhued  with  an  impera- 
tive inward  and  forward  impulse.  For  when  what  is  necessary  to 
spiritual  self-preservation  has  been  wrung  from  the  average  life 
of  an  age  and  developed  and  consolidated  in  opposition  to  this, 
and  it  is  then  held  up  to  this  life  as  a  task  that  cannot  be  refused, 
there  comes  into  life  a  discontent,  an  unrest,  an  inner  movement. 
This  probing  impels  it  to  an  upward  effort  and  at  the  same  time, 
by  the  aid  of  the  ideal  incentive,  its  effort  is  guided  along 
definite  paths.  Hence,  from  our  point  of  view,  taken  as  a  whole, 
metaphysics  cannot  be  regarded  as  something  which  floats 
vaguely  above  the  efforts  and  experiences  of  the  task  of  human 
history ;  it  is  interwoven  in  the  most  intimate  manner  with  the 
movements  of  this  problem.  Every  important  civilisation  has 
its  own  metaphysics,  in  which  it  expresses  its  innermost  being 
and  intention ;  its  desire  is,  in  and  through  this  metaphysics,  to 
attain  an  essential  character  and  a  living  soul,  to  idealise  itself 
therein.  On  the  one  hand,  metaphysics  must  seize  on  the 
dominant  force  which  permeates  a  culture ;  on  the  other  hand, 
it  must  raise  what  it  has  apprehended  above  all  the  limitations 
of  the  existing  situation  into  completeness  of  form  and  absolute 
validity,  and  from  this  standpoint  undertake  a  conflict  against 
everything  in  the  established  customs  and  social  habits  which  is 
inadequate,  merely  human,  and  base,  thus  provoking  a  sharp 
cleavage  into  "for  and  against."  For  example,  the  Platonic 
doctrine  of  ideas  elevated  the  Greek  artistic  view  of  the  cosmos 
into  the  metaphysical  realm,  the  idea  of  an  unchangeable  eter- 
nity taking  the  first  place.  So,  again,  the  thought-world  of 
the  Enlightenment  acquired  a  metaphysical  form  in  Leibniz's 
system,  with  its  hold  on  the  infinitely  little  and  its  conversion  of 
philosophy  into  a  universal  mathematic.  On  every  hand  we 
perceive  an  endeavour  to  push  forward  from  the  highest  point 
of  human  accomplishment  into  the  absolute  and  to  obtain  an 
independence  of  a  spiritual  character  for  our  thought  and  being 
by  a  reversal  of  the  immediate  order  of  things.  Through  this 
relationship  to  history  metaphysics  makes  no  surrender  to  what 

10 


146    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

is  merely  temporal ;  rather  does  it  elaborate  the  timeless  element 
of  truth  contributed  by  the  passing  generations.  This  element 
does  not  disappear  with  the  age,  but  remains  continually  present, 
at  any  rate  as  a  possibility  and  a  challenge. 

If  we  conceive  of  metaphysics  in  this  fashion  we  shall  have 
no  difficulty  in  meeting  the  attacks  which  have  been  made  upon 
it  from  the  earliest  times.  The  very  name  was  calculated  to 
arouse  prejudice.*  But  in  regard  also  to  content,  metaphysics 
must  now  pursue  a  different  path  from  that  which  it  has 
attempted  to  tread  in  the  past.  There  must  be  a  decisive  break 
with  that  unfettered  speculation  which  believes  itself  able  to 
produce  a  new  world  out  of  mere  thought :  this  fits  rather  the 
old-fashioned  mode  of  thinking  which  conceived  it  possible  to 
discover  the  whole  spiritual  content  of  life  through  knowledge, 
and  then  to  communicate  it  to  the  remaining  departments  of 

*  The  expression  "  metaphysics  "  has  its  origin  in  the  fact  that  Andronicus 
Khodius,  a  contemporary  of  Cicero's,  in  his  arrangement  of  the  Aristotelian 
writings  placed  the  investigations  dealing  with  the  ' '  first  philosophy  "  (vrpwri; 
<jti\offo<pia)  after  the  physics :  jierd  rd  <t>vai\a  (for  particulars  see  Bonitz' 
Kommentar  zur  aristotelischen  Metaphysik,p.  3&.).  Even  in  the  first  century 
after  Christ  this  led  to  the  naming  of  the  discipline  itself  according  to  its  posi- 
tion (rd  fs.t.ra  ra  (pvaiKa,  jj  /ierd  rd  QvaiKo.  Trpa.yfia.Teia).  The  singular  form 
metaphysica  belongs  to  the  scholastic  system  and  was  probably  derived  from 
Averroes'  translation.  The  name  was  an  unfortunate  one,  in  as  far  as,  from  the 
very  beginning,  the  idea  which  it  indicates  attached  to  the  concept  itself, 
creating  the  impression  that  metaphysics  has  to  do  with  what  is  remote  or  tran- 
scendental, that  it  represents  a  more  or  less  imaginary  addition  to  the  immediate 
reality.  It  was  already  referred  to  in  this  fashion  by  the  Neo-Platonist, 
Herennius  (see  Brandis  in  the  Abhandlungen  der  Berlin.  Akad.,  1831,  p.  80)  : 
"  fttTo.  rd  tyvatxa  \eyovrat,  airtp  0y<r£o>£  VTrtpijprai  Kai  virip  airiav  KUL  \6yov 
flaiv."  To  the  scholastic  philosophers,  too,  such  as  Thomas  Aquinas,  meta- 
physica meant  the  same  as  transphysica.  Kant,  however,  says  (viii.  576,  Hart.)  : 
"  The  ancient  name  of  this  science,  /xera  ra  (pvffina,  already  gives  an  indication 
of  the  type  of  knowledge  towards  which  the  science  was  directed.  It  is  sought, 
with  its  assistance,  to  transcend  all  the  objects  attainable  by  experience  (trans 
physicam)  in  order,  where  it  is  possible,  to  know  that  which  cannot,  under  any 
circumstances,  be  an  object  of  experience."  The  friends  of  metaphysics,  on  the 
other  hand,  strove  to  obtain  fresh  terms.  Clauberg,  the  most  important  German 
Cartesian,  recommended  "  ontosophy  "  or  "  ontology,"  but  the  disfavour  which 
had  attached  to  the  old  term  was  soon  extended  to  the  new  one  ;  Wolff  already 
complained  (see  Philos.  prima  sive  ontologia,  1.) :  Vix  aliud  hodie  contemtius  est 
nomen  quam  Ontologice.  Moreover,  ontology  denotes  only  the  older  type  of 
metaphysics — now  regarded  as  an  impossibility.  We  may  ask,  in  passing,  is  it 
not  a  remarkable  fact  that  no  thinker  of  the  first  rank  has  ever  written  a 
"metaphysics"  under  that  name? 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  147 

life,  whereas  now  we  set  knowledge  within  an  underlying 
spiritual  life  and  permit  it,  along  with  the  other  departments, 
to  struggle  simultaneously  for  truth  and  for  the  development  of 
this  deeper  life.  More  particularly  the  new  metaphysics  form 
the  sharpest  contrast  to  the  ontological,  and  therefore,  at  the 
same  time,  abstract  and  dogmatic  character  of  the  older  meta- 
physics. Aristotle's  action  in  determining  the  task  of  the  "  first 
philosophy  "  to  be  the  contemplation  of  the  Being  as  being 
(ro  ov  %  ov),  the  discovery  of  the  most  general  properties  of 
being,  struck  a  false  path  from  the  very  outset.  This  had  the 
effect  of  making  certain  formal  properties  appear  to  be  the  real 
essence  of  things,  constituting  the  main  framework,  all  particu- 
larity being  fitted  in  as  mere  illustrative  material.  Thus 
metaphysics  became  mere  ontology.  This  resulted  in  a  move- 
ment of  the  thought- world  towards  the  abstract  and  formal ;  a  set- 
ting-aside of  the  specific  content  of  human  life.  At  the  same  time 
it  gave  rise  to  dogmatism,  since  these  formal  properties  seemed 
to  be  once  for  all  recognisable  previous  to  any  closer  experience 
and  independently  of  all  historical  movement,  and  were  for  this 
reason  conveyed  from  metaphysics  to  the  other  departments  of 
knowledge  as  inviolable  truths.  This  dogmatic  procedure  had  the 
double  effect  of  depriving  metaphysics  of  inner  movement  and 
the  other  sciences  of  their  independence.  No  wonder  that  this 
ontological  and  dogmatic  metaphysics  met  with  resistance  from 
all  quarters.  The  development  of  modern  scientific  inves- 
tigation has  only  become  possible  by  throwing  off  the  old 
metaphysics. 

But  the  rejection  of  a  special  type  of  metaphysics  is  not  an 
abandonment  of  all  metaphysics.  We  are  inclined  to  agree 
with  Kant  when  he  expressed  the  conviction  that  "  some  sort 
of  metaphysics  has  always  existed  in  the  world  and  will  doubtless 
continue  to  do  so  "  (Hart.,  iii.  25).  At  any  rate,  the  metaphysics 
which  our  own  way  of  thinking  necessitates  is  not  open  to  the 
objections  which  destroyed  the  old  metaphysics.  For  where 
there  is  a  germ  of  developing  life  within  knowledge  itself,  and 
where  knowledge  is  primarily  directed  towards  the  deepening 
and  illumination  of  this  life,  metaphysics  will  not  entice  thought 
and  life  into  the  abstract,  but  will  communicate  to  these  its  own 


148    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

actuality  and  definiteness  ;  with  its  integration  of  all  multiplicity, 
metaphysics  will  for  the  first  time  render  clearly  visible  the 
unique  individuality  of  our  being  and  our  world.  All  life's 
several  meanings  and  problems,  even  such  connected  systems  as 
those  of  religion,  art,  and  morality,  will  be  able  to  overcome  the 
wretched  colourlessness  of  current  solutions  and  interpretations 
only  through  being  assigned  a  definite  place  and  goal  within  an 
inclusive  scheme  of  life  ;  moreover,  the  content  which  is  revealed 
by  reality  as  it  consolidates  into  a  totality  of  this  kind  can  alone 
justify  the  form  of  being  assumed  and  provide  it  with  a  mean- 
ing. Thus  our  investigation  is  impelled  towards  metaphysics, 
not  through  any  delight  in  forms  and  universals,  but  through  a 
desire  for  more  character,  for  a  profounder  actuality,  for  a  more 
energetic  renovation  of  our  sphere  of  life. 

A  metaphysic  which  preserves  the  connection  between  the 
endeavour  after  knowledge  and  a  fundamental  and  compre- 
hensive spiritual  life  is  equally  secure  as  regards  the  charge  of 
petrifying  dogmatism.  Such  a  metaphysic  will  keep  in  closest 
touch  with  the  movements  of  universal  history,  and  at  the  same 
time  gain  a  history  of  its  own ;  this  will  not,  however,  cause  it 
to  sink  to  the  merely  temporal  level. 

To-day  we  have  no  metaphysics  and  there  are  not  a  few  who 
consider  this  to  be  an  advantage.  They  would  be  justified  in 
this  view,  however,  only  if  our  thought-world  chanced  to  be 
particularly  flourishing ;  if,  despite  the  absence  of  metaphysics, 
firm  convictions  ruled  our  life  and  endeavour  and  high  aims 
fortified  us  and  liberated  us  from  the  petty  human  routine. 
But  in  point  of  fact  we  cannot  avoid  recognising  a  limitless 
disintegration,  a  lamentable  insecurity  of  conviction  in  all 
matters  of  principle,  a  helplessness  in  the  face  of  the  trivialities 
of  our  human  lot,  a  soullessness  in  the  midst  of  an  overflowing 
outward  plenty.  Those  who  can  quietly  endure  such  a  state  of 
affairs  will  not  be  led  to  metaphysics  by  any  theoretical  con- 
siderations. But  those  who  recognise  how  imperative  is  the 
task  of  welding  our  civilisation  into  a  more  compact  and 
purposive  whole,  and  of  winning  for  it  an  inner  independence 
(thereby  at  once  more  sharply  dividing  and  more  closely  uniting 
men's  minds),  will  side  with  us  in  our  retention  of  metaphysics 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  149 

and  in  the  seeking  of  new  paths  along  which  to  carry  on  the 
ancient  task. 

(d)    The   Pursuit   after   Knowledge :    a   General   Survey 

The  foregoing  discussions  express  fundamental  convictions  as 
to  the  nature  of  knowledge,  and  these  only  need  developing  to 
give  rise  to  a  characteristic  view  of  the  whole.  In  particular,  it 
is  the  conception  of  spiritual  life  which  we  have  here  advocated 
which  promises  to  overcome  the  antithesis  bequeathed  to  us  by 
history.  From  our  point  of  view,  spiritual  life  is  at  the  same 
time  a  new  stage  of  reality  over  against  that  of  nature  and  a 
creative  fount  of  life  in  contrast  with  the  soul's  life  as  we  find  it, 
wherein  the  products  of  both  stages  come  together. 

From  this  deeper  standpoint  it  will  be  possible  both  to  liberate 
the  substance  of  knowledge  from  all  dependence  upon  externals 
and  fully  to  recognise  the  limitations  of  our  human  quest  for 
knowledge  :  many  factors  which  formerly  played  the  part  of 
enemies  and  necessarily  injured  one  another  may  now  mutually 
contribute  to  one  another's  advancement. 

We  have  regarded  spiritual  life  as  fully  active  life  which  does 
not  run  its  course  between  subject  and  object,  but  encompasses 
the  antithesis  from  the  very  beginning.  In  this  case  our  task 
cannot  lie  in  the  attempt  to  copy  a  transcendent  world,  but  must 
be  sought  in  the  shaping  and  perfecting  of  our  own  existence. 
Spiritual  life  must  therefore  contain  in  itself  different  stages  of 
expression,  the  movement  from  the  lower  stages  to  the  higher 
being  guided  by  a  necessity  inherent  in  the  development  as  a 
whole.  That  which  in  any  way  already  appertains  to  its  activity 
cannot  become  its  full  property  until  it  has  been  converted  into 
self-activity.  This  applies  also  to  knowledge :  its  movement 
lies  within  life  as  a  whole  ;  for  in  its  case,  too,  the  matter  with 
which  it  is  concerned  must  be  situated  within  the  spiritual  life 
and  not  outside  it ;  something  totally  external  could  excite 
nothing  and  set  nothing  in  motion  ;  it  could  never  touch  thought 
at  all,  and  under  no  possible  circumstances  could  it  even  become 
an  intellectual  problem,  for  this  can  only  occur  when  an  object 
is  already  in  some  fashion  present  to  the  thought-world.  The 
manner,  however,  in  which  it  is  so  present  does  not  correspond 


150    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

to  the  nature  of  spiritual  life,  nay,  it  contradicts  it.  This  con- 
tradiction then  becomes  a  compelling  impulse  towards  further 
construction.  Thus,  in  the  task  of  knowledge  with  its  pressing 
forward  to  a  higher  stage,  spiritual  life  accomplishes  an  act  of 
self-assertion. 

If  this  is  the  position  of  affairs,  nothing  can  become  an 
intellectual  problem  which  is  not  in  some  way  already  incor- 
porated within  the  life-process.  Thus  when  knowledge  is  to 
become  active,  it  must  be  preceded  by  an  inner  enlargement  of 
life.  This  assertion  is  corroborated  in  the  most  clear  and  con- 
vincing manner  both  by  a  study  of  human  history  and  by  every- 
day experience.  For  these  show  us  that  even  that  which  sur- 
rounds man  with  intrusive  nearness  and  affects  him  in  the  most 
strongly  sensuous  manner,  may  remain,  in  an  inward  sense,  com- 
pletely alien  to  him  and  not  become  a  problem  of  human  know- 
ledge at  all.  Things  will  not  answer  those  who  do  not  question 
them  ;  realities  will  only  reveal  themselves  to  those  who  confront 
them  with  possibilities.  Even  the  hardest  resistance  does  not 
produce  a  spiritual  effect  until  it  has  been  converted  into  an 
inner  obstruction.  Individuals,  peoples,' or  whole  epr chs  may 
suffer  from  the  most  serious  evils  without  being  greatly  aroused 
by  them  or  driven  to  any  sort  of  protective  measures.  Both 
great  artists  and  great  educators  agree  in  maintaining  that  the 
spiritual  organs  are  not  brought  with  us  ready-made,  but  must 
first  be  moulded  into  shape.*  A  study  of  human  history,  too, 
shows  that  much  that  lay  quite  near  to  man  (nay,  that  already 
outwardly  belonged  to  him)  has  only  quite  recently  become  part 
of  his  own  life  and  stirred  his  own  endeavour ;  at  the  same  time 
it  permits  us  to  recognise  the  assumptions  and  predispositions 
underlying  that  which  later  on  was  lightly  regarded  as  a  matter 
of  course.  What  a  slow  process  was  the  artistic  discovery  of 

•  In  this  connection  we  may  mention  Herbart's  well-known  saying  with 
regard  to  the  nonagenarian  village  schoolmaster  (Werke,  x.  8):  "  We  should  all 
bear  in  mind  that  we  each  experience  only  that  which  we  test  I  An  aged  village 
schoolmaster  of  ninety  has  the  experience  of  his  lengthy  routine ;  he  has  the 
feeling  of  his  great  labours.  But  can  he  also  criticise  his  achievements  and  his 
methods?"  Froebel  was  of  the  opinion  that  man,  "in  order  to  understand 
nature,  must  himself  create  it  afresh,  within  and  without,  by  means  of  an 
artistic  method  peculiar  to  himself." 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  151 

nature ;  how  recently,  for  example,  have  the  beauties  of  land- 
scape been  revealed  to  us  !  Consider,  too,  how  present-day  art 
is  labouring  to  develop  our  visual  sensibility  so  that  more  and 
more  may  be  seen  in  the  external  world  and  new  aspects  of  it 
opened  up.  Moreover,  man  has  had  to  discover  himself,  his 
humanity,  and  the  common  life  and  feelings  to  which  this 
humanity  gives  rise ;  he  did  not  find  all  this  ready-made ;  he 
won  it  for  himself  through  inward  movements  and  develop- 
ments. Pedagogy  describes  apperception  as  the  absorption  of 
new  impressions  within  the  thought- world  of  the  individual ;  but 
the  great  world  of  history  has  its  apperception  also,  like  the 
individual ;  humanity  as  a  whole  cannot  assimilate  anything  to 
which  it  does  not  oppose  an  inner  movement. 

What  is  thus  so  readily  accepted  with  regard  to  particular 
things  must,  when  extended  to  the  whole,  result  in  the  problem 
of  knowledge  assuming  a  new  aspect.  For  it  thus  becomes  clear 
that  all  knowledge  lies  within  man's  sphere  of  work,  and  that 
there  is  no  essential  progress  in  knowledge  without  a  growth  of 
this  sphere.  In  the  case  of  knowledge,  too,  every  really  great 
achievement  does  not  fall  within  a  ready-made  sphere,  but  itself 
alters  the  sphere  of  life.  Modern  science  would  have  been 
impossible  without  the  modern  man  with  his  bold  superiority 
to  the  world  and  his  confidence  in  the  might  of  his  own  soul. 
It  is  only  by  thus  giving  a  deeper  foundation  to  the  process 
of  knowledge  that  we  are  able  to  conceive  of  it  as  an  immanent 
procedure,  and  so  avoid  the  dilemma  by  which  we  seem  com- 
pelled to  view  thought  either  as  being  concerned  with  an  alien 
world  or  as  spinning  all  existence  out  of  itself. 

But  precisely  this  recognition  of  the  independence  of  spiritual 
life  and  of  the  immanence*  of  the  process  of  knowledge  is 
calculated  to  bring  the  distinctively  human  element,  and  with 
it  the  importance  of  experience,  to  full  recognition.  For  the 
more  we  conceive  of  spiritual  life  and  knowledge,  too,  as  being 
independent  and  superior,  the  more  does  the  given  world  recede 
from  us,  and  the  more  clearly  do  we  perceive  that  only  under 

*  We  here  take  "immanence"  in  its  old  and  original  sense,  according  to 
which  it  signifies  something  which  takes  place  within  the  life-process  and  does 
not  go  beyond  it ;  see  the  chapter  "  Immanence — Transcendence." 


152    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

certain  conditions  and  as  the  result  of  hard  work  will  man 
be  able  to  participate  in  spiritual  life,  and  that  the  latter  is 
accessible  to  him  only  through  some  kind  of  experience.  Man 
is  in  the  first  place  occupied  with  the  sub-spiritual  stage  of 
reality,  which  finds  intellectual  expression  in  the  world  of  sense- 
perception  with  its  mechanical  connections ;  it  would  be  impos- 
sible for  him  to  proceed  beyond  this  stage  at  all  if  the  higher, 
too,  were  not  in  some  fashion  operative  in  his  sphere.  But 
this  higher  is  not  fully  present  within  the  life-process ;  it  must 
first  attain  to  such  fullness  of  presence ;  the  very  impulse  in  this 
direction  follows,  as  a  rule,  only  from  special  conditions,  from 
the  perplexities  and  contradictions  which  arise  in  the  lower 
stage.  History  clearly  shows  us  how  laboriously  and  slowly  the 
quest  after  knowledge  took  shape.  And  the  very  progress  of 
the  movement  compelled  it  to  recognise  something  peculiar  in 
man's  nature  and  circumstance — a  peculiarity  not  to  be  deduced 
conceptually,  but  simply  accepted  as  a  fact.  To  this  extent 
human  knowledge  bears  an  experiential  character.  In  recog- 
nising this,  however,  we  are  far  from  committing  ourselves  to 
empiricism.  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  could  not  recognise  this 
experiential  character  itself  unless  we  occupied  a  position 
superior  to  mere  experience.  Man,  limited  and  fettered  as  he 
is,  only  attains  to  insight  in  so  far  as  he  participates  in  an 
independent  and  superior  spiritual  life  and  is  able  to  measure 
his  position  from  this  standpoint. 

Experience  has  a  twofold  significance  with  respect  to  know- 
ledge :  it  is  an  external  limitation  and  an  internal  determina- 
tion. It  is  the  former  when  spiritual  activity  remains  bound  to 
external  conditions  and  is  hence  unable  to  raise  itself  to  full 
self-activity.  It  is  the  latter  when,  for  the  first  time,  it  attains 
its  own  full  and  definite  character  in  conflict  with  resistance, 
learns  to  know  itself  through  trial  and  experience  and  attains 
to  pure  self-activity.  In  both  cases  alike  human  knowledge 
depends  upon  experience ;  experience  is  here  indispensable,  not 
only  for  the  relating  of  spiritual  life  to  its  environment,  but  also 
for  the  constituting  of  this  life  itself,  not  only  for  determining 
its  scope,  but  also  for  deciding  its  content. 

The  knowledge  which  humanity  develops,  finds  itself,  in  the 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  153 

first  place,  face  to  face  with  an  alien  and  immeasurable  world, 
and  it  can  advance  only  through  close  contact  with  this  world ; 
it  may,  in  fact,  appear  to  draw  solely  upon  the  world ;  moreover, 
in  the  elaboration  of  what  is  thus  taken  up,  there  are  lar»e 
departments  of  life,  notably  that  of  nature  as  apprehended 
through  the  senses,  in  which  knowledge  can  never  cut  itself 
loose  from  the  given  world ;  that  portion  which  enters  into  man's 
thought-world  cannot  be  purely  converted  into  terms  of  thought, 
it  continues  to  be  attached  to  something  external  and  to  present 
an  opaque  barrier.  But,  however  necessary,  in  this  connection, 
a  contact  with  sensible  things  and  a  relation  to  these  things 
may  be,  this  contact  and  relation  do  not  produce  knowledge. 
Knowledge  develops  subject  to  conditions  and  limitations,  but 
it  nevertheless  remains  in  the  first  place  a  product  of  spiritual 
life.  It  does  not  develop  itself  out  of  experience,  but  only  in 
contact  with  experience,  just  as  impressions  cannot  pass  into 
the  thought-world  without  undergoing  an  essential  transforma- 
tion. How  fundamentally  different  does  the  same  natural 
phenomenon  appear  to  the  immediate  perception  of  the  unsophis- 
ticated man  and  to  the  thought-world  of  the  scientist !  Hegel 
observes  with  justice :  "  It  is  the  nature  of  spirit  not  to  assimi- 
late anything  just  as  it  comes  to  us  from  outside,  nor  to  permit 
a  cause  simply  to  carry  on  its  previous  agency  within  it,  but 
it  must  needs  break  off  the  old  threads  of  connection  and  inwardly 
reconstitute  them"  (Wke.,  iv.  229). 

Not  only  the  extension  of  spiritual  life  but  also  its  inner 
nature  is,  for  us  men,  a  problem  and  a  task.  Spiritual  life  does 
not  directly  fill  our  own  life  in  firm  and  definite  form,  nor  does 
it  draw  us  to  itself  in  a  sure  and  steady  advance,  as  the  intellec- 
tual optimism  of  speculative  philosophy  supposed ;  on  the  con- 
trary, we  have  to  gradually  push  forward  from  small  beginnings 
(and  these  not  incontestable),  and  our  endeavour  abounds  in 
obstacles  and  dangers ;  in  glad  confidence  we  undertake  many 
things  which  are  subsequently  found  to  be  impracticable ;  often 
we  seem  to  be  tossed  to  and  fro  and  to  make  no  progress  at  all. 
That  w1  ich  our  labour  does  bring  us,  however,  does  not  come  as 
the  result  of  reflection,  but  of  pursuing  chosen  paths  to  the  end. 
Both  our  ability  and  our  limitation  are  only  revealed  to  us 


154    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

through  the  developments  and  experiences  of  life  itself.  It  is 
more  especially  true  that  it  is  through  struggle  alone  that  our 
life  fathoms  its  full  depth.  Resistance  alone  drives  it  to  put 
forth  its  whole  strength  and  compels  it  to  exercise  its  full  origi- 
native power.  At  the  same  time  the  growth  of  spirituality  does 
not  signify  a  pure  victory  over  the  hostile  element,  nor  does  it 
bring  full  illumination.  On  the  contrary,  the  inner  advance 
is  likely  to  bring  forth  new  claims,  problems,  and  resistances, 
and  therefore  the  aspect  of  reality  will  take  on  a  more  and  more 
positive  and  irrational  form.  Such  an  actuality  must  make 
knowledge  into  something  essentially  different  from  that  which 
rationalism  would  have  it  to  be ;  at  every  point  it  is  now  referred 
to  the  experiences  of  life  as  a  whole.  It  was  only  in  the  early 
infancy  of  knowledge  that  men  fancied  themselves  to  be 
approaching  a  smooth  conclusion ;  an  increased  insight  has  led 
to  the  recognition  of  more  and  yet  more  unsolved  problems ; 
the  world  has  not  grown  more  lucid,  but  more  enigmatic.  Thus 
precisely  at  the  height  of  modern  life  the  general  aspect  of 
knowledge  is  anything  but  simple.  Reality  looms  before  us,  a 
series  of  gradations  showing  an  advance  from  inorganic  to 
organic,  from  inanimate  to  animate  and  psychical,  from  the  soul 
enslaved  to  nature  to  the  soul  filled  with  the  spirit.  Each  stage 
presents  its  own  characteristic  aspect  of  reality ;  and  there  will 
always  be  conflict  of  opinion  as  to  whether  the  lowest  or  the 
highest  stage  should  be  taken  as  the  starting-point  for  explana- 
tion. Philosophy  cannot  avoid  treating  the  realities  which 
become  visible  upon  the  highest  stage  of  life  as  the  deepest 
revelations,  and  from  this  standpoint  forming  its  conception  of 
the  whole.  But  it  presently  discovers  that  the  categories  won 
from  this  standpoint  are  not  adapted  to  the  world  beneath  us, 
which  opposes  them  with  a  rigid  nature  of  its  own ;  it  also  dis- 
covers that  this  world,  throughout  the  whole  of  its  active  being, 
treats  this  higher  stage  with  indifference,  as  something  quite 
subsidiary.  It  seems  as  if  that  which  we  cannot  help  regarding 
as  the  essence  of  all  reality  cannot  carry  out  its  purpose  in  our 
world  with  the  aid  either  of  its  own  concepts  or  its  own  forces. 
On  every  side  there  is  the  same  contradiction ;  man's  spiritual 
nature  demands  from  him  more  than  his  mere  humanity  is 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  155 

able  to  compass ;  spiritual  self-preservation  compels  him  to 
affirm  truths  to  which  his  intellectual  capacity  is  not  fully  equal, 
and  energetically  to  maintain  the  fundamental  ideas  which  these 
truths  imply,  without  being  able  to  carry  these  adequately  into 
practice.  Therefore  if  our  intellectual  capacity  is  to  decide  as 
to  the  whole  content  of  life,  a  spiritual  impoverishment  will 
be  the  inevitable  result. 

(e)   Estimation  of  Rationalism  and  Empiricism 

The  foregoing  discussion  has  brought  us  to  a  point  from  which 
we  may  attempt  to  estimate  impartially  the  two  opposing  move- 
ments. It  will  be  seen  that  while  each  represents  important 
elements  of  truth  and  successfully  employs  them  in  attacking 
the  opposite  side,  each  falls  into  error  and  fails  to  maintain  its 
own  position  as  soon  as  it  attempts  a  final  solution  on  its  own 
account. 

The  strength  of  rationalism  lies  in  its  advocacy  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  spiritual  life  and  its  superiority  to  all  environment, 
and  also  in  its  defence  of  the  conviction  that  life  does  not 
primarily  and  essentially  proceed  from  without  inwards — that 
(as  Plato  put  it)  a  blind  man  cannot  simply  be  provided  with 
eyes  from  without.  In  the  absence  of  this  conviction  there  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  truth  at  all.  The  complete  dependence  of 
our  knowledge  upon  outward  impressions  would  deprive  it  of  all 
stability,  all  connection,  all  inner  illumination,  and  would  leave 
it  at  the  mercy  of  mere  individual  accident.  It  is  an  axiomatic 
necessity,  when  rationalism,  in  the  face  of  these  facts,  advocates 
an  a  priori.  But  the  a  priori  must  be  understood,  not  as  a 
ready-made  quantity  in  the  soul  of  each  individual,  but  as  a 
basic  law  of  spiritual  life  that  man  has  first  to  appropriate. 
Such  an  a  priori  involves  the  assertion  that  spiritual  life  carries 
within  itself  norms  which  continually  turn  our  search  for  know- 
ledge towards  truth  and  away  from  error ;  it  involves,  further, 
the  assertion  that  spiritual  life  is  essentially  superhistorical, 
and  is  no  mere  historical  product.  Without  being  thus 
superhistorical  it  could  never  subject  historical  formations  to  a 
superior  criticism;  it  would  be  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  their 
changes. 


156    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Since  it  stands  for  such  indispensable  truth,  rationalism 
possesses  a  superior  justification  as  compared  with  empiricism. 
But  it  falls  into  error  in  believing  it  possible  to  attain  these 
truths  directly,  in  treating  what  is  really  a  far-off  goal  as  a 
present,  or  at  any  rate  easily  accessible,  fact :  we  refer  to 
its  treatment  of  the  spiritual  life  in  man  without  qualification 
as  spiritual  life  in  itself,  as  absolute  spiritual  life;  this  has  the 
effect  of  blunting  our  sense  of  the  characteristically  human 
and  of  the  limitations  of  humanity.  "We  see  this  effect  when 
achievements  which  thought  can  only  produce  in  connection 
with  an  independent  spiritual  life  as  a  whole  are  attributed 
to  thought  itself,  thus  depriving  ideas  of  their  vital  depth ; 
we  see  it  also  when  rationalism  believes  our  spiritual  life, 
just  as  it  is,  to  be  upon  a  safe  path  and  no  inner  perplexities 
are  recognised. 

Taking  all  in  all,  rationalism  tends  towards  weakening  and 
explaining  away  the  dark  and  hostile  element  which  humanity 
finds  in  the  world.  It  sacrifices  the  individual  to  the  universal, 
content  to  form.  The  resulting  conception  of  reality  is  smooth, 
attenuated,  and  anaemic  to  an  extreme.  Both  life  and  thought 
become  abstract,  formal,  and  shadowy.  This  is  particularly 
obvious  in  the  case  of  the  view  of  history  which  rationalism 
produces  in  its  leaning  towards  speculative  ideal  constructions : 
the  movement  of  history  is  here  looked  upon  as  taking  place, 
from  the  very  beginning,  in  a  sphere  of  reason,  whereas  in 
reality  it  must  first  laboriously  obtain  its  rational  character 
and  as  constantly  confirm  it.  It  is  believed  that  all  antitheses 
and  conflicts  are  only  a  means  towards  the  advancement  of 
reason ;  everything  irrational  appears  to  be  ultimately  resolved 
into  a  great  harmony,  whereas  in  truth  the  struggle  does  not 
take  place  simply  within  reason;  it  is  more  a  struggle  for  reason, 
and  every  increase  of  reason  in  human  relationships  is  apt  to 
increase  the  irrational  element  as  well.  According  to  this  view, 
each  epoch  appears  to  represent  a  steady  advance,  resting 
securely  on  the  one  preceding,  and  the  historical  experience 
which  humanity  acquires  is  looked  upon  as  a  permanent  posses- 
sion, though  in  reality  the  struggle  over  ultimate  issues  is  being 
perpetually  renewed,  a  firm  foundation  must  be  continually 


THOUGHT  AND  EXPERIENCE  157 

constructed  afresh,  and  every  spiritual  experience  again  and 
again  resumes  its  problematical  character.  Man  now  appears 
purely  and  simply  as  the  instrument  of  spiritual  work,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  his  predominant  inclination  is  far  rather  to 
subordinate  spiritual  life  to  natural  and  social  self-preserving 
instincts,  thus  grievously  perverting  it  and  alienating  it  from 
its  own  purposes.  When  the  obscure  and  hostile  element  is 
thus  slurred  over,  history  loses  its  power  and  depth.  The  more 
exclusively  this  rationalistic  treatment  is  carried  out  the  more 
it  evacuates  and  dissipates  reality.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
becomes  clear  that  historical  life  does  not  advance  with  a 
continuous  and  steady  movement,  but  that  the  whole  must 
continually  be  made  the  subject  of  fresh  conflict,  and  that 
there  must  be  a  continual  reaffivmation  of  the  whole,  then 
free  action  takes  precedence  of  the  idea  of  a  historical  process 
and  all  possibility  of  a  rational  construction  vanishes. 

Thus  the  unrestricted  development  of  rationalism  must  give 
rise  to  a  reaction  in  the  direction  of  empiricism  with  its  thirst 
for  actuality  and  its  ready  recognition  of  human  limitation,  and 
history  shows  us  that  empiricism  has  attained  to  power  and 
prestige  more  especially  when  the  deficiencies  of  a  traditional 
rationalism  have  become  obvious.  The  antipathy  to  speculative 
conceptual  construction  is  at  the  back  of  the  most  recent  develop- 
ments of  empiricism. 

But  empiricism,  on  the  other  hand,  entirely  fails  to  afford  any 
suitable  expression  to  the  experiential  character  of  our  thought- 
world.  It  conceives  the  process  of  experience  as  sharply  con- 
trasted with  self-activity,  without  which,  however,  there  can  be 
no  scientific  knowledge.  Since  it  denies  all  independent  spiritual 
life,  it  must  seek  to  develop  spirituality  and  knowledge  from  a 
merely  human  standpoint.  This  is,  in  reality,  impossible,*  and 

*  The  impossibility  of  attaining  to  a  science  by  empirical  means  has  recently 
been  very  emphatically  pointed  out  by  distinguished  investigators.  Windel- 
band  (Praludien,  2nd  edit.,  p.  303)  calls  it  a  "hopeless  attempt,  through  an 
empirical  theory,  to  supply  a  foundation  to  that  which  is  itself  the  assumption 
upon  which  the  theory  rests  "  ;  and  Husserl  (Logisehe  Untersuchungen,  I. 
110)  remarks  in  the  same  connection :  "  The  greatest  objection  that  can  be 
raised  against  a  theory  of  logic  is  to  say  that  it  clashes  with  the  evident 
conditions  of  the  possibility  of  a  theory  at  all." 


158    MAIN  CURRENTS  OP  MODERN  THOUGHT 

it  only  achieves  a  faint  appearance  of  success  by  secretly  assum- 
ing the  existence  of  a  spiritual  world  and  employing  factors 
borrowed  therefrom.  This  results  in  a  view  of  reality  which 
is  distorted  down  to  its  smallest  detail.  In  dealing  with  the 
process  of  knowledge,  empiricism  directs  its  whole  attention  to 
the  thing  done,  and  is  oblivious  of  the  spiritual  activity  that  is 
operative  in  the  achievement  itself;  it  clings  to  the  external 
object,  and  forgets  that  this  means  nothing  to  us  except  through 
our  act  of  appropriation.  It  perceives  the  determination  of 
knowledge  by  experience,  but  it  does  not  perceive  that  this 
determination  takes  place  within  an  encompassing  mental  space 
and  through  the  movement  of  the  spirit  itself,  not  through  a 
communication  from  without.*  It  is  so  exclusively  taken  up 
with  a  wealth  of  particulars  that  it  looks  upon  their  connection 
as  a  matter  of  course.  It  cannot  see  the  wood  for  the  trees.  The 
empiricist  regards  the  things  themselves  as  producing  what  ir. 
reality  our  activity  has  placed  within  them ;  this  is  seen,  for 
example,  in  the  concept  of  the  world  of  experience,  which  is 
anything  rather  than  a  product  of  mere  experience.!  Taking 
Kant's  work  into  account,  it  should  not  be  easy  to  obscure 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  problem  of  knowledge  as  a  whole, 
that  is  to  say  that  the  ground  upon  which  experience  comes 

*  Out  mode  of  speech  cannot  be  acquitted  of  blame  in  this  respect,  since  it 
places  thought  and  experience  in  opposition  to  one  another,  as  if  experience 
could  accomplish  anything  without  thought.  So  early  a  writer  as  Robert  Boyle 
justly  protested  against  this  (The  Christian  Virtuoso — towards  the  end) : 
"  When  we  say,  experience  corrects  reason,  'tis  an  improper  way  of  speaking, 
since  'tis  reason  itself,  that  upon  the  information  of  experience  corrects  the 
judgment  it  had  made  before." 

t  It  is  very  remarkable  how  often  an  appeal  is  to-day  made  to  experience 
without  any  previous  examination  of  its  conditions  or  guarantee  of  its  possi- 
bility. This  takes  place  most  often  perhaps  in  the  educational  world.  New 
types  of  schools  are  established,  and  soon  it  is  said  that  experience  has  shown 
them  to  be  excellent.  There  is  a  general  inclination  to  introduce  devices  copied 
from  foreign  nations  on  the  ground  that  these  have  been  justified  by  the  experi- 
ence of  the  nations  in  question.  But  can  we  assume  that  what  is  suitable  to 
one  people  is  equally  adapted  to  another,  perhaps  under  essentially  different 
conditions  of  life?  And  if  an  institution  has  good  results  here  and  there, 
perhaps  under  exceptionally  favourable  circumstances,  is  that  any  demon- 
stration of  its  universal  advantage  ?  Experience  can  be  appealed  to  only 
when  there  are  essentially  equal  conditions  ;  whether  or  not  this  is  the  case 
is  usually  not  at  all  adequately  ascertained. 


THOUGHT   AND   EXPERIENCE  159 

to  pass  must  first  be  gained,  and  that  in  striving  towards  truth 
the  conflict  does  not  bear  upon  isolated  data,  but  concerns 
totalities — constructions  and  convictions  as  a  whole.  Empiri- 
cism, however,  cannot  avoid  obscuring  this  fact,  because  it  only 
takes  into  account  particular  aspects  of  reality,  aspects  which 
by  no  means  exhaust  its  scope  and  depth.  And  this  holds  not 
only  on  the  objective,  but  also  on  the  subjective  side,  as  we  may 
briefly  express  it.  Since  our  thought  and  life  first  find  play  as 
conscious  processes,  empiricism  is  content  not  to  go  beyond  this 
point,  and  omits  to  perceive  that  the  content  of  consciousness 
is  not  itself  comprehensible  apart  from  a  more  deeply  grounded 
self-consciousness  of  spiritual  life,  and  apart  from  a  reversal 
of  first  impressions,  as  when  the  view  of  the  gradual  forma- 
tion of  a  unifying  ego  is  supplanted  by  the  insight  that  it  is 
the  ego  which  first  makes  possible  all  inward  synthesis 
such  as  is  essential  to  the  very  existence  of  science.  Now 
to  break  up  the  life  of  the  soul  into  a  mere  juxtaposition  of 
separate  processes  in  consciousness  is  to  abandon  all  inner 
relationship,  and  therefore  to  make  all  science  fundamentally 
impossible. 

On  the  objective  side,  however,  empiricism  clings  far  too 
exclusively  to  external  nature  and  overlooks  the  specific  character 
of  the  other  spheres  of  existence.  That  portion  of  its  doctrine 
which  has  a  certain  justice  as  applied  to  nature  falls  into  error 
when  extended  to  the  whole  world.  The  sensuous  effects  which 
we  experience  never  permit  of  being  fully  translated  into  spiritual 
activity  and  developed  from  within ;  thus  there  always  remains  a 
strangeness  and  constraint,  and  we  do  not  advance  beyond  mere 
registration  and  description.  But  even  the  first  view  of  human 
life  and  endeavour  reveals  a  different  state  of  affairs.  Here,  too, 
we  first  meet  with  separate  processes,  but  we  can  pass  beyond 
the  mere  impression  :  these  processes  permit  of  being  traced 
back  to  the  life-process  that  produced  them,  and  of  being  linked 
together ;  since  the  looker-on  is  able  to  transplant  himself  within 
this  process  he  can  convert  the  strange  element  into  personal 
life.  If,  however,  man  can  thus  live  and  feel  with  man,  not 
merely  contemplating  him  from  without  as  an  alien  thing,  then 
there  is  a  knowledge  that  is  more  than  mer  description.  But 


160    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

we  take  a  yet  further  step  if  we  recognise  a  spiritual  life  within 
the  human  sphere,  if  we  take  our  stand  upon  this  in  the  develop- 
ment of  knowledge,  and  thence  illuminate  and  sum  up  the  whole 
social  and  historical  life  of  humanity,  including  the  experiences 
of  individuals.  In  this  case,  we  can  never  be  content  with  a 
mere  cataloguing  of  the  observed  phenomena ;  we  must  effect 
an  inner  appropriation  and  critically  transform  what  we  assimi- 
late. For  spiritual  life  as  revealed  in  the  human  sphere  is,  in 
its  immediate  condition,  so  much  encumbered  with  matter  of 
a  temporal,  accidental,  merely  human  nature,  that  there  can 
be  no  clarification  without  an  energetic  sifting  and  adjustment 
to  one's  own  nature.  At  the  same  time  it  is  our  task  here  to 
pick  out  from  amidst  the  special  connections  and  tendencies 
wherein  this  life  finds  a  struggling  expression,  a  comprehensive 
whole  whence  we  may  illuminate  this  manifoldness  and  render  it 
coherent.  In  truth  the  high-water  mark  of  the  knowledge  re- 
vealed to  man  is  to  be  seen  here,  in  the  characteristic  develop- 
ment of  spiritual  life  and  the  construction  of  a  spiritual  world ; 
therefore  here,  too,  lies  the  decision  as  to  our  whole  view  of  the 
universe ;  it  is  from  this  standpoint  that  the  type  of  our  world- 
view  must  be  determined  and  some  sort  of  justice,  too,  must  be 
done  to  the  limitations  and  contradictions  of  human  existence. 
The  whole  task  is  replete  with  experiences,  full  of  movements 
which  take  us  deep  into  ourselves  and  could  never  under  any 
circumstances  proceed  from  mere  concepts  ;  hence  it  lies  entirely 
outside  the  sphere  of  mere  rationalism  and  just  as  certainly 
beyond  the  capacity  of  mere  empiricism.  Both  fail  clearly  to 
distinguish  spiritual  life  from  human  existence;  this  impels 
rationalism  to  an  exaggeration  of  man  and  empiricism  to  a 
denial  of  spiritual  life ;  the  former  is  unable  to  provide  know- 
ledge with  a  living  content,  while  the  latter  robs  it  of  its 
scientific  character.  A  further  mistake  is  common  to  both  ; 
neither  makes  knowledge  a  portion  of  a  greater  whole  of  spiritual 
life  and  treats  the  problem  of  knowledge  in  connection  with  this 
whole.  Left  thus  isolated,  knowledge  is  either  under-  or  over- 
valued. At  the  same  time,  both  rationalism  and  empiricism 
represent  factors  indispensable  to  knowledge :  on  the  one  hand, 
originality ;  on  the  other,  actuality.  What  is  needed,  however, 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  161 

is  a  new  standpoint  from  which  to  combine  these  factors  of  truth 
into  a  whole,  and  so  to  cling  one-sidedly  no  longer  either  to  the 
greatness  of  human  knowledge  or  to  its  limitation,  but  to  recog- 
nise greatness  and  limitation  alike.  When  empiricism,  in  spite 
of  all  its  obvious  weaknesses,  continually  raises  its  head  afresh 
to  exert  an  overpowering  influence  over  humanity,  this  is  due 
not  so  much  to  what  it  has  actually  achieved  as  to  that  defective 
grasp  of  the  truth-concept  which  so  often  characterises  rational- 
ism. The  service  and  justification  of  the  latter  is  to  be  found 
in  its  elevation  of  truth  above  all  shades  and  divisions  of  human 
opinion,  in  the  fact  that  it  makes  truth  fully  independent  of 
man  ;  whenever  this  independence  becomes  in  any  way  insecure, 
then  science  can  no  longer  be  saved  from  utter  destruction.  But 
so  long  as  this  separation  between  truth  and  man  is  not  in  some 
way  overcome,  and  the  former  is  not  in  some  fashion  made  our 
own  affair,  truth  will  continue  to  be  more  or  less  cold  and  dead ; 
its  ability  to  move  us  with  overpowering  force  and  to  elevate  the 
whole  of  life  will  remain  inexplicable.  However  firmly  we  must 
reject  the  pragmatic  method  of  measuring  truth  according  to  its 
utility  for  life  (or  indeed  according  to  any  external  standard  at 
all) ,  the  apprehension  of  truth  must  still  be  understood  as  the 
development  of  a  new  life,  and  the  truth  itself  conceived  as 
existing  not  without  life,  but  within  it.  It  is  ultimately  a 
question  not  of  grasping  a  reality  external  to  life,  but  of  gaining 
a  life  which  develops  a  reality  out  of  itself.  By  pursuing  this 
quest  we  may  secure  a  more  inward  relation  to  truth.  Without 
such  a  relation  we  fall  victims  to  empiricism,  which  would  not 
attain  to  any  truth  whatever  if  it  did  not  set  out  with  a  belief 
in  truth. 

In  empiricism  and  rationalism,  as  we  have  seen,  opposing 
spiritual  tendencies  are  operative.  It  will  depend  upon  the 
character  and  circumstances  of  any  given  period  which  of  the 
two  will,  for  the  time  being,  obtain  the  upper  hand.  When  the 
thought-world  is  regarded  as,  in  essentials,  complete  and  capable 
of  being  easily  reviewed  (as  was  the  case  in  the  Ancient  World, 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  in  the  time  of  the  German  speculative 
philosophy),  the  mind's  own  contribution  will  take  the  first  place 

11 


162    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

and  there  will  be  a  tendency  to  undervalue  experience.  When, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  consciousness  of  the  narrowness  of  the 
previous  field  of  vision  predominates,  and  there  arises  a  desire 
for  expansion,  salvation  will  be  looked  for  solely  from  experience 
and  the  constructive,  nay,  transforming,  spiritual  activity  is  easily 
overlooked.  This  was  what  happened  with  Bacon,  and  again 
in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  this  is  what  often  happens  to-day. 
The  immeasurable  enlargement  of  our  field  of  vision  both  in 
nature  and  in  history  which  was  effected  by  the  work  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  bound  to  exercise  a  particularly  powerful 
influence  in  Germany,  because  it  was  accompanied  by  an  ener- 
getic reaction  against  the  too  rigid  syntheses  of  the  constructive 
systems. 

But  the  more  such  an  empirical  movement  spreads,  and  the 
more  exclusively  it  occupies  the  field,  the  more  necessary  opposi- 
tion becomes.  We  saw  that  empiricism  was  only  able  to  attain 
even  to  an  ineffectual  conclusion  because  it  operates  within  a 
ready-made  thought-world,  superior  to  (and  even  contradictory 
of)  its  own  world  of  concepts ;  but  the  more  independent  and 
the  more  impatient  of  restraint  this  tendency  becomes,  the  more 
this  thought- world  must  be  shaken  and  broken  up.  Thus,  through 
its  own  progress,  it  undermines  these  indispensable  complements, 
and  therefore  in  its  outward  triumph  it  must  suffer  an  inward 
collapse.  Its  inadequacy  becomes  transparently  obvious  as  soon 
as  it  relies  entirely  upon  its  own  means.  In  spite  of  all  the 
favour  which  is  still  accorded  to  empiricism  in  the  domain  of 
exact  sciences  remote  from  life,  we  perceive  that  such  a  catas- 
trophe is  now  impending.  It  becomes  increasingly  clear  that  no 
accumulation  and  arrangement  of  known  facts  can  afford  any 
sort  of  knowledge,  or  ideas,  or  convictions ;  yet,  at  the  same 
time,  man  cannot  exist  without  these  if  he  is  to  remain  a  beiug 
with  a  soul  and  not  to  degenerate  into  a  mere  civilised  machine. 
Thought  is  imperatively  driven  beyond  empiricism,  not  only  by 
a  necessity  of  spiritual  life  but,  in  particular,  by  the  peculiar 
position  of  present-day  culture.  No  culture  can  exist  without 
an  independence  and  originality  on  the  part  of  thought.  But  so 
long  as  life  proceeds  along  paths  which  are  supposed  to  be  safe, 
this  independence  may  be  overlooked  and  forgotten  unless  it  is 


THOUGHT  AND   EXPERIENCE  163 

threatened  by  severe  perplexities  and  contradictions.  To-day, 
however,  we  are  completely  dominated  by  such  perplexities  and 
contradictions  ;  we  perceive  the  necessity  for  a  thorough  over- 
hauling of  our  whole  heritage  of  culture,  the  necessity  for  an 
energetic  sifting  out  of  all  that  has  become  obsolete  and  untrue, 
for  a  powerful  synthesis  and  development  of  all  the  elements 
of  truth.  Nay,  we  are  so  deeply  shaken  that  our  uncertainty 
extends  to  the  last  elements  and  compels  us  to  struggle  for 
spiritual  life  as  a  whole.  In  the  face  of  such  tasks  how  can  we 
make  any  sort  of  progress  without  a  capacity  for  independent 
and  original  activity,  without  a  self-recollection  and  self- 
awakening  on  the  part  of  the  spiritual  life,  without  a  spiritual 
elevation  and  renewal,  to  indicate  new  possibilities  and  reveal 
new  realms  of  fact?  Empiricism,  however,  cannot  help  us  in 
any  of  these  respects.  And  as  the  age  stands  in  need  of  an 
inner  transformation  it  must  necessarily  leave  empiricism  behind 
it.  We  warmly  welcome  the  fact  that  the  philosophical  investi- 
gation of  the  present  day  is  tending  towards  idealism,  and  we 
thoroughly  understand  the  accompanying  dislike  of  again  adopt- 
ing anything  resembling  the  old  type  of  metaphysics :  as  certainly 
as  we  need  a  thorough  renewal  and  systematic  invigoration  of 
life,  we  need  a  rousing  and  progressive  idealism.  Such  an 
idealism,  however,  cannot  be  merely  critical,  it  must  be  positive. 
For  although  the  critical  idealism  which  to-day  takes  a  leading 
place  on  the  highest  level  of  philosophical  investigation  renders 
an  important  service  in  indicating  the  limits  of  realism  and 
empiricism,  and  in  particular  in  demonstrating  that  they  can 
only  succeed  in  creating  a  whole  of  life  and  knowledge  by 
secretly  borrowing  from  their  opponents,  and  although,  in 
addition,  it  certainly  exhibits,  along  certain  main  lines  of  ten- 
dency, the  operation  and  control  of  a  new  order  of  things,  it 
fails  in  adequately  gathering  these  main  tendencies  into  a 
whole.  A  whole,  however,  is  indispensable  if  man  is  to  find 
his  spiritual  self  in  this  movement,  to  place  the  centre  of 
gravity  of  his  life  therein,  and,  at  the  same  time,  reverse 
the  current  of  his  life.  Apart  from  such  a  reversal,  apart 
from  this  uprooting  from  the  other  side  into  a  life  of 
elemental  power,  the  new  life  will  hardly  be  strong  enough 


164     MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

to  take  up  an  independent  position  over  against  an  order  of 
another  kind,  and  to  overcome  the  immense  obstacles  offered 
by  the  worldliness  at  its  doors.  It  is  therefore  no  mere 
thirst  for  intellectual  adventure  which  drives  us  towards  meta- 
physics, but  the  imperative  demand  for  a  self-preservation  of 
spiritual  life. 


2.    MECHANICAL— ORGANIC 

(TELEOLOGY) 

THE  concepts  of  the  "mechanical"  and  the  "organic"  have 
behind  them  a  particularly  influential  history.  This  history  not 
only  exhibits  great  contrasts  in  cosmic  speculation  and  in  theory 
of  method,  but  it  reveals  a  hard  struggle  fought  over  the  character 
of  scientific  work ;  moreover  it  is  full  of  fine  distinctions  and 
the  more  delicate  variations  of  thought,  and  hence  gives  us  a 
characteristic  insight  into  the  movement  as  a  whole.  Oppositions 
which  hark  back  thousands  of  years  still  exert  their  influence 
over  the  work  of  to-day.  Hence  our  attention  will  be  chiefly 
directed  to  the  historical  side  of  the  subject. 

(a)  On  the  History  of  the  Terms  and  Concepts 

The  concepts  mechanical  and  organic  (like  the  terms  them- 
selves) are  old,  but  it  was  long  before  the  terms  became 
associated  with  the  concepts.  Mechanical  appears  in  Aristotle  as 
a  well-established  expression,  as  the  technical  designation  of  the 
art  of  invention,  of  the  construction  of  machines  (17  firi^aviKri,  TO. 
and  one  of  his  later  writings  bears  the  name 
*  The  word  continued  to  bear  this  meaning  through- 
out the  centuries,  and  since  the  time  of  Descartes  it  has  served 
to  denote  a  theory  which  explains  the  function  of  nature  by 
analogy  with  human  contrivances,  not  by  reference  to  a  driving 
power  inherent  in  the  structure  as  a  whole,  but  as  the  result  of 

*  In  this  work  the  expression  is  explained  as  follows:  "Orav  Sky  TI  irapA 
<t>i>rrii>  Trpa£ai,  Sid  TO  xa\E7r6v  awopiav  iraptxfl  <ca*  lei-Tat  Tt\tn\f.  lib  rat 
raXov/^tv  TTIQ  f(-XVTIS  TO  irpbg  rag  Toiavra^  cnropiaf  poqGovv  (ifpoc  fir)x<fvr)y 
(Arist.  847  a,  16).  Art  here  appears  to  be  a  kind  of  outwitting  of  nature. 

165 


the  combination  of  diminutive  particles  of  matter,  originally 
endowed  with  motion.  The  works  of  nature  appear  to  differ 
from  those  of  man  solely  in  their  greater  refinement  of  structure, 
that  is  to  say  quantitatively  not  qualitatively.*  Theoretical 
mechanics,  in  the  form  of  a  theory  of  motion,  provides  the 
means  of  technical  explanation.!  The  term  mechanical  seems 
to  have  been  brought  into  use  more  especially  by  the  chemist 
and  philosopher  Robert  Boyle,  who  had  a  peculiar  partiality  for 
it  and  liked  to  make  use  of  it  in  the  titles  of  his  books :  he  even 
took  objection  to  the  expression  "  nature  "  and  would  have  been 
glad  to  see  it  replaced  by  mechanismus  universalis. 

The  natural  science  of  the  following  periods  gave  the  term 
meanings  which  were  sometimes  exact  and  sometimes  loose. 
Discussions  as  to  these  meanings  were  in  constant  progress.  As 
a  rule,  however,  a  mechanical  explanation  meant  an  explanation 
of  the  properties  of  matter  by  means  of  figure  and  movement.  A 
transference  to  mental  processes  was  not  at  first  thought  of,  and 
mechanical  and  material  were  frequently  reckoned  as  synony- 
mous terms.  J  Hence  a  mechanical  explanation  of  mental 

*  Descartes  says  (Principia  philosophia,  iv.  §  203) :  Nullum  aliud  inter  ipsa 
(sc.  artefacta)  et  corpora  naturalia  discrimen  agnosco,  nisi  quod  arte  factorum 
operationes  ut  plurimum  peraguntur  instrumentis  adeo  magnis,  ut  sen*u  facile 
percipi  possint :  hoc  enim  requiritur,  ut  ab  hominibus  fabricari  queant.  Contra 
autem  naturales  effectusfere  semper  dependent  ab  aliquibus  organis  adeo  minutis, 
ut  omnem  sensum  effugiant.  According  to  this,  the  refinement  of  machines 
brings  art  continually  nearer  to  nature. 

t  Descartes  (Princ.  phil.,  iv.  §  200) :  Figuras  et  motus  et  magnitudines  corporum 
consideravi  atque  secundum  leges  Mechanics,  certis  et  quotidianis  experimentis 
continuatas,  quidnam  ex  istorum  corporum  mutuo  concursu  sequi  debeat, 
examinavi.  §  203  :  Et  sane  nulla  sunt  in  Mechanica  rationes,  qua  non  etiam  ad 
Physicam,  cujus  pars  vel  species  est,  pertineant,  nee  minus  naturale  est  horologio 
ex  his  vel  Hits  rotis  composite,  ut  horas  indicat,  quam  arbori  ex  hoc  vel  illo 
temine  ortae,  ut  tales  fructus  producat.  Quamobrem  ut  ii  qui  in  considerandis 
automatis  sunt  exercitate,  cum  alicujus  machines  usum  sciunt  et  nonnullas  ejus 
partes  aspiciunt,  facile  ex  istis,  quo  modo  alia  quas  non  vident  sint  factce, 
coniiciunt ;  ita  ex  sensilibus  effectibus  et  partibus  corporum  naturalium,  quales 
sint  eorum  causes  et  particulce  insensiles,  investigare  conatus  sum. 

I  Thus  Descartes  himself  places  the  incorporeal  in  opposition  to  the 
mechanicum  et  corporeum  (Brief e,  i.  67).  We  find  the  same  meaning  in  Wolff, 
who  maintains  (psych,  rat.,  §  395)  that  the  insight  resulting  from  contemplative 
knowledge  (cognitio  symbolica)  mechanice  quoque  in  cerebro  absolvi — nihil  inesse 
notioni,  qua  quid  in  universali  reprcesentatur,  quod  non  ceque  mechanice 
reprcesentatur  in  corpore. 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  167 

processes  means,  in  the  first  place,  a  deduction  from  merely 
corporeal  causes.  As  regards  the  facts  themselves  we  find 
Spinoza  already  undertaking  to  explain  the  content  of  mental  life 
as  a  resultant  of  the  combined  operation  of  separate  ideas,  and 
he  calls  the  soul  a  spiritual  machine  (automaton  spirituale}.  And 
Leibniz,  notwithstanding  the  importance  he  attached  to  the 
unity  of  the  soul,*  himself  refined  upon  this  idea,  whilst  Wolff 
and  the  French  psychologists  of  the  eighteenth  century  developed 
it  in  greater  detail.  Finally  the  word  itself  is  transferred,  and 
"  mechanical  "  is  applied  to  the  inner  life,  first  figuratively,  then 
didactically,  f  Kant  gave  the  term  a  more  universal  character, 
for  he  made  it  serve  for  "  all  necessity  of  occurrences  in  time 
according  to  the  natural  law  of  causality,  without  it  being 
necessarily  understood  that  the  things  subject  to  it  are  really 
material  machines."  In  natural  philosophy,  however,  he 
developed  clearly  and  sharply  the  contrast  between  a  dynamical 
and  a  mechanical  explanation.  I 

Organic,  too,  was  first  made  use  of  by  Aristotle,  the  great 
moulder  of  language.  But  it  was  not  employed  in  the  modern 
sense.  Corresponding  with  the  root  op-yavov,  instrument, 
organic  meant  "  instrumental " ;  it  was  used  of  the  living, 
purposefully  constructed  body  as  a  whole,  but  more  frequently  of 
separate  parts  of  the  body,  in  particular  of  such  as  are  composed 
of  dissimilar  parts.  The  concept  is  applied  only  to  living  beings, 

*  See,  for  example,  Erdmann,  153  :  II  faut  considerer  austi  que  I'dme,  toute 
simple  qu'elle  est,  a  toujours  un  sentiment  compost  de  plusieurs  perceptions  a  la 
fois ;  ce  qui  opere  autant  pour  notre  but,  que  si  elle  etait  composee  de  pUces 
comme  une  machine. 

f  In  the  case  of  Lessing  we  see  the  transference  still  in  process.  In 
Literaturbriefe  (7)  he  says  :  "  If  this  alteration  is  the  result  of  inner  springs  of 
action,  or  (to  use  a  crude  expression)  of  the  mechanism  of  his  soul  itself." 
Herbart  was  particularly  energetic  in  carrying  out  the  idea  of  the  mechanism  of 
the  psychic  life :  he  declares  it  to  be  our  task  (iii.  255)  "  to  split  up  the 
organism  of  reason  into  its  single  threads,  the  chains  of  ideas,  whose  formation 
can  only  be  explained  by  the  mechanism  of  the  mind." 

I  See  iv.  427  (Hart.) :  "  Mechanical  natural  philosophy  explains  the  specific 
differences  of  its  objects,  as  machines,  by  the  nature  and  disposition  of  their 
smallest  parts.  Dynamical  natural  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  deduces  the 
specific  differences  of  objects  not  as  machines  (that  is,  mere  instruments  of  out- 
ward motive  forces)  but  as  containing  elemental  attractive  and  repulsive  motive 
forces  of  their  own." 


168    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

but  does  not  itself  comprise  the  property  of  inner  life,  hence  it  is 
not  employed  outside  this  particular  sphere  (say  in  political 
theory)  to  denote  a  living  whole  :  there  are  passages  in  Aristotle 
in  which  bpyaviKog  can  hardly  be  translated  except  by  the  word 
mechanical.*  The  term  retained  this  meaning,  without  change, 
through  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  Modern  World  on  into  the 
eighteenth  century.!  The  concept  instrumental  could  be  appro- 
priated, also,  by  the  new  mechanical  theory  ;  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  both  organic  (natural)  and  artificial  machines  were  un- 
hesitatingly placed  under  the  concept  machine  ;  to  speak  of 
organic  machines  was  not  at  that  time  regarded  as  at  all 
unusual.  J 

Then  came  the  German  classical  period,  and  with  it  a  craving 
to  endow  nature  with  soul  and  motion  of  its  own;  this  first 
added  the  property  of  life  to  the  term  organic,  and  made  it  the 
main  characteristic.  Kant,  with  his  precise  concepts  and  dis- 
tinctions, exerted  a  special  influence  in  this  direction  ;  though 
Herder,  Jacobi  and  others  should  not  be  forgotten.  §  This  new 
meaning  was  next  transferred  from  natural  living  beings  to 


*  See,  for  example,  irepl  yEvlo-swc  xal  $9opag,  336  a,  2  :  icai  TUQ 
dirotiidoaffi  TOIQ  aw/iafft,  Si'  &£  yewwai,  Xiav  bpyaviK&s,  atyaipovvrtQ  rf)v  Kara  r6 
tlSoQ  alriav.  Pol.  1259  6,  23  :  cnroprjaEiev  av  TIQ,  Trortpov  tanv  dptrr)  TIQ  SovXov 
Trapa  TO.Q  opyavucae  KO.I  SiaKoviKag  aXXjj  TipiuTepa  TOVTWV. 

j  Cp.  the  last  important  ramification  of  scholasticism,  the  philosophy  of 
Suarez  (1548-1617),  (De  anima,  i.  2,  6)  :  Dicitur  corpus  organicum,  quod  ex 
partibus  dissimilaribus  componitur.  Even  with  regard  to  the  usage  of  the 
Wolffian  school,  Baumeister  observes  :  Corpus  dicitur  organicum,  quod  vi 
compositionis  sues  ad  peculiarem  quandam  actionem  aptum  est. 

I  Even  so  late  as  about  1813  Saint-Simon  called  society  a  veritable  machine 
organitte  (see  Paul  Earth,  Vierteljahrsschr.  filr  wissenschaft.  Philos.,  XXIV. 
i.  72). 

§  According  to  Kant  (v.  388,  Hart.)  :  "  An  organised  product  of  nature  is  one 
in  which  all  is  purpose  and,  reciprocally,  is  also  means."  On  p.  386  it  runs  : 
'  '  An  organised  being  is  hence  no  mere  machine,  for  that  has  solely  motive 
force  ;  such  a  being  possesses  in  itself  constructive  force,  and  of  such  a  nature, 
indeed,  that  it  is  communicated  to  the  materials,  although  they  have  none 
themselves  (that  is  to  say,  they  are  organised)."  Jacobi  has  (Hume,  172)  : 
"In  order  to  conceive  of  the  possibility  of  an  organic  being,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  think  first  of  that  which  creates  its  unity,  to  think  of  the  whole  before  the 
parts  "  ;  in  content  this  is  only  a  revival  and  more  exact  formulation  of  Aristo- 
telian thoughts.  Kant  also  speaks  of  a  wahren  Gliederbau  of  pure  speculative 
reason,  "  in  which  all  is  organ,  namely,  all  is  for  the  sake  of  one  and  each 
particular  one  for  the  sake  of  all  "  (iii.  28,  Hart.). 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  169 

society*  and  the  State,  then  to  law,  history,  and  so  forth. 
Organic  became  a  favourite  term  of  the  romantic  school, 
though  at  the  same  time  we  find  it  spreading  beyond  separate 
schools  and  tendencies  and  passing  into  ordinary  speech. 
Thus  while  mechanical  and  organic  in  the  first  place  meant 
almost  the  same  thing,  they  came  ultimately  to  stand  in  the 
most  complete  contrast  to  one  another.  At  present  these 
terms  denote  two  important  and  contrasting  views  of  the  world. 
[As,  for  example,  in  Trendelenburg  (Log.  Untersuchungen  (8 
edit.),  ii.  142  ff.)] 

(b)  On  the  History  of  the  Problem 

The  terms  that  we  have  been  studying  serve  to  indicate  a  con- 
trast in  the  nature  of  things  which  has  long  been  recognised  as 
a  problem.  In  the  discussion  of  this  problem  the  protagonists 
in  the  Ancient  World  were  Democritus  and  Aristotle.  During 
the  classic  age  of  Greece  the  organic  doctrine,  as  we  may  call 
it  for  short,  was  decidedly  uppermost.  The  artistic  and  syn- 
thetic mode  of  thought  peculiar  to  the  age  placed  the  whole 
before  the  parts,  the  living  before  the  lifeless,  and  explained 
the  latter  through  the  former.  It  was  in  sympathy  with  this 
tendency  that  the  idea  of  the  organism  (though  not  the  term 
organism)  was  adopted  by  Aristotle.  Aristotle,  too,  originated 

*  The  transference  of  the  expression  "  organisation "  to  the  sphere  of 
politics  seems  to  have  first  taken  place  in  the  movements  connected  with  the 
French  Eevolution ;  but  German  thinkers  and  poets  were,  however,  the  first  to 
give  the  word  its  inward  meaning.  Kant  says  (v.  387,  Hart.) :  "  To  speak 
exactly,  the  organisation  of  nature  is  in  no  way  analogous  to  any  sort  of 
causality  we  know,"  and  adds  in  a  note  :  "  On  the  other  hand,  one  can  bring 
to  light  a  certain  connection  (which  is  found,  however,  more  in  the  idea  than  in 
the  reality),  by  means  of  an  analogy  with  the  above-mentioned  direct  natural 
purposes.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  recently  undertaken  thorough  reconstitution 
of  a  great  nation  in  the  form  of  a  State,  very  appropriate  and  frequent  use  has 
been  made  of  the  word  '  organisation,'  for  the  construction  of  a  magisterial 
system  and  so  forth,  and  even  of  the  whole  fabric  of  the  State  :  for  in  a  whole 
of  this  description  each  member  should  certainly  be  no  mere  means,  but  at  the 
same  time  a  purpose,  too,  and  since  it  contributes  to  the  capacity  of  the  whole, 
each  member  should  be  determined  by  the  idea  of  the  whole  in  regard  to  its 
place  and  function."  He  says  on  p.  364  of  the  same  work  (Kritik  d.  Urteilt- 
kraft) :  "  Thus  a  monarchical  State  is  represented  by  an  animated  body,  if  it  be 
governed  according  to  the  inner  laws  of  the  people,  but  by  a  mere  machine  (such 
as  a  handmill)  if  it  be  governed  by  a  single  absolute  will.  In  both  cases,  how- 
ever, the  representation  is  only  symbolical." 


170     MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

the  formula  that  in  an  organic  being  the  whole  precedes  the 
parts.*  This  idea  at  once  extended  itself  beyond  its  immediate 
sphere  of  application  to  that  of  the  State  and  the  cosmos  as  a 
whole  ;  soon,  too,  though  not  till  after  the  time  of  Aristotle,  it 
was  carried  over  to  humanity  as  a  whole,  and  was  more  especially 
taken  up  in  this  sense  by  the  later  Stoics.  From  the  Ancient 
World  it  passed  to  Christianity,  and  the  religious  tendency  now 
gave  it  a  peculiar  inwardness,  t  Later  it  developed  into  the 
idea  of  the  church,  as  the  mystic  body  (corpus  mysticum)  of 
Christ.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  with  its  inseparable  union  of  spiritual 
and  sensuous,  the  organic  idea  acquired  a  tangible  form,  and  with 
this  form  it  dominated  mediaeval  social  doctrines ;  I  it  formed  a 
chief  portion  of  the  system  of  order  characteristic  of  the  age, 
a  system  which  looked  upon  the  individual  as  receiving  all 
spirituality  from  a  whole,  and  that  a  visible  whole. 

This  organic  doctrine  was  very  influential  both  in  practical 
matters  and  in  relation  to  scientific  method.  In  the  former 
case  it  demanded  from  the  individual  an  unconditional  subordi- 
nation to  the  whole,  a  service  which  was  considered  indispensable 
to  the  development  of  his  rational  nature ;  but  at  the  same  time 
it  gave  the  individual  a  consciousness  that  within  the  whole  he 
signified  something  special  and,  in  its  place,  irreplaceable.  In 
its  later  period  the  Ancient  World  dwelt  with  peculiar  pleasure 
upon  the  idea  that  the  individual  was  not  merely  a  fragment 
(fjLtpoo)  but  a  member  (jj.i\oo)  of  the  cosmos.  "  I  am  a  member 
of  the  whole  of  rational  being  "  ;  this  conviction  consoled  Marcus 
Aurelius  amidst  the  dangers  and  perplexities  of  life.  The  ancient 
church,  however,  developed  more  particularly  the  idea  that  all 
Christians,  as  members  of  the  common  body  dedicated  to  God, 

*  See  Pol.,  1253  a,  20 :  ri>  o\ov  irporepov  avayicaiov  tlvai  rov  ftipovg.  avaipov- 
fiivov  yap  rov  o\ov  oi>K  torai  iroitf  oiiSf  x«ip,  £t  /i»j  6/J.wvvfnag  vairtp  ei  ric  Xeyoi  TYJV 
Xi9ivT)v.  diarpQufiiiaa  yap  iarai  roiavrtj.  According  to  this,  the  State  precedes 
the  individual. 

f  Characteristic  of  the  Greek  origin  of  this  idea  is  the  fact  that  the  Gospel  of 
St.  John,  powerfully  influenced  as  it  was  by  Greek  philosophical  elements,  is 
the  only  gospel  which  brings  it  forward  (parable  of  the  vine  and  the  grapes). 

J  Thus  we  see  the  analogy  between  the  State  and  a  living  body  carried  beyond 
the  general  idea  and  freely  worked  out  in  detail.  John  of  Salisbury,  for 
example,  endeavoured  to  point  out  a  bodily  member  corresponding  to  every 
section  of  the  State  (see  Gierke,  Das  deutsche  Qenossentchaftsrecht,  iii.  549). 


MECHANICAL—  ORGANIC  171 

are  dependent  upon  one  another  in  fate  and  deed,  are  linked 
together  to  form  a  whole. 

This  mode  of  thought  was  not  less  productive  in  the  realm 
of  scientific  work.  Here  it  gave  rise  to  the  teleological  view, 
which  has  exerted  immense  influence  from  the  Ancient  World 
down  to  the  present  day.  If  the  whole  was  the  original  thing 
and  the  superior  thing,  then  it  offered  the  key  to  the  explanation 
of  the  single  members  and  their  respective  services.  But, 
according  to  the  Platonic-  Aristotelian  idea,  however,  the  whole 
was  an  unchangeable  form,  a  self-existent  and  self-sufficing  life. 
Hence  it  set  all  movement  a  fixed  goal  and  final  terminus.* 
Nor  was  this  conception  limited  in  its  application  to  the  realm 
of  living  things  ;  it  was  extended  to  cover  the  whole  universe. 
The  world  is  here  looked  upon  as  a  living  and  firmly  consolidated 
whole,  into  which  all  the  separate  parts  fit  as  members  ;  the 
various  movements  do  not  confusedly  cut  across  one  another, 
but  each  strives  towards  a  terminus,  there  to  pass  over  into  a 
settled  activity  (tvepytid)  that  returns  ever  upon  itself.  But 
this  mode  of  thought  is  particularly  fruitful  within  its  own 
native  region,  within  the  sphere  of  animated  being.  The  organs 
and  functions  of  all  the  various  kinds  of  animals  are  referred  to 
an  all-embracing  life  in  which  they  find  their  explanation  ;  at 
the  same  time  all  manifoldness  of  organic  formation  appears  as 
the  unfolding  of  a  single  normal  type  present  in  all  the  stages. 
This  normal  type  is  seen  in  its  purity  in  man  ;  hence,  starting 
from  man,  it  is  possible  to  throw  light  upon  the  whole  of  this 
vast  domain  and  to  bring  its  immense  content  under  the  control 
of  pervading  ideas.  In  this  fashion  there  grew  up  a  species  of 
comparative  anatomy  and  physiology,  as  well  as  an  evolutionary 
science.  An  attempt  was  also  made  to  explain  the  psychical 
life  of  animals  by  a  similar  reference  to  the  human  prototype. 
Such  a  method  as  this  must  appear  to  us  in  the  highest  degree 


*  See  Aristotle  (Phya.  194  a,  28)  :  17  Ik  Qvaic  reXoc  icat  of  IVIKU.  S>v  yap 
avvt\ovc  r»}c  Kivriotwf  OVCTJJC  tan  rt  riXoc  TJJC  Kivi]fft.^f,  rovro  iff%arov  teal  ri> 
oi  sVeica.  See  further  199  a,  30  :  kirii  fi  Qvaic  <Jim),  »j  pi  v  «c  8X17  17  fl'wf  H°P<t>fl, 
riXos  S'avrii,  rov  rlXouc  S'svtica  raXXa,  avn)  av  etij  i;  atria  jj  o5  fcV«a.  According 
to  Aristotle,  chance  might  indeed  be  responsible  for  occasional  purposeful 
formations,  but  under  no  circumstances  for  the  universal  purposefulness; 
on  this  question  see  the  second  book  of  the  Physict. 


172    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

inadequate,  but  it  provided  its  own  age,  and  many  succeeding 
centuries,  with  an  ordered  and  organised  material. 

There  was  no  lack  of  opposition  to  this  type  of  thought  even 
in  the  Ancient  World,  but  this  opposition  did  not  get  beyond 
mere  criticism,  it  did  not  pass  over  into  leadership.  This  did 
not  take  place  until  the  Modern  Period,  when  the  struggle 
against  this  organic  doctrine  became  a  chief  factor  in  the 
movement  toward  freedom  and  clarity.  The  liberation  took 
effect,  at  first,  within  the  more  general  life  of  the  time :  the 
modern  mind  felt  the  restriction  to  a  material  organisation 
and  the  communication  of  spiritual  life  through  this  medium 
to  be  an  unbearable  oppression,  and,  rejecting  it,  aspired  to 
enter  into  a  direct  relationship  with  the  whole,  and  from  this 
source  win  for  itself  a  secure  superiority  to  all  visible  order. 
We  see  this  tendency  first  in  the  Kenaissance  and  the  Keforma- 
tion,  then  in  the  political  and  economical  movement  of  liberation 
which  originated  more  particularly  in  England.  Life  thus 
directly  based  upon  the  individual  seemed  to  gain  immensely 
in  power,  rationality,  and  truth.  From  this  new  point  of  view 
all  institutions  appear  as  the  work  of  individuals  and  possess 
no  rights  except  such  as  may  be  granted  them  by  the  individual. 
According  to  Leibniz  the  individual  bears  within  himself  the 
whole  infinity  of  the  cosmos  and  evolves  it  out  of  himself: 
what  an  abyss  separates  this  view  from  the  organic  doctrine ! 

At  the  same  time  there  resulted  a  revolution  in  the  sphere  of 
science.  The  traditional  explanation  of  nature  from  within  and 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  whole  became  unendurable  ;  men 
came  to  look  upon  it  as  a  thoroughly  subjective  interpretation, 
as  a  mere  fanciful  conception  that  should  be  energetically 
repudiated  because  it  claimed  to  be  not  fancy  but  a  serious 
explanation.  Hence  the  works  of  this  period  are  full  of  com- 
plaints about  the  concealed  figurativeness  of  the  scholastic 
doctrine,  with  its  inner  forms  and  forces.  It  was  described 
as  a  "Kefuge  of  Ignorance"  (asylum  ignorantia ;  see,  for 
example,  Oldenburg  in  a  letter  to  Spinoza).  In  opposition 
to  this,  the  expulsion  from  nature  of  everything  inward  and 
the  reduction  of  all  complex  facts  into  their  smallest  elements 
was  regarded  as  the  fundamental  condition  of  true  knowledge. 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  173 

At  the  same  time,  the  discovery  and  further  examination  of  these 
elements  promised  to  render  transparent  the  reality  which  had 
so  far  been  obscured,  and  to  give  power  over  things  that  were 
else  inaccessible.  For  once  these  elements  are  in  our  power 
things  become  mobile  and  malleable.  There  is  here  no  feeling 
whatever  for  the  greatness  of  the  old  artistic  view,  which  had 
indeed  suffered  the  severest  injury  at  the  hands  of  scholasticism. 
So  much  for  the  mechanical  explanation  of  nature  put  forward 
by  the  Modem  World.  In  direct  and  deliberate  contrast  to 
the  more  ancient  mode  of  thought  it  raises  the  elements  to  the 
first  place  and  bases  its  whole  constructive  effort  upon  them ; 
through  space,  time,  and  movement  it  splits  up  the  traditional 
continuum  into  discrete  quantities,  and  in  this  fashion  it  makes 
possible,  for  the  first  time,  an  exact  comprehension  of  the 
phenomena.  The  teleological  view  naturally  collapses  along 
with  this  denial  of  all  inner  connection.  All  sorts  of  quite 
different  considerations  combine  to  ensure  its  rejection ;  it 
appears  anthropomorphic,  indefinite,  and  sterile.  The  unity 
of  nature  is  no  longer  secured  through  purpose  but  through 
law.  Laws  operate  universally  and  consistently,  and  as  simple 
basic  forms  they  dominate  all  manifoldness.  All  this  grips 
men's  minds  with  elemental  force.  It  is  believed  that  the 
new  type  of  thought  renders  genuine  knowledge  possible  for 
the  first  time  and  inaugurates  an  age  of  science.  All  previous 
work  sinks  to  the  level  of  mere  preparation. 

Thinkers  of  a  profound  type  could  not  fail  to  perceive  that  the 
new  type  of  thought  left  many  questions  open  and  that  it  even 
created  new  problems.  Descartes,  the  most  important  thinker 
of  the  Enlightenment,  treated  the  mechanical  theory  merely  as 
a  principle  for  the  exact  comprehension  of  nature,  not  as  a 
metaphysical  doctrine  dealing  with  ultimate  causes ;  at  the 
same  time  he  drew  a  sharp  distinction  between  himself  and 
Democritus.*  His  faithful  disciple,  Robert  Boyle,  maintained 

*  The  most  important  reference  to  this  is  in  the  Princ.  philot.,  iv.  §  202 : 
(Democriti  philosophandi  ratio)  rejecta  ett,  primo  quia  ilia  corpuscula  indivisi- 
bilia  supponebat,  quo  nomine  etiam  ego  illam  rejicio;  deinde  quia  vacuum  circa 
ipsa  ette  fingebat,  quod  ego  nullum  dari  potse  demonstro,  tertio  quia  gravitatem 
iisdem  tribuebat,  quam  ego  nullam  in  ullo  corporum  cum  tolum  spectator,  ted 
tantum  quatenus  ab  aliorum  corporum  situ  et  motu dependct  atque  ad  illarefertur, 
intelligo  ff. 


174  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  existence  of  a  purposeful  and  active  cause  as  an  indis- 
pensable complement  to  the  mechanical  causes.*  Berkeley 
drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  mechanical  view  only 
explained  the  laws  and  modes  of  occurrence  and  not  the 
causes  of  events.  Leibniz  went  very  thoroughly  into  the 
matter  and  developed  a  peculiar  type  of  cosmic  philosophy, 
which  declared  the  whole  of  nature,  with  its  mechanism,  to 
be  the  appearance  of  a  spiritual  reality  ;  he  raised  the  ultimate 
units  (which  from  a  mechanical  point  of  view  constitute  a  mere 
limiting  concept)  to  the  central  position  and,  as  monads, 
equipped  them  with  an  inner  life.  Within  the  sphere  of 
nature  all  was  to  be  explained  mechanically  ;  the  principles 
of  the  mechanism,  however,  seemed  themselves  in  need  of 
explanation  and  to  be  able  to  find  this  explanation  only  in 
the  purposeful  control  of  a  rational  Providence.!  Leibniz 
believed  the  purposefulness  of  natural  laws  to  consist  in 
their  all  serving  the  end  of  securing  the  greatest  possible 
utilisation  of  force.  He  found  that  on  every  hand  the 
shortest  paths  are  chosen  and  the  simplest  means  employed.! 
The  Leibnizian  school  firmly  believed  that  everything  was 
composed  of  parts  and  that  the  whole  material  world  therefore 
fell  within  the  mechanical  sphere,  while  the  soul,  as  a  simple 
body,  did  not.§  In  a  less  definite  manner,  Wolff,  in  scholastic 

*  See,  for  example,  De  ipsa  natura,  sect.  iv. :  Harem  autem  partium  motum  sub 
primordia  rerum  infinita  sua  sapientia  ac  potestate  ita  direxit,  ut  tandem  (sive 
breviore  tempore  sive  longiore,  ratio  definire  nequit)  in  speciosam  hanc  ordinatam- 
que  mundi  formam  coaluerint. 

f  Omnia  in  corporibus  fieri  mechanice,  ipsa  vero principia  mechanismi  generalia 
ex  altiore  fonte  profluere  (p.  161,  Erdm.) :  see  also  165  a,  Foucher,  ii.  253. 

J  See  147  b  (Erdm.) :  Semper  scilicet  est  in  rebus  principium  determinationis 
quod  a  maxima  minimove  petendum  est,  ut  nempe  maximus  prastetur  effectus 
minima  ut  sic  dicam  sumptu.  The  objection  that  mere  natural  necessity  might 
have  produced  the  same  result  is  answered  as  follows  (605  b)  :  Cela  serait  vrai, 
si  par  exemple  les  loix  du  mouvement,  et  tout  le  reste,  avait  sa  source  dans  une 
netesiite  geometrique  de  causes  efficientes ;  mais  il  se  trouve  que  dans  la  dcrniere 
analyse  on  est  oblig&  de  recourir  a  quelque  chose  qui  depend  de  causes  finales  ou 
de  la  convenance. 

§  Thus,  for  example,  Baumgarten  (Metaphys.,  ed.  vi.,  1768,  §  433) :  Machina 
est  compositum  stricte  dictum  secundum  leges  motus  mobile.  Ergo  omne  corpus 
in  mundo  est  machina.  Machines  natura  per  leges  motus  determinata  mechanismus 
ett.  At,  quidquid  non  est  compositum,  non  est  machina,  hinc  nulla  monas  est 
machina. 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  175 

fashion,  put  side  by  side  explanations  based  upon  efficient  causes 
and  explanations  based  upon  final  causes,  and  in  this  connection 
devised  the  expression  "teleology."* 

It  was  of  course  not  to  be  expected  that  the  traditional 
organic  and  teleological  doctrine  should  at  once  collapse  under 
the  advent  of  the  mechanical  theory ;  it  was  far  too  deeply 
rooted  in  the  concepts  and  methods  of  the  school  for  such  a 
collapse  to  be  possible.  Moreover,  there  was  no  lack  of  capable 
men  who  vigorously  upheld  the  distinctive  character  of  living 
things,  t  But  the  age  was  not  disposed  to  listen  to  them. 
For  this  a  new  wave  of  life  was  necessary,  a  movement  calling 
upon  men  to  seek  and  find  something  new  in  reality.  This 
came  more  especially  with  the  rise  and  growth  of  German 
Humanism.  This  movement  revealed  the  victorious  growth 
of  a  desire  for  a  greater  directness  of  life,  for  a  more 
intimate  relationship  of  man  to  nature  and  the  world,  for 
a  view  of  things  based  upon  an  understanding  of  the  whole. 
At  first  the  movement  shook  men's  sympathies  like  a  hurricane, 
but  it  gradually  settled  into  an  artistic  construction  of  life :  from 
this  position  a  return  to  the  ancients  lay  close  at  hand,  for  were 
they  not  the  pattern  of  a  pure  and  noble  nature  ?  It  was  there- 
fore not  surprising  that  the  organic  type  of  thought  was  revived 
and  adopted  by  this  latest  Kenaissance  and  that  it  held  and 
swayed  men's  minds  with  almost  magic  power. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that,  in  a  scientific  sense,  it  was  Kant 
(temperamentally  but  little  artistic)  who  prepared  the  way  for 
this  new  artistic  type  of  thought.  He  did  so  by  reducing 
mechanism  to  a  merely  human  mode  of  thinking,  thereby 

*  See  Philos.  ration,  xive  logica,  op.  iii.,  §  85 :  Rerum  naturaUum  duplicet 
dari  possunt  rationes,  quorum  alias  petuntur  a  causa  efficiente,  alia  a  fine. 
Qua.  a  causa  efficiente  petuntur,  in  disciplinis  hactenus  definitis  expenduntur. 
Datur  itaque  prater  eas  alia  adhuc  philosophies  naturalis  part,  qua  fintt 
reruni  explicat,  nomine  adhuc  destituta,  etsi  amplissima  sit  et  utilissima.  Dici 
posset  teleologia.  The  term  causa  Jinalis,  on  the  other  hand,  is  scholastic : 
I  find  it  first  occurring  in  Abelard. 

t  The  chief  place,  in  this  respect,  is  taken  by  Cudworth,  with  his  hypothesis 
of  a  plastic  nature ;  see,  in  particular,  The  True  Intellectual  System  of  the 
Universe  (1678),  i.  3,  19.  Among  German  scholars,  Riidiger  is  more  especially 
noteworthy ;  see,  for  example,  Institutions  eruditionis  seu philosophia  itynthetica, 
p.  109  :  physica  vel  mechanica  est  vel  vitalis. 


176    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

clearing  a  free  space  for  a  view  and  treatment  of  another 
kind ;  but  for  such  positive  construction  a  compelling  motive 
was  needed.  This  motive  appeared  to  him  to  be  provided  by 
the  organic  realm,  since  it  could  only  be  comprised  within  our 
concepts  by  the  aid  of  the  idea  of  an  inner  whole  and  a  guiding 
purpose.  Thus  the  old  doctrine  was  again  taken  up,  and  was 
applied  beyond  its  immediate  sphere  to  the  world  as  a  whole. 
In  Kant's  own  case  the  application  was  carefully  guarded  and 
put  forward  as  representing  a  human  point  of  view.  But  the 
flood  of  artistic  enthusiasm  rose  so  rapidly  as  to  sweep  away 
all  confining  obstacles,  and  the  organic  type  of  thought  acquired 
a  proud  self-consciousness  and  proclaimed  itself,  in  opposition 
to  the  Enlightenment,  as  a  view  of  life  based  upon  the  inner- 
most life  and  being  of  things  themselves,  the  mechanical  doc- 
trine being  regarded  as  bloodless  and  soulless.  Schelling  gave 
particularly  energetic  expression  to  the  new  tendency,  and  ranged 
all  natural  life  under  the  idea  of  the  organism.* 

Concept  and  term  then  came  rapidly  into  use.  Though  the 
ancient  traditions  were  still  adhered  to,  modern  influences  were 
now  unmistakably  apparent.  The  idea  of  the  organism  did  not 
so  much  represent  a  conception  of  being  as  of  becoming ;  reality 
did  not  so  much  constitute  a  finished  work  of  art  as  a  living 
being,  progressing  through  its  own  power ;  so  that  this  change 
of  attitude  was  at  first  far  more  fruitful  in  the  sphere  of  history 
than  in  that  of  nature.  A  great  fascination  was  exerted  by  the 
idea  that  all  historical  growth  proceeds  not  from  sudden  im- 
pulses but  through  steady  advance,  not  from  artificial  reflection 
but  from  an  unconscious  natural  impulse;  that  it  issues  not 
from  the  mere  individual,  but  from  the  power  of  a  systematic 
whole.  And  as  this  idea  transferred  itself  to  politics,  law, 
speech,  &c.,  it  seemed  on  every  hand  as  if  a  purer  and  richer 
actuality,  a  larger  conception  of  the  whole,  a  more  inward  and 
peaceful  relationship  of  man  to  things  had  been  won.  Man  was 
no  longer  to  master  things  from  without,  but  to  share  their  inner 
life;  for  example,  he  was  not  to  make  law,  but  to  find  it  as 

*  Usually,  however,  he  understands  dynamical  as  constituting  the  exact 
opposite  of  mechanical ;  in  the  latter  case  he  looks  upon  the  world  as  a  given 
thing,  in  the  former  as  something  unceasingly  growing. 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  177 

a  product  of  the  spirit  of  the  people.  He  was  now  free  to 
recognise  the  riches  of  historical  tradition,  retaining  throughout 
individual  character  and  doing  justice  in  its  own  place  to  each 
individual  development.  Thus  a  tendency  towards  a  historical 
view  of  the  world  (in  contrast  to  the  rational  view  of  the  En- 
lightenment) was  very  closely  connected  with  the  organic 
doctrine.  Historical  research  is  now  the  intimate  ally  of 
artistic  contemplation ;  it  is  characteristic  that  Schelling 
declares  the  standpoint  of  historical  art  to  be  the  "third  and 
absolute  standpoint  of  history." 

But  the  onesidedness  of  this  historical  view,  and  with  it  the 
limitations  of  the  organic  doctrine,  could  not  long  be  overlooked. 
Misgivings  were  bound  to  arise,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that 
political  and  ecclesiastical  reactionaries,  such  as  Adam  Muller 
and  de  Maistre  (the  father  of  modern  Ultramontanism) ,  took  up 
this  organic  doctrine  with  especial  enthusiasm  and  made  use 
of  it  in  a  mediaeval  sense  to  repress  the  independence,  not 
only  of  individuals,  but  of  the  living  forces  of  the  present. 
Apart,  however,  from  this  particular  development,  the  pro- 
blematical and  onesided  nature  of  the  organic  doctrine  soon 
attracted  attention.  The  smooth,  uninterrupted  growth  of 
history  had  been  presupposed  rather  than  proved ;  the  objec- 
tivity which  it  seemed  to  have  discovered  in  the  things,  it 
had  itself  placed  in  them ;  hence  its  conception  of  history  was 
seen  to  be  strongly  subjective.  This  movement  had  lent  a 
valuable  stimulus  to  the  comprehension  of  nature,  since  it 
directed  attention  to  life  itself  and  to  the  inner  connection  of 
things,  and  it  had  moreover  powerfully  promoted  the  quest 
after  the  unity  of  natural  forces  ;  but  these  suggestions  did  not 
become  scientifically  fruitful  until  they  were  transplanted  to 
the  different  soil  of  modern  natural  science.  In  so  far  as  the 
organic  mode  of  thought  attempted,  with  its  own  resources,  to 
come  to  a  definite  conclusion,  it  lost  itself  in  audacious  and 
often  fantastic  imaginations.  It  brought  danger,  moreover,  to 
life  as  a  whole,  because  it  induced  man  to  adopt  a  predomi- 
nantly contemplative  attitude  towards  reality  ;  it  invited  him 
rather  to  complacently  adopt  what  was  at  hand  and  fit  himself 
in,  than  to  proceed  independently  and  cut  his  own  paths.  The 

12 


178    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

whole  tendency  was,  in  fact,  unsuitable  for  an  age  burdened  with 
great  tasks  and  involved  in  difficult  complications. 

Hence  the  lead  was  again  taken  by  the  other  side,  which  had 
never  been  quite  suppressed,  but  only  intimidated.  It  now  came 
to  the  front  with  a  fresh  lease  of  life.  It  was  the  Enlighten- 
ment over  again ;  somewhat  different  in  complexion,  but  not 
fundamentally  changed.  From  its  point  of  view  the  Human- 
istic Epoch,  with  its  organic  doctrine,  seemed  no  more  than  a 
mere  episode.  The  individualistic  construction  of  social  life 
attained  full  development,  for  the  first  time,  in  modern  Liberal- 
ism and  in  the  modern  doctrine  of  Free  Trade.  On  into  the 
second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  we  see  Adam  Smith's 
elaborate  and  extreme  theory  treated,  even  by  distinguished 
scholars,  as  a  settled  truth  and  a  final  conclusion.  Natural 
science  for  its  part,  while  sharply  rejecting  the  speculation  of 
natural  philosophy,  undertook  to  thoroughly  eliminate  every 
remnant  of  vitalistic  theory.  It  now  demanded  that  organic 
growth  and  life  should  be  brought  without  remainder  under  the 
fundamental  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry.  Among  philoso- 
phers, Lotze,  in  particular,  maintained  this  universal  validity  of 
mechanism — though  certainly  not  without  giving  it,  as  Leibniz 
had  done,  a  deeper  foundation  in  a  realm  of  psychical  life.  But 
this  supermechanical  element  was  an  affair  of  metaphysics,  while 
nature  was  handed  over  to  mechanism,  and  in  time  the  affirma- 
tion of  mechanism  became  more  influential  than  the  doctrine  of 
its  limitation.  Thus  it  was  that  the  mechanical  theory,  properly 
understood  and  cautiously  applied,  seemed  to  offer  a  sure  solu- 
tion of  the  great  cosmic  problems.  However  much  might  remain 
to  be  done  in  the  way  of  working  it  out  in  detail,  the  principle 
seemed  beyond  the  reach  of  doubt. 

Then  came  a  resistance,  an  unexpected  resistance.  It  came, 
not  as  an  after-effect  of  older  modes  of  thought,  but  from  the 
movement  of  modern  life  itself,  not  so  much  from  an  artistic 
interpretation  of  reality  as  from  growing  experience,  new  facts, 
and  new  problems.  The  economical  and  industrial  development 
of  modern  life  drew  men  closer  together  and  multiplied  their 
points  of  contact ;  it  differentiated  and  complicated  human 
work,  and  thereby  bound  one  man  far  closer  to  his  comrade 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  179 

and  all  together  into  one  whole.  In  the  face  of  the  social  con- 
nections thus  initiated,  the  isolated  individual  of  the  mechanical 
theory  disappeared.  Just  as  the  mechanical  theory  had  derived 
all  social  connection  from  the  individual,  so  modern  sociology 
looked  upon  the  individual  as  belonging  from  the  very  begin- 
ning to  a  connected  social  whole  ;  the  doctrine  of  the  milieu 
took  into  account  even  the  invisible  elements  of  influence,  and 
tended  to  make  the  individual  the  mere  product  of  his  environ- 
ment. At  the  same  time,  the  defencelessness  of  the  individual 
in  the  presence  of  economic  complications  and  opposing  ten- 
dencies was  keenly  felt,  and  with  it  the  necessity  of  a  collective 
will,  as  embodied  in  the  State. 

All  this  tended  towards  a  resuscitation  of  the  organic  idea. 
Among  philosophers  Comte,  in  particular,  came  under  this 
influence,  and  constructed  his  ethics  and  politics  from  this 
standpoint.  But  in  his  case  the  concept  of  organism  underwent 
a  considerable  alteration  as  compared  with  its  earlier  meaning ; 
it  was  transferred,  at  any  rate  in  Comte' s  discussion  of  general 
principles,  from  the  artistic  and  ethical  spheres  into  the  realm 
of  natural  science.  It  was  more  especially  the  progress  of 
histology  (Bichat)  which  gave  empirical  support  to  the  funda- 
mental idea.  Like  the  living  body,  society  is  an  exceedingly 
fine  network  of  numerous  separate  elements ;  these  are  so  closely 
connected  with  one  another  that  the  action  or  inaction,  the  loss 
or  the  gain,  of  the  one  directly  affects  the  others.  This  has 
always  been  true;  but  it  now  appeared  more  true  than  ever 
owing  to  the  modern  division  of  labour,  which  convincingly 
demonstrates  the  manner  in  which  each  is  linked  up  with  each 
and  each  with  the  whole.  This  seemed  to  mark  the  discovery 
of  a  guiding  principle  for  ethics  and  politics — a  principle  which 
only  needed  to  be  developed  in  order  to  mark  out  definite  paths 
for  our  whole  conduct. 

In  reality,  such  a  principle  is  without  foundation,  and  has 
been  formed  by  a  surreptitious  interweaving  of  ancient  and 
modern  elements ;  the  result  is  then,  all  unconsciously,  palmed 
off  as  an  inner  whole — the  mere  fact  as  a  concept  of  value,  the 
"  is  "  as  an  "  ought."  Finally,  when  the  whole  makes  demands 
upon  the  individual  and  imposes  them  as  duties,  we  find  our- 


180    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

selves  completely  on  ancient  ground.  The  obscurity  which  has 
always  attached  to  the  concept  organic  is  increased  to  the  point 
of  unbearable  confusion  by  this  commingling  of  old  and  new. 
But  the  concept  is  firmly  retained  because  it  demands  that  the 
dependence  of  the  individual  upon  the  whole  context  in  which 
he  finds  himself  shall  somehow  be  brought  to  definite  expression. 
Hence  the  modern  investigator  comes  under  opposing  influences, 
and  it  cannot  cause  surprise  when  thinkers  differ  even  to  the 
point  of  sharply  opposing  each  other.  Nor  is  it  only  between 
individuals  that  these  divisions  occur,  but  also  between  different 
departments  of  research.  The  organic  doctrine  has  been  most 
warmly  taken  up  by  sociologists,  while  political  economists  as 
such  have  been  much  less  inclined  to  adopt  it ;  among  jurists  it 
finds  chief  favour  with  distinguished  Germanists. 

Along  with  this  movement  in  the  social  sphere  there  has  gone 
a  parallel  movement  in  natural  science,  but  since  this  began 
later  it  is  to-day  involved  to  an  even  greater  extent  in  uncer- 
tainty and  conflict.  Without  doubt  this  movement  has  been 
brought  about  in  the  first  place  by  the  modern  theory  of  evolu- 
tion. The  Darwinian  form,  in  which  this  theory  first  obtained 
general  recognition,  was,  in  its  characteristic  nature,  as  far 
removed  as  could  be  from  a  recognition  of  the  organic  idea,  and 
it  endeavoured  to  subject  the  whole  sphere  of  life  to  mechanical 
concepts  ;  but  in  natural  science,  as  in  other  departments  of  life, 
thought  movements  often  produce  results  entirely  opposite  to 
those  intended.  Since  the  domain  of  life  now  attracted  greatly 
increased  attention,  and  was  made  the  object  of  deeper  research, 
its  distinctive  nature  obtained  a  much  wider  recognition,  and  it 
became  evident  that  the  tracing  back  of  its  phenomena  to  ele- 
mentary physical  and  chemical  laws  was  incomparably  more 
difficult  than  had  been  supposed  during  the  middle  of  the  cen- 
tury. The  observations  on  protoplasm,  the  new  conceptions  of 
the  mechanics  of  evolution,  the  problem  of  the  continuity  of  life, 
the  theory  of  mutation,  with  its  demonstration  of  the  sudden 
production  of  new  forms,  &c.,  taken  together  gave  rise  to  a  new 
and  essentially  different  situation.  Opinion  became  in  conse- 
quence divided.  Some  believed  that  an  intellectual  appropria- 
tion of  the  new  facts  would  be  rendered  possible  through  a  further 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  181 

elaboration  of  mechanical  concepts  ;  others  believed  a  new  prin- 
ciple to  be  essential.*  In  connection  with  these  movements  the 
teleological  point  of  view  again  conies  to  the  front,  though  it  is 
now  brought  up  not  so  much  as  a  piece  of  metaphysics,  but  rather 
as  a  means  of  scientific  explanation,  as  "  empirical "  teleology ;  t 
but  even  in  this  sense  it  is  opposed  by  others  as  a  relapse  into 
metaphysics. 

Thus,  as  a  result  of  studying  the  realm  of  life  the  mechanical 
doctrine  is,  if  not  limited,  at  any  rate  forced  beyond  its  cus- 
tomary form  ;  "  the  too  simple  mechanical  conception  "  (Roux). 
Moreover,  its  own  fundamental  concepts  are  attacked  in  more 
than  one  way.  To  begin  with,  the  infinite  refinement  of  detail 
revealed  by  apparently  elementary  inorganic  processes  made  the 
older  mechanical  ideas  seem  much  too  coarse  even  for  the  stages 
below  the  vital  level.  The  science  of  "  energetics  "  has  attacked 
the  mechanical  view  of  the  world  on  grounds  of  principle,  for 
it  has  contested  the  basic  idea  of  matter  as  something  that 
exists  outside  the  sphere  of  sensation,  and  acts  as  the  special 
vehicle  of  physical  forces ;  moreover,  it  has  sought  to  trace  all 
natural  phenomena  back  to  the  fundamental  concept  of  energy.  J 

*  See,  among  others,  Eindfleisch,  Aerztliche  Philosophic,  1888,  and  Neovita- 
lismus,  1895.  Roux  (Einleitung  zum  Archiv  filr  Entwickelungsmechanik  der 
Organismen,  1894)  protests  against  "  describing  the  organic  form  as  inexplicable 
and  only  to  be  teleologically  deduced"  (p.  22),  and  remarks  further:  "The 
words  Incidit  in  Scyllam,  qui  vult  vitare  Charybdim  are  in  the  highest  degree 
applicable  to  those  who  are  investigating  the  mechanics  of  evolution.  The 
all-too-simple  mechanical  conception  and  the  metaphysical  conception  repre- 
sent the  Scylla  and  Charybdis,  and  to  sail  between  them  is  a  difficult  task 
which  a  few  only  have  up  till  now  succeeded  in  performing  ;  and  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  temptation  to  adopt  the  latter  conception  has  appreciably 
increased  with  the  increase  of  our  knowledge"  (p.  23).  See  also  W.  Roux: 
Ueber  die  Selbstregulation  der  Lebewesen,  1902. 

t  See  Cossmann,  Elemente  der  empirischen  Teleologie,  1899 ;  further,  E. 
Kunig,  Die  heutige  Naturwissenchaft  u.  die  Teleologie ;  Beil.  zur  Allg.  Z.,  1900, 
Nos.  29  and  30 ;  also  Ueber  Naturzwecke,  1902.  These  problems  have  given 
rise  to  an  exceedingly  rich  and  unceasingly  growing  literature,  a  clear  sign  of 
the  central  position  they  occupy  in  the  work  and  interest  of  the  modern  world. 

{  See  Ostwald,  Vorlesungen  ilber  die  Naturphilosophie,  p.  153  :  "Everything 
that  we  know  of  the  outer  world  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  existing  energy. 
Therefore  the  concept  of  energy  is  seen,  on  every  hand,  to  be  the  most  uni- 
versal which  science  has  yet  formed.  It  comprehends  not  only  the  problem 
of  substance  but  that  of  causality,  too."  With  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the 
concept  energy  we  read  on  p.  158 :  ' '  We  would  universally  define  energy  as 
work  or  as  every  thing  which  results  from  work  and  can  be  converted  into  work." 


182    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

It  is,  however,  quite  impossible  in  a  mere  sketch  such  as  this  to 
go  into  all  the  problems  here  suggested.  The  main  point  is 
that  the  mechanical  theory  has  lost  the  matter-of-course  cha- 
racter which  it  long  appeared  to  possess.  It  is  seldom,  however, 
that  an  old  theme  becomes  a  problem  once  again  without  under- 
going a  transformation. 

To-day  the  whole  air  is  full  of  conflict  and  unrest.  But  the 
matter  is  not  one  to  be  settled  by  general  reflections,  but  by  the 
main  direction  which  work  and  life  actually  take.  Thus  it  has 
been  in  the  past,  and  thus  in  the  future,  too,  the  progress  of 
the  world's  work  will  itself  settle  the  form  in  which  the  opposi- 
tions declare  themselves,  and  decide  what  further  developments 
both  fundamental  concepts  must  undergo  ;  also  whether  new 
modes  of  explanation  may  supersede  the  old.  It  falls  to  the 
philosophical  speculation  of  to-day  to  survey  the  field  of  reality 
and  note  how  the  concepts  stand  in  relation  to  it,  and  what 
tasks  they  urge  upon  us. 

(c)  The   Present-day   Conflict 

1.  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECT  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

Philosophy  must  insist  above  everything  else  on  the  fact  that 
the  mechanical  theory,  even  if  it  could  explain  everything  that  is 
known,  is  never  under  any  circumstances  capable  of  furnishing  a 
definite  conclusion.  The  mechanical  explanation  does  not  carry 
us  beyond  a  juxtaposition  of  the  elements,  a  conclusion  which 
from  the  philosophical  point  of  view  necessarily  constitutes  a 
difficult  problem.  If  the  elements  existed  side  by  side  without 
any  connection  whatever,  and  in  a  state  of  indifference  towards 
one  another,  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  to  perceive  how 
one  could  affect  another.  This  holds  above  all  in  the  sphere 
of  nature ;  Leibniz  and  Lotze  were  compelled  to  thoroughly 
reorganise  the  immediate  view  of  the  world  through  a  con- 
sideration of  the  fact  of  mutual  influence.  Further,  we  cannot 
very  well  reject  Leibniz's  belief  that  nothing  can  be  completely 
absorbed  solely  in  accomplishing  something  for  others,  but  must 
also  be  something  in  itself,  and  hence  that  whatever  is  taken  to 
be  the  final  element  must  be  something  with  an  existence  of  its 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  183 

own.  If  this  thought  be  followed  up  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  mechanical  realm  is  the  mere  appearance  of  quite  a 
different  kind  of  world.  With  regard  to  the  life  of  the  soul,  too, 
those  who  would  trace  everything  hack  to  the  mechanism  of 
association  are  quite  unable  to  give  an  answer  to  the  question 
how  all  these  processes  come  to  be  experienced  as  personal  life, 
as  my  life  and  your  life.  On  every  hand  unity  and  connection 
must  somehow  be  accounted  for,  and  this  is  a  task  beyond 
the  powers  of  mechanical  explanation. 

Since  the  mechanical  view  shelves  an  unsolved  problem,  then 
from  the  point  of  view  of  actual  fact  it  cannot  be  admitted  that 
it  dominates  the  whole  of  reality,  even  if  it  completely  explains 
the  whole  of  nature.  For  associated  with  nature  is  the  life 
of  the  soul,  and  this  life  exhibits  (more  particularly  in  the  case 
of  human  beings)  a  completely  different  kind  of  process.  For  in 
so  far  as  the  inner  life  grows  to  be  something  more  than  a  mere 
accompaniment  of  natural  processes  and  unfolds  an  independent 
character,  in  so  far  as  spiritual  life  grows  up  within  us,  a  mere 
assembling  of  single  elements  no  longer  provides  a  satisfactory 
explanation ;  each  single  phenomenon  is  now  a  portion  of  a 
whole,  and  the  joining-up  results  not  directly  between  the 
separate  elements,  but  indirectly  through  their  relationship  to 
the  whole.  Thought,  for  example,  certainly  runs  its  course  in 
separate  ideas,  but  it  does  not  consist  in  a  mere  accumulation 
and  summation  of  these  ;  it  pursues  a  definite  aim,  and  is  there- 
by inwardly  held  together.  It  cannot  endure  anything  which 
disturbs  this  unity.  Nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  the  dis- 
tinctive nature  of  thought  than  the  fact  and  power  of  the  logical 
contradiction.  It  would  be  impossible  to  perceive  this  contra- 
diction if,  in  thought,  multiplicity  was  not  comprehended  within 
the  scope  of  an  all-inclusive  activity,  and  it  could  not  be  so 
unendurable  as  it  is  if  the  desire  for  unity  were  not  enormously 
powerful.  At  the  same  time  contradiction  reveals  a  totally 
different  sort  of  relationship  from  any  which  is  to  be  seen  in 
the  mechanical  realm.  It  is  not  a  collision  of  spatial  elements 
but  an  incompatibility  of  content.  This  brings  us  to  the  con- 
cept of  content,  which  is  absolutely  incomprehensible  from  the 
mechanical  point  of  view.  Moreover,  content  involves  a  new 


184    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

principle  of  order — that  of  objective  reality,  meaning,  and  inter- 
dependency  ;  as  seen,  for  example,  in  the  relationship  of  the 
characteristic  marks  of  a  logical  concept  to  one  another.  Only 
the  grossest  misunderstanding  can  confound  the  inner  structure 
of  such  a  concept  with  the  juxtaposition  within  a  sense-presenta- 
tion. The  fundamental  form  of  connection  in  the  former  case 
is  that  of  system.  Each  element  stands  within  a  whole,  under 
the  influence  of  a  whole  and  subject  to  its  compelling  power, 
while  the  various  elements  mutually  determine  one  another. 
Hence  the  whole  of  reality  does  not  fall  within  the  mechanical 
sphere. 

Therefore,  purpose  or  design  does  not  disappear  from  the 
world  even  if  nature  can  no  longer  find  room  for  it.  For  design 
indisputably  possesses  reality  and  power  in  human  life,  not  only 
in  the  soul  of  the  individual,  but  also  in  the  life  of  humanity  as 
a  whole ;  as  witness  the  great  systems  of  science  and  art,  law 
and  morality,  and  in  last  resort  the  whole  of  human  culture.* 
Since  purposeful  action  is  essential  to  inner  life,  it  follows  that 
it  is  a  portion  of  reality  as  a  whole ;  we  must  therefore  insist 
on  shaping  our  conception  of  the  world  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  make  this  fact  intelligible. 

Finally,  looking  at  the  matter  as  a  whole,  we  find  ourselves 
face  to  face  with  a  sharp  alternative.  It  is  customary  to-day  to 
regard  the  world  as  a  series  of  ascending  stages,  but  there  is  an 
important  divergence  of  opinion  upon  the  question  whether  the 
higher  is  a  mere  product  of  the  lower  (and  therefore  capable  of 
complete  explanation  by  reference  to  the  lower)  or  whether,  in 
the  higher,  something  new  and  original  comes  to  light,  some- 
thing which  can  only  be  understood  by  enlarging  our  conception 
of  the  world  as  a  whole.  The  opposition  between  these  two 
views  becomes  peculiarly  acute  in  the  case  of  the  problem  of  the 
relationship  between  nature  and  spiritual  life.  Is  the  latter  a 
mere  product  oj  the  former,  or  does  it  form  the  commencement  oj 
a  new  stage  of  reality  ?  The  validity  or  invalidity  of  the  idea  of 
design  will  depend  upon  our  settlement  of  this  question.  If 
spiritual  life,  with  its  inwardness  and  wholeness,  has  a  nature 

*  That  "  real  categories  "  proceed  from  design  has  been  shown  by  Trendelen- 
burg  in  a  very  important  chapter  of  the  Logischen  Untersuchungen  (see  chap.  xi). 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  185 

and  origin  of  its  own,  then  it  belongs  essentially  to  the  whole 
and  must  from  the  very  beginning  have  been  operative  in  the 
movement  of  the  whole,  directing  it  towards  itself.  In  this  case 
the  world-process  has  an  aim  and  cosmic  speculation  will  not  be 
able  to  dispense  with  the  idea  of  design.*  But  if  spiritual  life 
is  a  mere  product  of  nature,  then  all  aim  disappears  and  design 
with  it.  In  this  case  the  world  and  humanity,  too,  are  drifting 
rudderless  into  chaos  and  the  void. 


2.  THE  SCIENTIFIC  ASPECT  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

In  the  sphere  of  natural  science  the  conflict  centres  round  the 
question  whether  the  phenomena  characteristic  of  life  can  be 
explained  by  the  general  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  or 
whether  we  are  compelled  to  recognise  in  them  a  new  kind  of 
process.  This  is  before  everything  a  question  of  actual  fact,  and 
as  such  it  belongs  to  that  branch  of  science  which  deals  with 
these  phenomena,  but  at  the  same  time  the  problem  is  closely 
associated  with  many  considerations  of  a  more  general  kind 
which  cannot  here  be  evaded.  So  much  is  indisputable,  that  the 
uniqueness  and  mystery  of  life  has  again  come  more  to  the  front 
as  a  problem  that  must  be  faced,  nor  can  we  settle  the  matter 
to-day  so  easily  as  our  immediate  predecessors  thought  it  possible 
to  do.  It  seems  to  be  more  and  more  out  of  the  question  that 
we  should  conceive  of  life  as  a  mere  property  of  matter,  it  is 
becoming  more  and  more  recognised  that  life  must  be  granted 
an  independent  character.  In  this  connection  (to  mention  some 
prominent  names  outside  Germany)  we  may  refer  to  Bergson 
(more  particularly  in  his  L' evolution  creatrice,  1907)  t  and  Sir 

*  Thus  we  are  again  driven  to  metaphysics,  in  accordance  with  Herbart's 
conviction  (Wke.,  ii.  461) :  "In  thinking  about  nature  and  humanity  the  force 
of  the  human  spirit  impels  it  unavoidably  towards  metaphysics,  which,  like  the 
great,  primitive  mountains  of  the  earth,  forms  the  broad,  deep,  invisible 
foundation  of  all  human  thought  and  activity,  while  at  the  same  time  in 
isolated,  sharp,  almost  unattainable  summits  it  towers  above  all  other  heights 
and  depths." 

t  The  following  passages  are  characteristic  of  Bergson's  conception  of  life : 
L'tvolut.  criatrice,  p.  105 :  La  vie  est,  avant  tout,  une  tendence  d  agir  sur  la 
matUre  brute ;  further,  p.  197 :  La  vie  c'est-d-dire  la  conscience  land*  a  traveri 
la  matiere. 


186    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF   MODERN   THOUGHT 

Oliver  Lodge.*  Looked  at  from  this  point  of  view  the  problem 
is  to  fix  upon  an  essential  and  distinctive  characteristic  of  life ; 
Boutroux  finds  this  in  the  capacity  "  of  creating  a  system  in 
which  certain  parts  are  subordinate  to  certain  other  parts " ; 
this  implies  an  "  agent  "  and  "  organs,"  together  constituting  a 
"hierarchy"  to  which  there  is  no  analogue  in  the  inorganic 
world,  t  Bergson  sees  a  decisive  proof  of  the  working  of  life  as 
a  psychic  force  in  the  fact  that  nature  frequently  develops  like, 
or  similar,  structures  in  the  case  of  very  different  organisms  and 
hence  appears  to  pursue  like  aims  by  different  paths.  J 

The  various  civilised  nations  differ  markedly  from  one  another 

*  In  Life  and  Matter  (1909),  p.  68,  Lodge  says,  in  summing  up:  "The view 
concerning  life  which  I  have  endeavoured  to  express  is  that  it  is  neither  matter 
nor  energy,  nor  even  a  function  of  matter  or  of  energy,  but  is  something 
belonging  to  a  different  category ;  that  by  some  means  at  present  unknown  it  is 
able  to  interact  with  the  material  world  for  a  time,  but  that  it  can  also  exist 
in  some  sense  independently ;  although  in  that  condition  of  existence  it  is  by 
no  means  apprehensible  by  our  senses.  It  is  dependent  on  matter  for  its 
phenomenal  appearance — for  its  manifestation  to  us  here  and  now,  and  for  all 
its  terrestrial  activities ;  but  otherwise,  I  conceive  that  it  is  independent  of 
matter.  I  argue  that  its  essential  existence  is  continuous  and  permanent, 
though  its  interactions  with  matter  are  discontinuous  and  temporary."  Further 
(p.  19) :  "  I  am  using  the  word  '  life '  in  quite  a  general  sense,  as  is  obvious,  for 
if  it  be  limited  to  certain  metabolic  processes  in  protoplasm — which  is  the 
narrowest  of  its  legitimate  meanings — what  I  have  said  about  its  possible 
existence  apart  from  matter  would  be  absurd.  It  may  be  convenient  to  employ 
the  word  '  vitality '  for  this  limited  sense." 

t  See  Boelitz,  Die  Lehre  von  Zufall  bei  E.  Boutroux,  1907,  p.  91. 

}  See  L'6volut.  creatrice,  1907,  p.  59 :  Le  pur  mecanisme  serait  done  refu- 
table et  lafinalite,  au  tens  special  oil,  nous  Ventendons,  demontrable  par  un  certain 
cote,  si  Von  pouvait  etablir  que  la  vie  fabrique  certains  apparcils  identiques,  par 
des  moyens  dissemblables,  sur  des  lignes  devolution  divergentes.  La  force  de  la 
preuve  serait  d'ailleurs  proportioned  au  degrA  d'ecartement  des  lignes  devolution 
choisies,  et  au  degre  de  complexity  des  structures  similaires  qu'on  trouverait  sur 
elles.  W.  Boux,  in  particular,  shows  how  even  from  the  standpoint  of  a  finer 
mechanism  (but  one  readily  recognising  deeper  problems)  a  specific  character 
may  be  attributed  to  life.  He  regards  "  the  self-regulation  in  the  performance 
of  all  separate  functions  necessary  to  persistence  amidst  the  alterations  of 
circumstance  "  as  a  universal  elementary  property  of  living  beings ;  in  this 
regulation  he  sees  "  that  property  which  above  all  others  distinguishes 
living  beings  from  all  other  natural  bodies,  since  it  effects  the  direct  accom- 
modation to  changing  outward  circumstances.  We  may  safely  conclude 
from  the  immeasurably  long  duration  of  the  unicellular  organisms,  which  has 
produced  countless  generations  of  the  same  type  in  spite  of  the  alteration  of 
outward  circumstances,  that  even  the  lowest  forms  of  life  possess  this  self- 
regulating  capacity,  apart  from  inheritance."  (See  Archiv  filr  Entwicklungs- 
mechanik  der  Organismen,  vol.  xxiv..  no.  4  (1907).  p.  685.) 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  187 

in  their  treatment  of  these  problems.  Very  noteworthy  is  the 
"  part  played  by  the  principle  of  discontinuity  in  the  most  recent 
French  thought  "  (see  H.  Hoffding,  Moderne  Philosophen  (1905), 
p.  67).  With  regard  to  this  school  and  its  motives  we  cannot 
do  better  than  quote  Hoffding' s  words  (ibid.  p.  82  ff.) : — 

"In  French  philosophical  literature  the  philosophy  of  dis- 
continuity has  come  to  the  front  in  a  peculiarly  interesting  and 
energetic  fashion.  There  are  three  different  factors  which  are 
of  decisive  importance  for  the  philosophy  of  discontinuity.  In 
the  first  place,  experience  exhibits  differences  of  quality  which 
neither  speculation  nor  the  theory  of  evolution  has  succeeded  in 
reducing.  We  may  here  note  that  Comte's  positivism  expressly 
recognised  the  gap  which  separated  the  different  departments  of 
nature  from  one  another :  for  Comte  each  new  science  signified 
a  special,  irreducible  group  of  phenomena.  In  the  second  place, 
even  in  each  particular  group  of  phenomena,  the  law  of  causality 
is  not  able  to  find  more  than  a  partial  corroboration.  Hence 
Hume  is  again  appealed  to,  and  his  empiricism  is  set  up  against 
the  attempt  of  Kant  and  the  evolutionists  to  overcome  it. 
Finally,  attention  is  drawn  to  the  consciousness  of  initiative,  the 
capacity,  through  thought  and  action,  to  place  something  new  in 
the  world,  and  great  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the  moral  importance 
of  this  capacity."  * 

In  the  case  of  such  a  mode  of  thought  as  this  there  can  be  no 
inclination  to  refer  the  characteristic  phenomena  of  life  back  to 
sub-vital  forces ;  on  the  contrary,  any  such  attempt  at  mechanical 
explanation  will  be  severely  criticised.  The  mechanical  theory 
seems  to  make  the  mistake  of  treating  the  world  as  a  given  and 
final  system,  not  as  something  in  process  of  development.  Hence 
it  denies  all  movement  derived  from  within  as  well  as  all  possi- 
bility of  essential  progress,  t  refuses  to  attribute  to  combinations 
of  elements  anything  beyond  what  is  due  to  each  indivi- 

*  The  most  prominent  protagonists  of  this  philosophy  of  discontinuity  are 
Eenouvier  (d.  1903)  and  E.  Boutroux,  whose  work  De  Videe  de  la  loi  naturelle 
dans  la  science  et  dans  la  philosophic  contemporaine  (1895)  was  published  in 
Germany  in  1907 ;  trans,  by  Benrubi. 

t  See  Bergson,  Uevolut.  creatrice  (p.  40) :  L'estence  de»  explications  meca- 
niques  est  en  eff'et  de  consider  er  I'avenir  et  le  passe  comme  calculables  enjonction 
du  present,  et  de  pretendre  ainsi  que  tout  est  donne. 


188    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

dually,*  credits  the  separate  elements,  as  a  rule,  with  every- 
thing which  they  exhibit  when  associated  together,  t  and  does 
not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  the  manner  in  which  a  more  exact 
knowledge  of  vital  processes  increasingly  does  away  with  the 
supposed  isolation  of  the  elements.  I 

This  direction  of  attention  towards  life  and  its  progressive 
movement  causes  the  idea  of  design  also  to  appear  in  a  new 
light.  The  complete  rejection  of  design  in  nature  was  rooted  in 
the  tendency,  so  long  dominant,  not  to  regard  life  as  an  original 
and  fundamental  phenomenon,  hut  to  deduce  it  from  the  lifeless 
— in  direct  opposition  to  the  older  mode  of  thought,  which  ex- 
plained the  whole  content  of  nature  hy  reference  to  the  living. 
In  a  certain  reaction  towards  the  latter  position,  or  rather 
towards  a  less  crude  variety  of  it,  emphasis  is  again  laid  upon 
certain  facts  which  seem  to  indicate  a  direction  of  the  life- 
movement  towards  a  goal  which  has  yet  to  he  attained,  a  Ziel- 
strebigkeit  (directivity)  (K.  E.  von  Baer),  together  with  an 
endeavour  on  the  part  of  separate  elements  to  join  together  to 
form  a  whole.  The  difficulty  of  making  this  in  any  way  com- 
prehensible without  introducing  into  the  sphere  of  nature  the 
human  propensity  to  weigh  and  deliberate  was  already  keenly 
felt  by  Aristotle :  §  to  us  moderns  the  difficulty  must  appear 

*  See  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter :  "  One  frequently  hears  it  said  that  whatever 
properties  are  to  be  found  in  the  whole  are  also  to  be  found  in  the  parts.  This 
is  incorrect.  An  aggregate  of  atoms  may  possess  properties  which  are  not 
attributes  of  the  separate  atom,  even  in  the  slightest  degree." 

f  See  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter :  "  In  this  case  that  which  has  to  be  explained 
is  simply  accepted  as  it  stands  and  straightway  attributed  to  the  atoms,  in  the 
hope  of  thus  bringing  the  matter  to  an  end."  Bergson,  L'dvolut.  creatrice,  vi., 
finds  the  error  of  Spencer's  evolutionism  in  that  it  endeavours  a  decouper  la 
realite  actuelle,  dejd  evolu6e,  en  petits  morceaux  non  mains  lvalue's,  puis  a  la 
recomposer  avec  ces  fragments,  et  a  se  donner  ainsi,  var  avance,  tout  ce  qu'il 
s'agit  d'expliquer. 

J  See  Bergson,  L'tvolut.  creatrice  (p.  205) :  Plus  la  physique  avance,  plus  elle 
efface  d'ailleurs  I' individuality  des  corps  et  meme  des  particules  en  lesquelles 
I'imagination  scientifique  commengait  par  les  decomposer;  corps  et  corpuscules 
tendent  a  se  fondre  dans  une  interaction  universelle. 

§  See,  for  example,  Phys.  199  a,  17 :  «  oZv  rd  Kara  rrjv  rtyvriv  eveicd  rov, 
SffXov  art  icai  rd  Kara.  ri\v  (pvffiv.  opoititg  yap  fyti  irpoQ  a\A»)\a  iv  rolg  Kara 
r'i.-xyi}v  Kal  iv  role  Kara  (ftvaiv  ra  v<rrepa  irpog  rd  irporepa.  fidXirrra  St  <j>avtpbv 
tTTi  rStv  Ziliuiv  rGrv  d\\wv,  a  ovre  rk\vg  ovre  Zqrfiffavra  ovre  /3ov\£v<rdp.fva  TroteT. 
'69ev  Stairopovffi  rivet;  irorepov  v<ji  fi  nvt  dAAy  ipyd£ovrai  o'i  r'apd^vai  KOI  oi 
Kal  rd  roiavra. 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  189 

still  greater.  But  no  difficulties,  however  great,  should  induce 
us  to  neglect  or  set  aside  definite  groups  of  fact  because  they 
do  not  chance  to  fit  into  the  mechanical  system.  After  all, 
theories  must  be  made  to  fit  facts  and  not  facts  to  fit  theories ! 
The  main  objection  that  is  raised  against  vitalism  and 
teleology,  even  in  its  more  recent  forms,  is  that  the  formative 
principle  which  is  here  put  forward  explains  "  simply  every- 
thing, and  that  in  the  same  way,"  without  enabling  us  to  find  out 
anything  about  the  necessarily  different  determining  factors 
and  their  modes  of  producing  the  various  purposive  structures. 
(See  W.  Roux  in  the  Archiv  fur  Entwicklungsmechanik  der 
Organismen,  vol.  xxvi.,  no.  4  (1907),  p.  687).  Following  up 
this  line  of  argument  Roux  (who  by  no  means  denies  "  ever- 
present  ultimate  problems")  says:  "Nothing  could  be  easier 
than  to  deduce  purposive  phenomena  from  a  real  purposeful 
agent.  This  last  supposition  will  still  remain  open  to  us  when 
the  other  has  been  proved  to  be  really  inadequate :  but  at  the 
present  time,  only  just  after  the  commencement  of  exact  causal 
investigation,  this  inadequacy  may  very  well  appear  to  be 
present,  and  that  in  many  directions,  and  yet  we  may  be  quite 
unable  to  prove  that  it  is  so.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  very  diffi- 
cult to  deduce  such  '  apparently  purposive  phenomena  '  from 
non-purposeful  agents.  The  first  solution,  however,  leaves 
unknown  all  the  different  types  of  determination  which  charac- 
terise the  different  cases,  transferring  them  all,  as  it  does,  to  a 
principle  whose  modes  of  operation  remain  wholly  obscure. 
And  yet  we  would  investigate  these  '  determining  factors ' 
also,  together  with  their  modes  of  operation.  Common  to  us 
both  is  the  investigation  of  the  physico-chemical  factors  in- 
volved in  the  carrying  out  of  determined  processes,  for  our 
opponents,  too,  admit  that  that  which  is  '  determined ' 
through  psychical  action  is  carried  out  by  means  of  physical 
factors  "  (p.  688).  Thus  the  matter  remains  in  a  state  of  flux  ; 
but  through  the  unrest  of  conflict  we  may  safely  hope  for  the 
progress  of  knowledge. 

8.  THE  PKOBLEM  IN  THE  SOCIAL  SPHERE 

It  is  not  difficult  to  show  that  the  mechanical  theory  does  not 
suffice  for  the  understanding  of  social  life ;    as  in  the  case  of 


190    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

nature,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  formulate  the  counter-theory 
in  definite  terms.  If  we  start  from  mere  isolated  statements 
it  is  quite  impossible  to  make  comprehensible  any  sort  of  in- 
terest in  the  whole,  any  sort  of  immanence  of  the  whole  within 
the  parts ;  any  elevation,  nobility,  and  independence  displayed 
by  the  whole  (as,  for  example,  by  the  State),  or  any  kind  of 
spiritual  character  which  we  may  ascribe  to  the  whole.*  The 
mechanical  theory  is  bound  to  convert  the  community  into  a 
soulless  maze  of  wheelwork,  in  which  each  unit  goes  its  own 
exclusive  round.  On  such  terms  a  common  thought-world 
would  be  impossible.  The  idea  of  justice,  to  which  the  up- 
holders of  the  mechanical  theory  are  especially  wont  to  appeal, 
is  not  to  be  explained  from  this  point  of  view,  from  which  it  can 
be  regarded  only  as  a  mystical  product.  For  the  conception  of 
justice  never  develops  from  the  basis  of  natural  individuality; 
but  only  from  that  of  rational  being,  and  such  is  not  possible 
without  a  foundation  in  a  world  of  reason.  Justice  can  appear 
to  be  derived  from  the  mere  individual  only  when  in  the  process 
the  rational  spiritual  being  is  surreptitiously  substituted  for  the 
isolated  natural  being.  So  it  was  more  particularly  in  the  case  of 
the  English  Enlightenment.  The  political  and  economical  systems 
of  Locke  and  Adam  Smith  contain  a  thoroughgoing  contradic- 
tion :  they  work  with  natural  units  and  treat  them  like  rational 
units.  To  recognise  this  confusion  is  to  become  aware  of  the 
inadequacy  of  this  whole  philosophical  movement. 

But  this  negation  does  not  bring  an  affirmation  with  it.  To 
reject  the  mechanical  doctrine  does  not  mean  to  accept  the 
organic.  The  concept  of  the  organic  has  come  to  us  from  an 
older  culture  of  a  different  type ;  it  bears  the  stamp  of  the 
ancient  social  doctrine  and  view  of  the  world  in  general.  The 
champions  of  the  organic  doctrine  would  like  to  free  it  from 
these  associations;  they  can  point  to  the  fact  that  we  often 
employ  concepts  which  have  been  developed,  in  the  course  of 
history,  far  beyond  the  narrowness  of  their  original  significance. 
But  in  such  questions  everything  depends  on  the  special  nature 
of  the  case.  Now,  it  seems  to  us  that,  in  the  case  referred  to, 

*  This  has  recently  been  set  forth  in  brilliant  fashion  by  Gierke ;  see  Dot 
Weten  der  Verbttnde,  Eektoratsrede  ;  Berlin,  1902. 


MECHANICAL— ORGANIC  191 

the  original  meaning  is  so  firmly  attached  to  the  concept  that  it 
cannot  but  draw  the  thought  hack  to  the  older  interpretation. 
The  application  of  the  concept  organism  to  the  social  sphere 
is  in  the  first  instance  a  mere  analogy :  although  certain  resem- 
blances exist  between  an  organic  being  and  a  social  order,  it  is 
very  well  open  to  doubt  whether  these  touch  their  really  essen- 
tial and  characteristically  spiritual  qualities.  In  the  first  place 
this  mode  of  explanation  makes  an  appeal  to  the  structure  of 
the  living  being,  and  this  itself  is  a  difficult  problem,  one  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  has  now  again  become  an  object  of  the  severest 
conflict.  With  regard  to  its  philosophical  definitions  as  given 
by  Aristotle,  and,  we  may  add,  by  Kant  and  his  successors, 
Lotze  observed  with  justice  that  they  do  not  so  much  contain 
an  explanation  as  reproduce  the  enigmatic  character  of  the 
impression.  In  the  case  of  the  concept  of  the  organic,  nature 
does  not,  as  we  might  imagine,  offer  us  the  subject  matter,  in 
a  certain  and  fixed  form,  but  we  project  a  characteristic  method 
of  viewing  the  matter  from  ourselves  into  nature,  and  this, 
decked  out  now  in  intuitive  bodily  form,  is  once  more  trans- 
mitted to  the  mind.  Why  this  detour?  Does  it  not  involve 
the  danger  of  an  influx  of  natural  elements  into  the  spiritual 
life,  or  at  any  rate  the  substitution  of  a  mere  metaphor  for  an 
explanation  ? 

The  chief  objection,  however,  is  the  tenacious  continuance  of 
the  Grseco-mediseval  mode  of  thought  in  this  concept;  it 
threatens  to  confine  the  indispensable  element  in  the  idea  to 
a  stage  which  has  been  inwardly  overcome.  The  ancient 
organic  theory  regarded  the  individual  as  being  in  every 
respect  a  member  of  the  whole ;  in  its  more  precise  form  it 
caused  him  to  be  completely  absorbed  in  his  relationship  to  the 
whole  ;  it  knew  no  kind  of  independence,  no  sort  of  individual 
right  as  against  the  whole.  From  the  very  beginning  this 
depression  of  the  individual  was  possible  only  as  the  result  of 
a  confusion  of  the  State  with  human  society  in  general ;  what- 
ever social  life  might  mean  to  man,  that  was  claimed  by  the 
State.  Thus  ethics  and  politics,  the  ends  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  social  life,  were  held  to  be  completely  similar. 

In  truth,  this  organic  doctrine  was  not  even  the  true  expres- 


192    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

sion  of  the  life  of  the  State  during  the  golden  age  of  Greek 
civilisation ;  it  was  a  creation  of  the  philosophers,  an  endeavour 
to  resist  the  commencing  dissolution  of  life  into  innumerable 
individual  centres ;  it  was  an  attempt  to  effect  a  restoration— 
futile,  like  all  such  attempts.  Nay,  the  philosophers  themselves 
did  more  than  any  one  else  to  make  their  demand  impossible, 
since  they  made  a  special  point  of  raising  man  above  the  merely 
social  sphere  by  opening  up  a  new  ideal  of  life,  that  of  scientific 
research.  The  very  same  Aristotle  who  explained  the  State  to 
be  prior  (that  is  conceptually  prior)  to  man  saw  true  happiness 
and  blessedness  only  in  the  theoretical  life,  with  its  concentra- 
tion upon  the  great  universe.  And  in  so  doing  he  merely 
formulated  the  thoroughgoing  conviction  of  the  whole  Greek 
philosophy,  one  of  the  chief  achievements  of  which  was  the 
liberation  of  the  individual  from  his  social  environment.  The 
organic  doctrine  reached  its  zenith  during  the  Middle  Ages. 
In  the  shape  of  the  Church  the  social  whole  became  absolutely 
superior  to  the  individual ;  it  set  up  the  claim  to  communicate 
all  spirituality  to  man;  the  importance  of  the  individual  was 
measured  entirely  according  to  his  position  in  the  whole;  the 
whole  became  the  conscience  of  humanity.  The  economic 
arrangement  of  the  Middle  Ages,  too,  constituted  an  ordered 
system  which  from  a  position  of  secure  superiority  assigned 
the  individual  his  place.  The  whole  thought-world  was  indeed 
hierarchical  in  form,  since  the  separate  spheres  had  their  guid- 
ing lines  prescribed  according  to  certain  central  truths  of  religion 
and  metaphysics,  and  these  lines  were  merely  to  be  pursued, 
but  neither  examined  nor  altered.  For  this  condition  the  idea 
and  expression  "  organic  "  may  seem  appropriate. 

Nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  the  Modern  World  than  the 
liberation  of  life  from  such  attachment  to  a  visible  central  point 
and  its  uniform  distribution  over  the  whole  surface  of  existence. 
The  individual  now  became  spiritually  and  socially  independent, 
and  each  separate  sphere  of  life  set  out  to  deal  independently 
with  its  own  problems :  each  desired,  too,  to  fight  for  the  whole 
from  its  own  individual  standpoint.  To  those  who  are  accus- 
tomed to  the  mediaeval  mode  of  thought  this  must  seem  an 
audacious  departure  from  principle,  a  self-willed  dissolution  of 


MECHANICAL- ORGANIC  193 

every  relationship,  just  as  it  is  usually  very  difficult  even  for 
free  Catholics,  with  universal  sympathies,  to  recognise  the 
specific  nature  and  rights  of  Protestantism.  In  realitv  this 
departure  from  the  mediaeval  ideal  does  not  mean  the  abandon- 
ment of  all,  but  only  of  visible  relationships ;  the  greatness  of 
the  Modern  World  lies  in  the  development  and  defence  of  the 
conviction  that  the  spiritual  life  as  a  whole  is  present  at  each 
separate  point  and  may  there  be  brought  to  full  activity ;  thus 
man  does  not  need  to  receive  his  relationships  first  from  without, 
they  spring  from  within  and  spiritually  encircle  his  life ;  it  is 
precisely  through  the  inner  union  which  follows  upon  their  com- 
plete appropriation  by  the  individual  that  the  latter  wins  a  sure 
superiority  over  every  visible  human  order.  Since  such  union 
can  never  be  enforced  from  without,  but  demands  a  personal 
decision  and  inward  welcome,  it  is  not  in  any  sense  opposed  to 
freedom,  but  is  the  twin-sister  of  freedom.  Moreover,  only 
through  such  a  personal  welcome  can  life  acquire  a  purely 
inward  character ;  it  unavoidably  retains  an  element  of  outward- 
ness and  superficiality  so  long  as  the  individual  belongs,  in  the 
first  instance,  to  a  visible  order.  Personalities  like  Luther  and 
Kant  illustrate  clearly  enough  to  what  an  extent  this  revolution, 
this  transition  from  a  visible  to  an  invisible  whole,  this  chance 
and  this  call  to  awaken  at  every  point  an  absolute  and  infinite 
life  transforms  for  man  the  aspect  of  reality. 

This  transformation,  however,  involves  a  breach  with  the 
organic  doctrine.  The  latter  must  now  be  felt  as  too  narrow 
and  confining.  Man  is  not  absorbed  in  his  relation  to  his 
social  environment,  still  less  in  his  relation  to  the  political  com- 
munity. Moreover,  the  spiritual  character  of  the  whole  which 
surrounds  us  is  not  that  of  a  fixed  possession  secure  from  all 
danger,  a  possession  which  the  individual  can  draw  upon  without 
trouble ;  the  truth  is  rather  that  that  whole  body  of  common 
ideas,  institutions,  &c.,  which  has  been  developed  in  the  course 
of  our  social  and  historical  life  loses  its  spiritual  character  at 
once  if  it  be  not  continually  filled  with  new  life  through  the 
work  of  individuals,  more  particularly  of  great  personalities.  In 
the  social  whole,  as  elsewhere,  spirituality  does  not  maintain 
itself  by  virtue  of  its  mere  existence,  but  only  through  a  con- 

13 


194:  MAIN  CURRENTS  OP  MODERN  THOUGHT 

tinual  renewal,  an  unceasing  creation.  The  chief  danger  of  the 
organic  doctrine  appears  to  us  to  be  that  it  regards  as  once  for 
all  present  what  must  be  continually  produced  afresh  by  free 
action.  In  contrast  to  naturalism,  it  aims  at  giving  social  life 
an  ethical  character,  but  at  the  same  time  it  does  not  avoid  the 
danger  of  conceiving  the  ethical  itself  as  a  thing  at  rest,  thereby 
treating  it  as  though  it  had  a  natural  origin.  This  is  the  same 
danger  to  which  Komanticism  has  so  often  succumbed  :  the  reac- 
tion against  mere  reflection  leads  men  into  the  power  of  natural 
categories.  But  why  should  we  link  the  indispensable  truth  to 
such  a  problematical  form?  Why  not  seek  for  the  character- 
istic nature  of  spiritual  relationships  forms  which  answer  to 
the  requirements  of  our  modern  life  ? 


3.  LAW 

(a)  Historical 

TO-DAY,  the  concept  of  law  holds  a  central  place  in  science  ;  its 
extent  and  content  are  alike  matters  of  dispute :  now  one 
definition  finds  favour  and  now  another.  The  settlement,  in  this 
connection,  of  the  rival  claims  of  natural  and  mental  science 
gives  rise  to  particularly  vehement  discussion.  The  struggle  is 
concerned  with  nothing  less  than  the  characteristic  nature  of 
the  individual  sciences  and  the  character  of  scientific  work  as 
a  whole.  We  thus  find  ourselves  face  to  face  with  a  simply 
immeasurable  wealth  of  problems.  Within  the  limits  of  the 
present  study  it  will  hardly  be  possible  to  contribute  towards  the 
solution  of  these  problems,  but  we  will  endeavour  to  indicate 
their  nature. 

The  concept  of  law  has  passed  from  the  domain  of  man  to 
that  of  nature,  and  here  receiving  a  new  form,  has  returned 
with  it  to  man,  thereby  throwing  a  new  light  upon  his  life 
and  conduct.  This  is  a  striking  example  of  the  manner 
in  which  man  projects  his  own  image  into  the  cosmos  and 
receives  it  back  again,  enlarged  and  transformed.  From  one 
point  of  view  this  appears  a  mere  circle,  an  anthropomorphic 
process.  From  another  there  seems  a  prospect  of  an  inner 
enlargement  of  man  as  a  result  of  this  self-projection  and 
re-assimilation. 

The  concept  of  law  did  not  become  central  for  science 
nntil  the  Modern  Period,  but  noteworthy  commencements  are 
to  be  found  so  far  back  as  the  Classical  Age.  At  first, 
the  expression  natural  law  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
outer  world  but  referred  to  man's  own  nature ;  it  stood  for 

196 


196    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  unwritten  law  in  contrast  to  the  written.*  Plato  and 
Aristotle  only  very  occasionally  use  the  term  for  nature  in 
the  sense  of  the  outer  world,  and  even  then  they  do  not  use 
it  in  a  definite  technical  sense  ;  t  it  is  more  customary  for 
them  to  use  other  expressions  for  the  concept.  I  The  Stoics 
were  the  first  to  make  frequent  use  of  the  term  natural  law,  to 
which  they  were  led  through  the  medium  of  religious  ideas  ; 
"  It  was  the  concept  of  divine  law  that  first  led  to  that  of  natural 
law"  (Zeller).  It  was  easy  for  the  Stoics  to  look  upon  the  law 

*  For  the  historical  origin  of  the  term  natural  law  see  E.  Zeller,  Ueber  Begriff 
u.  BegrUndung  der  sittlichen  Gesetze,  1883  (Abh,  der  K.  Pr.  Akad.  d.  W.).  The 
subject  has  been  treated  with  peculiar  care  and  thoroughness  by  B.  Hirzel; 
dypaQos  vopoe  (Abh.  der  philologisch-histor.  Klasse  der  K.  Sachs.  Getell- 
schaft  der  Wissenschaften,  vol.  20).  According  to  Hirzel,  aypafyog  vopog  first 
meant  traditional  manners  and  customs,  and  this  meaning  was  retained 
throughout  the  whole  of  Antiquity.  Along  with  this  there  grew  up  (dating 
from  Thucydides)  the  other  meaning  of  the  divine  law  written  in  the  heart. 
The  following  quotation  may  be  taken  from  p.  40  (referring  to  the  revision  and 
reform  of  the  laws  of  Solon  as  carried  out  by  Kleisthenes)  :  "  Since  this  reform 
was  achieved  by  the  power  of  the  people  it  served  their  aims  and  purposes,  and 
we  can  understand  how  it  came  about  that  from  this  time  on  the  democracy  of 
Athens  regarded  their  laws  as  the  bulwark  of  the  young  Athenian  State.  This 
was  the  beginning  of  the  cult  of  the  law  and  its  name.  The  great  deeds  and 
victorious  conclusion  of  the  Persian  war  served  as  a  consecration."  On  p.  50  : 
"  It  is  more  probable  that  the  name  (aypa<f>os  va/ioc)  first  arose  in  contrast 
with  ytypaju/wvoc  \6yoe,  and  it  is  certain  that  it  first  derived  its  more  definite 
meaning  as  the  result  of  this  contrast."  As  to  the  contrast  between  j>6/zor 
and  <j>i>iTi(;,  see  ibid.,  p.  82  ff.,  and  further,  the  even  more  careful  investi- 
gation in  Themis,  Dike  u.  Verwandtes,  pp.  386-411. 

The  only  places  are  Plato,  Tirruzus,  83  E  :  Kai  ravra  fifv  Srj  iravra  voouv 
opyava  yeyovtv,  orav  alpa  pri  fK  rSiv  airiuv  Kai  iroriav  ir\i)0vffy  Kara  <j>vaiv,  d\\' 
i£  svavriwv  TOV  oyKov  irapd  TOVQ  TIJS  <j>vffet*>£  Xafiftdvy  j/o/xowg.  Arist.,  De  Ccelo, 
268  a,  10  ff.:  Ka9dire.p  yap  <f>aot  Kai  ol  Hv9ay6peioi,  TO  irav  Kai  TO,  irdvra  rolg 
rpifflv  tipiffiai.  TtXevrri  yap  Kai  ptaov  Kai  dpxn  rbv  dpidfjibv  ?x£t  1"°"  iravros, 
ravra  Sf  TOV  Ttjg  rpidSoc.  Siii  irapa  rrja  <f>vatuc;  tlXrjQores  tiffTrtp  vofiovg  ewt'i/JjCi 
Kai  irpog  TOQ,  dyiffreiag  ^pcu^cda  rStv  Otwv  r<#  dpi9[itj>  rovry.  How  vojuof,  with 
the  philosophers,  easily  came  to  mean  something  like  an  artificial  preparation, 
over  against  the  real  essence,  is  shown,  for  example,  in  Aristotle,  Phys.,  193  a,  14  : 
OVK  av  yevlffflai  xXivriv  dXAd  %v\ov,  ug  TO  piv  Kara  <n;/t/3£/3»j(c6c  VTrdp^ov,  ri\v 
Kara  vop.ov  StdOtoiv  Kai  Tt\vt)r,  rfjv  o'  oiiaiav  ofoav  fKtivqv,  fj  Kai  Siapivti  iravra 


I  More  particularly  dvdyKr)  (usually  in  the  plural),  which  occurs  not  in- 
frequently in  the  most  ancient  medical  literature  and  in  Democritus,  Xenophon 
(for  example,  Memor.,  I.  i.  11),  Plato  (for  example,  The  Laws,  967  A)  and 
Aristotle.  The  concept  of  natural  law  probably  arose  in  Greek  science  in  con- 
nection with  astronomy  and  medicine. 


LAW  197 

founded  by  God  as  being  at  the  same  time  a  specific  order  in  the 
things  themselves,  because  their  conception  of  God  was  that  of 
reason  dwelling  in  the  world  rather  than  that  of  an  external 
power.  The  term  soon  passed  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Stoic 
school.  Among  the  Romans  it  was  frequently  employed  in  the 
same  sense  by  their  first  philosopher,  Lucretius  (fcedera,  fcedus, 
leges  natures}.  The  adoption  of  the  term  helped  to  further  the 
then  customary  personification  of  nature  as  a  whole,  since  the 
regularity  of  its  operation  was  regarded  as  the  expression  of  an 
ordering  will.  The  concept  of  natural  law  did  not  exert  a  deep 
influence  upon  the  scientific  work  of  Antiquity,  more  especially 
owing  to  the  predominance  of  an  artistic  and  teleological  con- 
ception of  nature  which  did  not  conduce  to  a  splitting-up  into 
elementary  processes  and  the  discovery  of  their  regularities. 
The  fathers  of  the  Church  took  up  the  term  and  strengthened  its 
religious  significance.  Augustine's  view  of  natural  laws  was 
that  they  were  mere  habits  of  divine  conduct,  habits  which, 
granted  an  object  for  so  doing,  might  be  abandoned  at  any 
moment.  There  was  therefore  no  conflict  between  miracles  and 
natural  laws.  During  the  Middle  Ages  the  expression  sank 
very  much  into  the  background.  Lex  naturcB  then  denoted  the 
inner  moral  law,  not  the  order  of  the  external  world.*  With 
the  advent  of  the  Modern  World  the  concept  of  natural  law 
leapt  all  the  more  quickly  into  prominence  on  account  of  its  long 
neglect.  Scarcely  any  other  concept  so  exactly  expresses  the 
self-conscious  individuality  and  characteristic  nature  of  the 
Modern  Period.  The  general  tendency  of  thought  at  this  time 
and  the  more  specific  movement  of  industry  lent  each  other 
mutual  support.  Natural  law  as  an  order  of  what  does  and  not 

*  The  expression  leget  naturce  had  become  so  unfamiliar  that  the  early  En- 
lightenment considered  it  necessary  to  defend  and  justify  it.  For  example,  B. 
Claubergsays  (op.  omn.  103) :  Ett  qui  hie  nodumin  tcirpo  quarat,  quod  leges  sint 
tantum  causes  morales,  qua  imperant,  non  efficiunt,  qua  materice,  utpote  rationit 
experti,  ferri  non  possunt.  Cauta  autem  hujus  appellationis  (Naturce  legum) 
ett  in  propatulo.  Qucemadmodum  enim  rebus  ratione  praditis  Deus  legts  imposuit 
morales,  quas  abservando  bene  agunt,  transgrediendo  peccant,  ita  voluit  res  ow.net 
naturales  certo  semper  ordine,  certis  legibui  moveri  ac  quiescere,qua»  quidem  leget 
ipsa  ilia  ret,  utpote  causa  necessaries,  non  possunt  non  observare.  Here  again  we 
have  a  clear  revelation  of  the  important  part  played  by  religious  modes  ol 
thought  in  forming  and  applying  the  concept 


198     MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  what,  should  happen,  as  the  expression  of  the  simple  modes 
of  action  of  the  elements,  enlisted  the  full  sympathy  of  the  age ; 
and  this  because  it  promised  to  make  reality  comprehensible  not 
in  the  light  of  some  other  world  but  according  to  its  own  nature, 
and  because  it  appeared  to  reveal  this  nature  as  it  is  in  itself, 
free  from  all  human  addition  or  interpolation.  Following  upon 
this  came  the  effort,  so  characteristic  of  modern  science,  to 
obtain  a  new  and  exact  understanding  of  nature  by  splitting-up 
reality  into  its  smallest  elements,  and  explaining  it  on  this 
basis ;  whence  a  complete  reversal  of  our  whole  conception 
of  the  world,  a  reversal  in  three  chief  stages :  analysis, 
law,  and  development.  Law  with  its  revelation  of  the  simple 
modes  of  action  of  the  elements  constitutes  the  backbone 
of  the  whole ;  it  alone  makes  precise  knowledge  possible 
and  prepares  the  way  for  a  complete  subjection  of  reality  to 
thought.  This  method  of  referring  nature  back  to  simple 
processes  not  only  seemed  to  explain  things  but  also  opened  up 
the  possibility  of  making  new  combinations  of  elements  in  the 
service  of  human  ends.  Law  is  the  point  at  which  the 
endeavour  to  secure  the  closest  possible  combination  of  theory 
and  practice  (a  tendency  inherent  in  modern  research  from  the 
beginning)  becomes  converted  into  effective  work.  In  this  case 
the  goal  of  knowledge  is  the  starting-point  of  action.  The 
growth  of  technics  from  a  mere  collection  of  isolated  and 
accidental  discoveries  to  an  independent  power  taking  in  the 
whole  field  of  life  has  been  brought  about  only  by  the  aid  of 
laws.  Thus  we  see  laws  standing  at  the  very  centre  of  spiritual 
work.  They  form  the  clearest  expression  of  the  modern  desire 
for  an  explanation  which  proceeds  from  the  inward  nature  of 
things,  for  precise  and  analytical  comprehension  and  for  a  more 
active  relationship  between  man  and  his  natural  environment. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  law,  in  its  new  meaning,  was  a 
difficult  problem  and  full  of  the  most  varied  complications.  In 
the  search  for  laws,  experience  and  reason  embrace  each  other. 
Uniformities  are  discovered,  and  a  great  joy  results  when  what 
is  at  first  a  wild  confusion  reveals,  on  closer  study,  an  ordered 
disposition.  But  man  does  not  remain  content  with  the  mere 
cataloguing  of  more  or  less  intricate  facts,  he  wants  to  analyse 


LAW  199 

these  and  reduce  them  to  simple,  ultimate,  universal  elements, 
at  the  same  time  attaining  to  a  causal  connection  instead  of  a 
mere  sequence  and  juxtaposition.  The  aim  is  to  proceed  from 
the  empirical  to  the  rational,  from  descriptive  to  explanatory 
laws,  necessary  and  universally  valid.  Only  such  rational  laws 
may  claim  a  right  to  exclusive  authority ;  they  can  admit  no 
exceptions,  hence  no  miracles.  They  will  aim  at  the  greatest 
possible  simplicity  and  will  try  to  represent  all  variety  as  the 
expression  of  a  universal  mode  of  action.  Further,  these  laws 
will  require  a  precise  form  of  expression,  a  definite  formula, 
because  this  alone  can  ensure  control  over  the  existing  facts. 
This  precise  form  is  given  to  natural  law  more  particularly  by 
mathematics.  Thus  Newton  considered  the  supreme  task  of 
genuine  natural  research  to  consist  in  the  tracing  back  of  natural 
phenomena  to  mathematical  laws,  substantial  forms  and  hidden 
qualities  being  ignored  *  and  Kant  maintained  that  "the  amount 
of  genuine  science  to  be  found  in  any  particular  natural  doctrine 
can  be  measured  by  the  mathemathics  to  be  met  with  in  it " 
(iv.  360,  Hart.).  This  tendency  sets  us  difficult  problems  and 
involves  the  risk  of  many  errors.  Mere  empirical  generalisations 
are  apt  to  be  credited  with  properties  which  belong  only  to  strict 
laws.  Hardly  any  one  has  spoken  so  emphatically  of  the 
universal  validity  and  unchangeability  of  law  as  Comte,  although 
he  himself  insisted  that  law  was  nothing  more  than  a  description 
of  experience.  Moreover,  mere  uniformity  is  easily  mistaken  for 
an  adequate  explanation  ;  the  problem  as  regarded  as  settled 
when  in  reality  it  has  only  been  indicated.  The  concept  of  law 
has  often  had  a  dogmatic  influence,  particularly  in  the  realm 
of  biology,  where  highly  complex  phenomena  have  frequently 
claimed  to  be  rigid  laws  and  insisted  upon  their  rights  as  such. 

In  addition  to  the  difficulties  arising  from  the  application  of 
the  broader  view  of  law  we  have  to  face  complications  resulting 
from  the  more  or  less  concealed  influence  of  the  older  concept, 
with  its  reference  to  a  superior  will.  An  example  of  such 
influence  is  the  action  of  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century 

•  See  the  commencement  of  the  Philosophise  naturalis  principia  mathematica : 
Missis  formis  substantialibus  et  qualitatibus  occultis  phenomena  natura  ad  leget 
viathematicas  revocare. 


200    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

thinkers  in  inferring  the  existence  of  a  law-giving  divinity  from 
the  lawfulness  of  nature.  Another  example,  in  a  contrary  sense, 
is  the  pantheistic  treatment  of  laws  as  living  forces  and  their 
establishment  as  objects  of  reverence  in  the  place  of  the  divinity.* 
Law  is  often  looked  upon  as  a  power  superior  to  the  events 
themselves  and  as  determining  their  course.  Here  again  we 
perceive  the  influence  of  the  older  type  of  thought. t  Finally, 
it  may  be  mentioned,  in  the  same  connection,  that  the  more 
audaciously  any  law  or  formula  is  asserted  the  more  readily  it 
finds  acceptance.  It  is  customary  to  examine  facts  before  we 
accept  them ;  but  to  cast  doubts  upon  a  law  is  regarded  as  a 
sin  against  the  spirit  of  science.  Hence  the  authority  which 
law  possesses  as  a  practical  command  transfers  itself  to  the  law 
of  natural  events,  where  it  has  not  the  same  right  ;  we  are, 
moreover,  required  to  at  once  acquiesce  in  the  latter  and  no 
opposition  is  tolerated.  It  was  uncritical  respect  of  this  kind 
that  enabled  the  notorious  "  iron  law  of  wages  "  to  play  the  role 
it  did.  Formulae  can  work  miracles.  How  much  less  influential 
Malthus  would  have  been  if  he  had  not  expressed  his  doctrine 
of  the  increase  of  population  in  the  well-known  mathematical 
formula  !  Even  Pascal  complained,  "  People  love  certainty." 
It  is  only  too  easy,  however,  to  mistake  for  real  certainty  what 
is  merely  self-confident  and  audacious. 

But  however  doubtful  all  this  may  seem,  such  human  errors 
are  the  inevitable  accompaniment  of  every  great  movement  and 
they  must  not  mislead  us  as  to  the  laws  themselves.  Let  us  for 
a  moment  consider  the  intellectual  movement  which  has  been 
called  forth  (and  is  continually  being  called  forth)  by  the  conflict 

*  A  certain  cult  of  natural  law  extends  from  the  time  of  G.  Bruno  right 
through  the  Modern  Period  down  to  the  present  day.  Bruno  sought  for  the 
highest  in  inviolabili  intemerabilique  naturae  lege,  in  bene  ad  eandem  legem 
instituti  animi  religione  (De  universo  et  immenso,  653).  To-day,  the  more 
sceptical  people  grow  towards  religion  the  more  blind  becomes  the  reverence 
they  pay  to  natural  law. 

t  Sigwart  justly  remarks  in  this  connection  (Logik,  II. a  512) :  "  To  speak 
of  natural  laws  as  if  the  mere  formula  exerted  a  magical  power  over  the 
phenomena  and  exacted  something  from  them  which  did  not  follow  of  itself 
from  their  own  nature  is  an  empty  rhetorical  phrase.  Laws  can  never  be  the 
causes  of  actual  occurrences  ;  they  can  only  express  the  regular  manner  in 
which  real  things  behave." 


LAW  201 

which,  in   the   Modern   Period,  has  raged  round  the  problem 
of  law. 

(6)  The  Problem  of  Law  in  the  Modern  World 

The  natural  laws  received  their  characteristic  impress  in  the 
domain  of  inorganic  nature  ;  hence  the  conquering  of  other 
spheres  of  knowledge  by  the  concept  of  law  was  accompanied  by 
a  conveyance  into  those  spheres  of  the  categories  and  methods 
which  originated  in  inorganic  research.  Thus,  sooner  or  later, 
some  notice  had  to  be  taken  of  the  difficulties  and  limitations 
involved  in  the  concept  itself.  In  the  case  of  natural  laws  the 
whole  of  our  attention  is  concentrated  upon  the  form  of  an 
occurrence ;  causes  and  forces  remain  in  the  background.  But 
will  it  always  be  possible  to  keep  them  there,  and  will  not  the 
aspect  of  the  whole  be  changed  if  these  problems  of  cause  and 
force  insist  on  coming  to  the  front  ?  In  dealing  with  laws  we 
split  up  reality  into  numerous  separate  processes  and  put  from 
us  the  thought  of  any  dominating  whole.  But  is  this  procedure 
properly  applicable  to  all  branches  of  investigation  ?  From  the 
point  of  view  of  law,  each  particular  occurrence  simply  forms  a 
special  case  of  a  general  process  ;  all  individuality  is  here 
sacrificed  in  the  interests  of  science.  But  will  the  individual 
always  be  contented  with  such  a  modest  place ;  in  spite  of  all 
attempts  at  reducing  it  to  uniformity,  will  it  not  insist  upon  the 
fact  of  its  own  uniqueness  ?  Finally,  in  the  light  of  law  (more 
particularly  when  it  claims  to  be  explanatory  and  not  merely 
descriptive)  all  occurrence  seems  to  be  completely  determined 
and  unquestionably  established.  There  is  no  room  for  free 
decision,  for  a  choice  between  different  possibilities.  Will  all 
the  various  departments  of  life  be  able  to  accommodate  them- 
selves to  this  restriction  ? 

Problems  thus  crowd  upon  us,  and  running  through  them  all 
we  see  the  problem  of  the  whole,  the  question  how  far  the 
mechanical  concepts  of  nature  are  capable  of  including  the 
whole  of  reality.  The  opposition  to  the  concept  of  law  may 
take  a  sharper  or  a  milder  form ;  either  the  concept  of  law  is 
entirely  rejected  from  a  particular  department  or  it  is  adapted 
to  the  special  needs  of  the  latter  and  no  longer  bears  the 


202    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

interpretation  put  upon  it  by  natural  science.  These  two  forms 
of  interpretation  have  together  produced  a  very  active  movement, 
which  has  contributed  not  a  little  to  throwing  a  clear  light  upon 
the  peculiarities  of  the  separate  departments. 

As  early  as  the  seventeenth  century  the  concept  of  law  began 
to  be  applied  outside  the  sphere  of  nature  ;  in  particular  it 
began  to  be  used  in  psychology.  The  eighteenth  century 
carried  the  movement  further,  developing  and  establishing  its 
influence  within  the  various  departments  of  knowledge,*  but 
the  movement  did  not  reach  its  culmination  until  the  second 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Many  factors  worked  together  at  this  time  to  place  law  in  the 
centre  of  scientific  work.  The  most  important  of  these  was  the 
growing  independence  of  the  separate  sciences.  Henceforth, 
the  less  willing  a  science  was  to  borrow  laws  and  principles 
from  philosophy,  the  more  determined  it  must  be  to  find 
thoroughgoing  concepts  and  definite  relationships  within  its  own 
department.  Attention  was  accordingly  directed  towards  natural 
laws ;  with  their  help  it  seemed  possible  to  introduce  order  into 
the  immense  mass  of  material  and  to  compare  different  classes 
and  groups  of  occurrences.  The  relationship  between  the  natural 
sciences  and  the  mental  sciences  caused  this  movement  to  de- 
velop a  peculiar  tensity.  The  brilliant  results  obtained  by  the 
natural  sciences  increased  their  power  of  expansion  and  induced 
them  to  aim  at  the  domination  of  the  whole  intellectual  world. 
The  doctrine  of  evolution  (in  particular)  appeared  to  supply  con- 
cepts applicable  to  every  department  of  life ;  hence  the  concepts 
and  mode  of  thought  associated  with  natural  science  make  their 
way  further  and  further  into  other  spheres.  These  are  thereby 
stimulated  to  resistance  and  forced  to  consider  their  own  peculiar 
characteristics,  whence  results  a  vigorous  conflict,  during  the 

*  Montesquieu  advocated  the  concept  of  law  with  peculiar  energy.  At  the 
commencement  of  his  Esprit  des  lois  he  says:  Les  lois,  dans  la  signification 
la  plus  Gtendue,  sont  les  rapports  necessaires  qui  derivent  de  la  nature  des  choses ; 
et  dans  ce  sens  tous  les  etres  ont  leurs  lois ;  la  divinite  a  ses  lois,  les  intelligences 
superieures  a  I'homme  ont  leurs  lois,  les  betes  ont  leurs  lois,  I'homme  a  ses  lois. 
And  a  little  further  on:  II  y  a  done  une  raison  primitive,  et  les  lois  sont  les 
rapports  qui  se  trouvent  entre  elle  et  les  differents  etres,  et  les  rapports  de  ces 
divers  etres  entre  eux. 


LAW  203 

progress  of  which  the  differences  become  more  and  more  con- 
spicuous.* Starting  from  the  inorganic  world,  natural  law,  as 
its  first  task,  had  to  conquer  the  organic  world  :  the  resistance 
which  was  thereby  encountered,  and  the  struggle  which  again 
raged  with  full  force  round  this  question,  have  occupied  us  in  the 
previous  chapter.  Descartes  came  very  near  the  application  of 
natural  law  to  the  soul,  and  Spinoza  carried  it  out  in  a  most 
impressive  fashion :  the  whole  life  of  the  soul  was  now  looked 
upon  as  a  network  of  separate  processes  which  operate  exactly 
after  the  manner  of  mechanical  nature.  According  to  Leibniz, 
each  monad  follows  its  own  laws  :  he  distinguishes  between  the 
"  physico-mechanical  "  laws  of  the  body  and  the  "  ethico-logical " 
laws  of  the  soul  (736  b,  Erdm.).  The  English  were  more  par- 
ticularly concerned  in  discovering  psychological  laws  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term,  such  as  the  laws  of  association.  In  Germany, 
the  movement  advanced  through  Wolff  to  Herbart,  who  wished 
to  introduce  the  mathematical  formula  into  the  inner  life  of  the 
soul.  At  the  same  time  there  was  no  lack  of  thinkers  to  empha- 


*  A  very  clear  picture  of  the  movement  in  the  science  of  language  is  given  by 
B.  Delbruck  in  the  treatise  Das  Wesen  der  Lautgesetze  (Annalen  der  Naturphilo- 
sophie,  i.  277  ff.'.  After  Fr.  Schlegel  and  Bopp  had  already  compared  the 
science  of  language  with  natural  science  (without,  however,  reckoning  the  former 
as  a  natural  science),  Schleicher  carried  the  matter  a  stage  further.  The 
following  will  serve  to  indicate  his  opinion  (Die  Darwinische  Theorie  it.  die 
Sprachwissenschaft,  p.  7) :  "  Languages  are  natural  organisms  which  take 
shape  independently  of  the  will  of  man;  they  grow  and  develop  according 
to  definite  laws,  and  finally  age  and  die.  They,  too,  exhibit  that  series  of 
phenomena  to  which  we  give  the  name  '  life. '  Glossology,  the  science  of 
language,  is  accordingly  a  natural  science.  Its  method,  on  the  whole,  is  the 
same  as  that  of  the  other  natural  sciences."  On  the  other  hand,  as  Delbruck 
explains  in  detail,  other  scholars  (more  especially  Whitney)  have  demonstrated 
that  in  the  case  of  the  origin  and  development  of  languages  we  never  find  laws 
of  life  inherent  in  the  actual  material  of  the  language — in  every  case  only 
human  actions.  As  a  product  of  human  action  and  will  language  is  not  a  natural 
organism  but  an  institution,  one  of  those  institutions  which  constitute  human 
culture.  Hence  the  law  of  language  is  something  different  from  the  law  of 
a  natural  organism.  In  his  investigation  of  the  phonetic  laws,  Delbruck  comes 
to  the  conclusion  that,  however  much  these  are  sui  generis,  no  reason  exists 
why,  on  this  account,  they  should  not  be  called  laws.  "  In  the  case  of  other 
sciences  we  understand  by  laws  simply  those  expressions  of  uniformity  which 
do  not  exhibit  themselves  in  a  pure  form  in  a  given  case,  but  which  would 
always  be  clearly  discernible  (so  we  believe)  in  a  given  case  if  every  external 
disturbing  influence  could  be  removed  "  (p.  308). 


204    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

sise  the  unique  nature  of  the  soul's  life — its  inner  unity,  its 
mobility,  its  individuality,  and  thus  to  set  a  clear  limit  to  the 
establishment  of  laws  in  this  sphere.* 

Of  decisive  importance  for  the  treatment  of  the  inner  world 
and  the  part  laws  play  within  it  is  the  question  whether  or  not 
there  is  recognised  in  spiritual  life  a  new  stage  and  independent 
form  of  reality.  If  such  a  new  stage  be  recognised  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  we  have  to  do  with  something  essentially  different 
from  any  process  following  natural  laws.  Natural  laws  are  the 
forms  of  activity  proper  to  natural  processes,  understood  in  their 
purity;  in  a  plain  and  simple  sense  they  belong  to  the  given 
fact-world.  The  laws  operating  in  the  spiritual  sphere  must  also 
be  rooted  within  some  kind  of  actuality ;  laws  suspended,  so  to 
say,  in  the  air,  isolated  from  facts,  and  yet  exerting  effects,  are 
an  absurdity.!  But  the  spiritual  life,  which  gives  the  indispens- 
able basis,  is  by  no  means  fully  possessed  by  man,  but  (although 
appertaining  to  his  innermost  being)  is  at  the  same  time  a  lofty 
aim,  a  difficult  task — at  once  natural  and  ideal.  Hence  laws 
become  norms  which  meet  with  resistance  and  have  to  overcome 
it;  I  they  are  not  ineffective.  As  we  all  know,  the  nature  of 
the  resistance  and  of  the  life-process  in  general  varies  according 
as  we  are  dealing  with  the  intellectual,  ethical,  or  sesthetical 
sphere,  each  having  its  own  peculiar  characteristics. 

*  Sigwart  (whose  investigations  of  all  these  problems  are  noteworthy  for 
their  clarity  and  penetration)  remarks  with  regard  to  the  laws  of  association 
(Logik,  II.2  553) :  "  The  laws  of  association  do  no  more  than  indicate  par- 
ticular directions  in  which  reproductions  can  take  place  (or  frequently  do  take 
place),  particular  tendencies  in  the  actual  arrangement  of  images  or  words,  &c. ; 
they  have  not  the  capacity  to  represent  laws  from  which  every  actual  series 
of  ideas  could  be  demonstrated  as  necessary." 

t  Husserl  rightly  draws  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  "every  normative  and 
a  fortiori,  every  practical  discipline,  presupposes  as  bases  one  or  more  theo- 
retical disciplines,  in  the  sense,  namely,  that  they  must  possess  a  theoretical 
content  capable  of  being  separated  from  all  *  normation,'  which  has  its  natural 
basis,  as  such,  in  some  kind  of  theoretical  science  (whether  already  defined 
or  yet  to  be  constituted)."  (Logische  Untersuchungen,  i.  47.)  See  also  p.  164 : 
"The  opposite  of  natural  law  (as  the  empirically  grounded  rule  of  an  actual 
being  and  occurrence)  is  not  the  normal  law  (as  regulating  authority)  but 
the  ideal  law,  in  the  sense  of  a  regularity  not  founded  empirically  but  resting 
upon  a  purely  conceptual  basis  (of  ideas,  pure  class-concepts)." 

J  Among  modern  investigations  on  this  subject  we  may  mention  more 
especially  Windelband's  thesis,  Normen  u.  Naturgesetze,  in  the  Prciludien. 


LAW  205 

It  will  be  necessary,  in  passing,  to  devote  a  few  words  to  the 
much-discussed  question  of  the  relationship  between  the  natural 
law  and  the  moral  law.  Kant  was  mainly  responsible  for  bring- 
ing this  problem  to  the  front.  He  lifted  morality  above  all  mere 
psychical  processes,  with  the  result  that  the  moral  law  and  its 
imperative  injunction,  from  having  been  looked  upon  as  a  natural 
law,  took  up  a  position  in  the  sharpest  contrast  to  natural  law. 
Schleiermacher  regarded  this  as  a  onesided  interpretation  of 
morality,  an  interpretation  that  deprived  it  of  a  firm  foundation 
in  human  nature ;  this  impelled  him  to  champion  the  close 
relationship  of  natural  and  moral  law  (see  Werke  zur  Phil.,  ii. 
397-417).  Schleiermacher  carried  this  justifiable  idea  to  a  great 
extreme,  thereby  weakening  the  characteristic  nature  of  morality. 
To  count  morality  as  a  portion  of  man's  nature  is  to  impart  a 
new  meaning  to  the  concept  nature;  it  must  now  be  sharply 
distinguished  from  all  mere  existence ;  so  in  the  end  Kant's 
position  is  seen  to  be  stronger  than  Schleiermacher's.* 

It  was  characteristic  of  ancient  ethics  to  place  natural  and 
moral  law  upon  the  same  level,  but  this  position  is  now  obsolete ; 
it  would  be  impossible,  now,  to  ignore  the  complications  in  the 
relationship  between  man  and  spiritual  life  which  have  been 
revealed  during  the  progress  of  humanity.  Moreover,  it  would 
be  easy  to  show  that  whenever  modern  thinkers  have  conceived 
of  moral  laws  as  being,  in  principle,  natural  laws,  the  develop- 
ment of  their  investigations  has  invariably  compelled  them  to 
recognise  the  existence  of  a  difference.! 

The  socio-historical  method  of  thought  peculiar  to  the  nine- 
teenth century  inevitably  gave  rise  to  the  attempt  to  subject  the 
realms  of  sociology  and  history  to  the  rule  of  fixed  laws.  Modern 

*  With  regard  to  ethics,  Zeller  comes  to  this  final  conclusion  (Ueber  Begriff 
u.  Begrttndung  der  sittlichen  Gesetze  (1883):  "Its  principles  are  not  the 
expression  of  anything  existing  anywhere  as  right  or  customary ;  they  are  the 
norms  for  the  activity  of  the  human  will  which  the  idea  of  man  demands."  See 
also  Siebeck  :  Ueber  das  Verhdltnis  von  Naturgesetz  u.  Sittengesetz  (Philos. 
Monatshefte,  1884,  p.  321  ff.). 

t  Comte  furnishes  a  conspicuous  example.  Although  not  admitting,  in 
principle,  that  laws  were  anything  more  than  descriptions,  the  great  empiricist 
says  with  regard  to  sociology :  Cette  gintralM  empirique,  qui  en  toute  autre 
tcience  pourrait  dtja  avoir  une  valeur  svffisante,  ne  saurait  pleinement  convenir  a 
la  nature  propre  de  la  sociologie.  Cours  dephil.  pos.,  iv.  466.) 


206    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

social  science  or  sociology  is  distinguished  from  all  previous 
attempts  in  the  same  direction,  in  the  first  place  by  its  in- 
sistence upon  precision.  By  dealing  with  large  numbers  the 
accidental  element  attaching  to  individual  phenomena  is  elimi- 
nated, averages  are  obtained,  limits  are  marked  out  within 
which  any  observed  irregularities  have  been  found  to  fall,  and 
regularities  in  the  social  life  of  the  community  are  discovered.* 
The  demonstration  of  uniformities  within  a  region  of  life  which 
had  hitherto  appeared  to  be  under  the  dominion  of  chance  at 
first  occasioned  astonishment ;  in  time,  however,  this  gave  way 
to  a  critical  attitude  with  regard  to  the  concept  of  law.  It 
became  increasingly  clear  that  there  was  a  difference  between 
mere  tendencies  of  social  life  and  genuine  natural  laws. 

The  concept  of  law  has  been  the  cause  of  even  more  active 
movement  in  the  region  of  political  economy.  In  no  department 
of  life  is  the  conflict  fraught  with  greater  consequences  for  life  and 
conduct.!  For  the  problem  of  law  is  directly  connected  with  the 
question  of  the  proper  attitude  of  the  State  towards  economic 
movements;  should  it  play  an  active  part  or  remain  merely 
passive  ?  If  the  economic  process  is  a  mere  network  of  sepa- 
rate self-regulating  movements,  then  interference  on  the  part 
of  the  State  appears  to  be  a  disturbance,  and  laissezfaire,  laissez 
aller  must  be  looked  upon  as  constituting  the  sum  total  of 
political  wisdom.  In  reality  this  policy  of  letting  things  alone 

*  Quetelet,  as  is  well  known,  occupies  a  prominent  position  among  those  who 
have  worked  along  these  lines. 

f  Neumann,  to  whom  we  owe  particularly  valuable  investigations  upon  this 
topic,  remarks  with  regard  to  the  history  of  the  concept  (Jahrbilcher  fttr 
Nationalb'konomie  u.  Statistik,  3rd  Series,  1899,  pp.  152-3) :  "  Search  was 
made  for  social  and  economical  laws  so  far  back  as  the  Classical  Period,  as  we 
have  attempted  to  show  elsewhere  (see  the  article  Wirt.  Gesetze  nach  friiherer  u. 
etziger  Auffassung.  Jahrbuch  fur  Nationalokonomie  u.  Statistik:  N.F.,  1898, 
vol.  16).  And  in  later  times  the  search  has  been  stimulated  by  the  successes 
obtained  by  Bacon  and  Newton  (albeit  these  were  achieved  in  another  depart- 
ment), and  has  been  more  especially  active  since  the  second  half  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  dating  from  the  work  of  Locke  and  Hobbes  (the  first  of  whom 
already  made  use  of  the  term  law  in  this  very  connection).  The  physiocrats,  in 
particular  (having  this  heritage  behind  them),  cannot  quite  be  acquitted  of  blame 
for  not  knowing  properly  how  to  separate  the  laws  in  question,  dealing  with 
occurrences,  from  laws  of  duty  or  ethical  laws  (being  as  they  were  under  the 
influence  of  the  then  all-powerful  ideas  of  natural  right)." 


LAW  207 

is  in  itself  something  other  than  a  mere  natural  process.  For 
along  with  this  policy  exist  other  possibilities,  and  as  a  historical 
development  it  must  first  assert  itself  over  other  possible  condi- 
tions of  a  different  kind,  and  thus,  when  introduced,  it  does  not 
continue  as  a  matter  of  course,  but  is  capable  of  being  reversed  ; 
it  must  be  kept  up  by  a  persistent  effort. 

Hence  a  belief  in  the  self-regulation  of  economic  conditions 
through  the  natural  desires  and  forces  of  individuals  is  not 
possible  without  an  optimistic  faith  in  the  rationality  of  social 
conditions.  If  this  optimism  be  undermined,  then  belief  in  the 
universal  potency  of  natural  laws  must  fall  with  it.  Now  the 
economic  complications  of  the  nineteenth  century  have  very 
severely  shaken  this  optimism ;  with  an  ever-increasing  pressure, 
they  have  compelled  the  State  to  interfere  in  the  economic 
world,  and  in  so  doing  have  wrested  this  department  of  life  free 
from  the  sway  of  merely  natural  laws  and  increased  the  import- 
ance of  the  ethical  and  historical  elements.*  The  acceptance 
of  these  ethical  and  historical  considerations  need  not  in  any 
way  prevent  us  from  recognising  economic  laws.  But  in  this 
case  they  do  not  simply  correspond  to  natural  laws,  but  are, 
according  to  Neumann's  definition,  "  the  expression  of  a  regular 
recurrence  of  economic  phenomena  (tendencies  or  processes) 
actuated  by  certain  definable  motives  and  impelled  by  economic 
forces  of  a  systematic  kind."  (See  Naturgesetz  u.  Wirtschafts- 
gesetz :  Zeitschrift  fur  die  gesamte  Staatswissenschaft,  1892, 
No.  3.) 

During  quite  recent  times  the  most  important  discussion  of 
all  has  been  that  concerned  with  the  problem  of  historical  laws ; 
this  question  has  come  more  and  more  to  form  the  centre  of  the 

*  It  may  be  mentioned  that  not  only  individualists,  but  socialists,  too,  have 
shown  an  inclination  to  exaggerate  the  concept  of  law  at  the  expense  of  the  free 
act.  The  socialistic  view  has  been  that  a  general  movement  of  world-historical 
life,  beyond  the  control  of  the  wills  or  actions  of  individuals,  produces  great 
changes  and  revolutions  through  an  inevitable  dialectic.  Karl  Marx,  especially, 
worked  out  this  view  in  close  connection  with  Hegel's  philosophy  of  history. 
But  here,  too,  we  cannot  escape  the  contradiction  that  precisely  that  which 
should  result  from  the  necessity  of  law  cannot  achieve  complete  victory  without 
being  recognised  by  man,  without  becoming  part  and  parcel  of  his  own  convic- 
tion. Here,  too,  man  is  called  not  to  passive  contemplation,  but  to  energetic 
action. 


208    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

conflict  as  to  the  interpretation  of  history  as  a  whole.  The  more 
the  traditional  supernatural  conception  of  history  broke  up 
(which  breaking  up  began  with  the  Modern  Period),  the  more 
were  people  impelled  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  general 
movements  and  fixed  regularities  within  the  historical  sphere. 
The  Enlightenment  stamped  this  tendency  with  its  own  peculiar 
characteristics ;  its  historical  research  "  demolished  the  hitherto 
prevailing  idea  of  history,  based  as  it  was  upon  the  monarchies 
of  Daniel,  upon  the  Apocalypse,  or  upon  Augustine ;  it  dis- 
covered a  hitherto  unknown  or  unnoticed  world,  opened  up 
immense  vistas  of  forgotten  times,  banished  the  Fall  of  Man 
from  its  position  at  the  commencement  of  history,  and  con- 
structed a  totally  different  primitive  condition  as  the  earliest 
stage.  But  since  this  explanation,  leaving  miracles  and  the 
idea  of  providence  out  of  the  question,  discovered  an  endlessly 
complicated  network  of  human  forces,  it  was  felt  with  redoubled 
force  that  a  simple,  normal  historical  content  was  necessary, 
and  this  was  found  in  the  ideas  of  natural  right  and  of  natural 
morality  and  religion."  (See  Troltsch  in  the  Real-Encyklopadie 
fur  Theologie  u.  Kirche,  3rd  ed.,  article  Aufkldrung,  p.  231.) 
If  philosophy  at  first  showed  an  inclination  to  lay  stress  upon 
history  in  opposition  to  reason,  very  soon  a  movement  grew  up 
which  aimed  at  revealing  a  certain  reason  and  regularity  of 
movement  in  history.  (See  my  account  of  the  Philosophy  of 
History  in  the  Kultur  der  Gegenwart.)  Leibniz,  more  espe- 
cially, defended  the  idea  of  a  general  continuity  of  historical 
development,  while  Vico  propounded  the  theory  of  a  regular 
series  of  definite  stages  in  the  development  of  peoples  and 
periods.  The  desire  for  a  general  linking  up  of  events  to  form  a 
united  whole  grew  ever  stronger.  The  nineteenth  century  carried 
the  matter  an  important  stage  further;  in  the  first  place  it 
stamped  history  as  a  whole  with  clearly  defined  types  of  thought ; 
in  the  second  place  it  revealed  empirical  regularities  in  the  im- 
measurably broad  field  which  historical  research  had  opened  up. 
Under  the  former  head  we  may  mention  the  systems  of  Cointe  and 
Hegel — at  once  so  closely  related  and  so  sharply  opposed ;  in 
the  one  case  an  all-embracing  logic,  in  the  other  a  slow  accu- 
mulation of  separate  elements ;  on  the  one  hand  a  movement 


LAW  209 

brought  about  by  sharp  contrasts,  on  the  other  quiet,  steady 
progress  (three  main  stages,  "  trois  etats,"  being  distinctly 
recognised,  however) ;  in  both  cases  an  elimination  of  free 
action,  an  assured  progress,  and  a  complete  dependence  of  all 
individual  phenomena  upon  the  contemporary  stage  of  the 
development  of  the  whole.  In  this  manner  philosophy  com- 
municated the  idea  of  law  to  history,  and  with  it  a  spirit  of 
system  which  easily  compressed  an  overflowing  wealth  of  material 
into  too  narrow  a  framework  and  was  very  zealous  in  explaining 
away  everything  irrational.  Meanwhile,  working  from  the 
other  side,  the  scientific  investigation  of  historical  material  had 
revealed  a  great  number  of  empirical  regularities.  The  great 
contrasts  of  modern  life  played  no  small  part  in  influencing  this 
investigation.  The  tendency  to  discover  laws,  especially  natural 
laws,  in  history,  was  strengthened  by  the  increasing  insight  into 
the  dependence  of  human  conditions  and  actions  upon  outward 
circumstances ;  also  by  the  knowledge  of  the  dependence  of  the 
individual  upon  the  whole,  upon  the  social  milieu.  There  were, 
however,  other  factors  which  worked  in  an  opposite  direction  : 
the  individuality  and  positive  character  of  history  (as  insisted 
upon  in  opposition  to  the  Enlightenment),*  together  with  the 
tendency  to  lay  emphasis  upon  great  personalities — a  tendency 
which  found  particularly  fertile  expression  in  Carlyle's  work. 
The  answer  to  the  question  as  to  the  regularity  of  history  does 
not  depend  merely  upon  the  valuation  of  nature  and  spirit  in  our 
conception  of  reality  ;  it  depends  quite  as  much  upon  the  content 
of  spiritual  life,  and  most  of  all  it  is  determined  by  the  rationality 
or  irrationality  of  our  existence. 

These  contrasts  also  appear  in  the  treatment  of  the  methodo- 
logical problem,  which  is  to-day  exciting  discussion  and  acting 

*  Thus  B.  Steffensen  (Gcsammelte  Aufs&tze,  p.  278)  contends  that  "  in 
history  it  is  the  purely  individual  element — which  here  reveals  itself  in  its 
highest  forms,  in  powerful  personalities  and  societies,  and  finally  in  humanity 
itself,  in  the  great  deeds  and  sorrows  of  a  true  process  of  evolution — whicli 
produces  the  incomparable  fascination  that  historical  knowledge  possesses  for 
the  human  spirit ; "  also  that  "it  is  not  the  affirmation  of  the  validity  of 
general  empirical  natural  laws,  but  far  rather  the  quite  unmistakable  conflict  of 
the  highest  earthly  nature,  the  inner  man,  with  ideal  laws,  better  still  with 
ideal  powers,  reflecting  the  absolute  character  of  God,"  which  "  stirs  our  soul 
in  the  dramatic,  tragic  course  of  history." 

14 


210    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

as  a  source  of  division.  Windelband  has  recently  expressed  the 
difference  between  the  methods  of  history  and  those  of  natural 
science  with  remarkable  energy  and  clearness  [see  Geschichte 
u.  Naturwissenschajt  (Rektoratsrede) ,  1894] .  Natural  science 
seeks  the  universal  in  the  form  of  natural  laws,  history  the  par- 
ticular in  the  shape  it  has  historically  taken ;  in  the  former  case 
we  are  contemplating  an  unchanging  form,  in  the  latter  the 
unique  and  definite  content  of  actual  occurrence.  "  If  one  may 
be  allowed  to  coin  new  words,  scientific  thought  is  in  the  one 
case  nomothetic,  and  in  the  other  idiographic"  (p.  26);  "this 
general  regularity  in  things  supplies  the  rigid  framework  of  our 
conception  of  life,  a  regularity  which  expresses  the  eternally 
abiding  essence  of  reality  and  is  superior  to  all  change  ;  within 
this  framework  develops  the  living  sequence  of  all  those  indi- 
vidual situations  which  constitute  human  history,  and  hence  are 
of  such  value  to  man"  (p.  88).*  This  conviction  has  been 
further  developed  by  Rickert  with  great  penetration  and  inde- 
pendence (see  Grenzen  der  naturwissenschaftlichen  Begriffs- 
bildung,  i.  and  ii.).  It  has  given  rise,  altogether,  to  a  great 
deal  of  literary  activity.  In  opposition  to  this  individualistic 
tendency,  Lamprecht  maintains  that  the  individual  is  suitable 
for  artistic  comprehension  only,  and  that  scientific  thought  (in 
history,  as  elsewhere)  must  confine  itself  to  the  typical ;  from 
this  point  of  view  he  develops  the  doctrine  of  socio-psychical 
stages  of  evolution,  which  follow  one  another  in  a  definite  order,  t 
At  the  present  stage  a  more  detailed  discussion  is  hardly  pos- 
sible ;  but  we  shall  return  to  the  central  problem  in  our  chapter 
upon  history.  In  conclusion,  we  may  say  that  a  full  appreciation 
of  the  actuality  and  unique  character  of  history  need  not  hinder 
the  recognition  of  certain  uniformities.  The  manner,  for  example, 


*  Paul,  in  his  Prinzipien  der  Sprachgeschichte,  had  already  distinguished 
between  "historical  sciences"  and  "sciences  dealing  with  laws."  He  says 
(p.  1) :  "As  for  each  branch  of  historical  science,  so  for  the  history  of  language, 
there  must  be  a  parallel  science  concerning  itself  with  the  general  life-condition 
of  the  object  whose  development  we  are  tracing  and  examining  the  nature  and 
action  of  such  factors  as  are  superior  to  change." 

f  A  capital  guide  to  the  discussion  upon  the  problem  of  historical  laws  is 
supplied  by  Bernheim  in  his  Lehrluch  der  hittorischen  Methode  u.  der  Getchichts- 
philosophie,  3rd  and  4th  ed.,  p.  91  ff. 


LAW  211 

in  which  the  development  of  a  whole  people  takes  place  and  in 
which  particular  spheres  of  life,  such  as  religion  and  art,  com- 
plete their  evolution  by  passing  through  a  series  of  stages,  may 
very  well  be,  to  a  certain  extent,  related  or  even  similar,  since 
these  developments  are  products  of  the  permanent  character  of 
man.  To  this  extent  we  need  have  no  hesitation  in  recognising 
historical  laws.  But  such  laws  would  only  refer  to  the  form  in 
which  occurrences  took  place  ;  the  actual  content  would  depend 
upon  the  specific  character  of  each  particular  epoch,  and  would 
hence  lie  beyond  all  derivation.  How  far  the  individual  processes 
in  history  are  to  be  credited  with  independence,  and  how  far  the 
whole  of  history  is  to  be  conceived  of  as  a  separate  process,  are 
questions  depending  upon  our  attitude  towards  the  problem  of 
the  character  of  spiritual  life  and  its  relationship  to  the  situation 
of  humanity.  This  attitude  will  determine  whether  we  are  to 
regard  personalities  or  group  movements  as  the  determining 
factors  of  the  historical  movement.  All  this,  however,  threatens 
to  take  us  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  methodological  problem,  and 
we  shall  have  to  return  to  the  subject  at  a  later  stage. 


C.    THE    WORLD-PROBLEM 


1.   MONISM   AND   DUALISM 

IN  turning  our  attention  to  the  problems  which  centre  round 
the  idea  of  the  world  we  shall  still  find  ourselves  in  continual 
touch  with  the  problem  of  the  life-process,  and  in  particular 
with  that  of  spiritual  life.  In  this  sphere,  too,  the  last  word 
does  not  lie  with  abstract  conceptual  considerations,  but  with 
the  concrete  facts  of  reality ;  in  this  connection  nothing  is 
more  important  than  the  question  what  is  the  content  ot 
spiritual  life,  and  what,  consequently,  is  its  position  in  the 
universe.  This  is  the  centre  whither  all  the  different  lines 
of  investigation  must  converge,  and  here  all  that  experience 
gathers  from  an  examination  of  things  in  detail  finds  its 
ultimate  valuation.  In  all  his  struggles  with  the  problems 
around  him  man  is  ultimately  seeking  himself,  the  essence 
of  his  own  being.  Historical  research,  too,  corroborates  this 
by  showing  that  it  was  always  the  specific  shaping  of  spiritual 
life  which  produced  the  theories  and  lent  them  their  power. 

(a)  The  Concepts — Historical  and  Critical  Remarks 

The  terms  monism  and  dualism  have  come  into  existence 
during  the  last  few  centuries.  Dualism  was  first  employed 
by  Thomas  Hyde  in  the  Historia  religionis  veterum  Persarum 
(1700)— see,  for  example,  chap,  ix.,  p.  164 — where  it  served 
to  designate  a  religious  system  which  recognised  two  eternal 
principles,  one  good  and  the  other  evil.  The  word,  still 
bearing  the  same  meaning,  was  introduced  to  a  wider  circle 
of  readers  by  Bayle  (see  the  article  Zoroaster)  and  Leibniz 
(see  Theodicee,  ii.  144,  199).  It  was  first  used  in  contrast 
with  monism  by  Wolff,  who  at  the  same  time  transferred  the 
expressions  to  the  relationship  between  soul  and  body:  Wolff 

810 


216    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

also  originated  the  word  "  monists  "  to  stand  for  those  who 
admit  only  one  kind  of  being  (corporeal  or  spiritual) ;  hence 
the  term  included  idealists  as  well  as  materialists — dualists, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  those  who  looked  upon  body  and 
soul  as  substances  independent  of  one  another.*  Wolff  him- 
self declared  for  dualism.  Both  expressions  remained  confined 
to  this  school  of  thought,  and  monist  in  particular  occurs 
very  rarely  until  the  nineteenth  century.  Hegelians  first 
brought  the  term  into  more  general  use  by  employing  it  to 
describe  their  own  type  of  thought  (thus  in  1882  there 
appeared  a  work  by  Goschel  entitled  Der  Monismus  des 
Gedankens).  Then  the  word  was  dropped  for  a  time  until 
the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolution  (Haeckel  and  Schleicher) 
took  it  up  and  adapted  it  to  its  own  ends.  Further,  the 
term  monism  is  used  to  denote  any  system  which  aims  at 
subordinating  and  correlating  body  and  soul,  nature  and 
spirit,  not  one  to  the  other,  but  both  to  a  higher  third.  In 
this  sense  monism  and  "  Spinozism "  are  often  taken  as 
equivalent. 

The  study  of  these  expressions  now  leads  us  to  the  problem 
of  the  relationship  of  body  and  soul  or  (from  the  cosmic 
point  of  view)  to  that  of  nature  and  spirit.  The  contrast 
which  now  faces  us  is  aggravated  in  a  peculiar  degree  by  its 
intimate  connection  with  the  core  of  our  own  being,  and  by 
the  fact  that  it  seems  to  have  continually  increased  throughout 
the  whole  course  of  history.  The  world,  it  seems,  is  revealed 
to  us  in  a  twofold  manner :  from  without,  through  the  channels 
of  sense  perceptions,  from  within,  through  self-active  thought 
— as  a  world  of  sensuous  impressions  and  as  a  world  of  non- 
sensuous  ideas.  Does  the  one  series  really  include  the  other, 
or  will  it  be  possible,  as  a  result  of  deeper  knowledge,  to 
show  that  the  antithesis  is  apparent  rather  than  real?  In 

*  Wolff  drew  up  the  following  scheme  of  philosophical  parties : — 
Sceptics  Dogmatists 

Monists    Dualists 
Idealists    Materialists 


Egoists    Pluralists 


MONISM  AND  DUALISM  217 

addition  to  the  contrast  between  these  two  modes  of  viewing 
the  world  we  must  take  into  account  the  increasing  width  of 
the  gap  between  the  contents  of  the  two  worlds.  In  the 
interests  of  a  more  exact  conception  and  more  secure  dominion, 
science  has  increasingly  driven  the  spiritual  element  out  of 
nature.  At  the  same  time,  however,  spiritual  life,  in  its  own 
sphere,  has  been  continually  raising  itself  further  and  further 
above  mere  nature,  and  has  made  increasing  progress  towards 
establishing  itself  as  an  independent  kingdom.  Thus  historical 
development  has  tended  to  make  the  corporeal  seem  less  and 
less  spiritual  and  the  spiritual  less  and  less  corporeal.  This 
makes  for  dualism.  Yet  at  the  same  time  there  is  a  growth 
of  inducements  to  monism :  in  this  category  we  may  include 
the  fact  that  exact  research  shows  a  connection  between 
mental  and  bodily  life  (a  connection  which  is  becoming  pro- 
gressively clearer  and  more  detailed),  also  a  growing  impulse 
towards  unity,  which  makes  it  impossible  for  man  to  accept 
different  worlds  in  juxtaposition.  Hence  our  concepts  fall 
wider  and  wider  apart — although  experience  shows  the  worlds 
to  which  they  refer  to  be  increasingly  connected !  We  have 
no  choice  but  to  attempt  a  thorough  reconstruction  of  such  a 
contradictory  state  of  things.  History  has  already  shown  us 
what  are  the  chief  directions  in  which  such  an  effort  might 
be  made,  and  the  modes  of  thought  thus  suggested  have  not 
passed  away  with  the  epochs  to  which  they  belonged ;  they 
remain  with  us  as  ever-present  possibilities  and  are  continually 
calling  for  our  consideration  and  decision.  Through  the  course 
of  the  ages  down  to  the  present  day  specific  types  of  life 
and  thought  have  continued  to  assert  themselves  in  spite  of 
the  changes  which  their  concepts  have  undergone. 

The  living  history  of  the  subject  (that  is,  the  history  bearing 
upon  our  own  task)  does  not  go  back  further  than  Descartes 
— nothing  earlier  possesses  serious  historical  interest  for  us. 
It  is  true  that  during  classical  and  mediaeval  times  the 
problem  attracted  a  good  deal  of  attention,  but  the  work 
done  upon  it  did  not  lead  to  a  precise  definition  and  clear 
distinction  of  concepts  until  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  The  psychical  was  interpreted  rather  as  a  denial 


218    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  the  corporeal  than  in  any  positive  sense.*  It  was  hence 
unavoidable  that  the  concept  of  the  soul  should  be  largely 
influenced  by  this  negative  idea  and  the  psychical  thought 
of  as  something  corporeal  but  finer,  subtler  and  more  ethereal. 
The  body,  however,  was  regarded  as  formed,  vitalised  and 
directed  by  forces  of  a  psychical  nature.  The  whole  of  nature 
was  inwardly  vitalised.!  Relying  upon  concepts  of  this 
description,  natural  science  frequently  made  use  of  psychical 
factors,  a  practice  which  precluded  an  exact  understanding 
of  natural  processes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  science  of  the 
soul  fell  under  the  influence  of  sensuous  and  spatial  concepts ; 
it  experienced  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  of  outside  influences 
passing  into  the  soul  or  impulses  of  the  will  being  translated 
into  spatial  movement.  It  was  a  chaotic  state  of  affairs  and 
did  little  justice  either  to  nature  or  to  the  soul. 

Thus  the  matter  stood  until  the  time  of  the  Enlightenment. 
Descartes,  in  particular,  brought  about  a  thoroughgoing 
distinction  and  clarification.  Now  for  the  first  time  the 
characteristic  nature  of  each  sphere  was  fully  recognised. 
The  life  of  the  soul  was  understood  as  something  intrinsically 
self- sufficient  (ein  reines  Beisichselbstseiri) ,  the  unity  of  whose 
being — unilas  essentite—is  quite  distinct  from  any  mere  com- 
pounded unity — unitas  compositionis — such  as  is  seen  in  the 
outer  world ;  consciousness  precedes  all  special  activity  and 
first  imparts  a  psychical  character  to  it ;  the  activity  of  the 
soul  continually  returns  upon  itself  and  links  all  manifold- 
ness  to  a  dominating  ego.  Nothing  external  can  pass  into 
such  a  soul-life,  no  external  impulse  can  do  more  than 
excite  it  to  produce  certain  results  out  of  its  own  depths. 
Thus  it  remains  fundamentally  self-contained  in  spite  of  its 
apparent  dependence  upon  the  external  world.  This  inde- 
pendence on  the  part  of  the  soul  corresponds  with  the 
independence  of  nature.  The  movements  and  factors  which 
remain  after  the  expulsion  of  the  spiritual  element  form  a 

*  Thus  Descartes  could  justly  claim  to  have  first  positively  defined  the  soul, 
as  a  whole,  as  thought  (that  is,  conscious  activity). 

t  Characteristic  of  this  is  the  Aristotelian  definition  of  nature  as  that  which 
"  bears  within  itself  the  principle  of  rest  and  movement  "  (in  contrast  with  art, 
to  which  this  principle  is  external). 


MONISM   AND  DUALISM  219 

world  of  their  own  :  a  soul  had  previously  appeared  indis- 
pensahle  in  the  explanation  of  natural  movements,  but  these 
are  now  attributed  from  the  very  beginning  to  minute 
moving  (but  soulless)  particles,  whose  manifold  combinations 
are  made  to  account  for  all  the  immeasurable  variety  of 
nature.  Nature  thus  loses  all  inner  forces  and  tendencies. 
Moreover,  the  rich  and  varied  sense  properties  (colours, 
sounds,  &c.)  with  which  nature,  as  seen  by  man,  is  invested, 
are  no  longer  looked  upon  as  belonging  to  the  things  themselves, 
but  as  lent  to  them  by  the  soul,  projected  into  them  by  man. 

This  position  represented  a  very  sharp  separation  of  the 
two  spheres,  a  separation  so  complete  that  it  could  not  long 
be  accepted  as  an  adequate  explanation.  Hence  this  position 
gave  rise  to  many  new  problems  and  complications,  although 
at  the  same  time  it  constituted  an  enormous  step  forward 
and  supplied  much  fruitful  stimulus.  Now,  for  the  first  time, 
the  two  spheres  could  develop  their  characteristic  principles 
and  methods  with  proper  distinctness,  now  for  the  first  time 
it  was  possible  to  understand  the  psychical  psychically,  and 
the  corporeal  corporeally,  and  there  arose  an  exact  physics 
and  an  explanatory  psychology.  At  last  reality  appeared  to 
become  clearly  visible  as  if  by  the  lifting  of  a  veil.  This 
separation  brought  with  it  something  more  than  a  mere 
clarification  of  concepts :  it  was  the  forerunner  of  the  two 
contrasting  tendencies  of  life  and  human  culture,  which  from 
this  time  forward  ran  right  through  the  Modern  World.  On 
the  one  hand  we  see  an  increased  activity  of  thought,  a 
conversion  of  reality  into  forms  of  thought,  a  measuring  of 
existence  by  rational  standards,  an  aspiration  towards  the 
rationalisation  of  conditions  in  general,  and  an  intellectual 
culture  which  boldly  overleapt  the  hitherto  recognised  boun- 
daries; on  the  other,  the  establishment  of  the  external  world 
in  a  position  of  complete  independence  with  regard  to  man, 
a  more  intimate  relationship  between  man  and  his  environ- 
ment, a  prodigious  influx  of  new  experience,  an  increased 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  material  factors,  and  an 
ever-swelling  tide  of  realistic  culture.  Who  could  deny  that 
these  t\vo  tendencies  are  present  throughout  the  life  of  the 


220     MAIN   CURRENTS   OF   MODERN   THOUGHT 

Modern  World,  keeping  it  in  a  continual  state  of  tension 
and  introducing  a  sharp  division  into  every  sphere  of  life  ? 
This  contrast  within  life  itself  is  the  deepest  root  of  the 
dualism  in  concepts  and  doctrines,  and  it  continually  supplies 
this  dualism  with  new  force,  however  much  the  desire  for 
unity  may  tend  to  drive  man  beyond  it. 

A  desire  for  unity  is  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case 
unavoidable,  for  human  thought  cannot  remain  satisfied  with 
such  a  state  of  division.  Dualism  had  given  us  a  powerful 
analysis,  and  had  established  a  more  precise  terminology,  but 
there  existed  a  continual  impulse  to  progress  from  the 
analysis  to  some  sort  of  synthesis,  from  the  antithesis  to 
some  sort  of  comprehensive  unity.  Moreover,  there  was  no 
lack  of  formidable  arguments  against  this  division  of  reality  : 
for  example,  the  direct  impression  we  have  of  an  intimate 
relationship  between  body  and  soul,  the  increasing  knowledge 
of  the  dependence  of  the  life  of  the  soul  upon  bodily  con- 
ditions, the  philosophical  demand  for  the  unity  of  reality,  and 
finally,  the  fact  of  art  with  its  weaving  together  of  the  visible 
and  invisible,  the  outer  and  the  inner,  and  its  bringing  of 
both  into  a  relationship  of  fruitful  reciprocal  action.  Taking 
everything  into  consideration,  dualism  appeared  to  be  no 
more  than  a  kind  of  half-way  house  on  the  road  to  unity : 
it  was  true  this  unity  was  not  to  be  found  ready-made;  it 
was  an  object  of  spiritual  effort,  and  in  working  towards  it  it 
was  certainly  necessary  to  go  against  first  appearances.  Hence 
the  disposition  towards  unity  became  bolder  in  the  Modern 
World  than  it  had  ever  been  before. 

The  tendency  towards  unity  divided  itself  into  three  main 
movements — materialism,  spiritualism,  and  monism :  the  all- 
embracing  being  was  conceived  of  as  matter  or  spirit,  or  both  of 
these  were  regarded  as  aspects,  phenomena,  or  modes  of  expres- 
sion of  an  underlying  reality. 

In  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  there  was  no  such  thing  as 
materialism  until  the  time  of  Descartes  and  his  clear  definition 
of  concepts,  and  this  tendency  received  no  fixed  name  until  then.* 

•  The  term  materialist  was  first  employed  by  the  chemist  and  philosopher 
Robert  Boyle,  who  had  a  special  predilection  for  clear-cut  terms  (see  his  work 
of  1674  :  The  Excellence  and  Grounds  of  the  Mechanical  Philosophy).  Giordano 
Bruno  still  used  the  ancient  term  "  Epicurean." 


MONISM   AND   DUALISM  221 

Materialism  ran  its  course  through  all  the  grea  civilised 
nations,  one  after  the  other,  taking  a  somewhat  different  form 
in  each  case.  English  materialism  was  the  most  efficient, 
French  the  most  intellectual  and  ingenious,  German  the  coarsest 
and  most  robust.  Frequently  refuted  and  crushed,  it  has 
always  raised  its  head  again  and  attracted  large  bands  of 
followers.  This  clearly  demonstrates  that  there  is  more  in 
materialism  than  its  naiver  critics  imagine ;  critics  who  think 
to  dispose  of  it  once  and  for  all  with  a  clever  argument,  and 
wonder  how  it  is  that  the  long-exposed  error  again  and  again 
draws  adherents  to  itself.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  would  not  be 
difficult  to  overcome  materialism  if  it  were  simply  a  question 
of  theoretical  considerations.  The  indisputable  dependence  of 
the  life  of  the  soul  upon  bodily  conditions,  and  the  advantage 
materialism  possesses  of  being  very  simple  and  easily  under- 
stood, are  factors  telling  in  its  favour ;  yet  the  dependence  is 
capable  of  being  otherwise  interpreted,  while  the  simplicity  is 
an  illusion  which  vanishes  upon  a  closer  analysis  of  concepts. 
It  would  in  reality  be  hardly  possible  to  think  of  a  more  diffi- 
cult and  problematical  concept  than  that  of  matter ;  it  eludes  us 
in  the  very  act  of  definition.  But  the  more  exactly  we  try 
to  conceive  of  matter,  the  more  impossible  it  becomes  to  derive 
mental  life  from  it.  It  is  precisely  the  sharper  modern  defini- 
nition  of  the  concepts  of  body  and  soul,  a  precision  vital  to 
exact  science,  which  has  made  materialism  impossible  as  a 
cosmic  philosophy.  As  F.  A.  Lange  has  very  justly  observed : 
"  To  think  clearly  about  materialism  is  to  refute  it." 

However,  the  strength  of  materialism  does  not  lie  in  scientific 
arguments.  It  derives  its  power  of  attraction  and  conviction 
from  conditions  of  life  and  civilisation.  We  find  it  strong  and 
victorious  in  ages  when  the  traditional  forms  of  civilisation  are 
no  longer  felt  to  be  true,  but  weigh  upon  many  with  oppressive 
force.  In  such  ages  materialism  not  only  appears  to  offer  the 
best  means  of  liberation  from  oppressive  restraint,  but  to  con- 
stitute a  return  to  a  simpler  basis  of  life.  It  seems  to  promise 
a  more  natural  and  truthful  construction  of  all  our  relationships. 
Moreover,  it  makes  a  special  point  of  assigning  full  weight  to 
the  importance  of  material  conditions  for  civilisation  as  a  whole. 


222    MAIN   CURRENTS   OP   MODERN   THOUGHT 

Hence  its  power  of  carrying  men  with  it,  as  seen  in  the  move- 
ments which  preceded  and  accompanied  the  French  Revolution 
and  in  modern  socialism. 

What  life  has  thus  brought  forth  only  life  can  refute,  and 
this  it  does — negatively  and  positively.  Negatively  by  means 
of  the  inner  contradiction  to  which  a  materialistic  construction 
of  civilisation  succumbs  as  a  result  of  its  own  development ; 
positively  through  the  opposition  of  a  civilisation  of  another 
type.  The  root  of  this  contradiction  is  that  material  factors 
are  credited  with  having  accomplished  what  in  reality  has  been 
produced  through  them  by  a  superior  spiritual  life.  Just  as  the 
latter  allows  us  to  perceive  incomparably  more  in  the  visible 
world  than  the  senses  can  directly  demonstrate,  so  it  makes 
material  things  valuable  as  tools  for  the  manifestation  and 
development  of  reasonable  living  beings.  As  materialism  in 
the  one  case  mentally  adds  a  spectator,  so  in  the  other  it  uncon- 
sciously postulates  a  purposive  personality  and  treats  the  experi- 
ence of  such  a  personality  as  an  external  event.  Since,  however, 
the  materialistic  view  of  life  dissociates  human  work  and  aspira- 
tion from  the  real  life-bearer,  it  condemns  the  latter  to  become 
ever  more  wasted  and  empty.  If  at  the  same  time  the  increase 
of  external  relationships  has  given  rise  to  a  great  desire  for  life, 
the  result  must  be  an  exceedingly  painful  disparity  between 
what  we  desire  and  what  we  possess.  The  ensuing  distress  will 
finally  and  with  perfect  certainty  drive  men  beyond  a  material- 
istic way  of  life. 

This  is  illustrated  on  a  large  scale  in  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  humanity,  which,  all  through  its  course,  shows  a  con- 
tinual overcoming  of  materialism.  Once  awakened  to  an  inner 
life  through  the  toil  of  thousands  of  years,  through  fruitful 
experience  and  painful  disappointments,  it  is  impossible  for 
man  to  see  his  whole  reality  in  the  material  world,  and  find  his 
satisfaction  in  its  goods,  as  children  and  savages  do.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  movement  towards  an  inner  life,  the  mate- 
rial world  itself  appeals  to  him  in  an  essentially  new  light.  The 
variegated  domain  of  sense-impressions  has  now  become  a  great 
network  of  forces,  laws,  and  relations.  It  is  no  longer  the 
palpable  concreteness  of  the  sense-impression  which  stands 


MONISM  AND   DUALISM  223 

guarantee  for  the  reality  of  the  whole,  but  the  causal  order  with 
its  concatenation  of  all  isolated  events,  and  its  subsumption  of 
all  that  happens  under  simple  laws.  The  outer  world,  too,  has 
become  non-sensuous.  Factors  derived  from  thought,  ideal 
factors,  form  its  core.  It  is  true  that  in  this  case  the  spiritual 
activity  remains  attached  to  an  unspiritual  subject,  but,  even 
so,  it  is  something  very  different  from  any  sentient  faculty,  how- 
ever much  developed.  There  is  an  immense  gap  between  the 
world  of  the  natural  scientist  and  that  of  the  uncivilised  man, 
however  practised  his  organs  of  sense. 

Not  less  different  is  the  relationship  which  exists  between  the 
civilised  man  and  the  outward  things  of  life.  What  makes  the 
latter  valuable  to  him  to-day  is  not  so  much  sense-excitation 
and  pleasure  as  mastery  over  the  things,  the  capacity  of  sub- 
jecting them  to  his  will,  and  hence  indefinitely  enhancing  the 
significance  of  life.  The  civilised  man  does  not  so  much  enjoy 
the  things  themselves  as  himself  in  the  things.  His  thought 
imparts  value  to  the  sensuous  and  shapes  it  into  ideal  construc- 
tions. Think  of  the  gulf  between  the  savage,  enjoying  the 
shining  appearance  of  pieces  of  gold,  and  the  self-conscious 
power  of  the  great  business  man  whose  economic  influence 
stretches  to  the  ends  of  the  earth  and  who  is  yet  entirely 
emancipated  from  sensuous  tokens  of  value  ! 

Thus  there  are  spiritual  forces  operative  in  our  shaping  of  the 
material  world  which  are  beyond  the  comprehension  of  material- 
ism. But  at  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that  the  development  of 
life  which  is  thereby  produced  cannot  be  accepted  as  final ;  what 
accomplishes  so  much  with  foreign  material  must  necessarily  be 
something  in  itself;  no  subjection  of  the  external,  and  no  exten- 
sion of  power,  can  save  from  painful  vacuity  if  spiritual  life  is  not 
given  some  kind  of  content.  But  no  enhancement  of  material 
or  economic  power  can  possibly  do  this.  Hence  the  attempt  to 
base  happiness  upon  external  things  must  finally  result  in  dis- 
appointment and  upheaval.  The  materialistic  scheme  of  life 
will  come  into  the  severest  collision  with  the  desire  for  happiness 
which  it  has  itself  fanned  into  flame,  and  hence  suffer  destruc- 
tion. Thus  materialism  must  practically  refute  itself  through 
its  own  development.  But  a  critical  analysis  of  materialism, 


224    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

however  destructive,  does  not  ensure  that  materialism  will  be 
positively  overcome.  This  result  can  be  accomplished  only  by 
a  powerful  development  of  self -active  spiritual  life.  When  this 
life  and  its  tasks  fill  our  minds,  it  will  seem  hardly  conceivable 
that  man  could  (like  the  materialists)  regard  that  which  is 
inwardly  nearest  to  him,  and  the  source  of  his  characteristic 
greatness,  as  something  secondary  and  derivative — turn  his  own 
existence  inside  out  and  seek  happiness  from  outside. 

It  is  peculiarly  easy  for  materialism  to  influence  the  masses, 
on  account  of  its  ease  of  presentment  and  apparently  obvious 
character.  Spiritualism,  on  the  other  hand,  appeals  rather  to 
a  few  superior  minds  and  to  select  circles;  for  immediate  appear- 
ances are  against  it,  and  without  spiritual  energy  the  way  which 
it  aims  at  travelling  cannot  be  pursued  to  the  end.  The  Modern 
World  exhibits  two  forms  of  spiritualism :  one  which  conceives 
of  reality  as  a  kingdom  of  separate  souls,  and  one  which  regards 
it  as  the  life  and  being  of  a  universal  spirit ;  the  former  view  is 
represented  by  Leibniz,  and  the  latter  by  modern  German 
speculation  (seen  at  its  greatest  in  Hegel's  philosophy).  In 
both  cases  the  outer  world  is  entirely  converted  into  inner  life, 
the  relationship  between  spirit  and  nature  is  not  understood  as 
a  contrast,  but  as  a  gradation  within  the  spirit,  the  sensuous 
is  no  longer  looked  upon  as  a  world  grounded  in  itself,  but  as 
a  lower  form  of  spiritual  or  psychical  life — a  form  not  yet 
arrived  at  full  consciousness. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  devote  some  thought  to  this  view  of 
life  to  realise  that  it  is  not  so  extraordinary  as  a  first  impression 
might  lead  us  to  suppose.  Is  it  not  true  that  the  inner  life 
is  the  most  immediate  and  certain  reality  that  we  possess ;  and 
does  not  the  simplest  reasoning  convince  us  that  we  can  never 
wholly  leave  this  sphere  and  transfer  ourselves  into  another  state 
of  being,  and  that  what  is  called  the  outer  world  signifies  only 
a  peculiar  and  specially  limited  form  of  the  inner  life  ? 

But  however  justifiable  and  convincing  the  general  idea  may 
be,  when  the  attempt  is  made  to  strictly  carry  it  out,  human 
capacity  is  apt  to  overstep  the  limit  and  overestimate  its  re- 
sources. The  spiritualists  cannot  undertake  to  convert  the 
whole  of  nature  into  spirit  without  treating  our  spiritual 


MONISM   AND   DUALISM  225 

life  as  spiritual  life  pure  and  simple,  as  absolute  spiritual  life. 
Nature  will  never  allow  itself  to  be  reduced  to  the  position 
of  a  stage  of  human  spiritual  life ;  it  is  far  too  independent  of 
the  latter  for  such  a  supposition  to  be  possible,  far  too  much 
given  to  following  its  own  path,  and  offers  far  too  determined  a 
resistance.  Spiritualism  could  only  feel  itself  equal  to  this 
independence  on  the  part  of  nature,  and  this  firm  resistance, 
by  converting  spiritual  life  into  mere  thought  and  knowledge, 
while  conceiving  of  the  unspiritual  as  something  not  yet  fully 
understood,  something  which  had  not  yet  got  beyond  the 
unconscious  stage.  But  only  an  exaggerated  intellectualism 
could  reduce  the  world-life  itself  to  the  level  of  a  mere  view 
of  the  world,  thus  presenting  reality  in  a  form  so  attenuated 
as  to  be  robbed  of  all  living  content. 

Such  an  intellectualistic  overestimation  of  human  capacity 
can  only  be  explained  as  due  to  the  particular  character  of  some 
special  phase  of  human  culture,  a  phase  in  which  consciousness 
of  spiritual  power  and  the  afflatus  of  spiritual  creation  led  man 
to  think  himself  the  centre  of  reality,  and  lifted  him  in  bold 
flight  above  all  the  inertia  of  the  things.  But  the  difficulties 
cannot  long  be  ignored,  and  this  type  of  culture  must  soon  reveal 
its  shallowness.  This  is  the  fate  of  any  kind  of  spiritualism 
which  claims  to  be  a  complete  system. 

The  failure  of  the  attempts  to  establish  either  of  these  types 
of  life  as  exclusively  true  must  tend  in  favour  of  monism. 
Monism,  too,  aims  at  unity,  but  does  not  seek  to  obtain  it 
by  sacrificing  the  one  side  to  the  other,  but  by  the  comprehen- 
sion of  both  within  a  third.  This  seems  to  give  each  sphere  the 
chance  of  fully  developing  its  specific  character  without  losing 
its  connection  with  the  whole,  and  it  appears  to  do  away  with 
the  difficulty  of  interaction  between  body  and  soul,  since  the 
process  on  the  one  side  corresponds  directly  with  that  on  the 
other.  A  particularly  powerful  factor  working  in  favour  of 
monism  as  a  scheme  of  life  is  the  equilibrium  between  nature 
and  spirit  which  is  here  sought  for  and  is  supposed  to  have  been 
obtained,  a  balancing,  as  it  were,  of  outward  and  inward,  sense- 
life  and  thought,  realistic  and  idealistic  culture.  Such  an  equi- 
librium seems  peculiarly  suited  to  elevate  and  enlarge  life,  to 

15 


226    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

lift  man  above  the  narrowness  of  a  particular  sphere,  and  give 
him  a  share  of  the  whole  wealth  of  reality.  Hence  monism, 
more  particularly  since  Spinoza  gave  it,  or  appeared  to  give  it, 
classical  shape,  has  proved  in  the  highest  degree  attractive  to 
poets  and  thinkers,  natural  scientists  and  religious  natures.  It 
has  seemed  a  magic  formula  with  power  to  still  every  conflict. 

But  it  only  possesses  this  magic  quality  because  it  allows 
every  man  to  think  along  his  own  lines,  because  each  interprets 
the  general  idea  from  his  own  particular  point  of  view. 
Although  this  idea  contains  an  indisputable  truth,  yet  when  put 
into  practice  it  soon  appears  that  the  antithesis  which  was  to 
be  overcome  has  not  really  disappeared  at  all.  It  becomes 
apparent  that  in  the  case  of  this  problem  also  humanity  is  called 
upon  to  make  a  definite  decision ;  it  is  a  case  of  either — or.  It 
is  not  possible  for  the  contrasting  positions  to  be  peacefully 
united. 

According  to  monism  as  expounded  by  Spinoza,  the  two 
spheres  should  be  in  perfect  equilibrium.  This  is  also  the 
teaching  of  "psycho-physical  parallelism,"  which  has  recently 
developed  this  point  of  view  in  a  more  exact  manner.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  is  not  possible  to  carry  out  the  fundamental 
idea  in  detail  without  emphasising  one  side  more  than  the  other. 
Spinoza  himself,  closely  studied,  is  not  a  true  monist.  He 
alternates  between  spiritualism  and  materialism.  In  the  ground- 
work of  his  system  he  is  materialistic,  and  in  the  conclusion 
spiritualistic,  more  particularly  in  his  ethics.  He  begins  by 
regarding  nature  as  the  central  thing  and  the  measure  of  reality, 
while  the  life  of  the  soul  is  relegated  to  the  position  of  a  merely 
derivative  phenomenon,  a  reflex  of  the  process  of  nature.* 

In  bringing  the  system  to  a  conclusion,  however,  this 
materialism  becomes  spiritualism.  What  else  can  we  call  it, 

*  Herbart  very  justly  protests  against  this  in  his  Allgemeine  Metaphysik 
(Wke.,  iii.  198) :  "  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  Spinoza  everything  psychological 
is  deduced  from  the  corporeal ;  one  hardly  notices  that,  according  to  his 
teaching,  thought  should  exist  independently  of  matter  occupying  space. 
But  how  could  it  be  otherwise  in  any  doctrine  which  begins  by  looking  upon 
thoughts  as  representations  of  the  extended?  Such  a  view  will  invariably 
be  compelled  to  subject  spirit  to  mass,  in  virtue  of  the  relationship  between 
copies  and  their  originals." 


MONISM  AND   DUALISM  227 

when  a  divine  life  is  declared  to  penetrate  and  consolidate  the 
whole  of  reality,  when  nature  becomes  a  development  of  this 
life,  and  when  man  is  to  attain  to  a  participation  in  infinity  and 
eternity  through  an  intellectual  love  for  God  ?  And  this  division 
reaches  beyond  the  concepts  and  affects  the  core  of  life  itself  • 

it  is  not  a  single  but  a  double  life  which  is  visible  in  Spinoza 

sometimes  naturalism,  sometimes  mysticism.  Whatever  judg- 
ment we  may  pass  upon  Spinoza,  it  is  certain  that  he  did  not 
succeed  in  obtaining  the  desired  unity.  Later  attempts  to 
bring  about  an  equilibrium  of  nature  and  spirit  have  not  been 
any  more  successful.  "  Psycho-physical  parallelism  "  has  failed 
in  this  respect :  it  either  makes  the  life  of  the  soul  a  mere 
reflex  of  natural  processes  or  the  latter  mere  appearances 
of  the  spiritual  reality ;  in  neither  case  is  it  neutral — it  ap- 
proximates either  to  materialism  or  to  spiritualism. 

Still  less  does  this  supposed  equilibrium  result  in  a  charac- 
teristic type  of  human  culture.  For  the  harmonious  settlement 
between  nature  and  spirit,  which  proved  specially  attractive 
to  artistic  natures,  did  not  take  place  between  the  outer  and 
inner  world,  as  though  these  were  elements  with  equal  rights ; 
it  came  about  entirely  within  the  field  of  the  inner  life.  When, 
for  example,  in  the  creative  work  of  Goethe,  everything  inward 
forces  itself  into  outward  expression  in  order  thus  to  find  itself, 
the  outer  at  the  same  time  obtains  an  inner  life ;  spiritual  life 
is  in  this  case  enriched  and  shaped  by  a  more  vigorous  compre- 
hension of  nature,  and  in  particular  it  is  liberated  (by  a  closer 
relationship  to  the  world  as  a  whole)  from  all  that  is  petty, 
human,  and  narrow ;  but  human  being  is  not  divided  between 
spirit  and  nature. 

The  monism  associated  with  the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolu- 
tion even  more  definitely  abandons  neutrality.  It  is  only 
distinguished  from  materialism  by  the  fact  that  it  looks  upon 
the  life  of  the  soul  as  a  primary  instead  of  a  secondary  pheno- 
menon, as  an  attribute  of  matter  from  the  very  beginning,  and 
not  as  something  which  develops  subsequently  at  special  points. 
But  this  is  practically  the  view  which  has  always  been  held  by 
the  more  subtle  materialists,  and,  like  them,  the  monists  really 
make  nature,  as  perceived  by  the  senses,  everything,  and  allow 


228    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  whole  of  reality  to  be  dominated  by  natural  concepts,  while 
denying  all  independent  spiritual  life.  If  this  position  is 
logically  followed  up,  the  resulting  type  of  life  and  culture  will 
be  purely  materialistic.  The  matter  would  take  on  a  different 
complexion  if  the  idea  of  the  spiritualisatiou  of  all  the  elements 
of  reality  were  really  taken  earnestly,  for  that  would  result  in  a 
conception  of  the  world  similar  to  that  of  Leibniz.  But 
materialistic  monism  does  not  usually  go  so  far ;  it  merely 
adds  soul  to  the  elements,  as  a  property  along  with  other  pro- 
perties, without  their  becoming  thereby  essentially  different. 
In  reality  a  soul  cannot  be  had,  it  can  only  be. 

If  we  thus  come  to  the  conclusion  that  materialistic  monism 
is  open  to  all  the  objections  which  can  be  urged  against  the 
coarsest  type  of  materialism,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
spiritualistic  monism  is  a  more  promising  solution  of  the 
problem.  Monism  of  this  type  would  base  itself  upon  the  fact 
that  inner  life  does  not  appear  merely  at  separate  points, 
scattered  and  divided,  but  that  it  unites  to  form  a  comprehensive 
connected  whole,  which  reveals,  at  the  level  of  human  existence, 
a  spiritual  life  elevated  above  the  individual  and  with  it  an 
inner  world  rich  in  its  own  problems  and  powers.  The  critical 
point  of  reality  is  not  in  this  case  sought  between  nature  and  the 
soul,  but  between  the  unspiritual  and  the  spiritual.  The  life 
of  the  soul  has  a  share  in  both  stages,  because  in  the  first 
place  it  is  a  portion  of  nature,  and  in  the  second,  a  vessel  for 
the  reception  of  spiritual  life.  The  question  of  how  is  body 
related  to  soul  gives  way  to  that  of  the  comprehension  of 
spiritual  and  unspiritual  together  within  the  one  world.  The 
answer  to  this  question  from  this  point  of  view  is  that  the 
unspiritual  merely  signifies  the  sub-spiritual ;  that  the  same 
being  which  exhibits  nature  and  the  natural  life  of  the  soul 
in  a  condition  of  dissociation  and  as  a  network  of  mere  relation- 
ships begins  in  spiritual  life  to  consolidate  itself  to  form  a  whole 
and  to  develop  a  content.  Now,  for  the  first  time,  reality 
appears  to  gain  an  inwardness  and  to  reach  its  own  depth. 
Such  an  elevation  from  sub-spiritual  to  spiritual  is  no  mere 
speculative  demand,  but  a  task  which  claims  the  whole  of  human 
life,  for  all  specifically  human  achievement,  more  especially 


MONISM  AND   DUALISM  229 

ethical  progress,  is  an  ascent  from  nature  to  spirit,  an  elevation 
of  our  being  from  the  natural  to  the  spiritual  stage.  Hence 
in  this  case  the  problem  passes  from  the  mere  intellect  into 
the  centre  of  life. 

When,  however,  spiritual  life  appears,  from  this  point  of  view, 
to  be  at  the  same  time  the  fundamental  substance  of  reality  and 
its  goal,  this  does  not  in  the  least  mean  that  in  the  form  in 
which  it  is  possessed  by  man  it  is  in  a  position  to  command  the 
whole  world  and  simply  to  find  itself  again  in  nature  (as  was 
affirmed  by  pure  spiritualism) .  For  although  it  is  certain  that 
spiritual  life  must  somehow  be  present  to  man  as  something 
superhuman  and  universally  valid,  its  specific  form  is  continually 
being  influenced  by  much  that  is  merely  human.  We  do  not 
possess  spiritual  life  itself,  but  only  a  human  spiritual  life ; 
that  is  a  spiritual  life  whose  superhuman  core  is  never  accessible 
to  us  except  through  human  wrappings.  Therefore,  if  we 
endeavour  to  explain  the  whole  of  reality  from  the  point  of  view 
of  human  spiritual  life,  we  unavoidably  fall  into  a  narrow  and 
anthropomorphic  mode  of  looking  at  things.  An  indispensable 
protection  against  this  is  found  in  nature,  with  its  infinity 
and  its  superiority  to  all  petty  human  ends :  nature  saves  man 
from  sinking  into  narrow  ruts,  and  continually  forces  him  to 
separate  the  general  idea  of  spiritual  life  from  its  merely  human 
form  of  existence.  But  all  these  influences  operate  within  the 
spiritual  life,  and  the  position  here  outlined  differs  from 
dogmatic  spiritualism  only  in  the  fact  that  two  separate  points 
of  departure  and  two  distinct  bases  are  recognised  within  the 
inclusive  whole.  It  is  exactly  this,  however,  which  gives  rise 
to  a  type  of  human  culture  different  from  that  represented 
by  spiritualism.  Spiritual  life  now  presents  itself  not  merely 
as  the  basal  fact  of  life,  but  also  as  a  task  which  is  perpetually 
renewing  its  claim  upon  us.  Far  more  than  before  is  human 
life  set  between  opposing  forces ;  it  appears  far  less  complete, 
far  more  immersed  in  the  beginnings  of  an  upward  effort. 
There  is  a  call  to  personal  initiative  and  decision,  a  demand 
to  pass  beyond  the  satisfaction  of  the  intellect  into  whole- 
hearted alliance  with  the  progressive  forces  of  the  universe. 
Hence  the  ethical  rather  than  the  intellectual,  the  ethical, 


230    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

that  is,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word,  becomes  the  focus  of 
human  effort. 

The  particular  form  in  which  this  challenge  is  met  will 
no  douht  vary  with  the  man  and  the  age,  but  there  can  be 
no  doubt  where  the  chief  point  of  conflict  in  these  struggles  lies 
and  at  what  point,  in  particular,  opinions  become  divided.  The 
crucial  question  is  this :  Do  we  or  do  we  not  recognise  an 
independent  spiritual  life,  and  with  it  a  new  stage  of  reality  ? 
To  answer  in  the  negative,  or  even  to  hold  one's  judgmen 
back,  is  to  surrender  the  situation  to  a  coarser  or  finer  type  of 
materialism.  With  our  "Yes,"  on  the  other  hand,  we  win 
guidance  along  new  paths  and  the  secure  prospect  of  ultimate 
triumph.  Whether  the  decision  falls  on  the  one  side  or  on  the 
other  does  not  depend  merely  on  intellectual  acuteness,  but 
primarily  on  the  power  and  clearness  with  which  the  spiritual 
life  inspires  the  man  or  the  age.  This  again  brings  us  back 
to  personal  life  and  being. 

(6)  The   Monism  of  To-day 

In  the  course  of  a  critical  study  of  the  spiritual  and  intellectual 
tendencies  of  the  present  day,  it  would  be  impossible  to  avoid 
discussing  modern  monism.  The  monism  of  to-day  goes  far 
beyond  the  special  problem  of  the  relationship  between  nature 
and  spirit ;  it  has  become  a  powerful  and  exceedingly  energetic 
movement,  which  it  will  be  our  duty  to  explain  and  evaluate. 
Let  us  bear  in  mind  that  the  more  violent  the  conflict  with 
which  we  have  to  deal,  the  more  bound  we  are,  as  philosophers, 
to  treat  it  in  a  sober  and  judicial  manner. 

It  is  not  possible  to  understand  contemporary  monism  without 
some  consideration  of  the  wider  basis  upon  which  it  has  been 
built  up.  The  progress  made  by  the  idea  of  nature  in  influencing 
our  concepts  of  the  cosmos  and  our  views  of  life  in  general  has 
provided  this  basis.  This  progress  involved  a  necessary 
reaction  against  the  older  and  onesidedly  religious  and 
transcendental  type  of  thought,  which  was  in  the  habit  of 
looking  upon  nature  as  something  subordinate,  and  of  altogether 
secondary  importance,  or  even  as  an  object  of  suspicion.  The 
rapid  growth  of  natural  science  and  the  transformation  of  life 


MONISM   AND   DUALISM  231 

which  it  effected  gave  this  reaction  tremendous  weight  and 
triumphant  power.  The  scientific  precision  of  the  concepts  used 
and  their  united  influence  in  welding  together  a  systematic 
whole  of  thought  were  silent  but  powerful  factors.  The 
influences  proceeding  from  this  source  could  not  be  escaped 
even  by  those  whose  object  it  was,  in  the  main,  to  work  in 
an  opposite  direction;  this  is  obvious,  for  example,  in  the 
case  of  Leibniz,  whose  unceasing  struggle  against  naturalism 
did  not  prevent  natural  concepts  forcing  their  way  into,  and 
dominating,  some  of  the  innermost  portions  of  his  thought- 
world. 

Was  it  not  influence  of  this  description  which  caused  him  to 
make  of  the  idea  of  vital  progress  the  all-powerful  concept 
of  value,  to  convert  all  contrasts  into  differences  of  degree, 
and  to  make  the  concept  of  logical  possibility  coincide  with 
that  of  inhibited  force?  During  the  nineteenth  century  this 
movement  continued  to  make  progress.  The  mode  of  thought 
peculiar  to  natural  science  silently  increased  its  influence  over 
our  concepts  and  convictions,  while  we  ourselves  remained  quite 
unconscious  of  the  real  nature  of  the  affirmations  and  negations 
which  this  process  involved.  The  idea  of  evolution  took  upon 
itself  the  form  of  a  natural  process  and  through  the  strict  causal 
nexus  thereby  introduced,  destroyed  the  very  notion  of  activity 
and  (logically)  the  idea  of  a  real  present  as  well,  without  our 
being  in  the  least  disturbed.  The  law  of  persistence  (the 
so-called  "law  of  inertia"),  which  held  increasing  sway  in 
the  domain  of  nature,  was,  without  hesitation,  carried  over 
into  the  spiritual  and  historical  sphere,  although  in  this  case 
the  conditions  of  life  must  be  continually  produced  afresh  by 
original  creative  action  if  they  are  not  to  sink  immediately. 
On  the  natural  level,  happiness  is  identical  with  the  pleasures 
of  sense :  this  natural  concept  was  uncritically  carried  over  into 
the  spiritual  world,  and  people  came  to  look  upon  spiritual 
happiness  as  a  species  of  pleasure,  though  perhaps  of  a  more 
refined  description.  When  nature  is  perpetually  forcing  itself 
upon  us  from  outside  and  inside,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as 
remarkable  if  nature  conies  to  be  treated  more  and  more  as 
itself  absolutely  constituting  world  and  reality  in  one,  and 


232    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

if  a  "  scientific  view  of  life "  unhesitatingly,  and  in  perfect 
confidence  of  victory,  claims  to  be  not  merely  a  particular 
portion  of  reality,  but  an  exhaustive  representation  of  the  whole 
of  reality. 

But  notwithstanding  all  its  progress,  the  movement  could  not 
be  completely  victorious  as  long  as  man  occupied  a  privileged 
and  unique  position.  It  was  this  very  position  which  was  now 
shaken  in  the  severest  possible  manner  by  the  theory  of  evolution, 
a  theory  which  closely  connected  man  with  animal  life,  thereby 
identifying  him  with  nature,  and  reducing  him  to  the  position 
of  being  merely  one  of  a  number  of  natural  phenomena.  The 
immense  influence  of  this  tendency  was  still  further  increased 
by  the  results  of  its  practical  application :  by  diligent  and 
fruitful  work  it  succeeded  in  revealing  a  prodigious  number 
of  facts,  linking  up  hitherto  isolated  data  and  combining  them 
into  an  effective  whole.  Man  seemed  to  be  at  last  returning 
to  his  true  home  after  a  lengthy  period  of  delusion  and  vain 
self-glorification.  His  life  appeared  to  gain  a  firmer  basis, 
to  become  simpler,  fresher,  and  more  genuine ;  the  old  seemed 
new  and  the  new  old.  A  thoroughgoing  transformation  was 
commenced. 

Modern  monism  appropriated  and  co-ordinated  these  tendencies 
and  modes  of  thought.  From  the  point  of  view  of  monism, 
natural  concepts  merely  required  a  certain  extension  in  the 
direction  of  the  spiritual  in  order  to  be  capable  of  absorbing 
the  whole  range  of  reality  and  dominating  the  whole  of  life. 
But  all  these  advantages  and  possibilities  would  hardly  have 
been  able  alone  and  of  their  own  capacity  to  give  to  monism 
the  power  and  influence  over  men's  minds  that  it  really 
possesses.  There  was  another  factor  which  directly  tended 
to  inflame  passion  and  to  excite  great  masses  of  people.  Monism 
was  negative  as  well  as  affirmative.  It  not  only  stood  for  a 
position  of  its  own,  but  it  represented  opposition  to  the  religion 
of  the  churches.  From  the  beginning,  a  wide  gap  has  existed 
between  modern  civilised  life  and  traditional  religion,  and 
although  a  persistent  attempt  has  been  made  to  bridge  this  gap, 
its  futility  has  become  increasingly  obvious,  and  the  alienation  has 
developed  more  and  more  into  complete  and  sharp  opposition. 


MONISM  AND   DUALISM  233 

For  a  long  time  these  problems  did  not  appear  likely  to  affect 
the  lower  strata  of  society,*  but  more  recently  they  have 
penetrated  deeply  into  the  masses  and  are  now  increasingly 
agitating  them.  If  the  old  type  of  religion  is  officially  kept 
up  in  spite  of  all  these  changes  and  upheavals,  and,  in  particular, 
if  it  continues  to  be  imposed  upon  the  schools,  a  condition 
of  serious  strain  is  bound  to  result,  and  with  it  the  danger 
of  a  paralysing  lack  of  sincerity.  He  must  be  a  poor 
psychologist  and  a  shortsighted  statesman  who  can  escape 
seeing  the  anger  and  the  suppressed  scorn  which  such  a 
state  of  affairs  develops — emotions  which  will  be  forced 
finally  to  seek  some  kind  of  outlet.  Now  monism  stands  close 
at  hand  to  provide  just  such  an  outlet.  Is  it  surprising  that 
it  sweeps  people  along  with  the  force  of  an  irresistible 
whirlwind  ? 

The  monistic  movement  is  quite  comprehensible.  It  would 
not  have  acquired  its  extensive  influence  unless  both  its  positive 
and  negative  sides  contained  elements  of  truth.  But  while 
understanding  the  historical  causes  which  have  produced  the 
movement  and  justly  estimating  the  element  of  truth  which  it 
contains,  we  must  refuse  to  assign  it  the  leading  place  in  life. 
First,  with  regard  to  religion,  there  is  now  a  growing  movement 
in  progress  in  all  civilised  nations  to  liberate  it  from  antiquated 
elements  and  to  shape  it  in  accordance  with  the  present  position 
of  the  historical  evolution  of  life  ;  such  attempts  are  less  simple, 
but  more  fruitful  and  more  promising  for  the  future,  than  the 
summary  rejection  of  religion  which  is  usually  associated  with 
monism.  The  question  is :  Is  religion  (looking  beyond  all 
ecclesiastical  forms)  grounded  in  the  inner  necessities  of  our 
being  and  our  relationship  to  the  cosmos  or  is  it  not  so  grounded  ? 
If  it  is,  then  none  of  the  weaknesses  and  difficulties  of  the 
present  situation  can  in  any  way  justify  the  abandonment  of  a 

*  Thus,  for  example,  it  appeared  to  P.  Bayle  to  be  entirely  out  of  the  ques- 
tion that  the  Enlightenment  should  ever  win  ove*  the  masses.  He  believed  that 
a  certain  amount  of  superstition  was  indispensable  to  the  interests  and  needs  of 
society,  which,  in  his  opinion,  are  essentially  the  same  in  all  ages :  Let  betoini 
dont  je  parle  ne  sont  point  sujeti  aux  vicissitudes  de  la  lumtire  et  det  Mnebres,  il$ 
tont  de  tons  les  terns;  Us  sont  let  memes  tons  un  siecle  d1  ignorance,  et  sous  un  siecle 
de  science.  (See  the  article  on  Francis  of  Aasisi  in  the  Dictiannaire.) 


234    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

life-power  whose  work  it  is  to  place  man  in  a  proper  relationship 
to  reality  as  a  whole,  a  power  which  undertakes  to  give  man's 
life  greatness  and  his  soul  a  self-value  and  a  true  inner  life. 
The  opponents  of  religion  are  in  such  a  hurry  to  inflict  some 
injury  upon  the  Church  and  the  clergy  that  they  usually  forget 
that  this  negation  (with  its  abandonment  of  all  independent 
inner  life)  injures  no  one  so  much  as  themselves.  We  are 
reminded  of  the  boy  whose  father  had  refused  to  give  him  a 
pair  of  gloves,  and  who  stood  still  in  the  bitter  cold,  with 
freezing  hands,  saying :  "  It  serves  my  father  quite  right  that 
my  hands  are  freezing.  Why  didn't  he  give  me  those  gloves  ?  " 
We  are  still  left  with  the  main  question — and  whether  we 
hold  monism  to  be  right  or  not  will  depend  on  the  answer  we 
give  to  it — the  question,  namely,  whether  the  natural  concepts 
exclusively  employed  by  monism  are  sufficient  for  the  full  inter- 
pretation of  reality.  In  two  directions,  in  particular,  doubts  are 
bound  to  arise — in  the  sphere  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  in 
that  of  the  content  of  spiritual  life,  as  revealed  in  history.  In 
the  first  place  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  our  conception  of  the 
world  is  not  a  thing  given  to  us  from  outside ;  we  build  it  up 
ourselves  by  means  of  psychical  processes,  according  to  the  laws 
of  our  own  minds.  This  subjective  point  of  view  usually  bases 
itself,  in  the  first  instance,  upon  Kant,  whose  pre-eminent 
energy  has  compelled  philosophical  research  to  proceed  along 
these  lines.  This  compulsion  is  not  due,  however,  merely  to 
Kant,  or  indeed  to  any  individual  philosopher,  but  to  the  whole 
character  of  modern  life  and  thought.  For  nothing  is  more 
typical  of  modern  life  and  modern  civilisation  than  the  liberation 
of  the  subject  from  its  dependence  upon  environment,  and  its 
establishment  within  a  life  of  its  own.  If  at  the  same  time  the 
possession  of  the  world  is  not  abandoned,  but  passionately  sought 
after  with  all  available  strength,  then  life  takes  a  completely 
new  turn  :  instead  of  proceeding  from  the  object  to  the  subject, 
from  the  world  to  man,  it  proceeds  from  the  subject  to  the  object, 
from  man  to  the  world.  Such  a  reversal  must  essentially  change 
the  content  of  life  and  hence  affect  each  particular  department. 
This  remark  applies  also  to  knowledge.  Our  conception  of 
reality  will  be  refined,  vitalised,  and  spiritualised  when  the  result 


MONISM  AND   DUALISM  235 

is  understood  in  the  light  of  the  development  which  led  up  to  it, 
when  it  is  fully  recognised  that  our  conception  of  reality  is 
pieced  together  from  within,  that  not  the  outer  world,  but  our 
spiritual  organisation,  supplies  both  the  outline  and  the  general 
form,  and  that  elements  which  at  first  sight  appear  simple  often 
embody  the  results  of  a  very  complicated  process.  At  the  same 
time  it  becomes  clear  that  with  all  our  toil  we  cannot  get  beyond 
a  human  view  of  reality,  which  in  its  turn  becomes  problematical 
when  subjected  to  a  more  penetrating  analysis  and  called  upon 
to  demonstrate  its  truth.  New  questions  and  new  difficulties 
arise.  We  feel  ourselves  incomparably  less  settled  in  our 
opinions  than  we  were  before,  but  in  spite  of  this  we  experience 
a  deepening  of  reality  and  of  our  own  personal  life. 

The  materialists  and  monists  recognise  nothing  of  all  this. 
The  sense-world,  just  as  it  stands  (or  appears  to  stand)  consti- 
tutes for  them  the  genuine  and  whole  reality.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  this  is  as  if  some  one  were  to 
maintain  the  obsolete  Ptolemaic  astronomy  and  refuse  to  admit 
the  discoveries  of  Copernicus  !  It  reveals  a  naive  realism  best 
compared  with  that  exhibited  by  the  mediaeval  scholastics — 
usually  so  despised  by  the  naturalistic  school.  Thus  philosophy 
(in  opposition  to  naturalism)  represents  the  rights  of  the  subject 
as  defended  by  modern  thought.  It  represents  a  truth  which 
may  be  obscured  but  cannot  be  abandoned. 

Passing  on  to  the  second  main  objection,  we  find  ourselves  face 
to  face  with  a  problem  which  goes  yet  deeper  down.  It  is  the 
problem  of  the  content  of  reality.  Naturalism  and  monism 
agree  in  conceiving  this  content  as  something  far  less  significant 
than  it  really  is.  They  ignore  what  (to  those  of  another  opinion) 
is  of  primary  importance — the  life  of  the  spirit.  Their  position 
being  that  all  inner  life  is  a  mere  adjunct  of  nature,  they  are 
compelled  to  treat  the  psychical  life  as  a  mere  process  taking 
place  within,  each  separate  individual ;  in  pursuance  of  this  line 
of  thought  they  lay  stress  upon  the  indefinable  nature  of  the 
boundary  between  the  animal  and  the  human,  and  point  out  that 
what  was  formerly  looked  upon  as  a  human  heirloom  has  in 
reality  slowly  worked  its  way  up  by  a  historical  process  of  evolu- 
tion, and  that  even  the  civilised  man  remains  to  a  very  great 


extent  under  the  power  of  natural  instincts.  We  extend  our  full 
recognition  to  the  foregoing  and  have  no  desire  to  diminish  its 
importance.  But  it  is  not  the  whole.  For  the  life  of  the  human 
soul  does  not  remain  in  a  state  of  disintegration  and  confinement 
to  separate  points,  as  does  that  of  animals  :  it  results  in  an 
integration  and  the  formation  of  a  common  life,  which  in  turn 
develops  an  immeasurable  wealth  of  concrete  fact,  displaying 
essentially  new  features  as  compared  with  the  merely  natural 
world.  History  and  society,  in  their  distinctively  human  sense, 
would  he  impossible  without  this  integration.  In  its  absence, 
how  could  speech  be  employed  to  communicate  thought  and  how 
could  human  culture  have  developed  at  all  ?  Upon  this  basis  is 
built  up  a  vast  and  complicated  system  of  human  activities,  such 
as  law,  morality,  art,  and  science.  These  separate  activities  have 
(like  the  whole)  their  own  laws,  problems,  and  experiences.  They 
bring  man  face  to  face  with  difficult  tasks  ;  they  exercise  an 
increasing  attraction  over  him,  and  in  return  make  him  into 
something  immeasurably  greater  than  he  was  ;  from  being  a 
mere  fragment  of  nature  he  becomes  more  and  more  a  spiritual 
being,  and  in  this  capacity  he  inwardly  experiences  the  infinite, 
while  as  a  moral  personality  he  is  gifted  with  the  power  of 
converting  the  world  into  personal  action.  Such  a  profound 
transformation  as  this  necessarily  reveals  a  new  aspect  of  reality. 
It  is  clear  that  man  has  now  entered  upon  a  new  stage  in  the 
progress  of  the  world,  the  recognition  of  which  must  essentially 
enlarge  and  deepen  his  general  conception  of  the  whole.  This 
is  no  mere  theory.  In  the  course  of  the  historical  and  social 
development  of  man  as  we  know  it,  reality  has  actually  been 
thus  unfolded  and  has  worked  itself  into  the  institutions  of  life, 
forming  a  developing  force  which  surrounds  us  with  a  thousand 
influences.  To  bring  this  inner  solidarity  of  human  life  to  full 
recognition  was  the  chief  task  of  German  speculative  philosophy. 
It  was  conscious  of  having  reached  a  far  higher  level  than  the 
Enlightenment,  because  it  explained  spiritual  contents  and 
values  by  reference  to  this  solidarity  and  not,  like  the  Enlighten- 
ment, by  derivation  from  the  mere  individual. 

Naturalism,  however,  overlooks  this  rise  of  the  spiritual  life, 
this  development  of  a  specific  stage  of  civilisation,  this  inner 


MONISM   AND   DUALISM  237 

growth  of  man  through  the  work  of  millenniums,  and  ignores  the 
whole  wealth  of  reality  thus  revealed.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  naturalism,  all  this  is  simply  non-existent,  or  at  any  rate  it 
receives  no  systematic  appreciation.  We  are  given  a  picture  of 
the  whole  which  disregards  everything  specifically  human,  every- 
thing spiritual  and  everything  which  imparts  a  content  to  life. 
This  involves  a  terrible  restriction  and  impoverishment  of  life. 
It  signifies  a  rejection  of  the  whole  inner  content  of  history  and 
an  abandonment  of  everything  in  which  humanity  seeks  its  great- 
ness. Naturalism  constructs  and  rounds  off  its  conception  of  the 
cosmos  without  taking  man  into  account — and  then,  with  his 
distinguishing  characteristics  as  far  as  possible  eliminated,  he  is 
squeezed  in  as  well  as  may  be  !  We  speak  of  reaction  when  we 
see  life  being  screwed  back  to  some  old  stage  of  being  already 
inwardly  obsolete.  Yet  all  such  attempts  to  confine  life  to  an 
outworn  historical  position  are  modest  indeed  compared  with 
this  attempt  to  chain  life  down  to  its  prehistoric  beginnings,  and 
so  deprive  it  of  all  chance  of  inner  elevation  and  true  develop- 
ment. When  contemplated  from  this  standpoint,  the  whole  of 
human  history,  with  all  its  characteristic  features,  is  seen  to  be 
nothing  but  a  colossal  error,  a  complete  departure  from  truth, 
since  it  has  more  and  more  deceived  man  by  holding  up  to  him 
an  inner  world  which  is  in  reality  a  mockery  and  a  delusion. 

At  the  same  time  we  are  not  infrequently  called  upon  to 
endure  the  annoyance  of  seeing  this  denial  of  an  independent 
spiritual  life  parade  itself  as  a  thing  to  be  taken  for  granted — 
something  which  only  ignorance  or  obstinacy  could  avoid  recognis- 
ing. It  is  quite  possible  to  understand  this  attitude.  Negative 
tendencies  have  always  stood  in  peculiar  danger  of  engendering 
dogmatism  and  fanaticism  towards  other  types  of  thought.  In 
order  to  be  able  to  criticise  oneself  and  to  justly  value  others, 
nothing  is  more  necessary  than  the  capacity  of  sympathetically 
entering  into  other  modes  of  thought  and  contemplating  one's 
own  position  from  the  new  point  of  view.  This  capacity  is 
especially  endangered  when  a  system  rapidly  attains  completion 
and  begins  to  regard  everything  outside  its  limits  as  non-existent. 
As  a  thinker  and  investigator  Hume  was  certainly  a  great  man, 
and  as  far  as  his  own  life  was  concerned  he  was  anything  but 


238    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

a  fanatic,  yet  could  there  be  a  more  flagrant  example  of  intel- 
lectual fanaticism  than  his  famous  dictum  which  consigned  to 
the  flames  all  philosophical  literature  not  conforming  to  his 
opinions  ?  * 

The  equilibrium  of  spiritual  life  was  long  enough  threatened 
by  theology  and  religion,  and  now  in  the  very  course  of  its 
reaction  from  this  influence  it  is  in  danger  of  being  disturbed 
by  the  exclusive  domination  of  the  natural  sciences.  It  is  not 
so  much  the  natural  sciences  themselves  which  are  to  blame  as 
the  philosophical  systems  based  upon  them,  such  as  monism 
and  naturalism.  It  may  be  remarked  in  addition  that  it  is 
doubtful  whether  monism  fulfils  the  very  object  which  is  its 
main  aim  (an  object  that  we  others,  too,  regard  as  of  essential 
importance),  namely,  the  establishment  of  unity  in  the  thought- 
world.  The  question  is,  does  it  not,  while  forcibly  welding  its 
concepts  together,  inwardly  divide  life  as  a  whole  ?  Its  concepts 
and  doctrines  are  modelled  on  nature  as  seen  from  the 
mechanical  point  of  view,  hence  the  cosmos  becomes  a  domain 
of  mere  blind  actuality,  in  which  there  is  no  room  for  conduct, 
only  for  mechanical  occurrence ;  no  inward  impulse,  only 
juxtaposition ;  no  real  unity,  only  a  fitting  together  of  separate 
parts.  To  the  really  logical  mind  this  means  the  disappearance 
of  all  contents  and  values.  There  remains  no  place  for  the 
concept  of  truth,  and  therefore  no  place  for  science.  Any 
spiritual  consciousness  which  is  produced  can  do  no  more  than 
calmly  and  uncritically  submit  to  the  world-process.  This  is 
the  theory.  But  how  is  it  carried  out  in  practice  ?  Monism  is 
carrying  on  an  active  struggle  for  truth,  and  is  filled  with  joyful 
faith  in  human  progress ;  in  its  construction  of  human  life  it 

*  See  the  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth 
section:  "When  we  run  over  libraries,  persuaded  of  these  principles,  what 
havoc  must  we  make !  If  we  take  in  our  hand  any  volume  of  divinity  or 
school  metaphysics,  for  instance;  let  us  ask:  Does  it  contain  any  abstract 
reasonings  concerning  quantity  or  number  ?  No.  Does  it  contain  any  experi- 
mental reasonings  concerning  matter  of  fact  or  existence?  No.  Commit  it 
then  to  the  flames.  For  it  can  contain  nothing  but  sophistry  and  illusion." 
Should  a  speculative  philosopher  pronounce  judgment  in  this  fashion,  people 
would  pronounce  him  an  imbecile  or  a  fanatic.  But  when  such  a  method  is 
adopted  against  philosophy  there  are  many  who  Me  in  it  the  evidence  of  a 
powerful  and  undaunted  spirit  1 


MONISM  AND  DUALISM  239 

clings  firmly  to  the  old  ideals  of  the  good  and  beautiful,  and  it 
derives  the  chief  motive  for  its  scientific  efforts  from  the  con- 
viction that  through  science  it  is  possible  to  bring  more  truth 
and  more  reason  into  human  existence — in  a  word,  we  find 
monism,  in  these  respects,  travelling  along  a  purely  idealistic 
path  !  Is  it  possible  to  imagine  a  crasser  dualism  than  to  hold 
materialistic  views  of  life  while  acting  according  to  the  principles 
of  idealism  ?  This  is  but  another  example  of  the  ancient 
experience  that  men  often  accomplish  with  their  labour  the  exact 
opposite  of  what  they  themselves  intended. 


2.  EVOLUTION 

(a)  On  the   History   of  the  Term 

NEITHER  the  terms  expressing  the  idea  of  evolution  nor  the 
concept  itself  came  into  general  use  until  the  Modern  Period. 
Entwicklung  (evolution)  appears  in  the  German  language  for 
the  first  time  towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  but 
did  not  become  at  all  popular  until  the  second  half  of  the 
eighteenth.  An  older  term  is  AuswicJclung  (also  sich  auswickeln) 
which  was  probably  first  used  in  a  philosophical  sense  by  Jakob 
Bohme.  Entwickeln,  according  to  Grimm,  was  first  employed 
by  the  lexicographer  Stieler  (Der  deutschen  Sprache  Stammbaum, 
1691),  sich  entwickeln  by  Haugwitz  (in  Soliman,  1684),  and  by 
Hagedorn.  The  scholars  of  the  eighteenth  century  frequently 
spoke  of  an  Entwickeln  and  Entwicklung  of  a  concept,  proof  and 
proposition ;  "  the  procedure  whereby  a  concept  is  worked  out 
in  detail  is  called  the  Entwicklung  of  the  concept "  (Lambert). 
Entwicklung  in  the  sense  of  a  self-evolution  (Sichentwickeln  and 
Selbstentwicklung)  came  into  use  with  the  growth  of  the  German 
Humanistic  Movement,  which,  seeking  as  it  did  for  a  soul  in 
reality,  and  for  the  recognition  of  constructive  forces  in  nature, 
found  for  this  desire  characteristic  expression  in  this  term.  It 
is  sufficient  to  refer  to  Herder  and  Goethe.  Tetens  brings 
Entwicklung  into  the  title  of  a  book,  that  of  his  chief  work, 
published  in  1777 :  PhUosophische  Versuche  iiber  die  menschliche 
Natur  und  ihre  Entwickelung  (Philosophical  Investigations 
with  regard  to  Human  Nature  and  its  Development).  Entwick- 
lung now  completely  replaced  Auswicklung  (which  still  pre- 
dominated in  Kant's  earlier  works).  Einwicklung  (involution), 

MO 


EVOLUTION  241 

which  was  usually  used  in  the  opposite  sense  to  Ausicicklung, 
also  disappeared  from  the  philosophical  vocabulary. 

The  German  expression  was  a  translation  of  the  Latin  term, 
which  it  partly  replaced  and  partly  tolerated  as  a  rival.  The 
terms  evolutio-involutio  and  explicatio-complicatio  or  implicatio, 
are  derived  from  Latin  classics,  but  there  they  were  used  only 
in  a  methodological  sense  and  were  not  applied  to  actual 
growth.*  So,  too,  in  the  Middle  Ages ;  Thomas  Aquinas 
used  only  explicitus  and  implicitus,  and  these  only  in  their  formal 
sense.  Only  the  mystical  speculation  which  originated  in  the 
writings  of  Pseudo-Dionysius  employed  the  words  and  concepts 
in  order  to  give  expression  to  an  inner  relation  of  God  and  the 
world.  Thus  Scotus  Erigenus  has  involutus,  convolutus,  com- 
plicatio,  replicatio.  Since  Nicholas  of  Cusa,  the  philosopher 
who  stood  on  the  threshold  of  the  Modern  World,  connected 
himself  with  this  mode  of  thought,  he  made  continual  use  of  the 
terms  explicatio  and  complicatio.  When  he  employed  evolutio 
he  thought  it  necessary  to  add  an  explanation.!  With  the 
growth  of  the  Modern  World  the  expressions  became  more  and 
more  usual.  Together  with  developpement  and  enveloppement, 
evolutio  and  involutio  were  favourite  terms  of  Leibniz's;  eighteenth- 
century  physiology,  also,  adopted  them  in  the  sense  of  the  later 
so-called  pre-formation  theory  (the  "box  theory  ").  In  contrast 
to  this,  the  theory  of  a  new  formation  by  development  (repre- 
sented with  especial  brilliance  by  C.  F.  Wolff  in  the  theoria 
generationis)  was  called  epigenesis  I  in  place  of  "  evolution  " — 
now  understood  as  implying  a  merely  quantitative  increase,  and 


*  Cicero  (see,  for  example,  Top. ,  9)  has :  Turn  definitio  adhibetur  qua  quasi 
involutum  evolvit  id,  de  quo  quceritur. 

t  Nicholas  says  (Paris  ed.  of  1514,  i.  89  o) :  Linea  est  puncti  evolutio. — 
Quomodo  intelligis  lineampuncti  evolutionem  ? — Evolutioiiem  id  est  explicationem. 

I  C.  F.  Wolff  expressed  himself  very  clearly  with  regard  to  these  concepts, 
more  especially  in  the  German  edition  and  in  the  second  Latin  edition  of  1774. 
The  following  passage  occurs  in  the  latter  (Prcemonenda,  §  50) :  Evolutio  pheno- 
menon est,  quod  si  essentiam  ejus  et  attributa  spectes,  omni  quidem  tempore,  at 
inconspicuum,  exttitit,  denique  vero,  speciemprceseferens  ae  si  nunc  demum  oriatwt 
quo-modo  cunque  conspicuum  redditur.  See  also  Eant  (Krit.  d.  Urteilskraft.,v. 
436,  Hart.)  :  "  The  system  of  generated  things  as  mere  educts  is  callr '  uhat  of 
individual  pre-formation  or  the  theory  of  evolution ;  that  of  generated  things  as 
products  is  called  the  system  of  epigenesis. " 

16 


242    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

so  rejected.  But  at  the  same  time  evolution  retained  the  larger 
meaning  of  development  in  general ;  thus  (particularly  with 
non-Teutonic  peoples)  it  has  become  the  most  popular  designa- 
tion of  the  most  recent  form  of  the  theory  of  descent. 

(b)  On   the   History   of  the   Concept   and    Problem 
of  Evolution 

The  doctrine  of  evolution  illustrates,  perhaps  more  clearly 
than  any  other,  the  gap  between  the  old  mode  of  thought  and 
the  new.  The  doctrine  of  permanence  (die  Beharrungslehre) 
is  as  closely  connected  with  the  ideals  of  the  Ancient  World 
as  is  the  doctrine  of  evolution  with  those  of  the  Modern  World. 
Hence  the  study  of  this  subject  will  again  render  necessary  a 
rapid  review  of  the  whole  historical  movement. 

It  is  true  that  important  beginnings  of  a  theory  of  evolution 
were  to  be  found  in  the  earliest  Greek  philosophy ;  but  in  the 
mid-classical  period  the  doctrine  of  permanence  was  decidedly 
predominant,  for  the  artistic  character  of  the  Greek  people  was 
more  in  sympathy  with  this  mode  of  thought  and  much  better 
able  to  form  clear  concepts  with  regard  to  it.  Reality,  in  its 
fundamental  content,  was  regarded  as  a  living  work  of  art 
arranged  strictly  according  to  rule,  and  controlled  by  an  un- 
changing order.  The  chief  aim  of  science  was  to  throw  this 
truth  into  clear  relief  and  free  it  from  the  confused  crowd  of 
passing  sense-impressions.  This  task  could  not  be  accom- 
plished without  recognising  a  state  of  being  superior  to  time, 
and  the  truth  of  the  concepts  was  derived  from  their  corre- 
spondence with  this  being ;  through  thought  the  concepts  were 
communicated  to  action  and  supplied  the  latter  with  per- 
manent aims.  According  to  this  view  of  life,  science  is  in 
the  first  place  a  transference  from  a  world  of  becoming  into  a 
world  of  being,  and  of  living  being.  Being  is  consistently  placed 
before  becoming.*  This  type  of  thought  takes  on  a  more 

*  In  illustration  we  will  content  ourselves  with  a  single  passage  from  Aristotle 
(Depart,  anim.,  640  a,  18) :  »;  ykvioig  svfKa  rijg  ouaiaq  tariv,  dXX'  o'u\  »}  ovaia 
tvtKo.  rfff  y£V£<TEw£.  b,  1 :  eirfi  S'  tart  roiovrov,  ri}v  ykvioiv  w  Si  KO.I  rotavrrjv  avp- 
ftaivuv  avayKoiov.  Even  the  term  denoting  science  is  brought  into  relationship 
with  the  idea  of  permanent  being  (see  Phys.,  244  b,  9)  :  rj  d'  i%  apxve  Xjjjv//te  TTJC 
«7noT/;/t?j£  yeveffif  ov\  ianv'  T(p  yap  r/peurjaai  /cat  ffTtjvai  TTJV  Siavniav  siriaraadai 
iv  \kyputv. 


EVOLUTION  243 

detailed  character  in  the  doctrine  of  forms,  created  by  Plato  and 
further  developed  by  Aristotle.  Independent  of  time,  the  forms 
serve  as  the  prototypes  and  fundamental  forces  of  the  things. 
These  unchanging  forms  continue  right  through  a  world-process 
which  knows  neither  beginning  nor  end.  All  change  comes 
from  matter,  which,  at  any  rate  in  this  earthly  life,  does  not 
permanently  adhere  to  form,  but,  although  for  a  time  seized 
and  moulded  by  it,  continually  eludes  it  again  and  loses  form : 
therefore  form  must  ever  anew  seize  and  mould  matter ; 
this  explains  the  unceasing  change,  the  restless  becoming  and 
ceasing  to  become.  This  view  was  applied,  in  the  first  place,  to 
individual  living  beings.  But  it  was  not  denied  that  there  was 
movement  and  alteration  outside  this  sphere  ;  changes  in  the 
positions  of  the  stars,  and  the  rising  and  falling  of  nations  were 
readily  recognised.  But  such  changes  as  these  were  thought  on 
closer  examination  to  confirm  the  doctrine  of  permanence ;  for  in 
spite  of  their  great  changes  of  position  the  stars  revolve  in  their 
courses  and  come  back  to  the  starting-point  in  order  to  com- 
mence a  new  cycle.  The  change  is  thus  only  apparent. 
History,  in  the  same  fashion,  consists  of  an  endless  succession 
of  cycles  of  essentially  similar  content ;  for  the  ascent  of  a 
people  only  proceeds  to  a  certain  point  and  then  changes  into 
descent,  until  some  elementary  catastrophe  of  fire  or  water 
brings  about  rejuvenation  and  the  same  movement  is  free  to 
begin  again.  Thus  we  have  an  everlasting  repetition.  What 
we  are  experiencing  now  has  already  taken  place  countless  times 
and  will  take  place  countless  times  again.  The  world  was  not 
represented  as  a  rigid  state  of  being,  but  as  full  of  movement — 
movement  such  as  that  of  the  days  and  years,  strictly  rhythmic 
and  full  of  secure  peace  in  the  midst  of  all  outer  changes.  In 
every  direction  life  is  confined  within  fixed  limits ;  there  is  no 
real  aspiration  beyond  these  limits,  no  progress  into  the  infinite, 
no  hope  of  an  essentially  better  future.  In  its  stead  we  have  a 
conviction  that  the  present,  just  as  it  is,  can  comprehend  the 
eternal  and  fill  our  life  with  it.  Activity  itself  has  in  this  case 
to  absorb  rest,  and  it  accomplishes  this  by  itself  becoming  an 
operation  satiated  and  satisfied  in  itself  ("  energy "  in  the 
Aristotelian  sense)  instead  of  a  mere  striving.  Such  an  activity 


244    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

is  secured  in  the  first  place  by  the  contemplation  of  the  true  and 
the  beautiful,  but,  in  its  highest  form,  conduct,  as  well,  becomes 
the  representation  of  a  constant  type  and  character. 

Such,  a  type  of  thought  consistently  looks  upon  the  unchange- 
able as  good  and  the  changeable  as  bad.  The  main  charac- 
teristic of  the  divinity  is  eternity,  a  state  of  being  unmoved  by 
the  course  of  time.  An  unchangeable  ideal  status  is  held  up  as 
a  guide  to  conduct  and  as  a  standard  of  reference ;  this  we  see, 
more  particularly,  in  the  construction  of  ideal  constitutions 
independent  of  historical  changes.  The  conviction  that  our  life 
rests  upon  fixed  foundations  and  moves  within  fixed  limits  im- 
parts a  characteristic  quality  to  the  work  of  every  sphere  of  life, 
even  of  logic  and  scientific  method.  The  fundamental  truths 
are  supposed  to  exist  in  a  completed  form  as  concepts  and  judg- 
ments. All  that  remains  for  us  to  do  is  to  clearly  define  them, 
to  place  them  in  their  relationships  to  one  another,  and  to  follow 
up  their  consequences.  Inference  thus  becomes  the  main  por- 
tion of  philosophical  work,  while  the  new  age,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  laid  emphasis  rather  upon  the  concepts  and  judgments. 

The  philosophical  doctrines  were  reinforced  from  the  very  out- 
set by  the  subjective  temper  of  the  individual,  who  desired  to 
obtain  a  constant  and  worthy  content  of  life,  in  spite  of  the 
manifold  and  wearisome  changes  arising  from  the  relations  of 
the  city-states  to  one  another.  The  desire  to  leave  the  human 
sphere  and  turn  to  the  universe  was  due  at  the  same  time  to  the 
search  for  an  inward  elevation  and  consolidation  of  existence. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  antique  regime  this  tendency  gained  in 
power  and  Christianity  gave  it  fresh  nourishment.  The  problem 
was  now  passing  from  the  realm  of  art  to  that  of  religion.  The 
most  advanced  Greek  thought  had  sought  for  rest  within  move- 
ment ;  the  problem  now  was  to  rise  above  the  inconstant  and 
meaningless  activity  of  the  world  and  find  rest  in  God,  there  to 
seek  a  refuge,  as  in  a  safe  harbour,  from  the  storms  of  life. 
There  was  a  desire  not  for  pursuit  but  for  possession,  for  firm 
and  secure  possession.  This  type  of  thought  was  deepened 
and  strengthened  in  a  peculiar  degree  through  the  influence  of 
mysticism.  Mysticism  held  the  essence  of  all  wisdom  to  con- 
sist in  reducing  time  to  a  mere  appearance  and  becoming 


EVOLUTION  245 

"younger"  every  day  through  an  increasing  absorption  in  the 
eternal  being.  At  the  time  of  the  passing  away  of  the  ancient 
world  and  the  dawn  of  the  Middle  Ages,  this  idea  seized  hold  of 
men's  minds  all  the  more  powerfully  because  it  corresponded 
with  the  general  state  of  civilisation.  An  old  type  of  human 
culture  had  just  exhausted  its  influence,  and  as  yet  no  fruitful 
beginnings  of  a  new  type  were  at  hand.  Even  the  greatest 
minds  could  see  no  task  higher  than  the  faithful  preservation 
of  man's  existing  possession,  and  its  conscientious  communica- 
tion to  future  generations.  Religious  truth,  as  a  divine  revela- 
tion, seemed,  even  more  than  anything  else,  to  be  unchangeable. 
But  in  other  departments  of  life,  also,  such  as  philosophy  and 
medicine,  law  and  politics,  there  seemed  no  hope  whatever  of 
man  attaining  to  anything  more  than  that  which  he  already 
possessed.  The  dogmas  of  the  Church  were  hardly  more 
authoritative  than  the  teachings  of  Aristotle  and  Galen. 

The  mighty  ordered  system  of  the  Middle  Ages  rests  upon 
these  convictions — a  system  which  set  up  throughout  the  whole 
of  life  unchanging  standards  and  fixed  connections,  outward  and 
inward,  more  particularly  in  economical  relationships,  and  guided 
life  in  secure  pathways  while  permitting  no  desire  for  alteration 
to  find  expression.  Such  a  mode  of  thought  is  far  removed  from 
the  comprehension  of  nature  as  a  realm  of  gradual  development ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  regards  nature  as  engaged  merely  in  the 
conservation  of  the  forms  imparted  to  it,  in  the  first  instance, 
by  the  Creator.* 

From  the  very  beginning  the  Modern  World  was  hostile  to 
the  doctrine  of  permanence,  for  it  could  not  develop  an  indepen- 
dent character  without  a  belief  in  movement  and  in  the  right  to 
move,  and  in  fighting  for  this  belief  it  could  not  fail  to  advance 
its  own  aspirations.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  position  of  humanity 
had  altered  very  appreciably  since  the  close  of  the  Ancient 
World.  New  races  had  arisen,  full  of  exuberant  youthful  energy ; 

*  We  have  not  space  to  quote  more  than  one  characteristic  passage.  Alanus 
de  Insulis  puts  the  following  words  into  the  mouth  of  nature  (see  Baumgartner, 
Die  Philog.  des  A.  d.  J.,  p.  79) :  Me  igitur  tamquam  sui  vicarium  rerum  ycneribus 
nigillandis  monetariam  destinavit,  ut  ego  in  propriis  incudibus  rerum  effigiet 
commonetant  ab  incudi  forma  coiiformatum  deviare  non  sinerem. 


246    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  long  centuries  of  the  Middle  Ages  had  served  to  accumulate 
much  latent  capacity,  which  increasingly  strove  to  manifest  itself 
trusting  in  itself  to  see  the  world  with  its  own  eyes  and  to  shape 
it  towards  its  own  ends.  Men  grew  tired  of  mere  receptivity 
and  acquiescence  in  tradition,  and  there  arose  a  tendency  towards 
the  further  development  and  renewal  of  life.  A  changed  life- 
consciousness  opened  up  new  prospects  and  new  tasks,  while  the 
idea  of  a  progressive  movement  increasingly  dominated  the  life 
and  work  of  humanity. 

It  was,  however,  no  easy  task  to  secure  a  proper  outlet  for  this 
vital  energy.  The  history  of  the  idea  of  evolution  shows  that 
this  task  was  successfully  accomplished  only  by  relating  the  new 
impulse  to  older  efforts,  and  it  indicates  various  stages  through 
which  the  movement  passed.  The  impulse  towards  a  renewal  of 
life  reaches  back  to  Christianity  itself;  although  in  its  ecclesias- 
tical form  Christianity  clung  firmly  to  the  doctrine  of  unchange- 
ability,  its  thought-world  was  not  lacking  in  fruitful  impulses  of 
an  opposite  character.  History  meant  far  more  to  Christianity 
than  it  did  to  the  Ancient  World.  It  was  the  Christian  con- 
viction that  the  divine  had  appeared  in  the  domain  of  time,  not 
as  a  pale  reflection  but  in  the  whole  fullness  of  its  glory ;  hence 
as  the  dominating  central  point  of  the  whole  it  must  relate  the 
whole  past  to  itself  and  unfold  the  whole  future  out  of  itself. 
The  unique  character  of  this  central  occurrence  was  beyond  all 
doubt.  Christ  could  not  come  again  and  yet  again  to  be  cruci- 
fied ;  hence  the  countless  historical  cycles  of  the  Ancient  World 
disappeared,  there  was  no  longer  the  old  eternal  recurrence  of 
things.  History  ceased  to  be  a  uniform  rhythmic  repetition  and 
became  a  comprehensive  whole,  a  single  drama.  Man  was  now 
called  upon  to  accomplish  a  complete  transformation,  and  this 
made  his  life  incomparably  more  tense  than  it  had  been  in  the 
days  when  man  had  merely  to  unfold  an  already  existing  nature. 
Hence  in  Christianity,  and  nowhere  else,  lie  the  roots  of  a  higher 
valuation  of  history  and  of  temporal  life  in  general. 

But  the  realisation  and  definite  expression  of  the  principle 
underlying  these  changes  was  a  slow  process.  Philosophical 
speculation  played  a  chief  part  in  this  work ;  at  that  time  it 
went  hand  in  hand  with  the  desire  for  a  more  genuine  and 


EVOLUTION  247 

inward  appropriation  of  truth,  and  above  everything  else  it 
sought  to  bring  the  world  into  a  more  intimate  relationship  with 
God  than  mere  primitive  credulity  could  do.  What  is  this  world 
with  all  its  activities,  and  what  does  it  signify  from  God's  own 
point  of  view  ?  According  to  Augustine's  answer,  the  world  can 
be  nothing  other  than  the  self-manifestation  of  the  Divine  Being. 
According  to  this  conception,  however,  all  manifoldness  acquires 
an  inner  relationship  and  the  various  historical  events  can  no 
longer  remain  a  mere  disconnected  sequence,  but  become  parts 
of  a  general  movement,  nay,  of  a  single  world-embracing  action ; 
even  that  which  subsequently  comes  upon  the  scene  must  have 
been  in  some  way  already  present  in  the  preceding  events.  Thus 
the  whole  world-process  may  be  compared  to  the  development  of 
a  tree  from  its  seed.*  The  mystical  speculation  of  Dionysius, 
Scotus  Erigena,  and  others  carried  this  line  of  thought  still 
further,  conceiving  the  whole  world  as  an  auswickeln  (unrolling) 
of  that  which  is  eingewickelt  (rolled  up)  in  God,  as  a  develop- 
ment of  eternity  to  temporal  life,  of  invisible  unity  to  visible 
plurality.  The  terms  and  images  associated  with  this  type  of 
thought  are  certainly  not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lead  us  to 
identify  it  too  closely  with  modern  evolutionary  doctrines.  Both 
the  fundamental  being  and  the  motive  force  remained  of  a  wholly 
transcendental  description ;  the  chain  of  occurrences  and  the 
series  of  sequences  did  not  spring  from  the  realm  of  time  itself; 
they  were  a  timeless  differentiation  of  the  divine  unity.  As  this 
unity,  with  its  eternal  rest,  was  held  to  be  unconditionally  higher 
than  the  world,  life,  in  these  latter  days,  did  not  strive  to  enter 

*  Augustine  is  the  leading  spirit  of  the  above  tendency.  The  following 
passage  is  particularly  characteristic  of  his  teaching  with  regard  to  evolution 
(op.  iii.  148  D) :  Sicut  in  ipso  grano  invisibiliter  erant  omnia  simul  qua  per 
tempora  in  arborem  surgerent :  ita  ipse  mundus  cogitandus  est,  cum  Deus  simul 
omnia  creavit,  luibuisse  simul  omnia  qua  in  illo  et  cum  illo  facia  sunt,  quando 
factus  est  dies,  non  solum  calum  cum  sole  et  luna  cum  sideribus — sed  etiam  ilia 
qua  aqua  et  terra  produxit,  POTENTIALITEB  ATQDE  CAUSALITEE,  priusquam  per  tem- 
porum  morat  ita  exorirentur,  quomodo  nobis  jam  nota  vn  eit  operibus,  qua  Deu$ 
usque  nunc  operatur.  V.  714  E  shows  how  he  conceived  of  the  development  of 
a  tree  from  its  seed :  In  illo  grano  seminis  exiguo,  vix  visibili,  si  consideret 
animo,  non  oculis,  in  ilia  exiguitate,  illis  angustiit  et  radix  latet  et  robur 
insertum  est  et  folia  futura  alligata  sunt  et  fructus,  qui  apparebit  in  arbor  e,  jam 
ett  pramixxut  in  tendne. 


248    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

into  the  fullness  of  the  world,  but  rather  to  retire  from  it  into  the 
unity  superior  to  all  plurality  and  movement,  separation  and 
unrest.  But  in  spite  of  these  important  differences  it  was  the 
world  of  mystical  and  speculative  thought  which  introduced  the 
modern  doctrine  of  evolution.  The  former,  in  describing  the 
world  as  a  manifestation  of  the  Divine  Being,  had  taught  men 
to  think  more  highly  of  it  and  had  directed  life  towards  the 
eternal  and  infinite.  The  world  would  not  appear  so  imposing 
to  the  modern  investigator  if  the  idea  of  God,  of  the  Absolute 
Being,  had  not  lent  it  life  and  splendour. 

Before  secure  progress  in  this  direction  was  possible,  an  im- 
portant modification  had  to  take  place  in  the  view  of  the  world's 
relationship  to  God.  It  would  not  do  for  the  closer  union  of  the 
world  and  God  to  have  the  effect  of  allowing  the  world  to  become 
completely  absorbed  in  God  ;  it  must  rather  tend  towards  giving 
it  a  higher  value  as  the  expression  of  the  Divine  Being.  Now, 
this  alteration  in  point  of  view  is  to  be  seen  in  the  teaching 
of  Nicholas  of  Cusa  (1401-64),  the  pioneer  philosopher  of  the 
Renaissance ;  he  saw  the  world  as  the  unfolding  of  the  infinite 
life  (the  new  speculation,  in  dealing  with  the  idea  of  God,  usually 
placed  infinity  before  eternity),  and  hence  filled  through  and 
through  with  life ;  he  fancied  it  thirsting  at  every  point  for 
participation  in  the  infinite  life,  and  for  this  very  reason  carry- 
ing in  itself  an  impulse  towards  unlimited  progress.*  It  was 

*  Only  a  progress  into  the  infinite  can  provide  the  wealth  of  life  contained 
in  the  Absolute  Being  with  the  means  of  expression ;  see,  for  example,  Nicholas 
of  Cusa  (Paris  ed.  of  1514,  ii.  188  a) :  Posse  temper  plus  et  plus  intelligere  sine 
fine,  est  similitude  teterna  sapientue,  et  ex  hoc  dice,  quod  est  viva  imago,  qua  se 
conformat  creator*  sine  fine.  II.  187  b :  Semper  vellet  id  quod  intelligit  plus 
intellegere  et  quod  amat  plus  amare,  et  mundus  totus  non  sufficit  ei,  quia  non 
replet  desiderium  intelligendi  ejus. 

In  spite  of  the  prevailing  doctrine  of  permanence  the  concept  of  progress 
was  by  no  means  strange  to  the  Ancient  World ;  Plato  and  Aristotle  have 
the  expressions  liriSoaic  and  iiriSitovat  for  it  ;  the  Stoic  irpoKoirij  was,  however, 
far  more  prominent  and  was  used  (for  example  by  Polybius)  exactly  in  the  sense 
of  our  "  progress."  The  idea  of  a  progress  into  the  infinite  has  its  roots  among 
the  Platonists  and  mystics,  but  did  not  attain  full  development  until  the  philo- 
sophy of  the  New  Period  came  into  being.  Leibniz  represents  its  highest  level 
(see,  for  example,  150  a,  Erdm.) :  In  cumulum  etiam  pulchritudinis  perfection- 
isque  universalis  operum  divinorum  progressus  quidam  perpetuus  liberrimusque 
totius  universi  est  agnoscendus,  ita  ut  ad  maiorem  semper  cultum  procedat  ff. ; 


EVOLUTION  249 

the  duty  of  created  beings  to  approximate,  by  means  of  a  gradual 
growth,  towards  those  qualities  which  God  already  possessed. 
In  this  manner  the  function  of  movement  was  essentially  en- 
nobled and  an  upward  aspiration  was  imparted  to  the  whole 
world.  At  the  same  time,  in  exact  contrast  to  the  latter  days 
of  the  Ancient  World,  the  artistic  was  assigned  a  place  by  the 
side  of  the  religious  ;  nay,  it  began  to  replace  the  latter.  As 
the  world  more  and  more  took  on  the  form  of  a  living  work 
of  art  in  whose  harmony  all  apparent  contrasts  vanish,  it  seemed 
to  produce  movement  (like  all  development)  from  within,  through 
the  unfolding  of  its  own  being.  The  absolute  now  meant  not  so 
much  a  domain  of  its  own  as  a  depth  or  background  of  the 
world.  Giordano  Bruno's  thought  represented  the  victory  of 
pantheism  over  theism.  Henceforth  the  immanent  and  artistic 
form  of  the  theory  of  evolution  predominated,  and  down  to  the 
present  day  the  terms  and  symbols  we  make  use  of  stand  under 
its  influence.  The  upward  movement  of  nature,  working  from 
within  outwards,  was  now  compared  to  the  quiet  and  unceasing 
growth  of  plants.  The  Enlightenment,  since  it  split  up  nature 
into  soulless  elements,  was  less  favourable  to  this  type  of 
thought ;  *  on  the  other  hand,  the  reaction  against  the  En- 
lightenment (as  exemplified  in  German  Humanism)  did  full 
iustice  to  it.  Here  not  the  mere  movement  but  the  artistic 
construction  was  looked  upon  as  the  main  work  of  nature : 
hence  all  change  became  a  development  from  within  and  all 

further,  Deutsche  Schriften,  ii.  36  :  "  The  perfection  of  all  creatures,  including 
man,  consists  in  a  strong  and  unhampered  forward  impulse  towards  ever  new 
perfections."  In  the  case  of  Wolff  and  his  school,  perpetuut  sive  non  impeditus 
ad  majores  perfections  progrettus  was  reckoned  the  highest  good.  The  term 
Fortschritt  (progress)  probably  first  took  rank  as  a  fixed  term  in  the  second  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century. 

*  At  the  same  time  there  is  no  lack  of  stimulating  ideas  along  these  lines. 
See,  for  example,  the  little  noticed  passage  in  Leibniz's  chief  work  (Nouv.  E$$., 
Hi.,  c.  vi.,  p.  317  a  (Erdm.) :  Peut-etre  que  dans  quelque  terns  ou  dans  quelque 
lieu  de  I'univers  les  especes  det  animaux  tout  ou  itaient  ou  teront  plus  sujets  a 
changer,  qu'elles  ne  sont  prgsentement  parmi  nous,  et  plusieurs  animaux  qui  ont 
quelque  chose  du  chat,  comme  le  lion,  le  tigre,  et  le  lynx  pourraient  avoir  et& 
d'une  meme  race  et  pourront  etre  maintenant  comme  det  sousdivisions  nouveUet 
de  I'ancienne  espece  des  chatt.  Ainsi  je  revient  toujours  a  ce  que  j'ai  dit  plus 
d'une  fois  que  not  determinations  det  especes  vhysiques  sont  provisioiielles  et 
proportionelles  a  not  connaissances. 


250    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

multiplicity  of  form  seemed  to  be  reducible  to  a  single  funda- 
mental type.  Spreading  beyond  the  realm  of  nature,  the  idea 
of  evolution  then  mastered  the  life  of  man  and  the  cosmos  as 
a  whole  ;  "  everything  which  occurs  in  reality  "  was  now  viewed 
as  the  "  development  of  an  absolute  reason  "  (Schelling,  i.  481). 
In  the  more  detailed  working  out  of  this  idea  different  tendencies 
became  apparent ;  Romanticism  laid  special  stress  upon  the  quiet 
growth  and  increase,  while  Hegel  with  his  cosmic  logic  brought 
a  larger  element  of  self-activity  into  the  conception  of  evolution  ; 
in  every  case,  however,  the  movement  works  from  within  out- 
ward, the  superior  force  of  the  whole  being  looked  upon  as 
operative  at  each  separate  point. 

It  is  precisely  this  inwardness  which  distinguishes  the  artistic 
view  of  evolution  from  the  strictly  scientific  (which  is  peculiar  to 
the  Modern  World),  for  the  latter  abandons  all  inner  relation- 
ships and  considers  the  problem  entirely  from  the  point  of  view 
of  immediate  existence ;  the  empirical  co-operation  of  the  ele- 
ments is  to  teach  us  how  to  understand  nature  as  a  whole,  and 
all  progress  is  to  take  place  in  a  temporal  sequence.  The  idea 
of  evolution,  thus  interpreted,  has  become  a  corner-stone  of 
modern  science  It  has  the  effect  of  reducing  the  immediate 
aspect  of  things  to  a  mere  appearance  ;  starting  with  this,  it 
still  remains  for  us  to  penetrate  to  the  real  conditions.  This  is 
accomplished  by  a  process  of  analysis,  which  picks  out  the 
simplest  elements ;  laws  are  then  discovered  which  reveal  the 
manner  of  operation  of  these  elements,  and  finally,  by  means 
of  the  idea  of  evolution,  the  world  is  built  up  anew  and  the 
existing  state  of  affairs  is  made  comprehensible  as  the  result 
of  historical  growth.  Thus  modern  science  makes  use  of  the 
evolutionary  doctrine  as  a  chief  synthetic  principle,  and  it  is 
at  the  same  time  the  completion  and  the  touchstone  of  the  whole 
work  of  scientific  enquiry :  no  wonder  that  modern  thought  and 
modern  humanity  feel  themselves  to  be  indebted  to  it. 

The  new  doctrine  of  evolution  came  into  being  simultaneously 
with  the  definite  uprising  of  the  modern  type  of  thought. 
Descartes  already  entertained  the  idea  (if  only  as  a  possibility) 
that  the  present  state  of  the  world  had  been  gradually  brought 
about  as  the  result  of  a  temporal  process  (aim  tempore,  sue- 


EVOLUTION  251 

cessive).*  As  the  centuries  passed  by  this  idea  mastered  each 
separate  department  of  thought  and  engraved  itself  more  and 
more  deeply  upon  the  body  of  our  knowledge.!  In  cosmology, 
the  ancient  idea  of  the  unchangeability  of  the  astronomical 
world  gave  way  to  that  of  the  gradual  development  of  the 
celestial  bodies  and  their  systems  (Kant  and  Laplace).  Again, 
the  content  of  the  soul  is  no  longer  taken  as  ready-made  and 
then  described  and  analysed,  after  the  old-fashioned  style, 
modern  psychology  having  striven,  since  Locke's  time,  to 
understand  the  growth  and  development  of  the  soul  genetically, 
through  a  study  of  the  simplest  phenomena  of  life.  Human 
history,  too,  takes  on  the  appearance  of  a  gradual  upward  move- 
ment from  almost  imperceptible  beginnings  to  unlimited  heights 
of  achievement.  Similarly,  the  other  departments  of  human 
culture  are  looked  upon  as  being  in  a  condition  of  flux  and 
change :  in  fact,  on  every  hand  science  has  undergone  a  trans- 
formation as  compared  with  the  former  point  of  view.  For- 
merly, science  selected  what  was  permanent  and  immediately 
linked  it  up  to  form  a  fixed  whole ;  it  was  an  artistic  present- 
ment of  manifoldness  as  a  whole ;  but  now  it  brought  the 
(apparently)  fixed  into  flux  and  dug  its  way  with  unceasing 
energy  down  to  smaller  and  smaller  elements,  converting  reality 
into  an  unfinished  process.  In  this  way  it  seemed  to  come  into 
much  closer  touch  with  things,  while  formerly  it  had  approached 
them  from  outside ;  hence  to  bring  a  thing  within  the  sphere 
of  evolution  meant  to  throw  a  new  and  powerful  light  upon  it. 
Although  the  modern  idea  of  evolution  had  long  been  influ- 
ential, it  did  not  really  become  predominant  in  life  and  work 
as  a  whole  until  Darwin  set  his  mark  upon  it.  To  begin  with, 

*  Clauberg  described  the  Cartesian  method  after  the  following  fashion,  and 
his  description  is,  in  essentials,  accurate :  Hanc  methodum  Cartesiana  physica 
tenent  considerat  omnes  re*  naturales  non  statim  quales  tunt  in  statu  perfectionis 
suce  absolute  (ut  vulgo  fieri  solet  ab  aliis) ,  sed  prius  agit  de  quibusdam  eurundem 
principiis  valde  simplicibus  etfacilibus,  deinde  explicat,  quomodo  paulatim  ex  illis 
principiis,  supremo,  causa  certit  legibut  opus  dirigente,  oriantur  et  fiant  aut 
eerie,  oriri  aut  fieri  possint,  donee  tandem  tales  evadant,  quales  etse  experimur 
dum  consummate  et  absolutes  sunt  (op.  philos.  755). 

t  An  important  part  of  this  movement  is  dealt  with  in  an  admirable  manner 
by  H.  Heussler  in  Der  Rationalismus  des  17  Jahrhunderts  in  seinen  Beziehungen 
tur  Entwicklungslehre,  1885. 


252    MAIN.  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

his  work  filled  up  a  great  gap.  Until  then  organic  forms  had 
persistently  resisted  genetical  explanation,  subsisting  as  an 
unbridged  gulf  between  the  universal  concept  of  evolution,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  experiences  of  human  development  on 
the  other,  thereby  preventing  the  thoroughgoing  application 
of  the  former  to  the  latter.  It  is  true  that  important  beginnings 
of  an  explanation  existed  (for  which  we  are  indebted  for  the 
most  part  to  Lamarck),  but  these  beginnings  were  not  con- 
nected up  to  form  a  complete  whole,  and  hence  failed  to  compel 
conviction.  Through  his  combination  of  the  doctrine  of  descent 
with  that  of  selection,  Darwin  filled  up  this  gap  and  supplied 
the  whole  with  the  portion  necessary  for  its  completion.  The 
peculiar  strength  of  his  teaching  lies  in  the  fact  that  by  means 
of  an  exceedingly  detailed  investigation  of  his  particular  depart- 
ment he  elaborated  concepts  which  seemed  to  b«  capable  of 
immeasurable  application  in  everv  direction.  As  Helmholtz 
expresses  it :  "  He  elevated  each  separate  department  above 
that  condition  in  which  it  merely  contained  an  accumulation 
of  enigmatical  observations  and  connected  it  up  with  a  great 
development,  at  the  same  time  establishing  definite  concepts 
in  the  place  of  what  may  be  called  an  artistic  mode  of  viewing 
things"  (Pop.  Wissenschaft.  Vortrdge,  2nd  ed.,  ii.  204).  The 
service  which  Darwin  has  rendered  us  suffers  no  diminution 
through  the  ever-increasing  insight  into  the  limitations  of  the 
doctrine  of  selection,  with  its  struggle  for  existence  and  survival 
of  the  fittest :  for  Darwin  himself  did  not  offer  this  theory  as 
the  sole  explanation  of  organic  forms.  The  fact  remains  that 
it  was  he  who  raised  the  problem  into  a  new  position,  and  that 
it  was  through  his  establishment  of  the  idea  of  evolution  in 
the  sphere  of  organic  life  that  this  idea  was  enabled  to  enlarge 
itself  to  a  view  of  life  as  a  whole. 

This  development  was  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  Herbert 
Spencer,  who,  approaching  the  matter  from  a  realistic  point  of 
view,  was  the  first  to  employ  the  doctrine  of  evolution  as  the 
basis  of  a  specific  view  of  life.  For  him,  evolution  was  a  tran- 
sition from  a  comparatively  disconnected  state  of  things  to  one 
that  was  more  connected.  Evolution  seemed  to  him  the  most 
universal  fact  in  the  world;  he  saw  it  in  the  integration  of 


EVOLUTION  253 

matter  and  the  disintegration  of  movement,  and  following  upon 
this  period,  so  as  to  form  an  endless  cycle,  he  perceived  another 
period  of  dissolution — an  absorption  of  movement  and  a  disin- 
tegration of  matter.  Thence  follows  a  transition  from  the 
similar  to  the  dissimilar,  an  increasing  specialisation  and  differ- 
entiation in  the  world  as  a  whole,  in  the  various  celestial  bodies, 
in  human  society,  in  human  culture,  and  in  the  individual ; 
the  period  of  disintegration  follows  in  the  opposite  direction. 
There  is  no  mistaking  the  relationship  between  this  rhythmic 
movement  and  certain  ideas  put  forward  by  the  oldest  Greek 
philosophers  (more  particularly  Empedocles).  If  Spencer's 
teaching  (which  in  general  outline  preceded  Darwin's)  supplied 
the  latter's  thought  with  a  universal  background,  it  gained 
immeasurably  itself  in  fullness,  demonstrability,  and  penetra- 
tion, by  its  association  with  Darwinian  ideas. 

In  spite  of  the  great  progress  made  by  the  theory  of  develop- 
ment, the  doctrine  of  permanence  is  too  deeply  rooted  in 
important  departments  of  life  for  it  to  yield  without  offering 
considerable  resistance.  Religion,  in  particular,  not  only  sees 
individual  portions  of  its  traditional  sphere  of  ideas  threat- 
ened, but  also  the  (to  it)  indispensable  idea  of  an  eternal  truth. 
But  in  this  case,  as  in  others,  the  view  is  becoming  more  and 
more  established  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  doctrine  of  evolution 
itself  which  involves  an  irremediable  opposition  to  religion  as 
its  (by  no  means  necessary)  amalgamation  with  materialistic, 
or  at  any  rate  naturalistic  convictions.* 

*  In  this  connection  we  may  mention,  among  others,  a  passage  from  the 
works  of  the  eminent  French  theologian,  Archbishop  Mignot.  He  says  in  his 
well-known  speech  on  the  methods  of  theology  (see  Bulletin  de  literature  eccU- 
siastique,  Nov.,  1901,  p.  272) :  Vous  savez  avee  quelle  defiance  justified  fut 
re$ue  dans  nos  ecoles,  il  y  a  trente  ans,  Videe  devolution,  qui  paraissait  lite  par 
de  graves  compromissions  avec  la  philosophic  pantheiste ;  depuis  que  I'analyse 
en  a  precise'  le  contenu,  on  est  a  pen  pres  unanime  a  reconnoitre  qu'une  certaine 
fayon  d'entendre  revolution  ett  conciliable  avec  une  conception  religieuse  et 
chretienne  de  I'univerte ;  on  en  trouve  le  germe  dans  saint  Augustin,  et  on 
decouvre,  avec  Vincent  de  Lerins,  qu'appliquee  a  I'histoire  religieuse,  elle  pent 
apporter  de  grandes  clartes  dans  des  problemes  qui  teraient  restes  insolubles. 
Beischle,  too,  makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  evolutionism  as  a  view  of  life 
and  the  actual  facts  of  evolution  (see  Wissenschaftliche  Entwicklungsforschung 
und  evolutionistische  Weltanschauung  in  ihrem  Verhaltnis  zum  Christentum,  in 
the  Zeitschrift  fur  Theologie  u.  Kirche,  12th  series,  1st  vol.  We  may  also 
draw  attention  to  Newman's  theory  of  development  (see  Cardinal  Newman, 
Lady  Blennerhassett) 


All  these  considerations  combine  to  make  evolution  some- 
thing far  more  than  simply  one  of  a  number  of  theories  ;  it  has 
taken  over  the  leadership  of  the  whole  and  given  rise  to  a  new 
type  of  life — a  type  which  very  essentially  alters  our  fundamental 
relationship  to  reality  and  the  nature  of  our  conduct.  It  is  no 
longer  a  question  of  assimilating  an  already  existing  reality. 
We  have  now  to  assist  in  the  completion  of  an  unfinished 
reality.  Activity  thus  becomes  more  closely  associated  with 
environment,  and  in  this  manner  it  is  enabled  to  acquire  its 
more  precise  form ;  it  may  be  said  to  stand,  not  by  the  side  of, 
but  in  the  midst  of  the  world,  and  to  co-operate  in  its  develop- 
ment. There  is  an  end  of  the  ancient  flight  from  the  stream  of 
temporal  affairs  to  a  changeless  eternity,  as  well  as  of  the  erec- 
tion of  an  ideal  consummation  of  things  as  the  predestined  goal 
of  the  universe :  our  task  is  now  rather  to  follow  whole- 
heartedly the  movement  of  the  age,  and  to  adapt  conduct  as  far 
as  possible  to  the  demands  of  the  existing  situation.  This 
rouses  every  department  of  life  out  of  its  inertia  and  brings  it 
into  brisk  movement ;  it  sets  law  and  education,  for  example, 
in  closer  relation  to  the  age,  and  confronts  them  with  the  tasks 
of  the  living  present.  Thus  there  has  arisen  the  characteristic 
concept  "  modern,"  the  seizing  of  the  immediate  instant  and 
the  moulding  of  all  relationships  according  to  its  needs,  an 
elasticity  of  life,  a  readiness  to  take  up  new  developments. 
When  growth  constitutes,  to  employ  Hegel's  expression,  "  the 
truth  of  being,"  then  ideas,  too,  must  share  in  the  general 
mobility ;  our  ends  also  become  liable  to  change,  and  truth 
becomes  a  "  child  of  the  age  "  (veritas  temporis  filia).  Obvi- 
ously this  places  life  at  the  mercy  of  a  complete  relativism  ;  but 
since  the  older  type  of  thought  lost  its  force  this  has  ceased 
to  frighten  us;  for  the  appropriation  of  a  complete  truth, 
already  existing  around  us,  is  no  longer  regarded  as  the  chief 
end,  our  aim,  now,  being  the  production  of  as  rich  a  life  as 
possible  within  our  own  sphere ;  and  for  this  purpose  the  more 
relative  type  of  thought,  with  its  unlimited  mobility  and  adapt- 
ability, seems  particularly  suitable.  Nor  does  this  simply  affect 
the  inner  movements  of  the  soul.  The  outward  developments 
of  modern  life,  also,  have  most  effectively  supported  this  con- 


EVOLUTION  255 

version  of  existence  into  a  restless  progressive  movement. 
Technical  science  has  accelerated  the  life-process  in  undreamt- 
of fashion,  made  the  immediate  moment  more  important,  and 
immeasurably  multiplied  points  of  contact  and  possibilities  of 
change :  all  work  is  now  involved  in  unceasing  variation,  which 
extends  to  its  very  instruments.*  Taking  all  this  into  account, 
the  victory  of  the  doctrine  of  change  seems  to  be  definite  and 
final,  and  it  appears  to  have  brought  us  a  freer,  fresher,  and 
more  vigorous  life.t 

(c)  The   Complications   and   Limitations  of  the   merely 
Evolutionary   Doctrine 

The  foregoing  possesses  its  own  truth  and  justification.  It 
would  be  folly  to  place  oneself  in  opposition  to  suck  a  mass 
of  facts,  and  it  would  be  petty  to  pick  out  isolated  errors  and 
emphasise  these.  But  it  by  no  means  follows  from  these  dis- 
coveries that  life  and  the  world  are  absorbed  in  the  process 
of  evolution,  that  the  struggle  between  the  doctrine  of  movement 
and  that  of  permanence  is  finally  settled.  It  would  be  u  very 
extraordinary  thing  if  the  idea  of  development  itself  were  quite 
free  from  difiiculties,  if  a  tendency  which  has  carried  the  age 

*  The  consequences  of  this  as  they  affect  social  problems  are  dealt  with 
more  particularly  by  Karl  Marx,  whose  treatment  of  the  subject  is  very  pene- 
trating. He  says  (see  Das  Kapital,  i.  479):  "Modern  industry  always  looks 
upon  and  treats  the  given  form  of  a  process  of  production  as  variable  ;  its 
technological  basis  is  therefore  revolutionary,  while  that  of  all  previous  modes 
of  production  was  essentially  conservative." 

f  It  is  suiiiciently  remarkable  that  in  the  very  age  which  is  notable  for  the 
victorious  progress  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  science  is  raising  serious  doubts 
as  to  the  permanent  existence  of  life  ;  doubts  which  are  based  upon  the  fact 
that  warmth  can  pass  only  from  warm  bodies  to  colder  ones,  and  hence  the 
universe  is  moving  towards  a  state  of  equilibrium  in  which  life  must  cease. 
It  may  be  asked  if  there  is  no  opposing  movement,  and  in  this  connection  we 
refer  to  the  theory  of  pressure  due  to  radiation,  which  has  been  applied  to  this 
problem  in  a  very  fruitful  manner  (more  especially  by  Arrhenius).  Thus 
Arrhenius  comes  to  the  conclusion  (see  Das  Werden  der  Welten,  p.  190) :  "  Through 
this  compensating  co-operation  of  gravitation  and  pressure  due  to  radiation, 
as  well  as  of  equalisation  of  temperature  and  concentration  of  warmth,  it 
becomes  possible  for  the  evolution  of  the  world  to  proceed  in  a  continuous 
cycle  of  which  we  cannot  perceive  either  the  beginning  or  the  end,  and 
according  to  which  life  has  the  prospect  of  existing  continuously  and  without 
reduction." 


256    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

so  overpoweringly  with  it  did  not  contain  much  that  was  obscure, 
if  the  exclusive  devotion  to  one  particular  line  of  thought  did  not 
neglect  much  that  should  not  have  been  neglected,  whether 
of  a  supplementary  or  a  contradictory  nature.  Following  the 
plan  of  our  work,  we  will  proceed  to  consider  more  particularly 
the  following  points :  How  do  these  changes  and  these  theories 
affect  the  life-process,  and  how  does  the  latter  shape  itself  under 
their  influence — in  particular,  is  it  capable,  under  these  circum- 
stances, of  preserving  a  spiritual  character  ?  Every  movement 
must  justify  itself  with  regard  to  the  problem  of  the  possibility 
of  spiritual  life. 

The  terms  which  it  employs  would  alone  reveal  the  fact  that 
in  the  modern  doctrine  of  evolution  different  tendencies  are 
operating  together.  The  use  of  tho  terms  "development"  and 
"evolution"  really  involves  the  assumption  that  the  things  unfold 
from  within  according  to  a  law  of  the  whole,  and  are  being 
definitely  directed  towards  an  end.  This  is  not,  however,  the 
accepted  doctrine  of  the  predominant  modern  tendency,  which, 
on  the  contrary,  looks  for  all  progress  from  the  combination  of 
elements  which  are  originally  indifferent  to  one  another,  and 
from  a  slow  summation  of  small  movements ;  it  rejects  all  inner 
aims  and  tendencies,  all  "  working  from  a  whole."  What,  then, 
is  the  object  of  the  above  expressions,  which  inevitably  give  rise 
to  the  misleading  idea  of  a  movement  steadily  and  quietly 
growing  from  within  ?  Do  they  not  impart  far  too  agreeable  an 
appearance  to  a  view  of  the  world  which  is  in  reality  soulless 
and  meaningless ;  do  they  not  serve  to  conceal  the  upheavals 
and  negations  which  are  involved  in  this  conception  of  life  ? 

Meanwhile,  the  popular  mind  is  not  much  troubled  by  any 
such  doubts.  Intoxicated  by  the  idea  of  evolution,  of  endless 
,  progress,  of  an  unlimited  improvement  of  everything,  it  does  not 
feel  the  lack  of  a  more  precise  conception.  Many  of  the  disciples 
of  evolution  are  to-day  filled  with  an  enthusiasm  so  vague  that 
they  forget  to  ask  what  or  how,  whence  or  whither?  The 
greater  the  absence  of  precision,  the  vaguer  the  conception,  the 
more  confident  is  their  assurance,  the  more  heedless  their 
enthusiasm. 

At  any  rate  there  is  no  mistaking  the  fact  that  in  the  leading 


EVOLUTION  257 

systems  of  modern  evolutionary  thought  a  mechanical  view 
predominates  and  is  looked  upon  as  the  final  solution  of  the 
problem.  The  older  view  of  evolution,  artistic  or  logical  in 
character,  has  been  for  the  most  part  thrust  aside:  Hegel 
(although  his  influence  may  be  secretly  operative  to  a  greater 
extent  than  most  people  imagine)  has  been  superseded  by 
Darwin. 

In  the  case  of  Darwin  and  Darwinism  the  two  chief  ideas  of 
descent  and  selection  must  be  clearly  distinguished  from  one 
another.  The  theory  of  descent  receives  so  much  corroboration 
from  so  many  different  quarters,  and  has  demonstrated  itself 
to  be  so  immeasurably  fruitful,  that  it  can  hardly  be  said  to 
meet  with  any  scientific  opposition.  The  theory  of  selection,  on 
the  other  hand,  which  for  a  time  carried  the  scientific  world  by 
storm,  has  met  with  increased  opposition.  From  the  very  be- 
ginning the  predominant  philosophical  tendency  has  been  against 
the  idea  that  all  the  forms  we  see  around  us  have  come  into 
existence  solely  through  an  accumulation  of  accidental  individual 
variations,  by  the  mere  blind  concurrence  of  these  variations 
and  their  actual  survival,*  without  the  operation  of  any  inner 
law.  Natural  science,  too,  has  more  and  more  demonstrated 
its  inadequacy.  Within  the  very  sphere  of  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion itself  this  particular  view  has  to  meet  increasing  opposition. 
We  cannot  now  go  into  these  problems  more  in  detail,  but  we 
may  just  refer  to  Weissmann's  theories,  to  the  mechanics  of 
evolution,  and  to  the  doctrine  of  mutation.  The  same  movement 

*  We  may  here  refer  more  particularly  to  the  tireless  and  penetrating  work 
of  E.  von  Hartmann,  who  has  demonstrated  the  inadequacy  of  this  doctrine 
in  the  most  convincing  fashion  (from  the  point  of  view  both  of  speculation  and 
of  fact).  In  his  most  recent  treatment  of  this  question,  in  the  Abstain- 
mungslehre  seit  Darwin  (see  the  Annalen  der  Naturphilotophie,  ii.  3)  he  sums 
tip  (on  p.  354)  the  results  of  the  investigations  of  the  last  decade  as  follows : 
"  Selection  can  accomplish  no  positive  achievement  at  all ;  it  can  only  operate 
negatively  by  exclusion.  The  production  of  new  types  through  minimal 
alterations  is  possible  though  not  proved,  and  since  the  undulating  character 
of  minimal  alterations  has  been  known  it  has  become  less  probable.  Sudden 
alteration  has  now  come  to  the  front.  Accident  gives  way  to  a  definitely 
directed,  systematic  evolutionary  tendency  due  to  inner  causes ;  this  makes 
itself  seen  just  as  much  in  the  smallest  as  in  the  sudden  alterations.  The 
claim  put  forward  by  Darwinism  to  explain  purposive  results  from  purely 
mechanical  causes  is  totally  untenable." 

17 


258    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

which  is  again  bringing  the  characteristic  features  and  the 
problems  of  life  more  to  the  front  is  bound  to  resist  the  attempt 
to  abide  by  a  mechanical  doctrine  of  evolution,  and  will  recom- 
mend a  dynamical  one.  This  is  seen  in  the  re-acceptance  and 
development  of  Lamarckian  ideas,  also  in  the  accompanying 
sharp  criticism  of  a  merely  mechanical  doctrine  of  evolution, 
denying,  as  it  must,  all  development  from  within  and  from  the 
whole.  Amongst  other  things,  it  is  urged  against  the 
mechanical  theory  that  its  denial  of  all  inner  impulse  abandons, 
in  principle,  all  essential  progress  in  life,  and  with  it  the  idea 
of  evolution ;  *  another  equally  important  objection  is  that  this 
doctrine  only  reaches  a  plausible  conclusion  by  assuming  that 
the  elements  already  possess  the  qualities  visible  on  the  highest 
levels  of  development,  t  Here  are  great  tendencies  side  by  side, 
and  the  conflict  between  them  still  continues,  moving  now  in 
this  direction,  now  in  that.  One  thing  at  any  rate  is  certain : 
the  situation  does  not  appear  so  simple  to-day  as  it  did  to 
Darwin's  enthusiastic  disciples  (Darwin  himselt  was  less 
dogmatic). 

Singularly  enough,  however,  this  same  doctrine  of  selection, 
which  in  its  original  sphere  is  being  more  and  more  critically 
handled  and  increasingly  limited,  is  constantly  gaining  ground 

*  Bergson  remarks  (L'tvolut.  creatrice,  p.  40) :  L'etsence  des  explications 
mecaniques  est  en  effet  de  conside'rer  I'avenir  et  le  passe"  comme  calculables  en 
fonction  du  present  et  de  prdtendre  ainsi  que  tout  est  donne".  Bergson  himself 
defends  the  idea  d'un  Alan  originel  de  la  vie,  passant  d'ime  g6n6ration  de  germes 
a  la  generation  suivante  de  germes  par  Vintermidiare  des  organismes  developpe's 
quiforment  entre  les  germes  le  trait  d'union.  Get  6lan,  se  conservant  sur  les 
lignes  devolution  entre  lesquelles  il  se  partage,  est  la  cause  profondes  des  varia- 
tions, du  mains  de  celles  qui  se  transmittent  regulierement,  qui  s'additionnent, 
qui  crient  des  especes  nouvelles.  En  g6n6ral,  quand  des  especes  out  commence  d 
diverger  d  partir  d'une  souche  commune,  elles  accentuent  leur  divergence  d  mesure 
qu1  elles  progressent  dans  leur  Evolution.  Pourtant,  sur  des  points  de]finis,  elles 
pourront  et  devront  meme  6voluer  identiquement  si  Von  accepte  I'hypothese  d'un 
elan  commun. 

t  See  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter :  "In  this  case  that  which  has  to  be  explained 
is  simply  accepted  as  it  stands  and  straightway  attributed  to  the  atoms,  in 
the  hope  of  thus  bringing  the  matter  to  an  end."  Bergson,  L'e"vol.  cr6at.,\\.,  finds 
the  error  of  Spencer's  evolutionism  in  that  it  endeavours  d  decouper  la  rialit& 
actuelle,  dejd  evoluee,  en  petits  morceaux  non  moins  6volues,  puis  d  la  recomposer 
avec  ces  fragments,  et  d  se  donner  ainsi,  par  avance,  tout  ce  qu'il  s'agit 
d'expliquer. 


EVOLUTION  259 

outside  this  sphere  in  the  general  study  of  things  human.  In 
all  quarters  there  is  a  widespread  inclination  to  go  back  to  the 
simplest  possible  beginnings,  which  exhibit  man  nearly  related 
to  the  animal  world,  to  trace  back  the  upward  movement  not 
to  an  inner  impulse,  but  to  a  gradual  forward  thrust  produced 
by  outward  necessities,  and  to  understand  it  as  a  mere  adapta- 
tion to  environment  and  to  the  conditions  of  life.  It  seems  to 
be  all  a  mere  question  of  natural  existence,  of  victory  in  the 
struggle  against  rivals.  In  the  so-called  "higher,"  then,  nothing 
essentially  new  is  introduced,  we  have  nothing  but  com- 
binations and  variations  of  the  elementary  phenomena  of  life ; 
as  a  necessary  consequence  spiritual  life  cannot  be  credited  with 
the  least  independence.  The  change  of  concepts  which  this 
view  involves  penetrates  deeply  into  the  various  departments  of 
life.  When  all  development  of  life  is  reducible  to  a  main- 
tenance in  the  struggle  for  survival,  when  all  spiritual  mani- 
festation becomes  a  mere  adjunct  of  physical  existence,  then 
the  useful  becomes  the  value  of  values,  the  concept  of  the  good- 
in-itself  sinks  to  an  empty  illusion,  and  the  true,  too,  can  con- 
tinue to  exist  only  by  taking  on  the  character  of  a  conjunction 
of  ideas  fitted  for  assisting  in  the  preservation  of  life.  Ethics, 
aesthetics,  and  the  theory  of  knowledge  must  all  undergo  a 
complete  transformation ;  they  must  all  look  for  the  solution 
of  their  problems  to  the  discovery  and  retention  of  the  primitive 
elements. 

The  conception  as  a  whole  affects  us  with  the  fresh  energy 
of  a  new  insight.  It  reveals  much  that  is  new  in  the  ancient 
experiences.  It  illuminates  by  bringing  otherwise  scattered 
matter  into  a  related  whole.  Its  backward  vision  is  fruitful  of 
many  discoveries.  The  natural  conditions  of  our  existence,  the 
continued  operation  of  elemental  instincts  in  the  midst  of  all 
the  complications  and  apparent  refinements  of  civilisation,  the 
slow  and  phlegmatic  nature  of  the  historical  movement,  now 
come  to  full  recognition.  All  this  seems  to  lend  a  more  natural 
colour  and  a  more  vital  truth  to  the  conception  of  our  existence, 
and  at  the  same  time  efforts  directed  towards  the  elevation 
of  human  conditions  acquire  more  definite  opportunities  for 
exerting  their  influence. 


260    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

But  if  the  foregoing  is  to  be  employed  purely  in  the  service  of 
reason  and  truth  it  must  be  placed  in  a  greater  whole  and 
estimated  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  relationships.  If  it 
endeavours,  by  itself,  to  come  to  a  final  conclusion  and  seeks  to 
build  up  a  thought- world  with  its  own  resources,  serious  error  is 
unavoidable.  Underlying  this  error  is  the  mistake  of  treating 
the  particular  fashion  in  which  spiritual  life  and  reason  are 
developed  in  man  as  the  creating  and  impelling  basis  of  spiritual 
life  itself;  if,  however,  the  latter  is  thus  from  the  very  beginning 
reduced  to  a  mere  appurtenance  of  humanity  and  deprived  of  all 
independence,  then  its  derivation  from  mere  nature  can  give  rise 
to  no  difficulty.  He  who  stands  outside  the  charmed  circle  in 
which  this  type  of  thought  moves  will  at  once  perceive  the 
circular  nature  of  the  argument  and  realise  how  destructive  is 
the  transformation  of  spiritual  life  which  it  effects.  Spiritual 
values,  and  finally  spiritual  life  itself,  are  not  merely  changed  by 
being  thus  made  subordinate  to  the  useful ;  they  are  annihilated. 
A  good  (such  as  right,  honour,  love,  or  loyalty)  which  is  aimed  at 
on  account  of  its  usefulness,  that  is  to  say,  as  a  mere  means  for 
the  physical  and  social  preservation  of  life,  thereby  undergoes  an 
inward  transformation  and  ceases  to  be  a  good.  The  same 
thing  would  happen  to  the  concept  of  truth  if  it  sank  to  be  a 
mere  utilitarian  arrangement  of  our  ideas ;  it  might  then  be  all 
manner  of  other  things,  but  could  no  longer  be  truth.  However, 
inward  experience,  than  which  we  know  nothing  more  certain, 
resists  such  a  degradation  of  life.  However  much  conflict  there 
may  be  as  to  the  more  detailed  conception  of  the  good  and  true, 
however  little  part  the  individual  may  have  in  these  values,  as 
mere  Ufe  possibilities  they  are  facts  which  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  to  explain  away,  facts  which  make  the  whole  of 
reality  something  more  than  it  could  be  without  them.  Finally 
there  arises  the  question,  if,  from  the  above  point  of  view, 
spiritual  life  can  be  said  to  exist  at  all.  When  the  whole  life  of 
the  soul  is  converted  into  a  mechanical  system  of  elementary 
forces,  then  there  is  no  life  bound  up  with  the  whole,  no  thought, 
no  experiencing  subject ;  thus  the  person  who  is  judging  brings 
about  his  own  disappearance  and  declares  all  spiritual  work, 
including  his  own,  to  be  an  illusion  !  So  long  as  he  does  not  do 


EVOLUTION  261 

this,  and  cannot  do  it,  the  form  of  his  statement  contradicts  its 
content ;  the  denial  itself  (which  is  put  forward  as  a  scientific 
and  universally  valid  truth)  corroborates  the  operation  of 
a  spiritual  life  superior  to  the  process  of  nature. 

Along  with  this  contradiction  (whereby  spiritual  work  is  made 
use  of  in  the  destruction  of  its  own  fundamental  conditions)  are 
associated  complications  in  the  more  detailed  carrying  out  of  the 
theory.  The  most  remarkable  thing  of  all  is  that  this  abandon- 
ment of  all  independent  spirituality  and  this  state  of  being 
bound  down  to  mere  nature  presents  itself  as  a  heightening  of 
life  and  a  liberation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  when  closely  examined 
it  is  seen  that  this  position  destroys  the  whole  meaning  and 
value  of  our  life.  From  this  point  of  view  the  labour  and 
struggle  of  man  and  of  humanity  as  a  whole,  the  vast  complex  of 
civilisation  with  its  countless  ramifications,  has  no  other  task 
than  the  preservation  of  physical  life,  of  sensuous  existence  ;  it 
merely  accomplishes,  in  an  extraordinarily  roundabout  way,  what 
animals  achieve  in  much  simpler  and  easier  fashion.*  Every- 
thing which  asserts  an  object  and  value  of  its  own,  as  compared 
with  physical  existence,  must  disappear  as  untenable.  Such  a 
life  can  offer  no  sort  of  content.  But  it  is  a  fact  that  we  are 
thinking  and  judging  beings,  we  are  actually  in  possession  of  a 
self-centre  and  are  compelled  to  relate  all  experience  to  it  and 
measure  it  from  thence.  Hence  we  are  bound  to  feel  this 
absence  of  content  as  a  painful  emptiness,  an  emptiness  which  is 
all  the  more  intolerable  because  the  connections  of  the  evolu- 
tionary scheme  do  not  permit  of  the  slightest  hope  of  any 
change ;  they  remorselessly  tie  us  down  to  the  senseless  routine 
of  the  nature  process.  Could  there  be  a  more  comfortless  con- 
struction of  life  ?  It  demands  unceasing  work,  unaccompanied 


•  We  may  here  draw  attention  to  Kant's  saying  (in  the  Critique  of 
Practical  Season,  v.  65,  Hart.):  "Man  is  not  in  the  least  elevated  above 
mere  animalism  by  the  possession  of  reason  if  his  reason  is  only  employed  in 
the  same  fashion  as  that  in  which  animals  use  their  instincts."  Nay,  from 
this  point  of  view  the  supposed  progress  ie  in  reality  retrogression.  For  is  it 
not  retrogression  when,  for  the  attainment  of  the  same  goal,  more  and  more 
complicated  means  are  employed,  more  and  more  care  and  labour  expended  ? 
If,  however,  new  contents  and  values  are  recognised,  then  we  have  already 
abandoned  the  mechanical  theory  of  evolution  1 


262    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

by  any  inner  profit ;  it  bids  us  put  forth  all  our  forces  with 
feverish  energy,  and  yet  has  no  object  other  than  the  eking  out  01 
a  bare  existence. 

Moreover,  considered  from  a  methodological  point  of  view,  as 
soon  as  this  type  of  thought  attempts  to  include  spiritual  life  it 
becomes  involved  in  serious  difficulties.  We  then  see  the 
construction  of  evolutionary  ethics,  evolutionary  aesthetics, 
evolutionary  theories  of  law,  &c. ;  all  these  hark  back  to  com- 
mencements in  the  animal  world  and  seek  in  these  the  key  to  all 
further  development.  The  older  view  certainly  made  the 
mistake  of  projecting  the  higher  stages  into  the  commencing 
ones  and  hence  falsely  idealising  the  latter.  To-day,  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  the  spiritual  life  did  not  drop  from 
heaven,  but  commenced  with  little,  half-animal  beginnings.  But 
is  it  necessary  that  these  commencements  should  remain  decisive 
for  the  whole  movement ;  could  not  the  life-process  itself  raise 
itself;  could  not  new  forces  come  to  light  in  it?  In  reality,  this 
tying  down  to  the  first  commencements  does  not  so  much 
strengthen  evolution  as  deny  it.  Moreover,  are  the  first  begin- 
nings so  simple  and  clear  that  they  are  capable  of  shedding 
light  upon  what  would  otherwise  be  obscure  ?  Can  we  form  any 
direct  image  of  them  ;  is  not  our  conception  of  them  necessarily 
dependent  upon  our  present-day  position?  This  path  really 
leads  us  into  the  profoundest  obscurity  of  all ;  to  try  to  explain 
higher  stages  by  going  back  to  hypothetically  constructed 
beginnings  is  not  a  direct  way  but  a  by-path.* 

Thus  far  we  have  been  engaged  in  opposing  the  mechanical  and 

*  Volkelt  has  recently  shown  this  to  be  the  case  in  the  sphere  of  aesthetics. 
See  his  penetrating  and  convincing  article  Die  entwickelungsgeschichtliche 
Betrachtungsweise  in  der  Aesthetik  (Zeits.  filr  Psychologie  u.  Phytiologie 
der  Sinnesorgane,  Ed.  29).  This  has  been  reprinted  as  a  separate  booklet, 
and  we  read  on  p.  7  :  "It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  in  order  to  answer  the 
question  how  are  we  to  approach  artistic  creations,  poetically,  artistically, 
aesthetically,  we  must  start,  if  we  are  to  have  any  firm  foundation  for  our 
reply,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  mature  man  of  to-day.''  P.  8  :  "  In  reality 
the  aesthetics  of  primitive  peoples,  to  employ  a  brief  term,  is  not  a  methodical 
means  but  rather  one  of  the  most  obscure  and  impenetrable  special  problems 
known  to  the  whole  of  aesthetics."  P.  11 :  "  '  ^Esthetics  upon  a  historical  and 
evolutionary  basis  '  is  therefore  a  reversal  of  the  proper  position  of  affairs." 


EVOLUTION  263 

naturalistic  type  of  evolutionary  teaching  in  so  far  as  it  aims  at 
moulding  the  whole  of  life  according  to  its  own  standards.  But 
the  whole  idea  of  evolution,  in  the  form  in  which  it  permeates 
the  modern  world,  involves  more  problems  than  are  apparent 
upon  the  surface.  To  begin  with,  it  is  far  too  readily  taken  for 
granted  that  all  movement  is  progress,  is  development  in  the 
sense  of  a  continual  ascent.  Even  the  ancients  fully  realised 
that  the  world,  particularly  the  world  of  human  action,  was  in 
perpetual  movement ;  but  they  regarded  this  as  a  lower  stage  of 
reality,  they  saw  mere  confusion  and  disarrangement,  no  steady 
forward  movement.  A  chief  article  of  faith  with  moderns,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  the  belief  in  a  consistent  upward  trend.  Of 
religious  origin,  this  idea  was  supported  and  further  developed 
by  speculative  philosophy.  Religion  and  speculation  are  to-day 
mere  shadows  of  their  former  selves  and  for  many  people  non- 
existent ;  but  their  product,  the  belief  in  progress,  has  remained. 
After  the  removal  of  these  foundations,  has  it  still  a  strong 
enough  basis?  Does  mere  experience  proclaim  it  to  be  an 
irrefutable  fact?  Can  experience  with  its  limitations  really 
demonstrate  a  continuous  progress  at  all?  Much  subjective 
feeling  enters  into  all  these  questions.  Men  are  very  apt  to 
regard  all  change  as  progress ;  they  perceive  the  new  which  their 
own  age  brings,  and  while  accepting  it,  forget  the  old  which  has 
meanwhile  been  lost.  In  this  way,  every  age  readily  conceives 
that  it  represents  the  highest  that  man  has  yet  reached,  because 
it  values  all  endeavour  according  to  its  own  standard :  an  artistic 
age  will  usually  value  from  the  point  of  view  of  art,  a  technical 
age  from  that  of  technical  progress.  To  these  permanent 
influences  we  must  add  temporary  ones ;  nothing  is  more  favour- 
able to  the  belief  in  progress  than  a  strong  sense  of  power  and 
consciousness  of  the  present,  feelings  which  penetrate  ascending 
ages  and  in  particular  permeate  the  main  tendency  of  the  Modern 
World.  From  this  point  of  view,  everything  which  promises  an 
increase  of  life  is  vigorously  taken  up  ;  experiences  in  particular 
spheres  which  seem  to  point  in  this  direction  are  generalised ; 
isolated  and  scattered  matter  is  linked  up  and  supplemented ; 
obstacles,  on  the  other  hand,  are  overlooked  or  set  aside,  even 
resistance  itself  is  understood  as  an  impulse  to  further  activity : 


264     MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

in  all  the  foregoing  mere  experience  is  transformed  by  an  inward 
and  vital  impulse. 

Such  a  view  and  treatment  of  human  existence  must  neces- 
sarily expose  itself  ultimately  to  the  danger  of  reaction.  A 
calmer  and  more  critical  mode  of  thought  will  destroy  much  of 
this  belief  in  progress,  will  direct  attention  towards  retarding 
factors  and  will  discover  much  that  was  raised  by  this  belief  to 
the  position  of  permanent  law  to  be  mere  temporary  appearance. 
For  example,  during  the  last  few  centuries  the  doctrine  of  an 
unceasing  growth  of  population  was  generally  accepted;  the 
cessation  of  growth  in  the  case  of  particular  nations  was  looked 
upon  as  a  notable  exception.  Yet  how  recent  is  this  doctrine ! 
Even  so  modern  a  writer  as  Montesquieu  believed  that  the 
population  of  Europe  was  less  than  it  had  been  in  ancient  times, 
and  that  it  was  advisable  to  promote  the  increase  of  the  race  by 
special  laws.  Then  the  opposite  assumption  prevailed,  and 
Malthus  gave  strong  expression  to  the  dangers  of  an  excessive 
increase.  For  a  time  statistics  corroborated  this  assumption, 
but  recently  indications  have  increasingly  appeared  that  upon  a 
certain  level  of  civilisation  the  increase  is  retarded  and  comes  to 
a  standstill — nay,  there  may  even  be  a  decrease.  This  compels 
us  to  ask  if  the  law  of  increase  is  perhaps  not  permanently  valid 
but  applies  only  to  particular  phases  of  civilisation.  How 
greatly,  however,  must  the  pursual  of  this  thought  alter  the 
whole  aspect  of  history! 

Moreover,  the  problem  passes  beyond  the  quantitative  into  the 
qualitative  sphere.  Does  history  bring  a  spiritual  growth  of 
humanity  ;  does  it  increase  the  sum  of  spiritual  capacity  ?  In 
this  respect  the  antagonism  between  spiritual  achievement  and 
power  of  reproduction  so  emphatically  maintained  by  Lorenz  runs 
directly  counter  to  the  optimism  of  popular  opinion.  Lorenz 
calls  it  "  a  very  noteworthy  fact  that  higher  and  stronger  spiritual 
activity  involves  a  diminished  capacity  of  reproduction  "  (Lehr- 
buck  der  Genealogie,  pp.  486-7),  and  holds  that  "  in  all  pro- 
bability, an  experience  that  has  been  elsewhere  observed  could 
be  also  corroborated  genealogically ;  the  experience,  namely, 
that  the  male  germ  migrates  from  below  upwards  and  in  the 
higher  classes,  or,  as  one  may  say  according  to  present-day 


EVOLUTION  205 

social  organisation,  in  the  higher  professions,  becomes  extinct." 
Following  up  this  line  of  thought,  it  seems  that  the  "  decay  of 
higher  civilisation  and  civilised  peoples  is  not  a  result  of  their 
being  overpowered  from  without,  but  far  rather  expresses  the 
natural  reduction  in  power  of  reproduction  of  the  higher,  culti- 
vated individual "  ;  it  appears  that  "  nature  is  incapable  of 
directly  propagating  the  spiritual  (to  employ  this  term  only  in 
the  sense  of  causality) "  (p.  487).  Thus  the  movement  of 
humanity  would  itself  exhaust  itself,  civilisations  would  live  their 
day  out  and  grow  aged,  and  stagnation  set  in,  until  there  again 
came  new  impulses  and,  above  all,  fresh  men.  The  whole  would 
then  no  longer  appear  as  a  continuous  ascent,  but  would  become 
an  up  and  down  movement  in  different  phases.  Any  progress 
which  took  place  under  these  circumstances  would  at  any  rate 
present  a  different  appearance  from  what  is  usually  understood 
by  progress. 

In  connection  with  the  present  theme  it  may  also  be  pointed 
out  that  the  various  departments  of  life  exhibit  different  types  of 
movement,  and  that  the  predominance  of  one  of  these  depart- 
ments usually  exalts  its  own  method  of  valuation  to  universal 
validity.  The  technical  and  exact  sciences  show  a  more  con- 
tinuous progress  than  do  any  other  departments  of  life,  though 
in  their  case,  too,  there  is  no  lack  of  losses  and  backslidings. 
Spiritual  creation,  in  the  sense  of  an  inner  elevation  of  human 
life,  finds  full  embodiment  only  at  individual  special  points,  and 
then  rapidly  sinks ;  in  a  moral  respect,  humanity  appears  to 
progress  alike  in  good  and  bad,  both  in  action  and  reaction,  the 
contrast  thus  becoming  increasingly  great.  Keligion,  finally, 
offers  its  fundamental  truth  as  superior  to  all  temporal  change  ; 
it  is  apt  to  consider  this  truth  as  having  been  already  obtained  at 
some  earlier  period,  and  thus  it  links  endeavour  with  the  past. 
Each  of  these  types  tends  to  construct,  from  its  own  point  of 
view,  an  all-embracing  conception  of  history  and  the  world. 
The  problem  of  progress  is  hence  full  of  perplexities ;  that 
which  presents  itself  as  matter-of-course  and  universally  valid 
is  often  merely  the  product  of  a  special  temporary  situation. 

Finally,  there  is  another  sense  in  which  the  idea  of  evolution 
must  give  rise  to  doubts.  It  easily  leads  to  the  understanding 


266    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

of  movement  as  exclusively  an  act  of  necessity,  thus  setting 
man  in  too  contemplative  and  passive  a  relationship  to  his 
environment.  Progress  seems  rather  to  happen  to  man  than  be 
achieved  by  him.  There  seems  no  necessity  for  personal  decision 
or  initiative.  This  is  evident,  for  example,  in  the  evolutionary 
ideas  of  the  German  Romantics,  who  attributed  all  formation 
to  a  quiet,  steady  growth  from  within  outwards,  and  thus 
paralysed  man's  impulse  towards  personal  activity.  The  same 
thing  can  happen  if  the  moving  force  be  placed  in  sensuous 
natural  impulses  and  outward  necessities.  In  both  cases  the 
evolution  endangers  the  ethical  character  of  life  and  destroys 
the  fundamental  condition  of  a  true  history — an  ever  fresh  in- 
sertion of  original  life,  a  conversion  of  all  that  we  receive  into 
personal  action  and  living  present.  While  human  spiritual  life 
acquires  its  tension  and  its  character,  in  the  first  instance, 
through  the  conflict  between  freedom  and  fate,  such  a  doctrine  of 
evolution  wholly  sacrifices  freedom  to  fate.  It  is  the  confusion 
of  a  laxer  with  a  more  strict  view  of  the  concept  of  evolution 
which  allows  such  problems  to  be  overlooked.  It  is  quite  a 
common  thing  for  all  progressive  movement  to  be  called  evolution, 
without  the  least  enquiry  as  to  the  cause  of  progress  ;  in  this 
case  there  may  well  remain  a  place  for  freedom.  On  the  other 
hand,  evolution  in  the  stricter  sense  signifies  a  natural  process 
driven  forward  by  an  imperative  necessity  —  it  matters  not 
whether  this  operates  by  an  integration  of  separate  elements  or 
by  a  movement  of  the  whole — and  according  to  this  view  all 
freedom  vanishes  and  with  it  all  history  (in  the  distinctively 
human  sense).  There  is  then  a  mere  taking  place  but  no  action. 
In  this  sense  of  the  word  historical  evolution  is  an  absurdity. 


Nay,  doubt  penetrates  yet  deeper;  it  attacks  the  very  pre- 
dominance of  movement  and  will  not  admit  the  conversion  of 
the  whole  of  reality  into  a  process.  At  first,  the  Modern  World 
saw  nothing  but  gain  in  this  mobilising  of  all  connections,  in 
this  melting  down  of  all  rigid  distinctions ;  it  saw  only  the 
enhancement  of  life,  the  growth  in  freedom  and  strength.  The 
fact  that  there  is  also  a  great  loss  cannot,  however,  be  perma- 


EVOLUTION  267 

nently  hidden.  Something  indeed  is  lost  which  is  indispensable 
to  the  existence  of  spiritual  life.  For  down  to  its  most  elemen- 
tary basic  forms  spiritual  life  demands  and  exhibits  a  permanent 
character,  a  permanence  not  within  time  but  in  opposition  to  it. 
A  truth  valid  only  for  to-day  or  to-morrow  is  an  absurdity. 
What  is  true  at  all  is  true  for  all  time — or  better  still  it  is  true 
irrespective  of  time ;  although  the  statement,  under  particular 
circumstances,  may  be  for  a  period  of  time  only,  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  expressed  is  always  timeless ;  as  spiritual  experience 
all  truth  involves  a  liberation  from  all  time.  Moreover,  that 
which  we  value  and  recognise  as  good  derives  its  value  not  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  particular  epoch  but  independently  of  all 
time ;  it  derives  it  from  a  timeless  order  of  things.  Certain  as 
it  is  that  the  concepts  of  good  obtaining  in  various  ages  alter 
with  the  age  in  question,  it  is  none  the  less  certain  that  whatever 
any  given  epoch  apprehends  as  good  is  taken  to  be  absolutely 
and  permanently  valid.  No  alteration  of  htiman  circumstance  is 
able  to  destroy  this  inner  superiority  of  spiritual  life  to  time. 
Further,  concepts  like  personality,  character,  spiritual  individu- 
ality, also  proclaim  this  supra-temporal  quality  of  spiritual  life  ; 
for  they  demand  the  formation  of  a  permanent  type  and  its 
consistent  retention  in  the  face  of  all  movement ;  conduct  in  all 
its  various  phases  aims  at  bringing  this  type  to  expression  and 
at  promoting  its  welfare.  Thus  to  convert  spiritual  life  entirely 
into  movement  is  to  destroy  its  very  foundations. 

Nay,  movement  itself,  regarded  inwardly,  bears  witness  to  the 
indispensability  of  permanence.  It  cannot  be  reviewed,  gathered 
together  into  a  whole  or  experienced  as  a  whole  in  the  absence 
of  a  standpoint  superior  to  itself  and  a  synthesis  effected  from 
thence.  Otherwise  it  becomes  split  up  into  numerous  separate 
states  which  may  indeed  occupy  and  entertain  the  soul  with 
kaleidoscopically  changing  impressions  but  cannot  provide  it 
with  a  whole  and  a  content.  Therefore  the  more  a  force 
superior  to  movement  disappears,  the  more  does  life  tend  to 
become  superficial  and  to  lose  all  spiritual  freedom. 

This  quality  of  spiritual  life  by  which  it  is  raised  above  time 
is  peculiarly  well  illustrated  by  the  construction  of  a  history,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  a  characteristically  human  and  spiritual  history. 


268    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

For  history,  in  the  human  sense,  is  by  no  means  a  mere  suc- 
cession of  events,  a  mere  floating  of  humanity  down  the  stream 
of  time  ;  that  would  never  lead  beyond  an  accumulation  of 
outward  effects,  such  as  nature  shows  us  in  the  formation  of 
the  earth's  crust.  All  human  history  is  far  rather  a  resistance 
to  the  mere  flux  of  phenomena,  some  kind  of  an  attempt  to 
bring  the  current  to  a  standstill,  a  struggle  against  mere  time. 
Even  the  most  primitive  attempt  to  preserve  customs,  deeds,  &c., 
in  the  memory  of  succeeding  generations,  and  thus  retain  them 
in  the  consciousness  of  humanity,  shows  such  a  resistance  to 
time.  The  more,  however,  history  is  to  mean  for  man,  the  more 
it  is  to  bring  him  not  merely  an  enlargement  of  knowledge  but 
an  elevation  of  life,  the  more  self-activity  must  he  put  forth. 
This  demands,  of  necessity,  a  standpoint  superior  to  time.  To 
experience  the  past  inwardly  we  must  liberate  ourselves  from  the 
accidental  character  of  the  present,  or  at  the  least  strive  towards 
such  a  liberation  ;  otherwise  in  everything  earlier  we  should  see 
solely  a  projection  of  the  present  type,  and  in  the  midst  of  all 
outward  enlargement  remain,  inwardly,  just  as  we  are ;  an 
understanding  of  other  epochs  according  to  their  own  distinctive 
relationships  would  be  totally  denied  to  us.  To  gain  such  in- 
sight we  should  not  merely  know  the  past  but  relate  it  to  our 
own  life,  convert  its  wealth  into  our  own  property,  raise  our- 
selves to  the  level  of  what  is  great  in  it.  With  this  object  it 
becomes  necessary  not  only  to  acquire  an  understanding  of 
previous  ages  but  to  sift  their  content,  to  decide  what  is  essential 
and  valuable  and  what  accidental  and  indifferent.  But  how  is 
this  possible  without  some  sort  of  standard  superior  to  the 
movement  of  the  ages,  and  without  transferring  the  sphere  of 
activity  to  a  timeless  standpoint  ?  Finally,  history  is  valuable 
to  us  only  in  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  convert  it  into  a  timeless 
present ;  its  main  function  is  to  lead  us  out  of  the  narrowness 
and  poverty  of  the  merely  momentary  present  into  a  wider 
present  superior  to,  and  encompassing,  time.  There  is  no  more 
dangerous  enemy  of  a  real  present  than  devotion  to  the  meie 
moment. 

Such  being  the  outlook,  it  is  absolutely  out  of  the  question  to 
allow  the  whole  of  life  to  pass  off  into  the  flux  of  movement. 


EVOLUTION  269 

Even  when  our  consciousness  has  been  entirely  filled  with  the 
idea  of  movement,  our  work  has  always  sought  a  counterpoise  in 
something  permanent.  Thus  even  the  most  extreme  protagonists 
of  the  doctrine  of  movement,  as  understood  in  natural  science, 
have  recognised  some  kind  of  supplement  to  movement ;  this  is 
seen  in  the  doctrine  of  the  permanence  of  matter  or  energy  and 
in  the  subordination  of  all  phenomena  to  unchanging  laws. 
Without  such  a  consolidation  its  work  would  lose  the  character 
of  science,  and  instead  of  being  a  causal  interpretation  would 
become  a  mere  disconnected  narrative. 

Philosophers,  too,  have  not  been  able  to  make  evolution 
the  central  idea  of  their  thought-world  without  recognising  a 
permanence  superior  to  change,  and  indeed  encompassing 
change.  Hegel's  system  would  have  become  split  up  into 
mere  separate  points,  and  the  shifting  nature  of  the  separate 
phases  would  have  destroyed  all  truth,  if  a  point  of  view 
superior  to  time  had  not  enabled  him  to  comprise  it  as  a 
whole,  to  convert  all  succession  into  a  self-life  of  this  whole, 
at  the  same  time  raising  it  above  the  temporal  stream  into  a 
timeless  present.  Whether  in  Hegel's  case  the  desired  goal 
is  completely  attained  is  another  question :  but  with  regard  to 
the  aspiration  itself  there  can  be  no  doubt,  and  indeed  the 
whole  greatness  of  the  Hegelian  system  is  closely  connected 
with  it. 

When  we  come  to  consider  Comte,  Hegel's  realistic  counter- 
par*;  we  discover  a  similar  situation.  He  succeeds  in  construct- 
ing a  scientific  system  only  by  elaborating  and  emphasising 
certain  permanent  elements.  It  is  true  that  he  brings  all 
previous  history  into  a  state  of  flux,  and  allows  the  earlier 
stages  no  more  than  a  relative  truth;  but  in  coming  to  Posi- 
tivism he  believes  himself  to  have  attained  the  absolute  and 
final  truth,  and  although  the  future  may  see  a  further  unfolding 
of  this,  the  core  seems  permanently  secured  for  all  succeeding 
ages.  Moreover,  the  historical  retrospect  takes  place  entirely 
rom  this  highest  fixed  point.  In  the  midst  of  all  movement 
a  permanent  truth  is  therefore  held  fast. 

Social  life,  ii  is  true,  gained  but  little  by  such  a  concealed 
recognition  of  a  permanent  element ;  the  progressive  conversion 


270    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  modern  life  into  a  mere  process  met  with  no  adequate  resist- 
ance from  this  point  of  view.  In  this  respect  a  much  greater 
influence  was  exerted  by  the  continued  effect  of  permanent 
elements  and  forces  proceeding  from  the  older  systems  of  life ; 
these  were  firmly  incorporated  in  the  existing  state  of  things, 
making  an  atmosphere  that  all  men  took  for  granted ;  in  these 
elements  and  forces  the  flux  of  movement  had  tacitly  found  now 
a  support  and  now  a  supplement.  Such  a  position  as  this,  ex- 
hibiting opposed  tendencies  not  yet  brought  into  equilibrium, 
cannot,  however,  be  permanently  maintained,  and  the  lead  is 
unmistakably  being  taken  by  the  principle  of  movement,  which 
will  thus  increasingly  occupy  the  field.  This  principle  will 
produce  its  own  consequences,  namely,  a  dissolution  of  every- 
thing fixed  and  the  conversion  of  the  whole  of  life  into  a 
restless  process. 

At  the  same  time,  those  results  will  become  apparent  which 
follow  upon  the  disappearance  of  all  permanent  elements  and 
forces ;  in  particular  we  shall  miss  the  inner  synthesis,  the 
experience  that  sees  life  whole;  and  in  the  place  of  these 
must  witness  a  decay  of  all  independent  spirituality  and  an 
enfeeblement  of  the  effort  to  raise  the  standard  of  spiritual 
existence.  The  triumph  of  mere  movement  means  the  com- 
plete victory,  not  only  of  relativism,  but  of  sensualism.  It 
signifies  the  abandonment  of  all  life-content,  the  dissolution  of 
existence  into  separate  moments,  the  loss  pf  any  true  present. 
Moreover,  humanity  must  at  the  same  time  become  split  up 
into  mutually  exclusive  associations,  and  lose  more  and  more 
completely  the  elevating  and  consolidating  influences  of  a 
common  thought-world.  Can  it  be  denied  that  a  review  of  the 
present  situation  already  exhibits  clearly  enough  the  destructive 
force  of  this  tendency,  and  that  the  problems  and  doubts  to 
which  this  tendency  gives  rise  reach  down  to  the  very  founda- 
tions of  modern  life  ?  It  is  indeed  true  that  we  have  obtained 
a  more  varied  and  less  rigid  life;  no  authority  or  tradition 
confines  us,  we  are  free  to  follow  up  each  impression  with  all 
our  might,  to  seize  the  instant,  to  accelerate  the  speed  of  life. 
But  in  the  midst  of  all  this  mobility  and  busy  activity,  life 
threatens  to  leave  us  upon  the  mere  surface  and  to  become 


EVOLUTION  271 

emptier  and  emptier  in  its  spiritual  character;  we  lose  our 
grasp  of  an  inner  unity  of  being,  and  with  it  of  our  sole  possible 
support  against  the  flux  of  phenomena ;  incapable  of  asserting 
our  independence  with  regard  to  the  latter,  we  are  tossed  help- 
lessly hither  and  thither.  At  the  same  time  we  lose  touch  with 
any  real  present,  for  this  requires  that  life  should  be  at  rest 
in  itself,  and  involves  an  elevation  above  mere  time.*  In  its 
place  we  get  a  succession  of  mere  instants,  whose  ever-varying 
character  converts  life  into  a  restless  flight  and  inevitably  in- 
clines us  to  seek  immediate  effects,  to  gratify  the  senses,  and 
secure  outward  advantages.  As  a  necessary  consequence  we 
have  a  continual  eager  pursuit  of  the  new,  the  dazzling,  the 
exciting,  a  seeking  after  sensation,  effect,  &c.,  a  pandering  to 
the  whims  and  moods  of  the  crowd,  the  low  average  of  humanity. 
This  unworthy  "  actuality"  has  so  perverted  Aristotle's  noble 
concept  that  it  has  acquired  a  significance  exactly  opposite  to 
that  which  it  was  intended  to  bear !  t 

The  more,  however,  the  present  thus  slips  from  our  grasp,  the 
more  keen  becomes  the  yearning  towards  an  indefinite  future, 
the  snatching  and  anticipating  of/ what  is  there  expected. 
"  Never,"  said  Lotze,  at  a  time  much  quieter  than  the 

*  At  the  classical  period  of  German  literature  this  was  fully  and  clearly 
realised.  We  need  recall  only  Goethe's  saying  (from  the  Conversations  with 
Eckermann) :  "Every  situation,  nay,  every  moment,  is  of  infinite  value,  for  it 
is  the  representative  of  the  whole  of  eternity."  In  this  connection,  too,  the 
thoughtful  words  of  a  more  modern  thinker  (W.  Gidionsen)  may  be  brought  to 
mind : — 

Nicht  vom  Tage  sollst  du  leben, 

Auf  und  nieder  schwankt  die  Welle — 

Lass  dein  Inn'res  frdhlich  weben, 

Stets  verjUngten  Daseins  Quelle. 

1st  Ursprttnglichkeit  dir  eigen, 

Darfst  sie  hegen,  darfst  sie  zeigen, 

So  nur  spilrst  du  in  der  Zeit 

VorgefUhl  der  Eivigkeit. 

t  The  term  actualis  is  a  product  of  later  antiquity  (Augustine,  Macrobius) ; 
in  the  Middle  Ages  actus,  actualis,  actualitas,  derived  from  Grseco-Latin 
translations  of  Aristotle,  became  widely  used  (more  especially  after  the  time  of 
Duns  Scotus),  and  were  thence  carried  over  into  the  New  Period.  The  word 
served  to  represent  the  Aristotelian  concept  of  energy  or  entelechy — activity 
resting  within  itself  and  self-sufficing,  in  contrast  with  movement  still  striving 
forward  and  incomplete. 


272    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

present  (Microkosmiw,  2nd  edit.,  ii.  281),  "  has  this  contra- 
diction been  so  prominent :  men  hold  the  whole  life  which  they 
so  eagerly  and  diligently  take  part  in,  to  be,  at  bottom,  not  the 
true  life,  and  dream  of  another  and  more  beautiful  one  that  they 
would  like  to  live  and  will  live,  so  soon  as  the  present  life  gives 
the  leisure  for  it  and  opens  the  way." 

Thus  an  exaggerated  and  frenzied  movement  causes  the  in- 
ward life  to  crumble  to  pieces ;  it  ceases  to  be  a  true  life,  and 
becomes  more  and  more  a  mere  will  to  live,  a  something  that 
points  to  life  but  is  itself  no  life,  but  an  illusion.  This  cannot 
possibly  be  allowed  to  continue.  Such  a  conversion  of  existence 
into  mere  movement  involves  a  complete  destruction  of  life,  and 
must  therefore  be  resisted.  Humanity  must  and  will  overcome 
this  dangerous  crisis,  for  the  desire  to  do  so  arises  from  an 
imperative  necessity  of  man's  innermost  nature.  But  this  over- 
coming will  not  be  accomplished  without  a  thoroughgoing 
transformation  of  existence,  without  the  construction  of  a  new 
type  of  life,  without  the  courage  and  power  to  ascend  to  a  new 
spiritual  height. 

\ 

(d)  The  Requirements  of  a  New  Type  of  Life 

Although  the  problem  into  which  our  investigation  has  re- 
solved itself  cannot  here  be  fully  discussed,  yet  without  some 
sort  of  indication  of  the  path  to  be  pursued  our  study  would 
appear  to  end  in  nothing.  Therefore  we  must  proceed,  as 
briefly  as  possible,  to  sketch  at  any  rate  an  outline. 

It  is  necessary  above  everything  else  to  find  some  firm  sup- 
port with  which  to  oppose  this  threatened  volatilisation  of  life. 
This  support  cannot  be  supplied  by  the  outer  world,  since  we 
never  experience  the  latter  except  through  the  medium  of  our 
soul,  and  therefore  even  the  most  fixed  external  thing  must 
become  movable  to  us  if  the  soul-life  should  be  given  over 
entirely  to  movement.  Neither  does  the  immediate  life  of  the 
soul  provide  any  fixed  principle.  For  in  this  case  the  most 
varied  elements  are  mingled  together,  and  the  fleeting  phe- 
nomena overlap  in  a  confused  medley.  Hence  only  one  hope 
remains ;  we  must  penetrate  to  some  spiritual  activity,  which, 
being  firmly  established  in  itself,  promises  to  impart  firmness 


EVOLUTION  273 

to  the  rest  of  life.  The  Modern  World  has  seen  this  attempted 
hy  various  great  thinkers  in  different  ways  :  Descartes  sought 
the  Archimedean  point  in  pure  thought,  Kant  in  moral  action ; 
both  undertakings,  however,  were  rooted  in  wider  movements  of 
modern  life,  since,  on  the  one  hand,  the  work  of  science,  and 
on  the  other  a  moral  initiative,  were  bent  on  giving  human 
existence  a  firm  foundation  and  so  preventing  its  dissipation 
into  mere  phenomena.  Both  movements  have  accomplished 
great  things,  and  are  continuing  to  do  so  ;  at  the  same  time 
there  arises  an  increasing  doubt  as  to  whether  they  penetrate 
to  the  last  depth  and  are  able  from  thence  to  embrace  the 
whole  of  life.  To  begin  with,  they  constrain  life  in  a  particular 
direction  and  give  it  a  particular  bias,  in  the  one  case,  intel- 
lectualistic,  in  the  other,  moral.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
our  problem,  however,  it  is  a  still  more  serious  objection  that 
the  adoption  of  a  particular  standpoint  as  central  can  always 
be  doubted  and  contested  from  other  standpoints ;  conduct  can 
pit  itself  against  intellect  and  vice  versd,  while  scepticism  can 
attempt  to  reduce  science  to  a  mere  tissue  of  images,  and  natural- 
ism to  convert  morality  into  a  product  of  mere  natural  instincts. 
No  particular  sphere  can  offer  us  the  highest  certainty  to  which 
we  can  attain ;  only  a  synthesis  of  the  whole  can  offer  us  this. 
If  a  unity  superior  to  all  division  is  not  found  in  spiritual  life, 
and  if  an  original  life  does  not  manifest  itself  in  this  unity,  then 
our  life  and  endeavour  can  never  acquire  any  stability. 

The  thought  of  an  all-embracing  unity  is  something  more  than 
a  mere  fancy ;  this  is  witnessed  by  the  movement  towards  per- 
sonality which  animates  our  human  striving.  For  however  much 
our  true  human  personality  may  be  commingled  with  what  is 
human  in  the  pettier  sense  of  the  word,  and  however  much  it 
may  be  subject  to  the  most  manifold  conditions  and  limitations, 
a  new  kind  of  life,  a  greater  depth  of  reality,  here  begins  actively 
to  manifest  itself.  In  this  case,  spiritual  life  does  not  appear 
as  a  particular  manifestation  but  as  a  new  kind  of  reality,  a 
new  stage  of  being,  to  which  the  particular  manifestations  (in- 
cluding scientific  thought  and  moral  conduct)  have  to  subordi- 
nate themselves  and  into  which  they  must  fit.  Thus  we  see  that 
a  stable  conclusion  is  reached  only  when  the  whole  life,  pressing 

18 


274    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

forward,  attains  to  the  spirituality  which  is  the  source  of  all 
wholeness  of  life.  In  this  way,  also,  an  ideal  is  held  up  to 
civilisation — an  ideal  which  transcends  the  antithesis  hetween 
theory  and  practice,  discriminating,  within  each  factor,  hetween 
a  spiritual  and  a  pre- spiritual  stage. 

Thus  it  is  solely  by  means  of  an  energetic  upheaval  and 
revolution  of  existence  that  we  can  press  forward  to  a  steadfast 
centre  and  take  up  the  struggle  against  the  time-current  and 
the  meaningless  flux  of  mere  movement.  The  outlook  would  he 
entirely  hopeless,  and  even  our  aspiration  in  this  direction 
would  he  incomprehensible,  if  man  were  not  grounded  in  a 
spiritual  world  superior  to  immediate  existence  and  yet  directly 
present  in  the  life-process. 

This  regress,  however,  involves  the  further  requirement  that 
spiritual  life  should  not  be  looked  upon  as  a  property  of  our  mere 
human  nature,  but  rather  that  man  should  be  conceived  as  par- 
ticipating in  a  spiritual  life  superior  to  himself.  Spiritual  life 
in  its  substance  must  be  recognised  as  independent  with  respect 
to  man.  If  spiritual  life  and  human  nature  thus  become  more 
widely  separated  than  would  be  warranted  by  the  current  con- 
ception, at  the  same  time  a  mutual  adaptation  between  fixity 
and  movement,  and  the  formation  of  a  type  of  life  superior  to 
the  antithesis,  is  now  made  possible.  Change  (and  with  it 
evolution)  is  absolutely  out  of  the  question  as  far  as  the  sub- 
stance of  spiritual  life  is  concerned.  The  concept  of  truth  (and 
this  concept,  also,  is  superior  to  the  antithesis  of  theoretical  and 
practical)  tolerates  neither  growth  nor  change.  It  is  essential 
to  its  existence  that  it  should  belong  to  a  timeless  order.  Man, 
on  the  other  hand,  can  only  obtain  a  life-content  within  time 
and  through  gradual  experience.  For  this  purpose  freedom  and 
mobility  are  essential.  Moreover,  the  truth  to  which  man 
attains  is  not  won  once  for  all,  so  that  he  can  peacefully  enjoy 
his  possession ;  it  must  continually  be  reconquered,  again  and 
again  must  it  become  the  subject  of  struggle.  Doubt  is  con- 
tinually at  work  sapping  the  foundations  of  our  spiritual  existence 
and  requiring  of  us  again  and  yet  again  strenuous  reconquest. 

Thus  there  arise  three  quite  distinct  types  of  life  :  one  of  these 
is  exclusively  directed  towards  permanence,  nay,  towards  a  state  of 


EVOLUTION  275 

eternal  rest,  and  seeks  as  far  as  possible  to  free  human  being 
from  all  movement ;  another  is  wholly  taken  up  with  movement 
and  will  know  of  nothing  that  escapes  its  influence ;  the  third 
strives  to  get  beyond  the  antithesis  and  aims  at  an  inward 
superiority  which  shall  do  justice  to  both  sides.  The  first  of 
these  tendencies  dominates  the  antique  and  the  second  the 
modern  construction  of  life;  the  third  has  from  the  earliest 
times  been  operative  in  the  world's  spiritual  work,  but  it  has 
yet  to  be  recognised  in  principle,  and  to  be  developed  as  a  type 
of  life  into  full  power  and  clarity.  This  is  the  task  of  the 
future.  The  strength  of  the  old  type  of  life  lay  in  the  firmness 
and  repose  which  it  imparted  to  the  spiritual  life,  and  in  its 
power  to  raise  it,  as  an  inviolable  order,  above  all  mere  preference 
and  prejudice,  whether  of  the  individual  or  of  the  crowd.  The 
solution,  however,  became  problematical  when  it  treated  truth 
not  only  as  unchangeable  in  its  substance  but  as  ready  to  man's 
hand ;  when,  in  brief,  it  identified  substance  with  the  human 
form  of  existence.  Thus,  during  the  Classical  Period  and  to  an 
even  greater  extent  during  the  Middle  Ages,  scientific  truth  was 
looked  upon  as  a  final  and  settled  thing ;  nor  did  ecclesiastical 
Christianity  admit  any  further  development  of  the  religious 
thought- world.  The  possession  of  a  particular  age  is  thus  set 
up  as  a  permanent  thing,  all  further  endeavour  is  inhibited  and 
a  rigid  yoke  laid  upon  humanity — a  yoke  which  is  bound  to 
become  more  and  more  oppressive  with  the  passage  of  time.  More- 
over, truth  itself  suffers  injury,  since  it  becomes  incorporated 
with  accidental  matter  derived  from  particular  periods  or  peoples. 
All  this  brings  with  it  an  inevitable  reaction.  Movement  insists 
upon  the  recognition  of  its  rights,  while  man  begins  to  be  con- 
scious of  his  limitations  and  of  the  conditional  nature  of  his 
achievements.  There  commences  that  development  of  modern 
life  the  greatness  of  which,  self-corrosive  as  it  is,  we  have  already 
noted.  If  the  doctrine  of  permanence  makes  the  mistake  of 
directly  fusing  the  substance  of  spiritual  life  with  its  human 
form  of  existence,  the  doctrine  of  change  errs  in  subjecting 
spiritual  life  to  the  conditions  of  the  human  type.  The  one 
petrifies  spiritual  life,  the  other  volatilises  it. 

There  has  been  no  lack  of  attempts  at  compromise.     Life  as 


276    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

a  whole  has  sought,  and  still  seeks,  for  help  more  particularly 
hy  reading  the  new,  which  the  passage  of  time  brings  with  it, 
as  far  as  possible  into  the  old ;  and  in  respect  of  the  formations 
of  history  a  distinction  is  made  between  kernel  and  shell,  the 
former  being,  as  well  as  can  be,  retained  and  the  latter  cast  off. 
But  this  is  no  more  than  a  makeshift,  and  its  success  is  made 
increasingly  impossible  by  the  historical  temper  of  modern 
thought,  with  its  demonstration  of  the  unique  and  characteristic 
nature  of  the  individual  ages.  If  we  do  not  wish  to  remain 
subject  to  these  oppositions  and  to  be  crushed  by  them,  we  must 
strive  to  overcome  them  inwardly  by  essentially  transforming 
the  idea  of  reality.  This  will  not,  however,  be  possible  until 
spiritual  life  is  recognised  as  independent  and  more  sharply 
separated  from  human  life.  For  in  this  way  alone  can  we  retain 
both  permanence  and  change.  In  the  last  depths  of  his  being 
man  must  be  grounded  in  an  unchanging  spiritual  world,  and 
from  this  centre  outwards  must  proceed  the  influences  that  move 
and  direct.  At  the  same  time  his  immediate  existence  remains 
in  the  highest  degree  insecure  and  incomplete.  Change  is  slow, 
and  progress  toward  the  goal  can  take  place  only  under  time- 
conditions.  But  owing  to  its  connection  with  this  unchanging 
basis  the  movement  of  change  does  not  lose  itself  in  what  is 
vague  and  strange  to  it ;  there  takes  place  in  it  a  realisation  of 
its  own  being,  and  though  it  passes  from  one  transition  to 
another,  it  is  no  longer  mere  change.  Considered  from  the 
point  of  view  of  man,  such  a  conviction  demands  that  life  should 
be  based  upon  something  deeper  than  the  psychical  functions  in 
their  separate  manifestations.  For  these  reveal  reality  already 
in  a  state  of  flux ;  and  the  thought-world,  in  particular,  figures 
as  in  ceaseless  transition.  But  a  strongly- defined  and  funda- 
mental type  of  life  can  maintain  its  identity  through  all  such 
changes  as  these,  express  itself  through  them,  and  unfold 
within  them,  a  truth  superior  to  time.  Thus  man  stands  at 
once  in  time  and  above  time :  his  life  possesses  a  two-fold 
character,  since  it  has  to  realise  a  truth  superior  to  time  as  a 
fact  of  experience  and  ground  itself  within  this  truth,  and  at 
the  same  time  must  strive,  within  the  realm  of  time,  for  a  clearer 
unfolding  and  more  forceful  application  of  this  truth.  Truth  is 


EVOLUTION  277 

therefore,  here,  both  a  possession  and  a  problem — a  possession 
in  the  innermost  depth  of  our  being,  a  problem  in  so  far  as  we 
are  called  to  transform  existence  into  a  life  of  full  self-activity. 

From  this  point  of  view  we  may  establish  a  relationship  with 
history  which  will  absorb  and  overcome  the  opposition  between 
permanence  and  change.  Let  us  consider,  for  example,  our 
attitude  towards  a  historical  religion  such  as  Christianity.  The 
form  which  it  has  historically  acquired  cannot  be  permanently 
retained.  Taking  into  account  all  the  immense  changes  which 
have  taken  place  in  our  outward  and  inward  existence,  it  would 
follow  that  not  only  our  thought,  but  our  emotions  and  convic- 
tions as  well,  would  be  in  danger  of  unreality  if  they  were  to  be 
forced  into  the  mould  of  this  older  type.  We  may  easily  be 
unjust  to  our  own  age  if  our  sole  aim  is  to  do  full  justice  to 
other  ages. 

But  this  retreat  from  the  immediate  form  of  existence  does 
not  necessarily  involve  the  least  abandonment  of  substance.  A 
genuine  type  of  spiritual  life  may  have  come  to  light  in  forms  of 
existence  that  have  since  become  inadequate,  and  this  life  may 
have  imparted,  and  may  continue  to  impart,  vitality  to  events  of 
more  than  temporal  significance,  whose  influence  pervades  the 
whole  of  human  history.  Human  life  can  never  under  any  cir- 
cumstances afford  to  cut  itself  loose  from  spiritual  life  of  this 
type.  As  far  as  its  human  form  is  concerned  this  eternal 
remains  at  the  same  time  a  perpetual  task  ;  it  does  not  demon- 
strate its  superiority  to  time  by  retaining  a  rigid  self-sameness 
through  the  ages,  but  far  rather  by  entering  into  the  distinctive 
character  of  each  age  without  losing  itself,  by  enabling  each  age 
to  discover  the  eternal  which  dwells  within  it  and  thus  liberating 
it  from  mere  time.  But  in  opposition  to  this  view  of  the  Ancient 
World,  that  which  assigns  to  time  a  reality  has  this  immense 
advantage,  that  it  is  only  as  a  time-process  that  progress  within 
the  eternal  first  becomes  possible. 

We  have  not  space  at  our  disposal  to  pursue  the  question  how 
the  aspect  of  the  world  and  man's  relationship  to  reality  are 
transformed  when  "  becoming "  drops  into  the  second  place, 
without,  however,  being  looked  upon  with  the  contempt  meted 
out  to  it  by  Greek  thought.  But  there  is  one  point  we  should 


278    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

like  to  mention  before  closing  this  section.  The  fundamental 
conviction  we  have  referred  to,  with  its  reconciliation  of  perma- 
nence and  change,  can  never  contradict  the  facts  of  evolution ; 
hut  it  must  needs  come  into  sharp  conflict  with  a  self-sufficient 
evolutionary  philosophy,  a  merely  naturalistic  theory  of  evolu- 
tion. The  ultimate  decision  depends  upon  our  whole  conception 
of  spiritual  life  and  at  the  same  time  of  our  own  heing.  How 
the  evolution  of  reality  as  a  whole  is  to  be  understood  depends 
chiefly  upon  whether  we  recognise  in  spiritual  life  a  new  stage  oj 
life  or  whether  we  see  in  it  nothing  more  than  a  mere  prolonga- 
tion of  nature.  In  the  former  case,  evolution  assumes  a  different 
appearance ;  the  process  in  which  we  ourselves  are  immediately 
involved,  with  which  we  are  familiar  through  experience,  does 
not  itself  give  rise  to  all  progress,  the  higher  does  not  arise  as  a 
mere  product  of  the  lower,  but  new  forces  belonging  to  a  greater 
whole  enter  into  the  movement.  Thus  our  reality  acquires  back- 
ground and  depth  ;  it  must  adjust  itself  to  the  larger  whole  which 
includes  it.  Change  is  then  no  longer  a  mere  race  without  goal  or 
meaning,  but  moves  within  the  realm  of  eternal  truth,  and  is  borne 
on  by  its  inspiration.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  spiritual  life  is  a 
mere  by-product  of  nature,  there  remains  no  possibility  of  pro- 
viding a  counterpoise  for  change  and  wresting  a  content  from 
life  ;  but  humanity  and  the  whole  world  with  it  are  in  headlong 
flight  towards  the  nothingness  which  is  their  sole  destination. 
Thus,  in  this  case,  as  at  all  the  other  critical  points  of  our 
enquiry,  it  is  our  attitude  towards  spiritual  life — more  particularly 
the  recognition  or  rejection  of  an  independence  on  the  part  of 
spiritual  life — which  decides  the  direction  in  which  our  thought 
must  move. 


D.     THE  PROBLEMS  OF   HUMAN    LIFE 


1.  CIVILISATION   (OR   HUMAN 
CULTURE)* 

IN  dealing  with  man  himself  we  shall  find  that  the  problems 
which  confront  us  centre  around  one  dominating  idea,  that  of 
human  culture  or  civilisation.  This  idea,  as  it  ramifies,  takes 
a  complex  shape,  which,  in  its  turn,  reacts  upon  the  parent-root 
and  helps  to  determine  it  more  closely.  If  we  ask  how  civilisa- 
tion has  come  to  be  the  thing  it  is,  we  are  led  to  the  problems 
of  history  and  social  life.  If  we  ask  what  civilisation  is,  we  are 
met  by  the  problems  of  morality,  art,  &c.  As  preliminary,  then, 
to  this  whole  discussion,  let  us  first  consider  in  outline  the 
concept  of  civilisation. 

(a)  On  the  History  of  the   Term  and  Concept 

Following  our  usual  practice,  we  will  again  commence  with  the 
term.  Kultur,  in  its  present-day  sense,  is  of  comparatively 
modern  origin.  For  although  the  later  Classical  Period  and  the 
Renaissance  were  familiar  enough  with  metaphors  comparing 
the  state  of  the  soul  to  the  cultivation  (colere)  of  the  field, 
Bacon  was  the  first  to  make  of  the  idea  of  culture  a  distinct  and 
finite  concept.  The  culture  or  Georgics  of  the  spirit  became  a 
chief  portion  of  his  ethics,  t  At  first,  however,  this  attempt 
produced  no  results ;  it  was  not  directly  taken  up  and  developed. 

*  It  should  be  understood  that  the  term  "  civilisation"  is  used  as  a  transla- 
tion of  the  German  Kultur,  a  word  very  difficult  to  translate  satisfactorily,  but 
which  would  perhaps  be  more  accurately  rendered  by  "  human  culture."  As  the 
latter  is  a  somewhat  awkward  expression  it  was,  however,  thought  best  (as  a  rule) 
to  use  "  civilisation."  Tr.  Note. 

f  See  De  augm.  scient.,  vii.  cp.  1 :  Particmur  igitur  ethicam  in  doctrinas 
principalet  duos,  alteram  de  excmplari  sive  imagine  boni,  alteram  de  regimine  et 
cultura  animi,  quam  etiam  partem  georgica  animi  appellare  consuevimut.  Ilia 
naturam  boni  describit,  fuse  regulas  de  animo  ad  illas  conformando  pratcribit ; 
gee  also  cp.  3.  The  expression  Georgics  shows  how  strongly  the  pictorial 
character  of  the  term  was  felt. 


282    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Not  till  the  advent  of  French  civilisation  in  the  seventeenth 
century  did  a  more  extensive  movement  take  place  in  this 
direction.  Then,  the  proud  self-consciousness  of  a  classical  age 
favoured  the  distinction  of  its  own  type  of  civilisation  from  that 
of  all  lower  stages  of  development,  and  the  result  of  this  distinc- 
tion was  to  give  rise  to  a  more  general  reflection  upon  the 
different  conditions  of  human  existence.  The  eighteenth 
century,  always  eager  to  establish  history  on  a  natural  basis, 
pursued  this  tendency  still  further  and  occupied  itself  more  and 
more  with  the  contrast  between  natural  and  civilised  conditions. 
So  far  from  lacking  expressions  for  the  progress  of  humanity, 
different  images  and  ideas  here  exist  side  by  side  and  often  cut 
across  one  another ;  for  example,  to  cultivate,  to  civilise,  to 
polish,  to  enlighten.*  A  definite  term  for  the  whole  status 
implied  in  these  expressions  appears  to  have  been  first  supplied 
by  Turgot  with  the  word  civilisation.^  In  Germany,  the  Latin 
of  the  Renaissance  possessed  the  term  civilisatio ;  I  civilitas, 
too,  was  employed  in  a  similar  sense ;  §  but  the  living  speech 
remained  unaffected  and  down  to  the  beginning  of  the  Classical 
Epoch  still  relied  on  designations  of  an  equivocal  kind.||  The 

*  We  just  select  a  few  here  from  a  simply  endless  number.  Bayle  (see  auv. 
div.,  La  Hague,  1727,  i.  453  a)  has  cultiver  leur  esprit  et  leur  raison  ;  when,  in 
the  same  work  (407  a)  he  speaks  of  toutes  Us  socUtes  ou  Von  cultivate  V esprit,  we 
should  hardly  translate  this  otherwise  than  by  "  civilised  nations "  (Kultur- 
vdlkcr).  But  at  the  same  time  he  employs  civiliser  (for  example,  in  the 
dictionary  ;  1465,  se  civiliser,  and  1472  b,  nations  civilisees  in  contrast  to  nations 
barbares).  In  a  similar  sense,  Bossuet  uses  nations  let  plus  eclairees.  Leibniz 
(398  a,  Erdm.)  has  le  siecle  qui  passe  pour  eclair6 ;  where  we  should  say 
"savage"  and  "civilised  man,"  he  says  "wild  man"  and  "European." 
Montesquieu,  too,  contrasts  peuples  iclair&s  with  peuples  grossiers,  but  more 
often  he  uses  poli  or  police  (for  example,  lea  peuples  les  polls,  la  Grece  seul  polie 
au  milieu  des  barbares,  un  pays  polices,  un  royaume  aussi  polic&  comme  la  France, 
les  peuples  polices,  peuples  bien  police's).  In  England,  too,  there  is  no  definite 
term;  thus  Adam  Smith  uses  indiscriminately  "civilised"  and  "polished 
nations  "  (see,  for  example,  The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  v.,  cp.  2). 

f  See  Earth,  Die  Philosophic  der  Geschichte  als  Soziologie,  p.  253. 

J  According  to  Paulsen  (Gesch.  des  gelehrten  Unterrichts  in Deutschland,  pp.  78 
and  131)  it  was  said  of  Wittenberg  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century 
that  it  lay  in  termino  civilisationis. 

§  In  Kepler,  for  example  (ii.  730),  it  stands  for  the  opposite  of  barbaries. 

||  This  is  seen,  for  example,  in  the  works  of  that  sterling  and  thoughtful 
writer,  Iselin.  In  his  Geschichte  der  Menschheit  he  usually  contrasts  Stand 
der  Natur  (natural  condition)  with  Stand  der  Sitten  (well-mannered  condition) 
and  accordingly  speaks  of  getitteten  (well-mannered)  peoples.  But  not  less  often 
he  employs  Polizierung  (polishing)  and  polixiert,  and  in  this  connection,  antioi- 


CIVILISATION  283 

decisive  distinction,  so  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  was  the 
outcome  of  this  Classical  Period.  The  then  prevalent  desire  for 
a  vitalising  of  the  whole  man  and  an  artistic  construction  of 
human  existence  involved  so  original  an  ideal  of  human  culture 
that  the  terms  were  inevitably  adjusted  to  suit  it.  As  a  result 
of  this  adjustment  the  concept  of  human  culture  acquired  a 
definite  meaning  and  assumed  the  leading  place  ;  Zivilisation  * 
was  held  distinct,  as  indicating  a  lower  stage  of  human  pro- 
gress ;  Aufkldrung  (enlightenment)  lost  its  more  general  mean- 
ing almost  before  it  had  passed  into  common  use,  and  came  to 
designate  the  social  manner  peculiar  to  the  eighteenth  century, 
thereby  taking  its  place  as  a  historical  category ;  in  its  place 
appeared  the  familiar  term  Bildung  (formation),  but  enriched 
now  with  an  inward  meaning  (mental  culture),  and  the  word  in 
this  sense  soon  became  fashionable.  But  let  us  look  a  little 
more  closely  at  these  alterations  in  terminology,  for  they  have 
dominated  German  usage  down  to  the  present  day. 

Kultur,  without  any  addition,  is  first  met  with  in  Herder ;  the 
new  meaning  still  seems  to  be  in  a  state  of  flux,  but  it  has 
already  solidified  sufficiently  to  require  for  its  expression  a 
definite  term.t  Geisteskultur  (spiritual  culture)  was  employed 

pating  the  subsequent  distinction  between  culture  and  civilisation,  he  dis- 
tinguishes two  kinds  of  Polizierung :  "  one  which  provides  society  with  its 
outward  form  "  and  "  one  which  improves  men's  minds  and  feelings  "  (  Book  7, 
Section  21).  He  also  contrasts  Barbarei  (barbarism)  and  Mcnschlichke.it 
(humanity),  and  employs  Nilderung  (softening  and  humanisation)  and  Milderung 
der  Sitten  (humanisation  of  manners),  also  Erleuchtung  (illumination)  and 
Erleuchtung  der  Geister  (illumination  of  men's  minds)  as  equivalent  to  our 
"  human  culture."  In  his  youthful  writings,  Goethe  speaks  of  a  polierter  man 
and  of  polierte  nations.  Eant  writes  of  the  geschliffenen  (polished)  classes. 

*  This  must  not  be  confused  with  the  English  word  ''civilisation,"  which 
approximates  to  the  German  Kultur  (see  p.  281).  Tr.  Note. 

t  With  reference  to  this  term  the  section  ix.  1  of  the  Idem  zur  Philos.  der 
Getchichte  is  particularly  important :  "  If  we  wish  to  call  this  second  genesis 
of  man,  which  runs  through  his  whole  life,  culture  (from  the  cultivation  of  the 
soil)  or  enlightenment  (from  the  idea  of  light),  we  are  at  liberty  to  make  use  of 
the  name.  In  this  case,  however,  the  chain  of  culture  and  enlightenment 
stretches  to  the  ends  of  the  earth."  Culture  has  for  its  ruling  aim  Humanitcit 
(humanity  in  the  sense  of  human  feeling),  which  to  Herder  signified  the  com- 
plete development  and  harmony  of  all  powers,  according  to  a  conviction  which 
idealised  the  intimate  nnion  of  life  and  beauty.  The  distinctive  mark  of  man 
aa  compared  with  mere  nature  is,  however,  freedom  ;  hence  freedom  is  essential 
to  the  concept  of  culture.  The  subject  is  dealt  with  in  greater  detail  in  Genthe's 
Der  Kulturbegriff  bei  Herder. 


284    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

for  a  long  time  side  by  side  with  Kultur  (as,  for  example,  in 
Goethe),  but  gradually  Kultur  simplidtur  prevailed.  The 
further  application  of  the  concept  took  place  in  two  directions, 
following  the  two  chief  tendencies  of  German  idealism — the 
artistic  and  the  ethical.  With  the  poets  and  humanists  the 
former  tendency  predominated ;  in  this  case,  art  and  science 
in  their  union  as  literary  creation  appear  to  be  the  authentic 
vehicles  of  culture,  the  distinguishing  mark  of  true  cultivation.* 
On  the  other  hand,  Kant  and  still  more  decisively  Fichte  make 
freedom  the  soul  of  culture,  and  hence  give  the  latter  a  predomi- 
nantly moral  character.  Kant  defines  culture  in  the  following 
terms  :  "  Culture,"  he  says,  "  is  the  drawing  forth  of  a  rational 
being's  capacity  for  certain  ends  in  general,  which,  being  general, 
are  within  the  scope  of  his  freedom.  Hence  the  ultimate  pur- 
pose which  one  has  cause  to  attribute  to  nature  in  respect  of  the 
human  race  can  be  no  other  than  culture  ;  this  purpose  cannot  be 
human  happiness  upon  earth  nor  even  the  prospect  of  ranking  as 
the  most  distinguished  instrument  in  the  establishing  of  order 
and  concord  in  irrational  external  nature"  (v.  464,  Hart.). 
Fichte  developed  this  idea  still  further,  expressing  it  forcibly 
after  his  own  fashion.  For  him,  freedom  or  full  self-activity  is 
at  the  same  time  the  content  of  culture ;  thus  the  latter  signifies 
(Wke.,  vi.  86) :  "  The  exercising  of  every  power  towards  the  end 
of  attaining  complete  freedom,  complete  independence  of  all  that 
is  not  ourself,  our  own  pure  Self."  Since  this  task,  from  his 
standpoint,  comprised  all  others,  "  nothing  in  the  sensuous 
world,  nothing  in  our  human  lot,  be  it  what  we  do  or  what  we 
suffer,  has,  when  regarded  as  a  phenomenon,  any  value  except  in 
so  far  as  it  makes  for  culture."  Religion,  science,  and  virtue 
are  expressly  counted  among  the  higher  branches  of  rational 
culture  (vii.  166)  ;  culture  also  forms  the  end  of  statecraft,  and 
the  State  of  which  the  thinker  dreams  is  described  as  a  culture- 
state.! 

*  See  the  passage  from  F.  A.  Wolf  which  we  are  shortly  about  to  cite. 

t  The  concept  of  the  "culture-state  "  contradicts,  in  the  first  place,  the  con- 
ception of  the  State  as  a  mere  "juridical  institution."  To  begin  with,  the 
"culture-state"  stood  in  opposition,  too,  to  the  national  State ;  see  vii.  212: 
"  Which  is  then  the  fatherland  of  the  truly  educated  Christian  European  ?  In 
general,  it  is  Europe ;  in  particular,  it  is  that  European  State  which  at  the 


CIVILISATION  285 

These  two  different  phases  of  the  movement  towards  human 
culture  agree,  however,  in  distinctly  separating  culture,  as  a 
development  from  within  and  an  elevation  of  the  whole  man, 
from  all  mere  social  order;  the  term  Zivilisation  serves  to 
denote  the  latter.  Thus  Zivilisation  and  Kultur  are  dis- 
tinguished as  lower  and  higher,  as  beginning  and  completion.* 
Closely  connected  with  this  development  and  enrichment  of  the 
concept  of  culture  is  the  appearance  of  Bildung ;  during  the 
second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  this  term  was  transferred  for 
the  first  time  from  the  outward  to  the  inward,  from  the  corporeal 
to  the  mental,  t  It  was  taken  up  with  particular  eagerness  by  the 
Romanticists,  who  seem  to  have  been  more  especially  respon- 
sible for  bringing  the  expression  die  GebUdeten,  "men  of 

period  in  question  stands  at  the  highest  level  of  culture."  Later,  it  was  Fichte 
himself  who  raised  the  concepts  nation  and  fatherland  to  honour;  but  it 
was  always  the  spiritual  content  and  never  the  sensuous  existence  which  gave 
them  their  importance  in  his  eyes. 

*  This  is  already  quite  clearly  to  be  seen  in  the  case  of  Eant ;  see  more 
especially  iv.  152  :  "  We  have  become  cultivated  in  a  high  degree  through  art 
and  science.  We  have  become  civilised  to  the  point  of  being  overburdened 
in  every  kind  of  social  behaviour  and  convention.  But  there  is  yet  a  great 
deal  to  be  done  before  we  can  call  ourselves  '  moralised.'  For  the  idea  of 
morality  is  a  portion  of  culture ;  though  when  the  idea  is  employed  only  in 
the  sense  of  mere  uniform  conventions  of  honour  and  outward  propriety  it 
does  not  amount  to  anything  more  than  civilisation."  Pestalozzi  says  in  the 
same  sense  (xii.  154) :  "  The  collective  existence  of  our  species  can  only  civilise 
the  same,  it  cannot  cultivate  it."  F.  A.  Wolf  was  a  peculiarly  energetic 
advocate  of  specifically  literary  culture ;  see  more  especially  the  famous  treatise 
which  serves  as  introduction  to  the  Museum  der  Altertums-Wissenschaft  (1807). 
He  makes  use  of  the  distinction  between  culture  and  civilisation  in  order  to 
elevate  the  Greeks  and  Romans  above  all  other  peoples.  In  this  connection  the 
chief  characteristic  of  genuine  culture  is  regarded  as  the  possession  of  a  litera- 
ture common  to  all ,  culture  is  that  position  of  society  brought  about  by  the 
development  of  literature  and  art.  See  p.  16 :  "  One  of  the  most  important 
differences  between  these  nations  and  the  others  is  that  the  latter  are  not  in  the 
least  (or  only  a  few  degrees)  elevated  above  that  kind  of  cultivation  which  should 
be  called  a  condition  of  respectable  polish  or  civilisation,  in  contrast  to  genuine 
higher  spiritual  culture."  P.  17:  "That  higher  culture,  the  spiritual  or 
literary."  P.  18:  "Asiatics  and  Africans,  as  merely  civilised  peoples — not 
cultivated  in  a  literary  sense — are  unquestionably  shut  out  of  our  domain." 
During  this  whole  period,  Europe  and  culture  were  closely  associated.  W.  v. 
Humboldt  also  adopted  this  distinction  between  culture  and  civilisation. 

t  Upon  this  point  see  Imelmann's  edition  of  Klopstock's  Oden,  p.  86; 
Paulsen,  article  Bildung  in  Rein's  Em.  Handbuch  der  POdagogik;  Biese  in 
d.  N.  Jahrb.filr  da*  Klats.  Altertum,  year  1902,  p.  241 


286    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

culture,"  into  general  use.*  In  Fichte  we  can  clearly  trace  how 
this  word,  so  indefinite  in  its  original  meaning,  acquires  a  fixed 
connotation.  Bildung  and  gebildet  undergo  a  characteristic 
development  differentiating  them  from  the  other  allied  terms  in 
this  respect,  namely,  that  they  are  used  not  so  much  of  whole 
peoples,  or  of  humanity  in  general,  as  of  the  higher  intellectual 
section  within  a  given  nation.  In  Bildung  stress  is  laid 
rather  upon  personal  activity,  independent  appropriation  on  the 
part  of  the  individual,  t  It  is  thus  contrasted  with  culture  in 
general  as  being  something  more  inward. 

The  distinction  hetween  Kultu/r  and  Zivilisation  has  recently 
become  very  vague  and  shifting.  J  There  is  an  intrinsic  reason 
for  this,  in  so  far  as  that  inner  culture  which  hovered  before  the 
minds  of  our  poets  and  thinkers  and  claimed  superiority  over 
any  mere  civilisation  has  ceased,  in  our  own  age,  to  possess  any 
firm  foundation.  Moreover,  in  this  respect  there  is  no  agree- 
ment between  the  nations ;  when  we  Germans  speak  of  Kultur, 
the  French  and  English  say  "  civilisation."  §  We  cannot, 
however,  pursue  this  matter  any  further  at  present.  As  to  the 
general  meaning  of  Kultur  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  its  more 
exact  meaning  is,  however,  quite  unsettled,  and  every  powerful 
mind  is  free  to  impress  its  own  mark  upon  it. 


However  indefinite  the  concept  of  Kultur  may  be  to-day,  it 
certainly  points  to  a  very  old  problem.  The  Ancient  World 
could  not  avoid  recognising  great  contrasts  between  the  nations 

*  This  expression  then  meant  far  more  than  it  now  does,  after  the  weakening 
influence  of  centuries.  This  must  be  taken  into  account  in  Schleiermacher's 
Reden  iiber  die  Religion  an  die  Gebildeten  unter  ihren  Verachtern.  For  more 
detailed  information  as  to  the  meaning  of  this  expression  among  the  German 
Romanticists,  see  Haym's  Die  Romantisehe  Schule,  pp.  420,  430. 

t  With  regard  to  the  problems  connected  with  the  concept  Bildung,  see 
amongst  recent  literature)  O.  Weissenfels,  Die  Bildung swirr en  der  Gegenwart. 

|  For  a  full  account  see  Earth's  Die  Philosophic  der  Getchichte  alt  Soziologie, 
p.  253. 

§  When  an  article  of  mine,  Religion  u.  Kultur,  was  translated  in  the  Libert^ 
Chretienne  (1907,  No.  3,  p.  114)  it  was  noted  with  regard  to  Kultur:  "Nous 
n'avons  guere  I  habitude,  enfran$ais,  d' employer  ee  mot  sans  quelque  deternuna- 
tif:  '  la  culture  intellectuelle,'  '  la  culture  des  lettret.'  " 


CIVILISATION  287 

as  well  as  different  intellectual  stages  within  individual  nations  ; 
Attic  life  at  its  zenith  was  bound  not  only  to  increase  the  self- 
consciousness  of  Greek  civilisation  but  to  produce  a  sharper 
division  within  Greek  life  itself.  There  was  much,  however,  to 
militate  against  a  full  appreciation  of  the  problem  of  human 
culture.  National  isolation  made  it  easy  for  the  higher  cultural 
position  of  a  particular  nation  to  be  regarded  as  merely  the 
natural  gift  of  a  special  race ;  at  the  same  time,  the  historical 
belief  in  endless  cycles  confined  all  progress  within  narrow 
limits  and  easily  hindered  an  impartial  examination  of  national 
origins.  On  the  other  hand  there  was  considerable  inclination 
to  recognise  an  ascent  from  a  crude  natural  condition.  The 
broadening  of  horizon  and  closer  connection  of  peoples  which 
began  with  Alexander  *  was  necessarily  hindered,  however,  by 
the  division  of  humanity  into  Greeks  and  Barbarians.  The 
same  age,  too,  which  saw  a  weakening  of  national  contrasts 
produced  a  sharpening  of  the  distinction  between  educated  and 
uneducated  among  the  Greeks  themselves,  since  without  a 
scholarly  education  it  was  no  longer  possible  fully  to  participate 
in  the  inherited  riches  of  civilisation.!  The  later  Classical 
Period  devoted  much  thought  to  the  problem  of  civilisation.  In 
the  early  Christian  world  and  in  the  Middle  Ages  this  question 
sank  into  the  background,  but  with  the  Eenaissance  it  came  to 
the  front  again  with  renewed  vigour.  Civilisation  has  since 

*  This  does  not  impart  a  cosmopolitan  tendency  to  philosophy  only  but 
transforms  thought  in  general.  What  Strabo  says  of  Eratosthenes  (at  the  end 
of  the  first  book  of  Geographica)  is  worthy  of  note  :  tiri  riXei  31  TOW  wTro/wj/iaroc 
OVK  tiraiviaag  TOVQ  5i%a  StaipovvTag  iiirav  TO  TUV  dvSpwirwv  ir\r)$0£  tig  re^EAA^vaf 
icai  /3ap/3apovc, — (3s\Tiov  ilvai  tpi]triv  apery  icai  KaKif  Siatpelv  ravra.  TroXAoif  yap 
icai  rSiv  'EXAjyvuij/  tlvai  KUKOVI-  icai  T&V  flappapw  aoriiovQ.  Strabo,  on  the  other 
hand,  defends  the  supremacy  of  the  Greeks  by  explaining  that,  in  their  case, 
there  is  a  predominance  of  legal  order  and  cultivation,  while  with  other  nations 
there  is  the  opposite  state  of  affairs :  rotf  piv  ivucpaTti  TO  voftipov  rat  TO  iraiStiac 
•cat  \6yu>v  oixtiov,  rot£  Si  Tuvavria. 

t  Already,  in  the  works  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  iraiMa  had  the  further 
meaning  of  polite  culture,  cultivation,  in  addition  to  its  ordinary  significance  of 
education.  As  an  indication  of  this  we  see,  for  example,  the  Aristotelian  con- 
junction :  wealth,  nobility,  efficiency,  culture  (TT\OVTOC,  eiijevtia,  dperr],  iraiSeia) 
Pol.  1291  6,  28  (see  similarly  1293  b,  37 :  vatBeia  ical  fvysveia,  1296  6,  18 :  l\cv- 
Stpia,  TrXourof,  vaiSua,  ivyiviia,  1317  6,  39 :  -ysvog,  TT\OVTOS,  iraiStia).  In 
Aristotle,  TreTraiStvfitvot;  and  d-iraidevroc  correspond  completely  to  our  "cultured" 
and  "  uncultured. " 


288    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

remained  in  the  centre  of  spiritual  work,  and  all  the  opposing 
forces  of  the  Modern  World  have  shared  in  the  struggle  raging 
around  this  centre.  Idealism  has  endeavoured  to  build  up  civili- 
sation from  within,  realism  to  piece  it  together  from  without. 
Artistic,  intellectual,  and  ethical  conceptions  have  cut  across  one 
another  and  struggled  for  the  upper  hand,  while  there  has  been 
no  lack  of  all  kinds  of  compromises.  During  the  nineteenth 
century  a  co-operation  of  history  and  natural  science  has  caused 
the  older  speculative  treatment  of  these  subjects  to  give  way 
more  and  more  to  an  exact  scientific  treatment.  At  the  same 
time  the  psychical  conditions  on  which  civilised  life  depends 
have  been  more  closely  examined,*  and  whilst  facts  have  accu- 
mulated without  limit,  the  need  for  a  conception  of  the  whole 
has  given  rise  to  fresh  attempts  at  a  philosophy  of  civilisation. 
From  among  the  very  numerous  problems  and  controversies  thus 
originated  we  will  at  present  pick  out  only  those  which  directly 
touch  the  problem  of  life  and  spirit. 

(6)  Critical 
1.   THE  NATURE  AND  VALUE  OF  CIVILISATION 

Civilisation  is  one  of  those  subjects  which  become  more 
complicated  the  more  we  think  about  it.  The  concept  should 
comprise  everything  which  raises  man  and  humanity  above  mere 
nature.  But  in  what  does  this  superiority  of  man  to  nature 
consist  ?  Does  it  simply  mean  that  man  attains  to  a  greater 
independence  and  power  within  a  given  existence,  and  that  he 
is  merely  able  to  take  a  wider  view  of  his  environment  while 
adapting  it  more  skilfully  to  his  purposes ;  or  do  we  find  in  him 
an  essentially  new  type  of  life,  are  new  depths  opened  up, 
permitting  him  to  construct  a  new  domain  of  reality?  In 
the  former  case  the  civilisation  is  no  more  than  outward ;  in 
the  latter  it  is  inward.  The  one  is  a  mere  drilling  and 
polishing  of  society ;  the  other  is  a  true  spiritual  culture, 
There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  reality  of  the  former;  but 
the  possibility  of  the  latter  has  been  sharply  disputed. 

*  Upon  this  point,  see  Vierkandt's  valuable  work,  Naturv'dlker  und  Kultur- 
viilker :  Ein  Beitrag  zur  Sozialpsychologie ;  1896. 


CIVILISATION 

If  the  content  of  civilisation  be  quite  uncertain,  the  same  may 
be  said  of  its  extent.  It  certainly  includes  a  translating  of 
human  life  into  greater  activity,  nay,  a  founding  of  it  upon 
personal  action  ;  this  is  indeed  indicated  by  the  expression 
Kultur,  since  it  calls  to  mind  the  cultivation  of  a  field  in 
opposition  to  the  wild  and  free  growth  of  nature ;  but  does 
this  activity  comprise  everything  which  is  in  any  way 
characteristic  of  man,  or  is  it  merely  one  aspect  of  life, 
side  by  side  with  which  other  possibilities  may  exist?  An 
insecurity  with  regard  to  the  relationship  of  religion  and 
human  culture  in  itself  intimates  the  existence  of  a  problem. 
Sometimes  the  former  is  ranked  along  with  the  latter,  and 
religion  seems  to  depend  upon  the  state  of  civilisation ; 
sometimes  they  are  presented  as  contrasts,  which  cut  across 
and  impede  one  another,  and  it  not  infrequently  occurs  that 
civilisation  is  attacked  from  the  point  of  view  of  religion, 
and  at  the  same  time  religion  from  the  point  of  view  of 
civilisation. 

The  question  of  the  value  of  civilisation  occupies  pretty 
much  the  same  position.  If  it  denotes  everything  which 
raises  man  above  the  level  of  uncultivated  nature  to  that 
of  cultivation  and  education,  then  it  must  appear  the  highest 
of  all  values,  and  anything  which  is  to  be  in  any  way  of  value 
to  us  must  rest  upon  it.  At  the  same  time,  however,  history  is 
full  of  complaints  as  to  the  evils  and  dangers  of  civilisation,  and 
sometimes  these  become  so  alarming  that  we  are  tempted  to 
regard  the  whole  of  civilisation  as  a  Danaean  gift.  In  three 
directions,  in  particular,  civilisation  has  from  the  earliest  times 
been  the  object  of  severe  attack. 

From  the  standpoint  of  religion  it  was  easy  for  civilisation  to 
excite  serious  doubts,  as  it  involved  a  strengthening  of  human 
power  and  an  increase  of  human  self-consciousness.  The  pious 
mind  saw  in  the  bold,  upward  effort  of  humanity  an  exaggeration 
of  man's  capacity,  an  overstepping  of  the  bounds  set  by  his 
nature,  a  lack  of  religious  feeling.  The  evils  and  reverses  of 
civilised  life  were  hence  interpreted  as  a  punishment  for  such 
folly.  A  belief  of  this  description  is  seen  in  the  Babylonian 
stories  of  the  Fall  of  Man  and  of  the  tower  which  was  to  reach 

19 


to  Heaven,  also  in  the  legend  of  Prometheus ;  as  applied  to  an 
undue  desire  for  knowledge,  it  is  unmistakably  present  in  the 
Faust  legends. 

Within  the  human  sphere  itself,  however,  there  has  often 
been  no  little  doubt  whether  civilisation  really  brings  man 
the  happiness  it  so  confidently  promises  him.  It  gives  rise 
to  a  great  complexity  of  life,  it  develops  artificial  needs,  it 
makes  man  increasingly  dependent  upon  his  environment,  it 
makes  work  and  trouble  for  him,  it  arouses  unattainable  wishes 
and  wild  passions ;  taking  all  this  into  account,  it  may  appear 
to  be  an  uprooting  of  man  from  his  native  soil,  a  process  which, 
in  spite  of  all  outward  appearance  of  success,  produces  inward 
unhappiness.  Ideas  of  this  description  have  been  current  since 
the  earliest  times ;  they  are  to  be  met  with,  for  example,  among 
the  ancient  Jews,  as  is  seen  in  Hosea  and  Isaiah.*  The  later 
Greek  period  was  particularly  full  of  doubts  ;  a  dislike  of  the 
refinement  of  contemporary  civilisation,  a  yearning  for  simple 
conditions  and  a  simple  mode  of  life,  became  more  and  more 
widespread :  the  philosophers,  in  particular,  gave  expression  to 
this  mood,  the  Cynics  in  broader,  and  the  Stoics  in  more 
refined  fashion ;  the  Belles  Lettres,  too,  fell  under  its 
influence,  and  thereby  proclaimed  its  extension  to  general 
social  life.t  In  the  Modern  World  Rousseau,  in  particular, 
placed  the  problem  before  humanity  in  the  clearest  possible 
manner ;  with  his  sensitive,  excited,  and  exciting  style  he 
imperatively  forced  it  upon  the  attention  of  modern  society. 

This  threatened  loss  of  happiness  might  somehow  have  been 
endured  if  at  the  same  time  there  had  been  no  doubt  as  to  the 
growth  of  man's  efficiency.  But  such  was  not  the  case.  On 
the  contrary,  complaints  as  to  a  diminution  of  strength  and 
efficiency,  due  to  the  progress  of  civilisation,  usually  accom- 
panied those  with  regard  to  declining  happiness.  Civilisation, 
we  are  informed,  weakens  man,  because  it  makes  him  dependent 
upon  others  ;  it  assigns  first  place  to  the  effects  of  his  social 

*  Upon  this  point,  see  Budde,  Das  nomadische  Ideal  im  altem  Testament 
(Preuss.  Jahrbilcher,  vol.  85). 

f  Interesting  information  upon  this  point  is  to  be  found  in  E.  Rohde's  De.r 
griechische  Roman  und  seine  Vorlaufer. 


CIVILISATION  291 

conduct,  thereby  placing  outward  achievement  before  feeling 
itself  and  threatening  to  reduce  life,  down  to  the  most  inward 
feelings,  to  the  superficial  and  unreal.  The  individual  comes 
more  and  more  to  play  a  mere  part  assigned  to  him  by  society, 
and  his  life  grows  increasingly  alien  to  himself ;  it  becomes  a 
mere  outward  possession.  Under  these  circumstances,  how  can 
man  retain  his  greatness  of  soul,  how  can  he  be  a  true,  strong, 
whole  man  ? 

At  the  same  time  civilisation  does  not  lack  its  defenders. 
These  evils,  it  is  maintained,  are  no  more  than  secondary 
phenomena,  the  shadows  without  which  there  could  be  no 
light.  It  is  only  man  who  drags  down  to  pettiness,  and 
thus  makes  doubtful,  what  is  in  itself  great  and  of  incon- 
testable value. 

Meanwhile  civilisation  lies  within  man's  sphere  of  life.  Is  it 
not  bound  up  with  his  human  status,  and  will  it  be  able  in  any 
way  to  raise  itself  above  the  petty  routine  of  human  affairs, 
while  clearly  dividing  essential  content  from  human  addition, 
right  from  wrong?  For  the  time  being  these  doubts  remain 
unsettled,  and  it  continues  to  be  an  open  question  whether 
civilisation  is  a  curse  or  a  blessing  to  man. 

2.   THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  CONTENT  OP  CIVILISATION 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  civilisation  makes  human 
existence  depend  to  a  very  large  extent  on  man's  own 
activity;  but  the  general  concept  of  activity  does  not  carry 
us  at  all  far.  Activity  cannot  attract  its  environment  to 
itself  and,  transforming  itself,  impart  its  content  to  this 
environment,  without  more  closely  determining  itself,  without 
giving  life  a  firm  nucleus,  a  dominating  tendency,  a  distinctive 
character.  Thus  the  answer  at  once  gives  rise  to  a  question. 
The  resulting  problem  has  been  solved  in  very  varying  fashion 
during  the  development  of  the  world's  history.  Different  types 
of  civilisation  have  resulted,  not  one  of  which  seems  to  give  full 
and  permanent  satisfaction,  and  yet  it  is  impossible,  taking  into 
consideration  their  contradictory  aims  and  values,  to  combine 
these  together. 


292    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Within  the  development  of  civilisation  as  a  whole  there  stand 
out  more  especially  three  definite  and  specific  forms  of  culture — 
the  artistic,  the  ethical,  and  the  dynamic.  These  we  see 
embodied  in  Hellenism,  Christianity,  and  Modern  Life.  The 
central  characteristic  of  the  Hellenistic  form  was  the  combina- 
tion of  the  elements  furnished  by  nature  to  form  a  harmoniously 
arranged  whole  pervaded  by  an  inner  life.  This  combination, 
order,  and  vivification  can  come  to  man  only  as  the  result  of  his 
own  activity,  which  must  wrest  a  permanent  and  correlated 
conception  of  the  world  from  sensuous  impressions  in  a  state 
of  disintegration  and  movement ;  it  sets  the  individual  within 
the  firm  structure  of  a  closed  community,  it  binds  together  the 
separate  forces  and  instincts  of  the  soul  (without  surrendering 
or  weakening  anything  whatever  thereof)  to  a  work  of  life  as  a 
whole;  at  every  point  it  accomplishes  a  transformation  from 
chaos  to  cosmos.  This  activity  places  nature  and  spirit  in  close 
and  fruitful  relationship,  creates  a  powerful,  active,  and  joyful 
life,  ennobles  and  reconstitutes  the  whole  cycle  of  existence. 
Questions  and  doubts,  however,  still  remained.  The  whole 
rested  upon  the  conviction  that  life  was  fundamentally  possessed 
of  a  certain  tendency  towards  reason,  and  this  conviction  grew 
more  and  more  unstable.  The  form  which  in  this  type  of 
civilisation  dominated  life  could  retain  its  position  only  so  long 
as  it  possessed  a  soul,  and  this  it  did  not  seem  capable  of  per- 
manently preserving.  Finally,  the  complications  and  perplexities 
of  life  came  so  much  to  the  front,  and  man  appeared  so  severely 
threatened  in  the  innermost  centre  of  his  being,  that  his  basic 
relationship  to  the  world  and  the  salvation  of  his  soul  became 
the  most  imperative  of  all  tasks. 

Christianity  took  this  task  upon  itself.  While  fully  recognis- 
ing the  negation,  it  undertook  to  lead  man  to  a  superior  affirma- 
tion ;  in  the  midst  of  an  immense  upheaval  it  preserved  fixed 
poles  for  life.  This  demanded  an  absolute  concentration  upon  the 
ethical  task.  The  problem  was  to  build  up  a  completely  new 
life,  as  compared  with  immediate  human  existence ;  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  hardness  and  soullessness  of  the  latter  there  was  set  up 
a  kingdom  of  benevolent  love  and  childlike  surrender.  In  the 
development  of  this  ideal  a  tremendous  deepening  of  life  re- 


CIVILISATION  293 

suited,  invisible  relationships  opened  up,  and  a  great  sensitive- 
ness of  feeling  went  hand  in  hand  with  profound  earnestness ; 
temporal  and  eternal,  finite  and  infinite,  human  and  divine,  now 
came  into  closest  contact.  But  as  regards  its  historical  position 
this  mode  of  thought  remained  predominantly  transcendent  and 
won  no  secure  hold  within  the  environing  world ;  this  world 
remained  unaffected  and  unpurified,  side  by  side  with  a  sphere 
of  pure  inwardness  ;  in  the  retreat  to  a  world  of  feeling  the 
task  of  grappling  with  the  resistant  elements  of  existence  was 
regarded  as  a  secondary  matter,  and  in  this  way  the  virility 
of  the  whole  was  endangered. 

The  Modern  World,  on  the  other  hand,  made  this  task  the 
hinge  upon  which  its  whole  activity  turned.  The  first  place 
in  men's  thoughts  was  now  occupied  by  the  idea  of  a  complete 
overcoming  of  resistance,  of  a  thorough  rooting  out  of  all  that 
was  obscure.  The  development  and  unlimited  increase  of  life 
itself  became  the  goal  of  goals,  the  all-sufficing  happiness.  Man 
now  appeared  in  a  fresh  light.  His  chief  distinction  seemed 
to  be  his  transcendence  of  all  rigid  limits,  his  ability  con- 
tinually to  increase  his  own  strength,  to  perpetually  strike  out 
new  paths,  to  make  ever  fresh  beginnings.  The  movement 
resulting  therefrom  gives  rise  to  radically  new  conceptions  of 
the  universe,  of  social  life,  of  the  soul  of  the  individual;  it 
creates  a  new  kind  of  work,  a  work  which  wins,  for  the  first 
time,  the  consciousness  of  a  superiority  to  the  world.  More 
than  ever  before  man  becomes  the  master  of  his  existence ; 
there  results  in  every  direction  a  process  of  revivification,  an 
awakening  of  all  that  is  latent,  a  liberation  of  all  that  is  bound ; 
on  every  hand  life  becomes  a  restless  forward  endeavour  while 
spirit  and  strength  immeasurably  develop. 

If  the  beneficent  results  of  the  foregoing  are  present  to  us 
in  a  thousand  forms,  there  are  also  present  the  countless  per- 
plexities which  this  vivification  and  liberation  has  brought  with 
it :  much  that  is  irrational  has  allied  itself  to  the  joyously  pro- 
gressive reason,  and  with  the  successful  growth  of  spiritual  life 
is  involved  so  much  petty  human  error  and  passion  that  the 
belief  in  modern  civilisation  as  the  sole  source  of  happiness  has 
become  in  the  highest  degree  uncertain.  It  becomes  increas- 


294    MAIN  CURRENTS   OP  MODERN   THOUGHT 

ingly  impossible,  too,  to  suppress  the  question  whether,  even 
in  case  the  dynamic  ideal  should  be  realised,  man  can  be 
entirely  absorbed  in  it.  For,  as  a  thinking  being,  he  surveys 
movement  from  a  point  outside  it,  comprehends  it  as  a  whole, 
and  must  demand  from  it  a  permanent  furthering  of  his  being ; 
from  this  standpoint  a  civilisation  which  merely  pushes  inces- 
santly and  recklessly  forward  and  never  grants  him  a  possession 
beyond  the  flux  of  time  will  become  meaningless  and  intolerable. 
All  this  is  developed  in  sequence,  but  the  successive  phases 
do  not  simply  replace  one  another ;  that  which  has  outwardly 
vanished  retains  an  inner  presence  and  continues  to  exert  an 
influence  upon  human  life.  Now  the  basic  tendencies  and 
general  characters  of  these  historical  movements  are  so 
different  that  only  a  shallow  type  of  thought  could  entertain 
the  idea  of  a  direct  combination.  Such  a  combination  is  all  the 
less  possible  because  the  historical  consciousness  of  the  present 
day  causes  us  to  perceive  distinctions  with  peculiar  clearness. 
Thus  the  different  solutions  remain  alien  and  alternative, 
waging  warfare  with  one  another,  though  for  the  most  part 
not  openly:  the  artistic  type  of  civilisation  finds  the  ethical 
narrow  and  gloomy,  the  dynamical  formless  and  restless ;  the 
ethical  inevitably  regards  the  artistic  as  shallowly  optimistic 
and  fettered  to  nature,  the  dynamical  as  self-conscious  and 
arrogant ;  the  dynamical  will  find  the  others  deficient  in  move- 
ment and  progressive  impetus.  In  the  midst  of  all  these 
contrasts  stands  the  man  of  to-day.  Will  he  not  be  borne 
down  by  them  and  spiritually  depressed?  He  cannot  unite 
these  different  types  of  civilisation ;  nor,  to  secure  one,  can  he 
abandon  the  others  ;  in  order  to  do  justice  to  each  and  eliminate 
its  errors  he  must  attain  to  a  secure  superiority,  but  he  is  not 
only  lacking  in  such  a  superiority,  he  does  not  even  see  in  which 
direction  it  is  to  be  sought. 

3.  THE   UNCERTAINTY  IN  THE  RELATIONSHIP  OF  MAN   TO 
CIVILISATION 

Our  perplexities  become  increased  when  we  consider  the 
relationship  of  man  to  civilisation.  There  seem  to  be  only  two 
possibilities — either  civilisation  must  serve  man  or  man  must 


CIVILISATION  295 

serve  civilisation.     Now,  we  may  easily  perceive  that  neither 
of  these  alternatives  is  possible. 

If  civilisation  were  a  mere  means  for  the  welfare  and  comfort 
of  man,  then  its  growth  would  make  his  life  more  and  more 
agreeable ;  an  increase  of  civilisation  would  be  synonymous 
with  an  increase  of  happiness.  Such,  however,  is  not  the  case. 
For,  as  far  as  its  effect  upon  human  comfort  is  concerned, 
civilisation  seems  to  be  injurious  rather  than  beneficial ;  it  gives 
rise  to  unlimited  desires  and  demands  unspeakable  effort  and 
labour,  it  surrounds  us  with  perplexities,  cares,  and  excitements, 
it  hems  us  in  with  rigid  limitations,  it  calls  for  obedience  and 
sacrifice.  That  all  this  tends  to  make  life  smoother  and  more 
pleasurable  can  hardly  be  maintained.  Mere  comfort  is  far 
more  likely  to  be  found,  and  man  is  far  more  likely  to  feel  con- 
tented, on  lower  levels  of  civilisation ;  moreover,  individuals  of 
lower  spiritual  susceptibility  will  secure  this  comfort  far  sooner 
than  those  who  are  more  sensitive.  If  contented  and  agreeable 
existence  were  the  highest  goal,  how  greatly  we  civilised  men 
should  envy  the  careless  ease  of  the  Brazilian  nigger's  life  !  In 
the  same  sense  it  would  be  easy  to  show  that  spiritual  move- 
ments which  have  made  happiness  the  highest  goal  (such  as 
Epicureanism  and  Utilitarianism)  have  done  extraordinarily  little 
to  promote  and  build  up  the  inner  structure  of  civilisation. 
Given  a  certain  state  of  civilisation,  they  may  soften  much  that 
is  hard  and  they  may  relieve  much  necessity,  but  it  is  not 
within  their  capacity  essentially  to  elevate  life  or  to  strike  out 
new  paths. 

There  is  only  one  alternative :  to  recognise  civilisation  as 
an  end  in  itself,  and  to  make  man  a  mere  means  for  its 
furtherance.  In  favour  of  such  a  conception  is  the  impression 
of  inward  greatness  which  it  conveys.  Civilisation  grows  in 
incomparable  fashion  when,  in  thus  becoming  independent,  it 
combines  to  a  whole,  and  works  with  the  force  of  an  inner 
necessity  of  its  own ;  man,  moreover,  in  spite  of  all  outward 
subordination,  appears  inwardly  to  do  nought  else  but  grow 
when  he  lays  aside  all  care  with  regard  to  his  own  condition 
and  surrenders  himself  wholly  to  the  stream  of  the  world's 
life.  Hegel's  system  magnificently  embodies  this  type  of 


296    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

thought.  But  spreading  far  beyond  the  limits  of  this  system, 
the  view  we  are  considering  exerts  no  small  power  in  modern 
life.  Amidst  all  that  is  depressing  in  human  circumstance 
and  amidst  the  growth  and  decay  of  races,  many  are  to-day 
comforted  and  sustained  by  the  conviction  that  throughout  all 
our  toil  and  effort  civilisation  pursues  a  steady  path,  and 
that  its  gain  imparts  a  meaning,  a  value,  and  a  permanent 
character  to  the  life  and  labour  of  those  who  work  for  it. 
"  Many  will  come  and  go,  but  knowledge  shall  increase." 

But  however  attractive  this  thought  may  be,  it  has  not  the 
capacity  to  prove  victorious.  For  there  is  no  such  self-sufficing 
civilisation.  A  civilisation  which  attempts  to  cut  itself  com- 
pletely loose  from  man,  reducing  him  to  a  mere  means,  must 
itself  collapse  into  nothingness.  Civilisation  exists  only  within 
the  life  of  man,  and  if  it  is  to  mean  something  for  the  latter, 
man  must  have  a  spiritual  self  to  express  in  and  through  the 
civilisation  ;  if  it  is  to  enable  man  to  obtain  his  full  power  it 
must  allow  him,  in  spite  of  every  resistance,  to  achieve  high 
ends.  An  impersonal  civilisation,  completely  isolated  from  man, 
would  be  a  ghost,  a  thing  devoid  of  flesh  and  blood ;  in  so  far  as 
it  attained  any  reality  in  our  minds  it  would  lead  us  into  error, 
bid  us  sacrifice  ourselves  for  unknown  ends,  and  deprive  life  of 
its  soul.  How  could  a  hope  in  the  future  sustain  us  and  en- 
courage us  to  joyful  effort  in  the  labour  and  conflict  of  the 
present,  if  this  future  were  nobody's  affair,  nobody's  joy, 
nobody's  advantage? 

Our  own  age  is  making  it  continually  and  increasingly  obvious 
that  this  self-abandonment  of  man  to  civilisation  is  absolutely 
impossible  of  accomplishment.  Above  all  the  speed  and  racket 
of  the  machinery  of  civilisation  there  breaks  out  with  ever- 
increasing  loudness  the  call  for  the  furtherance  and  development 
of  the  living  man,  for  the  building-up  of  the  soul,  for  the  salva- 
tion of  the  spiritual  self.  We  recognise  at  the  same  time  that 
this  is  indispensable  for  the  truth  and  depth  of  civilisation  itself. 
Such  experiences  teach  us  clearly  enough  that  man  is  no  mere 
receptacle  for  civilised  life,  that  the  latter  does  not  shape  him 
like  wax  this  way  or  that  according  to  its  needs,  but  that  he  has 
an  independent  nature  with  which  to  oppose  it,  a  nature  which 


CIVILISATION  297 

cannot  give  up  its  right  to  satisfaction.  Civilisation  does  not 
progress  along  a  definite  path,  propelled  by  an  indwelling  com- 
pulsion ;  on  the  contrary,  it  appears  that  its  specific  form  is 
continually  ageing  and  decaying.  New  beginnings  are  con- 
tinually necessary,  and  new  uprisings  of  original  life ;  above 
all  else,  however,  new  men.  Consider,  for  example,  the  close 
of  the  Ancient  Period ;  the  life  of  civilisation  did  not  regain 
vigour  until  new  races  took  it  up  and  brought  new  forces  to  its 
rejuvenation.  Will  such  a  rejuvenation  be  necessary  for  the 
present  day,  and  will  it  come  through  new  races  or  through 
freshly  awakened,  spiritually  less  exhausted  classes  ? 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  foregoing,  the  living  man 
maintains  his  independence  in  the  face  of  every  attempt  to 
reduce  him  to  a  mere  tool.  But  on  the  other  hand  civilisation, 
as  we  have  seen,  must  not  sink  to  a  mere  means  unless  it  is 
to  suffer  disintegration.  Thus  we  find  ourselves  in  a  difficult 
dilemma  from  which  we  must  escape,  and  yet  we  do  not  at  first 
see  how  escape  is  possible.  On  the  average  level  of  life  we  are 
to-day  driven  now  to  this  side,  now  to  that;  we  oscillate  helplessly 
between  empty  subjectivity  and  soulless  work. 

All  these  perplexities  combine  in  the  life  of  to-day  and 
mutually  aggravate  one  another.  The  most  painful  effect  of 
all  is  that  produced  by  the  insecurity  we  feel  concerning  the 
relationship  of  man  to  civilisation,  by  the  lack  of  a  compre- 
hensive and  guiding  purpose  to  make  the  work  of  civilisation 
man's  own  concern,  the  preservation  of  his  spiritual  self  an 
imperative  necessity  ;  a  purpose  which  would,  at  the  same  time, 
lift  its  object  above  the  petty  human  routine  to  which  we  other- 
wise fall  helpless  victims.  It  is  this  spiritual  poverty  alone 
which  prevents  us  from  striving  for  a  new  and  distinctive 
type  of  human  culture,  capable  of  holding  its  own  against  the 
various  formations  which  exert  their  influence  upon  us  from  a 
more  or  less  remote  past,  taking  possession  of  us  yet  not  fully 
satisfying  us.  In  all  the  confusion  which  thus  results  the  value 
and  essential  nature  of  civilisation  itself  finally  becomes  un- 
certain. Ingenious  reflection  scantily  enough  conceals  that  lack 
of  real  substance  from  which  the  whole  suffers,  and  we  are  put 
off  with  fine-sounding  speeches  and  artificially  elaborated  "  points 


298    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  view."  All  this  mere  veneer  of  civilisation  and  culture,  more 
especially  as  we  see  it  in  our  great  cities,  ultimately  grows 
intolerable ;  the  gap  between  what  is  declared  to  be  the  goal 
and  what  is  really  pursued  as  such  becomes  wider  and  wider, 
and  in  this  way  the  untruthful  ness  of  life  grows  greater  and 
greater.  This  must  be  resisted.  The  growing  discontent  shows 
clearly  enough  that  a  reaction  is  already  in  progress. 

(c)  The   Requirements   01  a  True   Civilisation 

1.  THE  NECESSITY  OF  A  DEEPER  FOUNDATION 

In  such  movements  and  upheavals  as  these,  philosophy  may 
play  ever  so  modest  a  role,  but  it  cannot  withdraw  from  the 
struggle.  It  will  be  its  particular  task  to  discover  the  direction 
in  which  our  endeavour  is  to  press  forward  in  order  again  to 
convert  life  from  a  "business"  to  an  "existence"  (J.  Burck- 
hardt).  For  this  purpose  it  is  in  the  first  place  necessary  that 
civilisation  should  proceed  from  ourselves,  that  it  should  become 
an  imperative  necessity  of  our  self-preservation,  and  yet  not 
succumb,  in  the  making,  to  the  petty  allurements  of  mere 
pleasure.  Now,  our  conception  of  spiritual  life  and  its  relation- 
ship to  man  offers  a  practicable  path  towards  this  end.  For 
spiritual  life,  as  we  represent  it,  grows  towards  independence, 
and  the  civilisation  which  subserves  its  development  will  be 
liberated  from  the  soullessness  of  the  human  treadmill  and 
placed  upon  a  deeper  foundation,  while  at  the  same  time  it 
will  not  be  alienated  from  man ;  for  in  accordance  with  his 
specific  nature  man  will  discover  his  true  being  and  realise 
the  possibility  of  a  genuine  selfhood  only  in  spiritual  life  as 
a  whole.  Looked  at  in  this  way,  man  does  not  take  part  in  the 
work  of  civilisation  for  any  alien  ends,  but  rather  to  realise  his 
own  purpose,  and  he  is  able  even  in  the  furthest  extension  of 
his  activities  to  control  these  from  a  central  point.  Hence, 
spiritual  life,  in  our  sense,  unites  man  and  civilisation  in  the 
closest  possible  manner  without  directly  fusing  one  into  the 
other  and  thus  surrendering  one  to  the  other.  It  should  be 
more  especially  emphasised  that  the  union  does  not  in  this  case 
appear  as  a  ready-made  fact,  conveniently  occurring  for  our 


CIVILISATION  299 

benefit,  but  as  a  high  ideal  awakening  the  whole  of  life  and 
stirring  it  to  activity.  In  this  connection  civilisation  appears  as 
our  co-operation  in  a  great  movement  of  the  universe,  whereby 
reality  advances  to  a  higher  stage,  the  stage  of  spiritual  freedom. 
Hence  the  power  of  the  whole  stands  behind  our  work  and 
operates  within  it. 

When  civilisation  is  thus  understood  as  the  development  of  an 
independent  spiritual  life,  something  far  more  is  signified  than  a 
slight  alteration  of  tendency  or  a  mere  change  of  name.  For 
so  understood  it  permits  of  the  fulfilment  of  demands  essential 
to  all  genuine  cultural  aspirations,  demands  which  the  current 
conception  entirely  fails  to  satisfy. 

Thus,  for  the  first  time,  the  contents  and  values  which  inspire 
the  work  of  civilisation  find  their  independence  made  possible. 
If  civilisation  were  a  process  circumscribed  by  purely  human 
ends,  it  would  have  no  standard  other  than  the  human ;  there 
would  be  no  splitting  and  dividing  of  the  chaos  which  surrounds 
us,  nor  could  civilisation  impress  our  human  existence  with  the 
constraining  force  of  its  ideals  ;  it  would  then  lack  all  power  to 
rouse  and  propel.  The  matter  takes  on  quite  a  different  com- 
plexion, however,  if  in  civilisation  we  recognise  a  movement 
which  transcends  the  merely  human  and  is  alone  capable  of 
revealing  to  man  the  core  of  his  own  being. 

Further,  unless  civilisation  be  based  upon  independent  spiritual 
life  it  can  acquire  no  genuine  greatness.  For  if  life  remain 
entirely  confined  to  the  merely  human,  and  we  do  not  pass 
beyond  absorption  in  our  own  immediate  concerns  into  a  life 
that  is  confluent  with  the  whole  of  reality,  we  may  wax  ever 
so  enthusiastic  over  greatness,  may  devise  complex  distinctions, 
and  may  in  a  spirit  of  pride  and  vanity  raise  ourselves  or  our 
class  above  the  common  herd;  none  the  less  in  reality  there 
is  no  elevation  but  only  littleness,  a  littleness  which  displays 
itself  more  particularly  in  its  illusion  of  greatness.  Within  this 
merely  human  circle  there  is  no  sublimity,  no  genuine  greatness, 
nothing  which  can  command  reverence  and  elevate  while  it  sub- 
dues. For  this  purpose  there  must  arise  in  man  something  that 
is  more  than  human,  something  to  which  he  is  compelled  to 
attribute  a  complete  superiority  ;  yet  he  must  be  able  to  regard 


300    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN   THOUGHT 

this  as  in  some  manner  belonging  to  himself.  Only  from  this 
position  will  a  true  elevation  of  his  being  be  possible,  and  with 
it  the  greatest  of  all  liberations — the  freeing  of  life  from  the 
narrowness  of  the  merely  human. 

This  superhuman  in  man  is  the  source  of  all  true  greatness, 
and  it  alone  preserves  civilisation  from  becoming  a  mere  man 
worship,  whether  of  individuals  or  of  men  in  the  mass.  We 
must  never  forget  Kant's  words,  "  All  things,  even  the  most 
sublime,  grow  small  under  the  hands  of  men  when  they  turn  the 
ideas  thereof  to  their  own  use." 

Further,  with  regard  to  the  spontaneity  of  civilised  life  it  is 
clear  that  the  present  time  cannot  dispense  with  a  new  stage 
of  reality.  For  if  civilisation  is  nothing  more  than  a  human 
addition  to  nature,  its  progress  must  carry  it  continually  further 
and  further  away  from  its  basis,  and  its  content  must  grow  more 
and  more  artificial  and  complex.  Civilisation  will  then  subject 
life  to  increasingly  rigid  limitations,  close  up  more  and  more 
possibilities,  and  make  life  less  and  less  spontaneous :  in  this 
way  it  will  become  the  destroyer  of  all  youthful  freshness  and  all 
originality.  Can  we  wonder  that  when  humanity,  at  any  par- 
ticular period,  awakens  to  a  special  consciousness  of  this  it  sets 
itself  against  it,  and  just  as  the  individual  would  often  like  to 
recover  the  freshness  and  rich  possibilities  of  childhood,  it 
yearns  with  its  whole  soul  for  a  return  to  nature,  to  the  most 
primitive  beginnings.  But  it  is  forbidden  for  mankind  to  return 
to  nature  ;  it  is  as  impossible  as  for  the  individual  to  go  back  to 
childhood.  The  effect  of  history  can  never  be  obliterated.  So 
we  must  resign  ourselves  to  see  civilisation  grow  progressively 
more  senile  and  more  lifeless,  to  see  humanity  sink  into  the 
same  unprofitable  Philistinism  in  great  things,  as  is  the  fate 
of  most  individuals  in  small  ones,  unless  it  be  possible  for  some- 
thing original  and  new  to  reveal  itself,  for  new  forces  to  come 
into  play,  for  new  possibilities  to  open  up.  These  things  cannot 
take  place,  however,  unless  life  possesses  a  spiritual  depth, 
which  in  the  midst  of  all  that  is  exhausted  and  obsolete  in  mere 
human  civilisation,  provides  us  with  new  beginnings,  produces 
simple  units,  and  opens  up  a  new  world  in  simple  things. 
When  we  say,  however,  that  everything  great  is  simple,  we 


CIVILISATION  301 

have  in  mind  a  simplicity  very  different  from  the  mere  naivete 
of  nature's  first  beginnings. 

Finally,  civilisation  lacks  the  necessary  motive  force  if  it 
merely  adds  something  to  a  given  world  instead  of  opening  up 
a  new  and,  to  us,  indispensable  world.  Nothing  can  powerfully 
rouse  us  and  move  us  with  constraining  force  except  the  con- 
sciousness and  experience  of  contradiction  in  our  own  life  and 
the  impossibility  of  allowing  things  to  remain  in  this  condition. 
A  civilisation  which  merely  embroiders  and  decorates  life  can 
never  give  rise  to  such  contradiction.  That  addition  to  life 
which  it  desires  may  be  rejected  at  will,  or  it  may  pass  off 
from  us  like  water  from  a  duck's  back  ;  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  common  run  of  life  is  inwardly  exceedingly  indifferent  to 
civilisation,  and  receives  it  more  as  a  social  compulsion  than 
as  an  inward  joy.  That  it  should  have  been  otherwise  at  the 
great  epochs  of  creative  genius,  and  that  such  creation  should 
have  been  possible  at  all,  is  due  to  this,  that  at  these  times  work 
was  looked  upon  as  the  winning  of  a  truly  spiritual  life  and 
hence  of  spiritual  freedom,  and  also  to  this  consideration,  that 
when  once  such  desire  made  itself  felt,  existing  conditions  no 
longer  seemed  tolerable,  silencing,  as  they  did,  an  imperative 
call  to  self-preservation.  It  was  this  call  which  infused  into 
the  endeavour  of  the  ages  a  passionate  warmth,  a  warmth  which 
knew  no  care  for  man,  was  ready  for  any  sacrifice,  and  drew 
back  before  no  obstacle. 

Through  all  these  queries  there  runs  one  and  the  same 
problem,  one  and  the  same  antithesis — that  of  a  genuine  and 
a  sham  civilisation.  Civilisation  is  genuine  only  in  as  far  as  it 
preserves  its  relationship  with  the  basic  spiritual  life  and  serves 
its  development,  and  becomes  false  as  soon  as  it  subordinates 
itself  to  the  aims  of  the  mere  man  and  drags  spiritual  life 
down  with  it  to  the  same  low  level.  The  conflict  between 
these  two  forces,  spirit  and  man,  runs  through  the  whole  of 
history  and  forces  us  to  perceive  in  it  something  other  than  a 
pure  triumph  of  spirit.  To-day,  however,  it  is  peculiarly  need- 
ful that  the  ancient  truth  should  be  more  clearly  laid  hold  of, 
that  the  necessary  condition  of  a  genuine  civilisation  should 
be  more  definitely  recognised,  and  that  the  division  of  forces  for 
and  against  should  be  more  decisively  declared. 


302    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

2.  THE  NECESSITY  OP  AN  INNER  DEVELOPMENT  OP 
CIVILISATION 

It  must  already  be  sufficiently  obvious  that  we  need  a  further 
development  of  civilisation,  and  that  there  is  a  particular  direc- 
tion in  which  this  is  to  be  sought.  We  are  affected  by  the  great 
practical  ideals  of  history,  none  of  which  we  feel  ourselves  able 
to  abandon,  yet  we  have  no  synthesis  which  directly  comprises 
these  ideals.  What  else  remains,  then,  but  to  look  about  us 
and  see  if  there  is  not  a  life-movement  at  hand  capable  of 
being  further  strengthened,  a  movement  which  may  lift  us 
above  the  existing  antitheses  and  make  it  possible  to  struggle 
against  them,  a  movement  at  the  same  time  universal  enough 
to  extend  itself  over  the  whole  of  life  and  divide  its  content 
into  "for"  and  "  against  "  and  characteristic  enough  to  impart 
a  specific  form  to  everything  which  it  comprises.  In  this  life- 
movement  an  original  presence  must  be  accessible  and  present 
to  each  individual  consciousness,  and  this  presence  must 
extend  an  awakening  and  formative  influence  over  the  whole 
of  life. 

Now,  such  a  dominating  original  factor  is  not  to  be  found  in 
this  or  that  appurtenance  of  spiritual  life,  in  this  or  that  spiritual 
achievement,  but  in  spiritual  life  itself,  as  we  understand  it — 
the  movement  of  reality  towards  spiritual  freedom.  Only  in 
spiritual  freedom  is  true  being  reached  at  all ;  everything  else 
is  but  the  shadow  of  it.  Such  being  cannot  lie  outside  activity, 
but  only  within  it,  and  it  issues  out  of  the  depths  of  activity  as 
it  organises  itself  to  a  self-subsisting  whole  and  passes,  as  a 
whole,  into  a  variety  of  particular  functions.  In  this  way, 
alone,  is  the  ascent  of  mere  life  to  self-life  achieved;  or, 
better  still,  it  is  in  this  way,  alone,  that  the  contradiction 
which  is  otherwise  involved  in  the  very  concept  of  life  is 
overcome.  For  is  it  not  a  contradiction  that  a  certain  in- 
wardness should  come  into  being  and  yet  remain  continually 
bound  down  to  what  is  alien,  never  attaining  to  independence  ?* 
Only  after  taking  up  this  position  does  the  concept  of  life- 

*  For  anything  further  I  must  refer  the  reader  to  my  systematic  works,  and 
in  the  first  instance  to  the  Grundlinien  einer  neuen  Lebensanschauung  [Life't 
Basis  and  Life's  Ideal,  Eng.  trans,  by  Alban  Widgery ;  pub.  A.  &  C.  Black.] 


CIVILISATION  303 

contents  become  intelligible ;  the  concept  of  value,  too,  now 
distinctly  separates  itself  for  the  first  time  from  the  lower  grade 
of  pleasure.  From  this  point  of  view  all  activity  falls  under  the 
antithesis  of  real  and  unreal,  independent  and  dependent,  and 
at  the  same  time  we  have  to  face  a  far-reaching  task,  namely, 
the  elimination  of  the  customary  confusion  which  obliterates 
all  distinction  between  the  two  types  and  the  definite  elabora- 
tion of  the  demands  associated  with  the  formation  of  an  essential 
being,  and,  finally,  the  carrying  through  of  these  indispensable 
demands.  Only  those  elements  in  civilisation  will  then  reckon 
as  genuine  which  further  the  formation  of  an  essential  being 
and  involve  an  extension  of  spiritual  reality,  and  with  it  of 
our  own  true  self;  everything  else,  however  pretentiously  it 
may  assert  itself,  thus  sinks  to  a  merely  human  level,  to  a 
burlesque  of  civilisation.  In  so  far,  however,  as  this  forma- 
tion of  essential  being  is  successful,  it  must  produce  a  thorough- 
going consolidation  and  deepening  of  existence :  the  chief 
sentiment  in  life  then  becomes  the  desire  for  truthfulness,  for 
a  liberation  from  all  show  and  sham. 

Hence  results  a  specific  type  of  life,  rigid  in  its  demands  and 
powerful  in  enforcing  them.  Within  its  sphere,  however,  there 
remains  room  for  manifold  movement,  for  the  transition  towards 
spiritual  freedom  must  be  consummated  under  the  conditions 
and  restrictions  of  human  existence  ;  hence  a  plurality  of 
points  of  attack  becomes  possible,  nay,  indispensable.  We  men 
are  bound  down  to  immediate  sensuous  existence,  and  remain 
dependent  upon  it  for  the  continuance  of  life.  We  cannot 
simply  separate  ourselves  from  it,  master  the  essential  unity 
of  life,  and  from  this  standpoint  unravel  the  whole  of  reality ; 
for  when  we  have  transferred  ourselves  to  this  standpoint  we 
must  still  continue  to  occupy  ourselves  with  the  old  sense 
immediacies  and  adjust  ourselves  to  them.  Thus  there  ensues 
a  sharp  conflict  between  the  demand  to  work  from  the  whole  for 
the  whole,  the  propulsion  through  the  inner  power  of  truth  in- 
herent in  all  true  spiritual  life  and  creation,  on  the  one  hand ; 
and,  on  the  other,  the  natural  impulse  of  self-preservation, 
which,  being  blent  with  spiritual  forces,  increases  to  a  boundless 
egoism :  a  complete  transformation  of  feeling  now  becomes 


304    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

indispensable,  and  shows  itself  to  be  the  fundamental  condi- 
tion of  all  really  genuine  spiritual  life.  This  raises  the  ethical 
task  high  above  all  others.  At  the  same  time  artistic  activity, 
with  its  formative  power,  makes  its  specific  value  felt.  That 
measure  of  spirituality  which  strives  upward  in  man,  exists,  in 
the  first  place,  side  by  side  with  crude  and  soulless  existence ; 
hence  it  easily  remains  in  a  condition  of  semi-reality.  Artistic 
construction  (which  reaches  far  beyond  art  in  the  stricter  sense 
of  the  word)  alone  enables  the  different  sides  and  stages  to 
mutually  influence  one  another,  and  in  thus  bringing  them 
into  contact  is  able  to  give  shape  to  the  inward  and  to  impart 
soul  to  the  outward,  thus  effecting  an  integration  of  life.  With- 
out art  there  is  no  thorough  spiritualisation  of  life.  If  we  lack 
its  formative  and  ennobling  activity,  even  the  most  eager  and 
rapid  ethical  advance  will  not  be  able  to  preserve  life  from 
barbarism.  Finally  the  task  of  enhancing  the  vitality  of  life 
asserts  also  an  incontestable  right.  To  spiritual  life  belong 
absoluteness,  infinity,  complete  control  of  reality,  while  man, 
in  his  immediate  sense-existence,  lives  subject  to  innumerable 
conditions  and  limitations;  compared  with  the  spiritual  task 
required  of  him  he  is  miserably  narrow  and  weak.  Hence  it 
is  necessary  that  his  power  should  be  augmented,  his  existence 
enlarged,  all  his  latent  faculties  aroused.  Can  we  wonder  that 
certain  epochs  took  this  to  be  the  whole  object  of  civilisation? 

Such  a  juxtaposition  of  different  lines  of  life  must  result  in 
sharp  tension  and  severe  conflict.  This  is  by  no  means  due 
to  mere  error  and  misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  man,  for 
none  of  the  tasks  in  question  permits  of  being  taken  up  with 
complete  devotion  and  pursued  with  full  intensity  without 
coming  to  figure  as  an  end  in  itself  and  being  felt  at  the 
moment  of  action  to  be  the  main  affair  of  life.  It  thus 
becomes  comprehensible  that  human  life,  as  a  whole,  is  not 
merely  affected  by  the  operation  of  ethical,  artistic,  and  dynamic 
impulses,  but  that  specific  types  of  civilisation  are  built  up  and 
compete  for  the  mastery.  Compromises  and  diluted  forms  are 
here  powerless ;  they  only  too  easily  depress  the  level  of  life. 
But  if  it  be  impossible  to  avoid  the  struggle,  and  if  its  cessation 
is  not  even  to  be  wished  for,  it  becomes  all  the  more  desirable 


CIVILISATION  305 

that  something  superior  to  the  conflict  should  remain  and  wage 
conflict  against  mere  conflict.  This  can  he  done,  however,  only 
by  bringing  into  vital  operation  that  essential  being  which 
experiences  itself  in  and  through  every  difference,  which  refers 
what  is  variously  achieved  back  to  a  superior  unity,  and  from 
that  standpoint  applies  its  standards  and  works  towards  a 
synthesis.  All  these  movements  are  now  oriented  towards  the 
development  of  a  self-dependent,  essential,  spiritual  life  and 
spiritual  reality :  here  a  life-space  is  provided  in  which  to  meet 
and  adjust  their  differences.  Nor  do  we  find  ourselves  powerless 
in  the  face  of  this  or  that  conflict ;  we  can  work  towards  har- 
mony, we  can  oppose  the  formation  of  mere  partial  civilisations 
by  the  development  of  a  whole  civilisation. 

The  partial  civilisations,  with  the  work  they  have  accom- 
plished, thus  find  themselves  face  to  face  with  a  sharp  alterna- 
tive :  shall  they  establish  relationship  with  the  depth  and 
wholeness  of  life  (for  only  through  moving  in  the  direction 
of  depth  does  life  become  a  whole),  or  shall  they  detach  them- 
selves from  the  foundations  of  life  and  so  become  more  and  more 
dispersed  ?  The  two  decisions  imply  diametrically  opposite 
developments.  In  the  one  case  we  have  a  real,  in  the  other 
an  unreal  type  of  civilisation.  In  the  one  case  an  adoption 
and  assimilation  of  the  experiences  and  destinies  of  the  whole 
man,  and  with  this  a  full-fledged  development,  in  the  other  an 
unchartered  freedom  of  function  and  therewith  a  great  vague- 
ness ;  in  the  former  case,  an  elevation  above  everything  pettily 
human,  or  at  least  a  brave  resistance  to  it,  in  the  other,  a 
spiritual  defencelessness  over  against  merely  human  culture. 
Thus,  in  the  absence  of  a  real  spiritual  world,  the  ethical  move- 
ment of  life  tends  to  degenerate  into  a  mere  system  of  laws  and 
formulas,  to  favour  narrowness  and  oppression  and  to  sink  into 
a  self-righteous  Pharisaism.  The  artistic  tendency,  when  left  to 
itself,  inevitably  leads  to  sensuality,  indulgence,  flippancy;  the 
dynamic  to  egoism,  wildness,  brutality.  The  truth  of  the 
partial  civilisations  themselves  depends  upon  their  having  a 
whole  and  essential  civilisation  behind  them,  upon  that  deeper 
foundation  of  civilisation  which  is  only  possible  through  union 
with  an  independent  spiritual  life. 

20 


306    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

In  the  following  sections  we  shall  be  considering  the  conse- 
quences and  requirements  which  flow  from  the  idea  of  a  civilisa- 
tion at  once  real  and  universal  in  contrast  to  the  immediate 
position  of  civilisation.  Civilisation  will  have  to  he  studied 
through  its  means  and  vehicles  as  well  as  through  its  content. 
On  the  one  hand  we  shall  have  to  discuss  the  problems  of  history 
and  society,  on  the  other,  those  of  art  and  morality,  in  their 
manifold  relationships.  Point  for  point  we  shall  see  that  this 
idea  of  a  spiritual  civilisation  is  no  mere  matter  of  a  new  name, 
but  of  a  new  thing  and  of  a  new  task. 

At  this  juncture  we  will  refer  to  one  point  only ;  the  world's 
present  state  makes  it  in  the  highest  degree  imperative  that 
civilisation  should  be  based  upon  a  more  solid  foundation.  The 
situation  has  become  critical,  more  particularly  through  a 
coincidence  of  two  facts.  In  the  first  place,  the  foundations 
and  traditions  of  civilisation,  as  handed  down  to  us  by  history, 
have  become  very  insecure,  in  as  far,  at  least,  as  they  affect 
man's  inward  life  as  a  whole :  this  has  occurred  mainly  because 
we  now  feel  the  older  type  to  be  too  anthropomorphic,  too  pettily 
human,  and  we  therefore  become  doubtful  whether  man  can  in 
any  way  overstep  the  confines  of  natural  sense-existence,  and 
whether  the  whole  of  that  "more  than  human"  which  he 
believed  himself  to  lay  hold  of  be  not  a  mere  mirage,  a  pro- 
duct of  human  delusion.  This  doubt  enters  very  deeply  into 
life,  far  more  deeply  than  those  imagine  who,  while  depriving 
the  world  of  all  spirituality,  delude  themselves  into  believing 
that  they  can  at  the  same  time  preserve  an  ideality  for  man. 
For  in  reality  the  one  stands  or  falls  with  the  other.  It  is 
impossible  to  preserve  here  and  there  and  subjectively  what 
has  been  abandoned  as  concerns  the  whole  and  in  its  real 
essence.  Thus  we  have  become  insecure  with  regard  to  all 
our  ideals,  nay,  with  regard  to  our  own  being;  we  no  longer 
draw  upon  a  common  groundwork  of  convictions,  of  uniting, 
directing,  elevating  forces.  In  spite  of  all  subjective  activity, 
an  inner  decline  of  life  is  unavoidable  if  this  uncertainty  con- 
tinues to  spread.  In  the  second  place,  we  perceive  in  the  very 
midst  of  this  shifting  and  wavering  age  a  violent  surging  forward 
of  the  masses  towards  a  full  participation  in  civilisation  and 


CIVILISATION  307 

happiness.  This  movement  is  accompanied  by  a  claim  on  the 
part  of  the  masses  to  form  their  own  judgment  as  to  what 
elements  in  civilisation  possess  content  and  value,  and  to  form 
it  according  to  the  immediate  impression  and  power  of  com- 
prehension of  individuals  who  have  scarcely  heen  in  the  least 
affected  by  the  great  historical  movements  and  experiences  of 
humanity.  Now  this  inner  insecurity  on  the  part  of  the  exist- 
ing systems  of  civilisation,  in  particular  the  fact  that  they  are 
weighted  down  with  much  that  is  obsolete  and  effete,  makes 
them  incapable  of  meeting  this  demand  of  the  masses  with  an 
irrefragable  truth  and  thus  guiding  it  into  safe  paths.  Hence 
this  movement  threatens  to  carry  everything  before  it ;  and 
indeed  it  already  operates  in  a  vulgarising,  shallowing,  narrow- 
ing, and  negating  fashion. 

There  is  absolutely  nothing  which  can  lead  us  beyond  such 
a  crisis  except  a  new  growth  of  life,  a  deepening  of  spiritual  life 
in  itself,  a  discovery  of  inner  facts  and  inner  relationships. 
Salvation  cannot  come  from  without.  We  can  replace  the  props 
and  helps  which  have  thus  been  irreparably  lost  only  by  an 
inner  strengthening,  by  ourselves  attaining  to  a  superior  world, 
fortifying  ourselves  therein,  and  thence  imparting  a  content  to 
our  life  and  building  up  a  new  civilisation.  If  such  a  deepening 
and  strengthening  is  successful,  then  the  threatening  crisis  may 
lead  to  a  renewal  and  rejuvenation  of  life,  and,  in  spite  of  all 
human  error,  provide  existence  with  a  greater  content  of  truth. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  exists  no  possibility  of  such  a 
deepening,  of  an  uprising  of  elemental,  originative  forces,  if  in 
human  existence  there  is  no  real  spiritual  world  to  be  revivified, 
then  all  hope  of  a  happy  issue  vanishes.  In  this  case  reason 
and  civilisation  must  remain  the  slaves  of  human  selfishness  and 
passion. 


2.   HISTORY 

(a)  Towards  the  Development  of  the  Problem 

OUR  relationship  towards  history  is  to-day  full  of  confusion ; 
we  depend  upon  history  and  derive  nourishment  from  it,  yet  at 
the  same  time  we  feel  our  life  to  be  severely  oppressed  by  it,  we 
think  of  it  as  a  burden  which  we  should  like  to  cast  off.  In 
attempting  to  thus  cast  it  off,  however,  we  find  ourselves 
threatened  by  the  vacuity  of  the  mere  moment,  and  fleeing  from 
this  danger  we  return  to  history.  Thus  we  waver  between  the 
two,  a  position  which  makes  purposeful  action  and  happy 
creation  impossible  of  success.  Let  us  examine  a  little  more 
closely  the  causes  which  have  brought  us  to  this  unfortunate  pass. 
In  its  relationship  to  history  the  nineteenth  century  was 
dominated  by  a  reaction  from  the  rationalistic  tendency  of  the 
Enlightenment.  Modern  humanity  had  sought  to  escape  from 
its  perplexing  circumstances  by  returning  to  universal,  indwell- 
ing reason ;  nothing  seemed  capable  of  liberating  human 
existence  from  obsolete  and  erroneous  elements  except  a  vigorous 
enlivenment  of  this  reason ;  this  alone  promised  to  lift  life  above 
childish  prejudice  and  stupid  limitation  and  to  bring  it  to  full 
maturity  and  clarity.  The  past  and  its  authority  receded  before 
this  claim  to  place  life  and  activity  in  a  timeless  present  of 
thought.  Undisturbed  by  tradition,  and  for  the  most  part 
in  conscious  opposition  to  it,  reason  created  a  "natural" 
religion,  a  "natural"  morality,  a  "natural"  social  economy, 
and  a  "natural"  education.  This  movement  exerted  an  irre- 
sistible influence  over  men's  minds  and  played  a  great  part  in 
the  construction  of  life.  In  this  way  much  freshness,  freedom, 
and  independence  was  acquired,  and  in  spite  of  all  hostility  and 
obscuration,  this  could  not  again  be  lost. 

306 


HISTORY  309 

But  from  the  very  beginning  this  tendency  contained  proble- 
matical elements.  In  course  of  time  these  increased  and  finally 
brought  about  a  reaction.  The  youthful  sense  of  power  with 
which  the  Enlightenment  commenced  gave  it  joyful  confidence  ; 
it  felt  itself  drawing  near  to  an  absolute  truth.  This  confidence 
of  victory  in  its  opposition  to  the  traditional  position  was  due 
to  a  firm  belief  in  the  direct  control  of  reason  in  reality  and  in 
humanity;  it  was  thought  that  this  reason  existed  in  each 
individual  and  was  easily  attainable  by  a  powerful  self-recol- 
lection. A  clarification,  an  elevation  to  full  consciousness, 
seemed  sufficient  of  itself  to  secure  the  mastery  of  the  good  and 
true.  This  had  the  effect  of  concentrating  the  work  of  life 
chiefly  upon  thought  and  knowledge,  so  that  human  culture 
acquired  a  onesidedly  intellectual  character.  As  the  first  rapid 
advance  ceased,  life  became  more  and  more  dominated  by  an 
isolated  intellectualism  which  placed  its  considerations  and  aims 
between  man  and  things  themselves  and  thereby  increasingly 
endangered  man's  inner  relations  with  the  world  and  the  direct- 
ness of  his  life.  The  reality  which  thus  resulted  was  finally  felt 
to  be  too  narrow  and  soulless  :  the  life-impulse  revolted  and 
demanded  more  content  as  well  as  more  manifestation  of  the 
whole  man.  The  historical  tendency  formed  a  main  feature  of 
this  new  life. 

The  motive  force  behind  this  historical  movement  was  supplied, 
in  the  first  place,  by  a  thirst  for  an  increased  reality,  for  a 
broader  groundwork  of  existence,  for  more  objectivity,  for  a 
greater  fullness  of  life,  and  for  a  more  extensive  linking  up  of 
manifoldness  in  great  relationships.  How  much  richer  in 
content  life  thereby  became  is  seen  in  all  its  particular  spheres, 
such  as  religion  and  art,  law  and  science :  an  infinitely  increased 
quantity  of  reality,  which  would  otherwise  have  remained 
unused,  is  here  associated  with  personal  action.  Work  as  a 
whole  produces  a  historical  mode  of  thought  and  thereby  alters 
the  character  of  life.  Man  no  longer  tears  himself  apart  from 
his  environment  and  places  himself  over  against  it,  to  master  it, 
as  if  it  were  something  quite  alien,  as  was  the  case  during  the 
Enlightenment,  but  he  yearns  after  an  inner  union  with  the 
environment  so  that  its  life  may  flow  over  into  his  and  lift  him 


310    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

above  all  pettiness.  Hence  his  existence  grows  not  only  wider 
but  more  restful.  Man  finds  a  reason  in  things,  to  whose 
guidance  he  may  confidently  trust  himself.  This  has,  moreover, 
the  further  effect  of  bringing  earlier  ages  close  to  him  and 
allowing  manifold  relationships  to  become  apparent  in  them, 
while  his  own  age  appears  as  the  summit  of  a  united  structure 
comprising  all  ages;  from  this  summit  everything  earlier 
appears  as  a  gradual  ascent  and  the  lower  levels  become 
interesting,  not  so  much  on  account  of  the  differences  and  con- 
trasts they  afford,  as  on  account  of  their  significance  as  ascending 
preparatory  stages.  When  the  sharpness  and  hardness  of  an 
absolute  valuation,  such  as  was  characteristic  of  the  Reformation 
and  of  the  Enlightenment,  gives  way  to  a  more  universal  and 
harmonising  mode  of  thought,  then  there  is  room  for  more 
understanding  and  more  love.  The  Mediaeval  period,  perhaps 
more  than  any  other,  has  experienced  a  very  drastic  alteration 
in  treatment. 

This  more  relative  treatment  did  not  at  first  by  any  means 
signify  a  sinking  to  relativism  and  an  abandonment  of  an 
absolute  truth.  For  a  spirit  of  proud  self-consciousness  per- 
mitted the  spiritual  strength  of  the  period  to  feel  itself  equal  to 
the  assimilation  of  any  influx  of  matter.  According  to  the 
philosophical  mode  of  thought,  at  any  rate,  reason,  while  itself 
undergoing  an  inner  expansion,  drew  history  to  itself  rather  than 
subjected  itself  to  history.  This  mode  of  thought  found  its  most 
magnificent  and  systematic  expression  in  the  historical  philo- 
sophy of  Hegel.  All  tension  between  reason  and  history  now 
seemed  happily  overcome,  since  the  latter  became  totally  con- 
verted into  the  development  of  reason,  while  in  this  same 
development  reason  found  its  own  essential  nature. 

Whatever  doubts  may  be  suggested  by  this  construction  01 
history,  the  superiority  of  reason  and  hence  of  spiritual  activity  is 
most  decidedly  preserved.  The  treatment  of  history  which  was 
developed  by  the  Romantic  School  was  not  so  much  directed 
towards  this  end.  The  movement  of  history  was  now  looked 
upon  as  resulting  from  an  unconscious  guiding  and  formative 
force  ;  independently  of  human  effort,  there  flowed,  out  of  the 
past,  a  stream  of  reason  which  swept  man  securely  along. 


HISTORY  311 

Floating  upon  this  stream  his  life  and  work  seem  to  be  guided 
into  safe  channels.  This  weakened  the  activity  and  interfered 
with  the  right  of  the  living  present :  men  made  themselves  at 
home  in  past  ages,  at  the  same  time  idealising  these,  and  they 
were  apt  to  shut  their  eyes  to  the  tasks  of  their  own  age.  Even 
at  this  stage,  there  appeared  the  danger  of  the  power  of  associa- 
tion and  appropriation  not  corresponding  to  the  enlargement  of 
the  sphere  of  vision  produced  by  history,  and  therefore  of  man 
acquiring  outward  gain  while  suffering  a  loss  at  the  centre  of 
his  life. 

Then  came  the  tendency  peculiar  to  the  nineteenth  century  : 
a  turning  away  from  the  problems  of  the  inner  man  and  of 
spiritual  creation  towards  work,  with  its  concern  for  the  things 
themselves  in  their  objectivity.  In  the  case  of  history  this 
brought  about  a  victorious  progress  of  exact  research  as  opposed 
to  construction  in  general  outlines.  This  tendency  acquired  a 
special  consciousness  in  Germany,  since  here  it  had  first  to 
fight  for  its  rights  against  the  predominance  of  the  specula- 
tive treatment.  The  Hegelian  construction  of  history,  in 
particular,  found  itself  opposed  by  a  desire  for  more  width, 
actuality,  and  individuality ;  even  from  the  outward  point  of  view 
this  conception  seemed  too  narrow,  for  its  concepts,  at  bottom, 
comprised  only  the  European  world  of  civilisation  and  were 
more  particularly  concerned  with  the  contrast  between  the 
Ancient  and  Modern  Worlds ;  it  suffered  further  from  an  inner 
narrowness,  since  in  squeezing  the  individual  phenomena  into 
its  dialectical  framework  it  was  bound  to  very  seriously  weaken 
their  individuality  and  positivity.  The  new  desire  for  pure  and 
unlimited  actuality  saw,  in  this,  a  forcing  and  a  falsification  of 
the  things.  With  all  the  greater  eagerness  recourse  was  had  to 
historical  investigation  as  a  liberation  from  this  state  of  affairs. 

This  historical  research  has  exceedingly  well  understood  how 
to  convert  the  desire  for  breadth  and  actuality  into  work  and 
achievement :  it  has  elaborated  new  methods  for  its  work,  and 
through  content  and  form  it  has  produced  a  specific  mode  of 
thought  which  is  a  powerful  influence  in  the  life  of  the  Modern 
World.  This  research  does  not  make  the  slightest  claim  to  be 
philosophy.  Its  chief  desire  is  to  free  history  from  all  philo- 


312    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

sophical  tutelage  and  make  it  entirely  self-reliant :  yet  this  ten- 
dency could  not  possibly  have  made  such  victorious  progress  and 
won  such  whole-hearted  devotion  unless  it  both  carried  in  itself 
and  aroused  definite  convictions.  Research  cannot  develop  and 
defend  the  desire  for  pure  actuality  without  perceiving  how 
much  there  is  lying  between  man  and  this  actuality,  without 
becoming  aware  of  much  subjectivity — in  tradition  as  well  as  in 
man's  own  apprehension.  Hence  an  energetic  struggle  was 
undertaken  with  the  object  of  eliminating  this  subjectivity,  its 
success  permitting  life  to  become  calmer  and  clearer.  This 
tendency  towards  actuality  had  the  effect  of  revealing  a  bound- 
less wealth  of  individual  formations  and  it  thus  ceased  to  be 
possible  to  string  the  course  of  the  ages  on  a  single  thread,  the 
new  insight  rather  revealing  a  vast  network  of  confused  threads, 
hardly  to  be  disentangled.  The  incapacity  of  man  to  grasp  all 
this  from  within  and  convert  it  into  simple  concepts  now  became 
evident,  and  he  was  thus  compelled  to  adopt  a  more  modest  and 
restrained  attitude;  no  longer  could  he  satisfy  his  desire  to 
adjust  and  round  off  the  facts  to  suit  his  own  point  of  view.  But 
since  instead  of  ruling  he  now  had  to  serve,  his  life  experienced 
an  immeasurable  enrichment,  a  thoroughgoing  liberation  from 
the  ancient  narrowness. 

At  first  all  this  was  regarded  as  pure  profit,  free  from  com- 
plication. But  perplexities  very  soon  became  apparent.  The 
gain  in  knowledge  threatened  to  bring  with  it  a  loss  of  life. 
The  objectivity  demanded  was  seen  to  be  a  by  no  means  simple 
thing :  if  this  pure  actuality  applies  only  to  the  things  in 
themselves  without  any  reference  to  the  subject,  apart  from 
any  action  of  thought,  then  everything  inward  which  appertains 
to  them  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  for  nothing  of  this  nature 
can  be  comprehended  at  all  without  a  putting  forth  of  personal 
thought,  without  an  exercise  of  sympathetic  understanding. 

Moreover,  a  distinction  between  big  and  little,  essential  and 
non-essential,  in  history  is  really  impossible  without  standards, 
and  these  standards  must  have  their  origin  in  some  conviction 
as  a  whole.*  A  history  deprived  of  all  inwardness  and  all 

*  In  this  connection  see  Aryid  Grotenf elt's  excellent  works,  Die  WertscMtzung 
in  der  Geschichte  (1903)  and  Geschichtliche  Wertmassstabe  in  der  Geschichtt- 
philosophie  bei  Historikern  und  im  Volksbewustttein  1905).  These  exhibit 
a  calm,  judicial,  and  independent  judgment. 


HISTORY  313 

gradation  must  become  a  mere  chaotic  sequence  of  events  and 
would  hardly  be  worthy  of  the  name  of  science.     The  recent 
and  ever-increasing  conflict  with   regard  to  the  main  content 
and    motive   forces   of    history   very   well    exhibits   how   little 
history,  in  spite  of  all  attempts  to  reject  philosophy,  can  dis- 
pense  with    certain   fundamental    convictions.     But  when    all 
philosophy  has  been   put   aside,  whence  are   these  convictions 
to   come  ?     There   are   two   ways   in   which   the   age  has   en- 
deavoured to  meet  these  difficulties  or  rather  to  evade  them. 
On  the  one  hand  the  very  speculative  mode  of  thought  which 
as  a  whole  is  so  decisively  rejected  is  unmistakably  maintaining 
a  certain  influence,  albeit  in  a  weakened  form  and  in  a  manner 
which   is   not    outwardly   obvious.      Hegel    is   set   aside,   yet 
some  sort  of  indwelling  of  reason  in  history,  some  sort  of  inner 
necessity  of  progress,  some  sort  of  domination  of  intelligence 
in  the  historical  process  is  unquestioningly  retained.     This  is 
but   a  portion  of  a   more   general   phenomenon  which   to-day 
confronts  us.     The  pantheistic  mode  of  thought  produced  by 
the   development   of  the   Modern  World  was  formerly  backed 
up  by  a  firm  conviction  and  a  joyful  life-temper ;  to-day  it  still 
makes  itself  felt  in  various  ways,  although  the  foundation  has 
ceased   to   be   secure ;    concepts   like   spirit,   reason,  progress, 
humanity,  remain  with  us,  turn  our  thought  in  certain  directions 
and   provide   it  with   certain   values :    the    difference   is   that, 
following  upon  the  destruction  of  the  foundation,  everything  has 
become  pale  and   vague  ;   living  forces   have  become  shadowy 
conceptions,  and  fruitful   ideas   have  degenerated  into   empty 
phrases.     The  whole  must  become  more  and  more  untrne  the 
more  we   are   influenced  by  convictions   directly  contradicting 
the  fundamental  conviction.     The  most  powerful  contradictory 
tendency  is   pessimism,  which   spread   more  and  more  during 
the  nineteenth  century ;    since  it  clearly  brings  to  light  the 
obscure  and  unreasonable  element  in  the  world  and  in  history, 
pessimism  pitilessly  destroys  the  illumination  and  glamour  with 
which   pantheism  enveloped   existence ;    it   is   so  energetic  in 
bringing  before  our  eyes  new  groups  of  facts  and  new  aspects 
of  the  whole  that  the  old   belief  in   the  rationality  of  reality 
cannot   remain   undisturbed.     In   this  connection  we  notice  a 


314    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

remarkable  contradiction :  the  mood  of  humanity  becomes 
heavier,  man  and  fate  create  an  impression  which  is  on  the 
whole  gloomier,  the  contradictions  of  existence  are  sharply  forced 
upon  our  attention  ;  yet  along  with  all  this  the  work  of  the 
period  retains  the  pantheistic  mode  of  thought  with  its 
idealisation  of  things,  clinging  to  it  as  to  the  sole  possible 
prop  which  can  save  it  from  total  collapse.  This  co-existence 
of  pessimism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  optimism,  on  the  other, 
affords  an  example  of  that  division  of  soul  and  work,  of  that 
cleaving  in  two  of  the  whole  man,  from  which  modern  life 
suffers. 

But  there  is  yet  another  way  in  which  the  present-day  meets 
this  problem.  It  has  no  particular  type  of  thought  with  which 
it  confronts  the  ages ;  it  endeavours  to  pass  judgment  upon 
them  and  gain  a  standard  for  them,  relying  solely  upon  the 
ages  themselves,  and  through  the  ages  themselves  it  strives  to 
develop  and  demonstrate  what  has  been  thus  obtained.  Present- 
day  research  would  like  to  sink  itself  so  wholly  in  the  ages 
it  studies  that  they  should  be  understood  and  valued  solely 
through  their  own  type  of  thought.  In  this  direction  much 
important  work  has  been  accomplished.  No  previous  age  has 
been  so  ready  and  skilful  in  giving  other  ages  their  full  rights, 
in  wresting  from  them  their  most  inner  purpose,  in  abstaining 
from  the  forcing  of  relationships  upon  them  from  without,  while 
drawing  such  relationships  forth  from  their  own  work  and 
desire  ;  no  previous  age  has  shown  a  greater  facility  in  placing 
itself  with  equal  sympathy  in  the  most  difficult  and  contra- 
dictory positions.  Later  ages  will  be  able  to  judge  better  than 
can  we  ourselves  as  to  whether,  in  this  endeavour,  we  do  really 
strip  ourselves  of  everything  that  is  peculiarly  our  own,  whether 
in  spite  of  every  precaution  our  supposed  objectivity  is  not 
mingled  with  subjectivity :  it  is  clear  enough  that  we  ourselves, 
as  a  result  of  this  attitude,  are  exposed  to  danger  and  injury 
through  the  weakening  of  our  own  purpose  and  being  conse- 
quent upon  this  very  facility  in  coming  into  contact  with,  and 
adapting  ourselves  to,  strange  positions.  Our  immeasurable 
enlargement  of  horizon  permits  all  sorts  of  different  elements 
to  pour  in  upon  us,  impress  themselves  upon  us  and  overmaster 


HISTORY  315 

us.  Our  souls  become  stages  upon  which  all  sorts  of  characters 
appear  and  play  their  parts.  We  forget  that  the  extension  of 
our  circle  of  ideas  by  no  means  carries  with  it  an  enlargement 
of  our  life.  We  incline  to  substitute  scholarly  knowledge  for 
spiritual  life.  This  life  of  sympathetic  understanding,  which, 
after  all,  is  never  more  than  a  half-life,  leads  us  into  the 
danger  of  increasingly  surrendering  a  full  life  of  our  own,  a 
life  of  clear  thought  and  firm  will.  We  are  greatly  concerned 
to  discover  the  spiritual  syntheses  occurring  in  former  ages, 
but  we  are  incapable  of  completing  a  spiritual  synthesis  for 
our  own  age  ! 

Our  weakness  becomes  apparent  chiefly  in  the  attempt  to 
establish  a  connection  between  the  past  and  the  present, 
between  bygone  aspirations  and  our  own.  We  feel  ourselves 
safely  at  home  in  the  past,  we  see  clearly  how  everything  has 
come  to  pass,  how  one  thing  resulted  and  could  not  but  result 
from  another,  and  we  follow  this  line  of  thought  down  to  the 
threshold  of  our  own  period;  only  one  short  step  and  the 
connection  would  be  established,  the  result  of  all  the  long 
labour  would  communicate  itself  to  us  and  be  converted  into 
personal  life.  But,  remarkable  though  it  may  seem,  we  do 
not  succeed  in  taking  this  short  step.  The  gap  remains,  and 
knowledge  and  life  are  not  brought  together.  Nay,  the  progress 
of  historical  knowledge  actually  hinders  the  connection  of  history 
with  life.  For  the  more  clearly  science  exhibits  the  specific 
character  of  bygone  periods,  the  more  it  becomes  apparent  that 
their  contents  have  depended  upon  special  conditions,  the  more 
definite  are  seen  to  be  the  boundaries  which  separate  one 
age  and  mode  of  thought  from  another,  the  more  impossible 
it  is  seen  to  be  that  there  should  be  a  simple  flowing-over  of 
strange  life  into  the  specific  life  of  a  given  period.  The  fact 
that  historical  investigation  dwells  with  peculiar  zest  upon 
remote  ages,  and  there  achieves  its  most  brilliant  triumphs,  is 
another  example  of  the  separation  between  knowledge  and  life. 
In  studying  the  remote  past  we  are  less  concerned  with  the 
state  of  affairs  in  our  own  life  ;  the  nearer,  however,  we  draw 
to  the  present  day,  the  more  unavoidable  our  own  problem 
becomes,  and  the  more  painful  our  own  insecurity. 


316    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

This  gap  between  knowledge  and  life,  between  the  preliminary 
conditions  of  spiritual  life  and  spiritual  life  itself,  is  at  its  widest 
in  the  sphere  of  religion.  Religious  investigation  has  to-day 
made  immense  progress ;  in  particular  it  has  placed  the  great 
religions  and  their  various  phases  before  our  eyes  with  greatly 
increased  clearness  and  has  presented  us  with  a  wealth  of  living 
facts  and  details.  Yet  how  defenceless  we  are  when  confronted 
with  all  this  actuality,  how  little  our  own  religious  convictions 
and  religious  life  profit  by  it,  how  great  is  our  helplessness  in 
this  respect !  And  this  helplessness  will  continue  as  long  as  we 
do  not  find  the  power  to  effect  a  personal  construction  of  life. 
It  is  history,  in  the  first  place,  which  prevents  us  from  finding 
such  a  power.  History  allows  us  to  cling  to  the  mere  appear- 
ance of  a  possession.  Through  a  perpetual  occupation  with 
bygone  things  it  distracts  us  from  our  own  thought  and  respon- 
sibility, giving  us  learning  in  place  of  life. 

It  is  therefore  no  wonder  if  from  time  to  time  there  arises  a 
passionate  anti-historical  movement,  and  that  to-day  a  feeling  of 
anger  against  an  enervating  historicism,  confined,  as  it  is,  to  a 
mere  half-life,  is  gaining  ground.  "  Cast  away  from  thyself  the 
yoke  of  the  past  and  set  thy  life  wholly  in  the  present ;  then  it 
will  again  grow  fresh  and  genuine,  then,  at  last,  will  it  become 
thine  own  life."  But  such  a  casting  away  is  no  simple  matter, 
and  moreover  the  attempted  liberation  involves  the  loss'of  much 
with  which  we  can  hardly  dispense !  In  reality  history  holds  us 
much  faster  than  its  opponents  imagine ;  it  holds  us  fast  even 
against  our  own  wills.  For  the  opposition  is  itself  a  product  of 
a  historical  situation  and  derives  a  specific  colour  therefrom ; 
its  negation  is  concerned  with  particular  evils  and  its  affirmation 
is  subject  also  to  contemporary  influences.  Such  a  historical 
dependence,  even  on  the  part  of  anti-historical  movements,  is 
clearly  perceived  as  soon  as  the  course  of  time  has  given  us  a 
sufficient  perspective :  for  example,  how  quickly  has  the  En- 
lightenment, which  wished  to  do  away  with  all  historical  rela- 
tions and  to  build  up  life  solely  upon  timeless  reason,  itself 
become  a  historical  quantity,  a  past  category ;  how  much  of  its 
work  now  impresses  us  as  belonging  to  a  remote  past !  In 
reviewing  history  as  a  whole  we  notice  a  kind  of  cyclic  movement : 


HISTORY  317 

now  there  is  a  period  when  historical  relationships  are  sought, 
now  one  when  they  are  rejected ;  this  observation  may  well 
convince  us  that  the  negative  attitude  is  just  as  much  a  historical 
phenomenon  as  is  the  affirmative,  and  that  the  passionate  attack 
upon  history,  with  its  tendency  to  assert  the  opposite  of  what  is 
transmitted  to  us,  does  not  produce  true  independence  so  much 
as  a  different  kind  of  dependence. 

At  the  same  time,  it  makes  no  inconsiderable  difference 
whether  the  conscious  aspiration  of  man  goes  with  history  or 
against  it.  In  the  latter  case  we  are  called  upon  to  build  up 
our  lives  solely  upon  the  immediate  present  and  to  recognise  as 
true  only  that  which  is  convincing  to  the  thought  and  feeling  of 
each  individual.  But  will  not  this  limitation  cause  life  to 
become  narrow  and  poor  ?  If  that  which  is  present  to  the  mere 
individual  is  alone  reckoned  as  the  measure  of  all  things,  will 
not  life  inevitably  become  superficial  and  split  up  into  numerous 
separate  phenomena  ?  In  this  way  will  not  the  inner  indepen- 
dence, the  spiritual  character  of  life,  suffer  the  severest  injury? 
The  Enlightenment  provides  us  with  a  clear  demonstration  of 
this.  For  it  did  not  succeed  in  establishing  a  firmly  grounded 
spiritual  world  equal  to  nature,  and  those  of  its  thinkers  who 
most  energetically  maintained  the  superiority  of  spiritual  life 
as  compared  with  nature  continually  succumbed,  in  the  con- 
struction of  their  thought-worlds,  to  the  influence  of  natural 
concepts;  this  was  certainly  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  they 
thought  themselves  able  to  despise  history  with  its  rich 
content,  its  fixed  relationships,  and  its  deepening  experiences. 
Unless  the  inner  life  can  itself  attain  to  a  super- subjective 
integration  it  would  seem  that  it  cannot  prevail  against  the 
unlimited  world  which  so  overpoweringly  presses  upon  us  from 
without.  For  this  purpose,  however,  history  is  essential. 
Further,  we  must  ask  ourselves  if  the  attempt  to  place  life 
entirely  in  the  present  must  not  destroy  itself,  since  the  present 
is  ever  changing ;  to-day  soon  becomes  yesterday,  and  thus  the 
whole  threatens  ultimately  to  be  reduced  to  nothing.  We  are 
certainly  protected  from  this  last  extreme  by  the  circumstance 
that,  as  we  have  seen,  history  holds  man  fast  even  against  his 
own  intention.  But  does  not  the  matter  then  amount  to  this : 


318    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

that  so  far  as  we  rid  ourselves  of  history  we  volatilise  life,  so  far, 
however,  as  history  retains  a  content  for  us  we  unwillingly 
affirm  the  very  history  from  which  a  liberation  appeared  indis- 
pensable to  the  power  and  reality  of  life  ? 

It  follows  that  we  find  ourselves  in  a  highly  complicated 
position — nay,  in  an  intolerable  dilemma.  We  can  neither 
retain  history  nor  dispense  with  it.  When  we  shake  it  off  we 
fall  into  emptiness,  when  we  submit  to  it  we  enter  upon  a 
shadow-life.  Under  these  circumstances  the  average  type  of 
mind  may  have  recourse  to  compromises  and  find  satisfaction  in 
a  middle  course  between  freedom  and  submission,  but  &  more 
energetic  mode  of  thought  will  thoroughly  realise  the  impossi- 
bility of  compromise  and  demand  an  overcoming  of  the  antithesis. 
Is  it  possible,  however,  to  effect  a  liberation  from  history  which 
shall,  at  the  same  time,  signify  a  reconciliation  with  history? 
Can  life  attain  to  something  beyond  history  and  at  the  same 
time  leave  history  a  value  ?  Can  we  conceive  of  a  type  of  life 
which  does  not  unstably  waver  between  the  rationalism  of  the 
eighteenth  century  and  the  historicism  of  the  nineteenth,  but 
is  able,  in  building  up  an  independent  type,  to  recognise  and  at 
the  same  time  to  limit  the  rights  of  each  ?  This  is  certainly 
not  to  be  attained  without  thoroughgoing  transformations  of 
first  appearances  and  energetic  further  constructions  of  life. 
Let  us  see  if  our  investigation  as  a  whole  affords  points  of 
approach  for  this  task.* 

(&)  Demands  and  Prospects 

The  next  question  is,  whether  human  life  is  in  any  way 
capable  of  freeing  itself  from  history  and  independently  con- 
fronting it.  The  answer  will  depend  upon  what  our  position  is 
with  regard  to  human  life  as  a  whole.  It  necessarily  involves  a 

*  The  discussion  will  remain  confined  entirely  to  this  one  main  point.  For 
a  further  treatment,  see  my  outline  of  the  "Philosophy  of  History"  in  the 
Kultur  der  Gegenwart  (volume  entitled  Systematische  Philosophic).  That  the 
content  of  history,  together  with  our  relation  to  history,  has  again  become 
insecure  is  clearly  indicated  by  the  uprising  of  manifold  disputable  points  and 
by  the  passion  to  which  their  treatment  gives  rise.  Otherwise  how  could  the 
philosophy  of  history  have  again  come  so  much  to  the  front  in  the  last  few 
years,  when  only  a  short  while  ago  it  was  generally  regarded  as  a  settled  matter 
lying  beyond  the  reach  of  discussion  ? 


HISTORY  319 

statement  with  regard  to  the  centre  of  this  whole.  If  man 
belongs  entirely  to  nature  (that  he  does  to  a  considerable  extent 
so  belong  is  beyond  question),  then  he  remains  inescapably 
subject  to  the  stream  of  time  and  can  never  rise  above  it  to  a 
life  of  his  own.  Further,  if  he  steps  beyond  nature  only  by 
virtue  of  isolated  characteristics  not  rooted  in  the  whole  of  a  life 
and  being,  he  may  perhaps  attain  to  some  sort  of  further  aspira- 
tion, but  never  to  a  real  liberation  from  time.  There  is  no 
possibility  of  such  a  liberation  being  realised  except  through  the 
existence  and  recognition  of  an  independent  spiritual  world,  such 
as  constitutes  the  main  subject  of  our  whole  investigation.  For, 
as  we  have  already  seen  in  reviewing  the  problem  of  evolution, 
this  elevation  above  time,  this  operation  by  means  of  a  timeless 
order,  is  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  spiritual  life  and  is  indis- 
pensable to  it.  In  this  sphere  effort  is  consistently  directed 
towards  that  which  is  of  timeless  validity ;  historical  effect  or 
recognition  can  never  establish  a  truth  and  a  right,  for  in  the 
realm  of  spiritual  life  truth  is  directly  given  as  proceeding  from 
an  original  life.  Hence,  in  this  region,  the  past  can  never 
replace  the  present  and  to-day  can  never  grow  out  of  yesterday, 
like  fruit  from  its  blossom.  For  the  spiritual  life  produced  by 
earlier  ages  does  not  by  any  means  continue  to  exist  because  it 
once  existed ;  in  this  case  the  law  of  inertia  (the  law  by  which  a 
thing  retains  its  existing  state  until  some  external  force  produces 
an  alteration)  is  not  valid.  We  here  observe  quite  another  law : 
that  whatever  is  not  being  continually  converted  afresh  into 
personal  life  and  action  sinks  immediately  and  sinks  lower  and 
lower.  This  means,  at  the  same  time,  that  all  spiritual  life 
must  proceed  from  the  immediate  present  and  that  every  obscura- 
tion of  this  fact  tends  to  weaken  the  distinctive  character  of 
spiritual  life.  Within  the  realm  of  human  experience,  too,  it  is 
clear  enough  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  past  which  decides  as  to 
the  present  as  the  present  which  decides  as  to  the  past,  and  that 
in  accordance  with  this,  our  picture  of  the  past  continually 
changes,  depending  upon  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  present. 
Consider  the  different  views  and  valuations  of  the  Classical  Age 
which  have  been  current  at  various  times ;  these  have  in  each 
case  been  determined  by  the  tasks  and  necessities  peculiar  to 


320    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  actual  time  in  question.  Scholasticism  sought  in  the 
Classical  Epoch  a  secular  culture  which  could  serve  as  complement 
to  a  religious  order  of  life ;  the  Renaissance  looked  for  encourage- 
ment in  its  strife  for  life  and  beauty ;  the  Enlightenment,  in  so 
far  as  it  valued  the  Classical  Epoch  at  all,  valued  it  for  its  clarity 
and  utility ;  *  German  Humanism  turned  to  the  same  period  as 
a  refuge  from  the  complexity  of  modern  life,  seeing  in  it  some- 
thing more  natural,  pure,  simple,  and  great.  Thus  this  one 
epoch  shows  different  sides  to  different  ages.  But  there  have 
heen  and  are  many  who  approach  it  without  possessing  a  life  of 
their  own,  and  to  these,  in  spite  of  much  diligent  research,  it 
reveals,  in  a  spiritual  sense,  absolutely  nothing  and  never  could 
reveal  anything.  Hence  everything  depends  upon  this  life  ;  the 
decisive  thing  is  the  possession  of  a  present,  and  a  present  of  a 
definite  spiritual  character.  It  is  we  ourselves,  now  living  and 
acting,  who  can  alone  impart  such  a  character  to  the  present. 
A  spiritual  present  is  not  the  result  of  accident.  We  must  our- 
selves build  it  up.  Moreover,  it  is  no  mere  moment;  it  is  a 
consolidation  to  lift  us  above  the  moment,  it  is  a  timeless  life. 

It  would  never,  under  any  circumstances,  be  possible  to 
attain  to  such  a  life — and  even  the  attempt  to  do  so  would 
be  folly — if  there  did  not  exist  an  eternal  order  as  a  new  type 
of  reality,  and  if,  moreover,  this  order  were  not  in  some  fashion 
present  within  our  own  sphere  of  life.  For  how  could  this 
order  help  us  if  it  did  not  operate  within  us  ?  Hence,  without 
this  order  there  is  no  liberation  from  history,  while  with  it  we 
may  obtain  a  secure  position  with  regard  to  the  past.  Since 
we  have  been  forced  in  the  consideration  of  all  our  problems 
to  thus  recognise  an  independent  spiritual  world,  the  demand 
for  such  a  world  cannot  surprise  us  in  this  case.  But  at  the 
same  time  we  become  aware  of  a  tremendous  perplexity  with 
regard  to  man ;  this  spiritual  sphere  in  which  he  must  somehov 
be  ultimately  rooted,  stands,  in  his  case,  in  sharp  contradiction 
to  the  immediate  constitution  of  existence.  Spiritual  life  is 
before  everything  else  a  whole.  It  places  all  manifoldness  in 

*  Leibniz  (see  Foucher  de  Careil,  Lettret  et  opuscules,  ii.,  introd.  xxziii) 
loved  the  ancients  on  account  of  la  clarU  dans  V expression  et  I'utiliU  dans  les 
chotet. 


HISTORY  321 

comprehensive  relationships,  whereas  human  life  falls  into 
individual  circles  within  which  the  separate  phenomena  are 
merely  jumbled  together  ;  in  the  one  case  the  inner  power  and 
joy  of  the  thing  itself  is  the  motive  power  of  conduct,  in  the 
other  natural  self-preservation  is  predominant,  and  in  its  con- 
tact with  spiritual  power  this  easily  increases  to  a  boundless 
egoism  ;  the  eternity  demanded  by  the  spiritual  life  contradicts 
the  strict  dependence  of  man  upon  time,  the  unceasing  flux  of 
all  living  phenomena,  and  the  rapid  disappearance  of  individuals ; 
in  the  spiritual  sphere  the  world  attains  to  a  content  and  forms 
itself  into  a  kingdom  of  spiritual  freedom,  whereas  man  seems 
spiritually  empty  and  defenceless  in  the  face  of  infinity.  How 
can  such  a  rude  contrast  be  overcome  ? 

The  first  necessity  is  without  doubt  an  inner  transformation 
of  life,  an  elevation  above  the  merely  human  type,  a  trans- 
position to  the  spiritual  standpoint.  In  reality,  all  work  which 
is  concerned  with  the  whole  and  affects  the  whole  man  produces 
such  a  transformation  ;  it  is  only  necessary,  in  this  case,  that 
that  which  penetrates  our  life  in  a  thousand  effects  should  be 
understood  as  a  whole  and  be  taken  up  in  full  activity.  But 
such  a  transformation  and  such  a  new  position  do  not  straight- 
way enable  the  new  life  to  adequately  unfold  itself.  Through 
an  exaggeration  of  human  capacity  there  arises  a  desire  to 
directly  produce  all  spirituality  from  the  human  standpoint, 
through  the  most  energetic  possible  output  of  force ;  this 
exaggeration  revenges  itself  by  producing  a  much  too  pale  and 
shadowy  construction  of  the  world.  The  limitations  of  man 
having  once  been  sufficiently  impressed  upon  us,  we  shall  not 
so  easily  again  attempt  to  construct  reality  out  of  self-dependent 
activity.  Our  endeavour  to  develop  a  spirituality  superior  to 
time  needs  an  effective  support.  Such  a  support  is  offered  by 
history.  Certainly  not  history  just  as  it  stands ;  this  is  no 
more  than  an  unsifted  whole,  for  we  have,  for  the  time  being, 
abandoned  the  idea  of  understanding  this  whole  as  a  domain  of 
pure  reason,  a  pure  development  of  spiritual  life.  But  this  does 
not  exclude  the  belief  that  within  history  some  kind  of  revela- 
tion of  spiritual  life  is  taking  place,  that  an  esoteric  history 
separates  itself  from  the  exoteric,  that  a  spiritual  history  is  to 

21 


322    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

be  distinguished  from  the  merely  human.  In  the  former  there 
may  be  manifested  an  independent  spiritual  life  speaking  to  us 
through  all  the  mutations  of  the  ages,  a  life  capable  of  further- 
ing our  own  human  aspiration.  The  most  demonstrable 
examples  of  such  spiritual  life  occur  at  certain  periods  of 
exceptional  elevation,  called  classical,  because  at  these  times 
there  manifests  itself  a  creation  superior  to  the  mere  age  and 
the  mere  man :  the  truly  great  element  at  such  epochs  has  not 
consisted  of  particular  thoughts  and  efforts ;  it  has  been  a 
revelation  of  a  new  type  of  life  as  compared  with  everyday  pur- 
poses and  opinions.  A  revolution  is  thus  accomplished,  and 
with  it  comes  an  opening  up  of  spiritual  sources  of  life,  of 
spiritual  forces  and  necessities,  a  liberation  of  man  from 
what  is  merely  human.  Certainly  this  does  not  take  place 
without  a  relationship  with  the  rest  of  life,  without  manifold 
preparation  and  close  reference  to  the  historical  position,  but 
never  under  any  circumstances  is  this  classical  element,  with 
that  which  makes  up  its  essential  being,  a  mere  summation 
and  development  of  existing  elements:  on  the  contrary,  it 
always  represents  a  breach  of  continuity  and  a  reversal,  a  trans- 
position to  a  new  standpoint,  the  winning  of  a  new  sphere  of 
life,  the  building  up  of  a  spiritual  reality  ;  it  is  hence  usual  for 
its  manifestation  to  be  accompanied  by  serious  upheavals,  and 
in  so  far  as  it  becomes  victorious  it  becomes  so  through  struggle 
and  pain.  It  makes  martyrs  of  its  pioneers,  even  in  those  cases 
where  martyrdom  is  not  sealed  with  blood.  Moreover,  the  out- 
ward recognition  which  the  great  does  as  a  rule  ultimately  find,  by 
no  means  signifies  a  pure  victory  and  a  transformation  of  the 
human  position ;  for  this  recognition  involves  a  reduction  to 
the  level  of  human  existence  and  an  adaptation  to  petty  human 
feeling,  and  in  any  case  it  is  only  particular  effects  and  not  the 
whole  of  its  being  which  obtains  general  recognition.  Thus  at 
bottom  the  antithesis  is  not  removed  but  only  concealed,  and 
through  the  whole  of  history  true  spirituality  and  merely  human 
life-conduct  remain  in  sharp  conflict  with  one  another. 

Further,  independent  spiritual  life  does  not  merely  manifest 
itself  at  isolated  points,  for  these  points  seek  a  connection  with 
one  another,  their  desire  being  finally  to  unite  in  the  construe- 


HISTORY  323 

tion  of  an  all-embracing  domain.  This  brings  with  it  serious 
perplexities  and  severe  conflicts.  Under  human  circumstances 
every  revelation  of  spiritual  life  has  definite  limits,  since  it 
attacks  the  problem  only  at  a  particular  point,  and  solves  it  only 
in  a  particular  direction.  It  will  not  be  able  fully  to  satisfy 
the  whole  of  that  spiritual  life  which  operates  from  the  deepest 
foundations  of  man's  nature  :  a  counter-movement  will  ulti- 
mately come  forward  and  compel  new  developments.  Further,  this 
does  not  merely  produce  new  opinions  and  new  efforts ;  it  enlarges 
and  deepens  the  life-process :  it  is  the  life-process  (and  with  it 
spiritual  reality  itself)  which  grows  through  the  progress  of  the 
ages;  revelations  of  spiritual  life  take  place  in  it,  and  these  are  no 
mere  products  of  reflection,  but  revelations  which  speak  with 
the  power  of  actuality — though  this  is  certainly  an  actuality 
of  a  spiritual  kind,  and  therefore  to  be  appropriated  only  through 
self- activity. 

Although  this  revelation  of  spiritual  life  by  no  means  covers 
the  length  and  breadth  of  human  existence,  it  exercises  power 
within  the  sphere  of  spiritual  work  and  presents  it  with  a  high 
goal,  without  the  attainment  of  which  this  work  is  not  capable 
of  giving  full  satisfaction  or  of  effecting  a  real  furtherance.  That 
which  lags  behind  this  historical  position  may  for  a  time  rouse 
and  influence  humanity,  but  finally  it  will  meet  with  a  superior 
resistance  and  its  inadequacy  will  become  apparent.  Such  a 
historical  position  works  both  negatively  and  positively: 
negatively  in  shutting  out  certain  solutions  as  inadequate, 
positively  in  setting  certain  tasks  and  providing  certain  in- 
centives to  progress — thus  humanity  as  a  whole  cannot  be 
satisfied  with  any  construction  of  life  which  does  not  comprise 
in  itself  the  spiritual  deepening  and  the  moral  earnestness  which 
Christianity  gave  us,  nor  with  any  that  rejects  that  liberation  of 
the  subject  and  that  acquirement  of  an  inner  infinity  which  were 
the  gifts  of  the  Modern  World. 

Thus,  spiritually  viewed,  history  contains  indications,  demands, 

and  possibilities  which  must  be  appropriated  and  vivified  in  order 

to  become  full  reality  for  us ;  this  can  occur  in  as  far  as  the 

spiritual  element,  however  much  it  may  have  been  brought  into 

'  our  existence  by  special  needs  of  the  age,  is,  in  its  essence, 


324  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

timeless  and  therefore  permanent.  It  is  necessary  to  seize  this 
timeless  element  in  its  full  power  and  in  its  specific  nature,  when 
it  can  become  a  living  present  for  us ;  history  is  then  no  mere 
sequence  and  the  earlier  no  mere  preparation  for  the  later; 
every  quantity  has  then  not  only  a  self-value  but  an  im- 
perishable truth ;  and  it  then  becomes  possible  to  strive  towards 
a  whole  beyond  the  multiplicity.  When,  in  this  way,  history, 
instead  of  being  a  mere  sequence  of  events,  becomes  the  gradual 
revelation  of  a  spiritual  world,  the  acquirement  of  a  present 
superior  to  time,  the  desire  for  a  spiritual  life  charged  with  a  full 
content,  can  find  in  history  a  most  powerful  support.  The 
essential  thing  is  to  penetrate  from  the  temporal  to  the  eternal 
and  to  separate  a  spiritual  history  from  the  remaining  chaos. 

This  task  is,  however,  subject  to  definite  conditions.  In  the 
first  place,  it  demands  that  there  shall  be  operative  a  depth  of 
life  beyond  the  immediate  form  of  existence,  and  a  whole  beyond 
the  separate  formations.  For  in  this  way  alone  can  charac- 
teristic types  of  life,  powerful  life-currents,  manifest  them- 
selves in  the  history  of  the  world — phenomena  which  do  not 
remain  tied  to  the  particularity  of  their  visible  source,  but  work 
beyond  this  in  the  whole,  and  work,  too,  in  definite  and  distinc- 
tive fashion,  not  merely  in  a  vague  and  general  way.  Thus  only 
can  an  inner  unity  be  recognised  in  the  flux  of  the  phenomena 
and  be  carried  over  to  the  present. 

It  appertains,  further,  to  such  a  carrying  over  and  appropria- 
tion that  our  age  should  itself  develop  an  independent  spiritual 
life.  To  this  end,  it  must  effect  a  powerful  self-concentration, 
grasp  its  own  task  in  the  history  of  humanity,  seize  the 
vital  centre  of  its  own  aspiration,  and  energetically  sift  out  that 
independent  spiritual  element  superior  to  time  which  it  contains, 
at  the  same  time  securely  elevating  itself  above  the  mere  flux  of 
phenomena.  In  order  to  perceive  what  is  characteristic  in 
others  we  must  become  conscious  of  our  own  self ;  in  order  to 
discover  the  eternal  in  other  ages  and  in  history  as  a  whole 
we  must  discover  the  eternal  in  ourselves.  In  this  case,  it  is 
peculiarly  true  that  to  him  that  hath  shall  be  given.  It  is 
clearly  evident  that  the  past  may  well  elevate  the  present  but 
can  never  replace  it. 


HISTORY  325 

Our  whole  view  of  life  must  undergo  an  alteration  in  so  far  as 
a  thoroughgoing  task  is  thus  discovered  in  the  movement  of 
history  and  progress  towards  a  timeless  truth  is  made  through 
all  the  changes  of  the  ages.  We  are  now  no  longer  swept  help- 
lessly down  the  stream  of  time.  On  the  contrary,  our  participa- 
tion in  eternal  truth  brings  us  calmness  and  firmness.  Through 
the  experiences  of  history,  the  life-process  will  now  continu- 
ally acquire  a  more  and  more  concrete  form  and  hecome  more 
and  more  replete  with  content ;  spiritual  life  itself  will  he 
revealed  to  us  in  a  more  definite  form,  while  the  specific  nature 
and  status  of  humanity  will  hecome  increasingly  clear :  in  all 
this  a  characteristic  type  and  a  permanent  moulding  of  our 
spiritual  being  will  come  to  development.  Human  life  thereby 
attains  a  solidity  in  its  deepest  foundation  and  becomes 
superior  to  mere  movement.  Even  in  change,  it  will  now,  in 
the  first  place,  experience  itself  and  become  strengthened  in  its 
characteristic  nature.  It  may  be  that  the  upheavals  of  historical 
life  will  continually  shake  even  the  ultimate  foundations  and 
again  make  man  regard  as  problematical  what  already  appeared 
to  be  secured  ;  it  may  be  that  the  eternal  which  works  within  us 
must  enter  into  the  particularity  of  the  ages  and  shape  itself 
accordingly :  nevertheless  it  signifies  a  revolution  of  the  most 
fundamental  kind,  if,  through  the  participation  in  a  spiritual 
world  superior  to  time,  we  can  secure  an  eternal  in  the  core  of 
our  life,  and  it  becomes  the  task  of  tasks  to  take  this  up  in  our 
activity  and  to  convert  that  which  our  spiritual  life  indicates 
to  us  into  our  full  possession.  Now  we  can  endeavour  to 
separate  the  transitory  in  history  from  the  permanent  and  to 
win  from  the  latter  a  spiritual  present.  History  no  longer 
appears  as  a  whole  with  a  self-contained  purpose,  but  as  a  mere 
aspect  of  life  and  being.  It  now  wins  a  spiritual  content  and 
some  kind  of  meaning  only  when  referred  to  a  timeless  order. 

Regarded  from  this  point  of  view,  we  see  that  it  will  never  be 
possible  to  go  back  to  the  older  type  of  life  which  thought  to 
grasp  the  eternal  by  a  single  effort,  and  then  to  build  it 
out  completely :  the  restfulness  which  was  thereby  obtained 
appears  to  us  a  petrifaction,  a  denial  of  the  living  present  in 
favour  of  the  dead  past.  But  we  need  on  this  account  by  no 


326    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

means  succumb  to  the  modern  dissipation  of  all  that  is  fixed 
and  permanent,  to  the  dissolution  of  life  into  separate  moments, 
to  the  abandonment  of  all  inner  relationship  and  all  superior 
unity.  For  when  our  connection  with  a  world  of  timeless  truth 
permits  of  the  working  out  of  a  spiritual  character  and  of  the 
reversal  of  life  through  a  development  of  its  essential  nature, 
then  our  main  position  may  be  taken  in  the  eternal  and  we  may 
press  forward  through  time  to  a  timeless  reality,  retaining  a 
superior  permanent  element  in  the  midst  of  all  movement.  The 
past  is  then  no  longer  a  mere  past.  It  can  become  a  portion  of 
a  present  superior  to  time  and  thus  remain  a  matter  of  personal 
life,  of  unceasing  labour. 

With  such  a  conviction,  science  must  develop  a  characteristic 
treatment  of  historical  phenomena,  seeing  and  seeking  the 
permanent  in  the  temporal,  the  whole  in  the  particular.  This 
took  place,  for  example,  in  Ihering's  great  work  on  the  spirit  of 
Roman  Law,  which  shows  a  full  understanding  of  this  method 
of  procedure :  the  central  matter  is  "  not  the  Roman,  but  the 
legal,  investigated  and  exemplified  in  the  Roman  "  (3rd  edit., 
introd.  ix),  and  the  task  thus  becomes  "the  separation  of  the 
temporal  and  purely  Roman  from  the  permanent  and  universal  " 
(i.  15).  It  is  true  that  such  a  philosophical  treatment  can  come 
only  as  the  end  point  of  arduous  scientific  work,  but  those  who 
would  reject  it  through  a  weak  fear  of  its  dangers  should  bear  in 
mind  Hegel's  well-known  saying  with  regard  to  metaphysics. 
They  are  seeking  to  build  a  temple  without  a  holy  of  holies. 

The  new  type  of  life  extends  itself  also  to  the  life  of  the 
individual,  throwing  a  new  light  upon  it.  From  the  standpoint 
of  the  individual,  existence  is  a  restless  flight  of  phenomena  only 
so  long  as  it  is  without  an  independent  inner  life  and  does  not 
in  some  way  attain  to  a  whole  of  personal  being  and  spiritual 
individuality.  But  when  this  whole  is  attained  and  events  are 
thus  converted  into  experiences,  we  are  able  to  experience  a 
spiritual  self  in  work  and  destiny,  and  that  which  in  any  way 
moves  us  no  longer  passes  by  like  a  shadow  and  sinks  into  the 
abyss  of  annihilation,  but  is  capable  of  striking  root  in  us,  of 
developing  and  furthering  what  is  permanent,  of  fitting  itself 
into  a  present  superior  to  time.  The  chief  object  remains 


HISTORY  327 

always  the  same — to  secure  for  life  a  present  full  of  content  and 
thus  consolidate  it  against  the  mere  moment ;  in  such  a  present 
there  operates  a  force  which  will  always  he  a  portion  of  real 
personal  life,  in  love  or  loss,  happiness  or  unhappiness.  For 
this  reason,  men  of  spiritual  strength  have  always  scorned  to 
complain  of  life's  transitoriness,  since  it  rests  with  us  to  rise 
above  this  transitoriness  and  establish  our  life  in  the  eternal. 
"I  am  sorry,"  says  Goethe,  "  for  the  men  who  make  a  great  to 
do  about  the  past  and  lose  themselves  in  the  contemplation  of 
earthly  nothingness.  The  truth  is  that  we  are  here  for  the  very 
purpose  of  making  the  temporal  eternal."  Hence  we  cannot 
regard  as  justified  Dante's  well-known  saying,  that  the  greatest 
misery  consists  in  remembering,  in  unhappiness,  past  happiness. 
For  if  the  happiness  were  true  happiness  it  would  be  inde- 
structible ;  it  would  persist  and  would  still  be  operative,  as  a 
living  presence,  through  all  unhappiness. 

Moreover,  the  natural  phases  of  life,  the  different  ages,  do  not 
appear,  when  thus  contemplated,  as  a  mere  sequence.  These 
phases  do  not  play  themselves  completely  out  in  themselves, 
neither  are  they  absorbed  in  the  preparation  for  future  phases ; 
each  remains  inwardly  present  to  life  and  affects  its  position  as 
a  whole.  Hence  the  importance  of  a  fresh,  joyful,  genuine 
youth  :  this  is  no  mere  matter  of  sentimental  recollection,  for 
such  a  youth  can  remain  a  portion  of  a  further  present,  an  ever- 
flowing  source  of  fresh  life. 

According  to  this  view  man  is  far  from  being  a  merely  temporal 
being;  profound  mediaeval  thinkers  believed  with  more  justice 
that  he  stood  on  the  boundary  of  time  and  eternity,  on  the 
horizon  where  the  two  run  together,  and  that  he  participated  in 
both.  Time  is  for  us  rather  a  problem  than  a  rigid  destiny. 
How  far,  however,  life  overcomes  time  and  attains  to  a  present 
superior  to  it  depends,  above  everything  else,  on  the  spiritual 
power  which  it  is  capable  of  putting  forth.  It  rests  with  our- 
selves whether  the  centre  of  gravity  of  our  being  falls  in  the 
temporal  or  the  eternal.  In  any  case,  this  action  of  ours  in  thus 
overcoming  time  has  for  its  indispensable  preliminary  condition 
the  reality  and  the  inner  presence  of  a  spiritual  world.  Even 
the  most  passionate  excitation  of  the  mere  subject  can  never 


328    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

give  rise  to  a  spiritual  content  and  with  it  a  superiority 
to  time,  and  it  remains  true  that,  for  man,  all  creation  is 
at  the  same  time  a  reception,  a  drawing  upon  invisible  relation- 
ships. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  it  will  he  clear  that  our  rejection 
of  this  weakening  and  disintegrating  historicism  does  not  mean 
that  we  fall  back  upon  rationalism.  We  freely  admit  that  if 
compelled  to  choose  between  the  two  we  should  prefer  rational- 
ism, for,  however  narrow  and  one-sided  may  be  the  life  which 
it  develops,  it  is  nevertheless  a  true  personal  life  and  endeavour, 
whereas  historicism  is  satisfied  with  a  mere  imitation  of  an  alien 
life.  Nevertheless,  we  stand  far  enough  removed  from  rational- 
ism. Its  exaggerated  consciousness  of  power  misled  it  to 
underrate  its  task ;  its  failure  to  appreciate  the  broad  gap 
between  immediate  existence  and  the  real  depth  of  human 
being  caused  it  to  expect  from  a  mere  direct  comprehension 
that  which  in  reality  demands  a  thoroughgoing  deepening  and 
transformation.  It  could  hardly  have  looked  to  an  intellectual 
enlightenment  for  our  whole  salvation  if  it  had  not  believed 
that  reason  was  already  at  hand  in  our  human  sphere  and 
needed  a  mere  liberation.  Far  beyond  the  limits  of  rationalism 
itself,  it  was  the  error  of  the  New  Period,  in  general,  to  regard 
the  essence  of  spiritual  life  as  a  mere  elevation  of  existence  to  con- 
sciousness ;  it  was  thought  that  what  was  operative  round  about 
us  (though  in  a  limited  and  obscure  fashion)  attained,  within  us, 
to  full  freedom  and  clarity.  Such  a  standpoint  as  this  reveals 
a  thorough  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  great  difficulties  and 
perplexities  of  our  view  of  life ;  it  also  involves  a  reduction 
of  the  life-process,  which  according  to  such  a  superficial  view 
has  no  opportunity  of  attaining  the  necessary  depth.  The 
matter  takes  on  quite  a  different  aspect,  however,  if  spiritual 
life  is  not  regarded  as  a  mere  illumination  of  nature,  but  as  an 
essentially  new  type  of  life,  characterised  by  spiritual  freedom. 
It  is  true  that  this  may  result  in  a  much  greater  tension,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  history  acquires  a  deeper  significance.  We 
can  no  longer  attempt,  however,  to  convert  it  into  a  domain  of 
pure  reason,  but  must  be  content  to  discover  within  it  some 
sort  of  revelation  of  reason. 


HISTORY  329 

The  Enlightenment,  too,  was  unfavourable  to  a  recognition 
of  history,  in  so  far  as  the  intelligence  which  there  took  the 
first  place  in  life  had  a  far  too  narrow  and  intolerant  conception 
of  truth.  A  merely  intellectual  truth  insists  upon  being  directly 
reckoned  as  exclusive  ;  therefore,  from  this  standpoint,  different 
things  cannot  exist  side  by  side;  to  affirm  the  right  of  the 
present  day  means  to  place  the  whole  of  the  past  in  error. 
Our  earlier  sections  should  have  made  it  clear  enough 
how  completely  the  situation  alters  when  the  intellectual  is 
carried  over  to  the  spiritual  and  when  there  come  together 
in  history  not  only  doctrines  and  opinions  but  life-develop- 
ments and  life-complexes,  when  the  historical  conflict  is 
fought,  not  for  mere  pictures  of  reality,  but  for  realities 
themselves. 

The  decisive  matter,  in  this  case,  is  always  the  gaining  of 
a  present  superior  to  time,  with  the  accompanying  reversal  of 
life.  For  only  through  such  a  present  can  history  become  more 
than  a  matter  of  scholarly  investigation,  only  in  this  way  can 
the  unlimited  expansion  of  "becoming,"  and  hence  of  the 
historical  point  of  view,  be  prevented  from  giving  rise  to  a 
destructive  relativism.  The  victory  of  a  historical  point  of 
view  is  indeed  the  greatest  triumph  of  our  whole  modern 
investigation.  This  point  of  view  does  not  only  permit  of  all 
existing  things  associated  with  the  formation  of  the  world  and 
with  organic  forms  being  understood  in  the  light  of  evolution ; 
it  extends  itself  to  the  most  elementary  processes  of  lifeless 
nature,  since  even  in  the  domain  of  physics  events  take  place 
to  a  very  large  extent  in  a  definite  sequence  and  are  not 
reversible  at  will.  A  much  clearer  picture  of  human  existence 
has,  however,  been  obtained  since  the  present  was  understood 
as  the  last  link  of  a  long  chain ;  in  the  chief  directions  of  human 
aspiration  not  only  is  much  recognised  as  changeable  which 
formerly  passed  as  fixed  and  inherent,  but  it  is  also  shown  how 
man,  even  down  to  his  psychical  nature,  depends  upon  the 
specific  character  of  his  age  (as  is  seen  from  the  fact  that 
different  ages  have  exhibited  different  types  of  men).  An 
immeasurable  wealth  of  life  is  thus  opened  up,  and  our  under- 
standing becomes  much  more  exact  in  coining  into  contact  with 


330    MAIN  CURRENTS   OP  MODERN  THOUGHT 

such  wealth.*  All  this  may  be  welcomed  as  an  essential 
enlargement  of  our  field  of  vision,  a  liberation  from  the  limita- 
tions of  a  particular  age.  But  the  gain  in  knowledge  may  well 
lead  to  a  loss  in  life  if  it  does  not  succeed  in  meeting  this 
enlargement  with  a  consolidation  and  the  growth  of  time  with 
a  strengthening  of  the  eternal.  History  must  remain  in  a 
secondary  position :  it  must  never  take  the  first  place.  It  is 
true  enough  that,  when  thus  regarded,  our  sphere  of  existence 
appears  much  less  complete  than  it  did  to  the  rationalists  and 
constructive  historical  philosophers.  But  why  are  we  so  sure 
that  we  ourselves  round  off  the  whole  cycle  of  life  ?  And  is  it 
a  defect  in  the  more  modest  conception  if,  along  with  the 
reduction  of  man,  there  takes  place  an  enlargement  of  reality, 
and  it  life,  in  presenting  itself  less  simply,  gains  in  depth  ? 

Appendix  :  The  Concept  "  Modern  " 

The  concept  "  modern "  to-day  moves  and  divides  men's 
minds  to  such  an  extent  that  some  discussion  and  explanation 
of  it  cannot  be  avoided.  In  the  first  place  the  history  of  the 
term  demands  explanation,  for  with  respect  to  this  point  very 
indefinite  if  not  erroneous  opinions  are  extant. 

*  We  may,  in  the  first  place,  mention  Dilthey's  brilliant  delineations  of  the 
men  of  different  centuries;  Lamprecht's  investigations,  too,  should  not  be 
forgotten  in  this  connection.  B.  Baerwald,  among  others,  deals  with  the 
psychical  position  of  the  present  day ;  see  Psychologische  Faktoren  de»  modernen 
Zeitgeittet  (published  by  the  Geselltchaft  fur  ptychologische  Fortchung).  The 
problem  of  the  dependence  of  man  upon  his  age  has,  however,  occupied  men's 
minds  from  the  earliest  times,  and  even  so  early  as  the  seventeenth  century 
it  had  become  a  definite  point  of  conflict.  As  it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  go 
into  this  matter  more  closely,  we  must  content  ourselves  with  taking  a  single 
passage  from  Walch's  Philos.  Lexikon  (contained  even  in  the  1st  edit,  of  1726), 
article  Sitten,  p.  2377 :  "  Now  because  such  a  change  (that  is,  of  customs)  takes 
place  almost  unnoticed  and  we  do  not  usually  become  aware,  until  it  is  over, 
that  such  and  such  customs  were  in  vogue  at  such  and  such  times,  it  has 
become  usual  to  attribute  the  customs  to  the  ages  Thus  some  have  endea- 
voured to  set  up  a  genium  seculi  which  guides  men's  minds  and  alters  their 
customs  according  to  the  ages.  Barclaius  (Barclay)  was  of  this  opinion,  and  in 
his  Icon  animor.,  p.  505  (John  Barclay's  Icon  animorum,  1614)  he  says  :  Omnia 
secula  genium  habent,  qui  mortalium  animos  in  certa  studio,  solet  inftectere.  In 
agreement  with  him  were  the  anonymous  author  of  the  Germaniam  milite  dcsti- 
tutam  and  the  so-called  Pater  Finnianus  who  published  a  special  book  with  the 
title  Seculi  geniui  (Paris,  1663,  13). 


HISTORY  331 

The  actual  problem  connected  with  the  term  "modern" 
naturally  reaches  back  far  beyond  the  coining  of  the  expres- 
sion. Whenever  it  was  desired  to  define  the  characteristic 
nature  of  the  present,  some  sort  of  term  will  have  been  found.* 

In  "  modern,"  however,  there  arose  a  permanent  expression, 
and  it  will  be  worth  our  while  to  follow  its  development  a  little 
more  closely.  This  word  (derived  from  mode  =  just,  now)  has 
been  used  more  especially  when  men  have  been  divided  by  the 
consciousness  of  inner  alterations :  the  friend  of  the  new  then 
calls  himself  "  modern  "  to  announce  his  superiority  as  com- 
pared with  those  who  tenaciously  cling  to  the  old;  while  the 
latter,  on  the  other  hand,  make  use  of  the  term  in  a  reproachful 
sense,  applying  it  to  those  who,  lacking  in  constancy  and  rever- 
ence, follow  the  fleeting  impressions  of  the  moment.  The  history 
of  the  word  shows  us  when  the  conflict  reached  an  especial 
height  and  the  point  which  more  particularly  caused  dissension. 

The  expression  appears  in  the  transition  period  which  divides 
the  Ancient  World  from  the  Middle  Ages,  being  employed  by 
the  grammarian  Priscianus  in  the  sixth  century  and  by  Theo- 
doric's  official,  Cassiodorius  (d.  abt.  575). t  It  occasionally 
occurs  in  the  following  centuries,  t  After  the  end  of  the  eleventh 
century  "  modern  "  was  made  use  of  in  the  logical  conflicts  of 
the  period  as  a  party  term  :  it  served  to  denote  the  nominalists 
— that  is,  those  who  refused  to  recognise  the  objective  reality 
of  intellectual  concepts.  §  Others,  however,  were  also  called 

*  Thus  Aristotle,  for  example,  repeatedly  employed  the  term  ol  vvv.  In  Met. 
992  a,  33,  he  clearly  denotes  the  Platonists  of  his  age :  ycyovcv  TO.  ^o&/;/iara  role 
vvv  r)  QiXovotyia,  similarly  in  1069  a,  26  :  ot  ft.lv  vvv  TO.  xadoXov  ovviaf  [taXXov 
TiStaatv  ra  yap  yivrj  K(t$6\ov,  a  Qaoiv  «px«£  Kai  ovaia<j  livat  ftaXXov  Sia  r6 
\oyuc<i>£  £ijr«v  ot  Si  TraXat  rd  KO$'  wcaarov,  olov  irvp  *at  y»jv,  aXX1  oil  TO  KOIVOV 
ffufta. 

f  In  Cassiod.  Variarum,  4,  51,  an  architect  is  recommended  as  antiquorum 
imitator,  modernorum  institutor. 

|  An  article  in  the  Historisch-polititchen  Blatter  (1393,  year  1907)  mentions 
a  letter  of  the  Abbot  Benediotus  Avianensis  (written  between  800  and  821)  in 
which  it  says :  Unde  apud  modernot  icholasticot,  maxime  apud  Scotot  (i)tU 
tyllogismus  delusionis,  ut  dicant  trinitatem  sicut  personarum  ita  eue  mlitan- 
tiarum  (Mon.  Germ.  hist.  Epi$t.  Carol.  Mvi,  vol.  ii.  563). 

§  Prantl  (Geschichte  der  Logik  im  Abendlande,  ii.  82)  quotes  the  oldest 
passage  in  which  the  nominalists  are  described  as  moderni :  non  juxta 
quosdam  modernot  in  voce,  ted  more  Boethii  antiquorumque  doctorum  in  n 
ditcipulis  legebat — namely  Otto,  Bishop  of  Cambray  from  1106. 


332    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

"moderns  ;"  for  example,  the  scholars  of  the  period.*  The  term 
acquired  a  more  important  content  and  a  more  exact  applica- 
tion when,  after  the  days  of  John  of  Salisbury,  the  Aristotelians 
of  the  thirteenth  century  (in  particular  the  great  Dominicans, 
such  as  Albertus  Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas — the  very  man 
who  is  now  the  pillar  of  all  that  is  anti-modern)  drew  the  term 
to  themselves  in  contradistinction  to  the  Franciscan  school,  t 
which  lent  its  support  to  a  mode  of  thought  more  influenced  by 
Plato  and  Augustine.  The  "modern"  thought  was  accused  by 
its  opponents  of  flooding  theology  with  dialectical  considera- 
tions and  petty  discussions.!  Later,  both  the  concept  of 
modernity  and  the  term  itself  were  transferred  to  Occam  and 
his  school ;  "  Occam's  doctrine  remained  the  '  modern  '  theology 
down  to  the  time  of  Luther,  "§  and  Luther  himself  announced 
his  adherence  to  it.  The  word  has,  however,  yet  another 
meaning :  the  brothers  of  communal  life  stood  for  a  devotio 
moderna,  understanding  by  this  a  devotion  which,  along  with 
the  outward  form,  laid  great  emphasis  on  "inwardness";  one 
of  Johannes  Busch's  works  bears  the  title  Liber  de  origine 
devotionis  moderncB.  \\ 

The  Middle  Ages  then  sank  into  decay  and  the  Renaissance 
opened  up  a  new  world.  But  it  was  a  long  time  before  that 
which  was  already  active  in  men's  minds  rose  to  the  level  of 
clear  consciousness  and  acquired  definite  terms.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Renaissance,  of  course,  "  modern  "  could 
not  mean  a  new  type  as  opposed  to  the  Ancient  World,  but 
only  a  new  method  in  the  treatment  of  the  Ancient  World. 
Since,  at  the  same  time,  the  mediaeval  terminology  persisted 

*  It  would  be  of  no  interest  to  go  into  this  matter  further  here,  but  we  may 
refer  to  Prantl  (see,  for  example,  ii.  116  if.,  195  and  241). 

f  Roger  Bacon  called  Alexander  of  Hales  and  Albert  duo  moderni  gloriosi 
(see  the  article  Scholastik  by  Seeberg  in  Herzog's  Eealenzyklopddie). 

I  The  papal  legate,  Simon  de  Brion,  who  played  an  important  part  in  the 
movements  which  at  that  time  excited  and  almost  broke  up  the  University  of 
Paris,  makes  a  depreciating  reference  to  the  moderna  curiositas,  qute  plus  solito 
innumeras  multiplicat  qucestionis  (see  Mandonnet's  excellent  work :  Siger  de 
Brabant  et  I'Averroisme  latin  au  XIII  siecle  (1899),  ccviii,  note  1). 

§  See  Seeberg,  Herzog's  Realenzyklopadie,  3rd  edit.,  xiv.  279. 

||  See  Gustav  Boerner's  article  Die  BrUder  des  gemeinsamen  Lebem  in 
Deutschland  in  the  Deuttchen  Getchichtsblattem  of  June,  1905,  particularly 
pp.  244-5. 


HISTORY  333 

things  became  seriously  confused.  This  is  clearly  illustrated 
by  the  epistolce  obscurorum  virorum.*  The  more,  however,  the 
Modern  World,  with  the  commencement  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  won  independence  and  self-consciousness,  the  more 
powerfully  it  compelled  contemporary  scholars  to  separate 
clearly  what  was  peculiar  to  their  own  age  from  everything 
earlier,  thus  making  an  arrangement  and  division  of  human 
history  which  was  quite  different  from  anything  previously 
attempted.  It  was  chiefly  the  growth  of  the  natural  sciences 
and  the  influence  of  French  literature  at  its  highest  level 
which  lent  that  epoch  the  consciousness  of  being  something 
new  and  of  being  superior  to  all  previous  ages.  This  resulted 
more  particularly  in  the  contrasting  of  "  ancient "  and 
"modern."  Perrault's  well-known  book,  Parallele  des  anciens 
et  des  modernes  (1688  ff.)  treats  the  expressions  as  already 
established ;  the  book  is  characteristic  of  the  self-consciousness 
with  which  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  was 
filled.!  The  contrast  once  having  been  set  up,  it  was  but  a 
step  to  examine  into  the  specific  nature  of  the  ancient  and  the 
modern ;  we  know  to  what  important  developments  this  gave 
rise,  and  how  Schiller,  in  particular,  considered  a  more  exact 
definition  of  these  concepts  worthy  of  thorough  and  devoted 
work. 

On  the  other  hand  the  modern  had  to  define  itself  as  opposed 
to  the  mediaeval,  and  for  this  purpose  it  was  first  necessary  to 
form  a  concept  of  the  Middle  Ages.  This  took  place  very  late. 

•  Here  modernut  occasionally  means  merely  "  new  "  (modernus  episcoput, 
modernus  imperator).  The  older  meaning,  originating  in  the  conflict  of  the 
different  schools  of  logic,  is  also  retained  (antiqui  et  moderni).  As  a  rale, 
however,  it  denotes  the  adherents  of  the  new  humanistic  mode  of  thought,  for 
example,  poeta  moderni ;  ex  quo  in  Ephordia  sumus  moderni ;  artiita  de  via 
modernorum.  The  term  is  not  by  any  means  always  employed. 

f  We  may  quote,  in  illustration,  a  couple  of  passages  from  the  first  dialogue 
of  this  work:  Jepretens  que  nous  avont  aujaurd'hui  une  plut parfaite  connais- 
tance  de  tout  leg  artt  et  tous  let  sciences,  qu'on  ne  Va  jamais  eue.  Further,  he 
speaks  of  the  progres  prodigieux  dei  artt  et  des  sciences,  depuit  cinquante  ou 
soixante  ant.  Again  :  II  ne  faut  que  lire  let  journaux  de  France  et  d'Angleterre 
et  jetter  les  yeux  sur  let  beaux  ouvrages  des  academies  de  cet  deux  grandet 
royaumes  pour  etre  convaincu  que  depuis  vingt  ou  trente  ant  ilt'est  fait  plus  de 
deeouvertes  dans  la  science  des  chotet  naturellet,  que  dans  toute  Vetendue  de  la 
savantc  antiquite. 


:i34  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

In  this  connection  Bernheim  remarks  (as  above,  p.  69)  :  "In 
spite  of  occasional  attacks  the  ban  of  tradition  lasted  long. 
Even  so  comparatively  recent  a  writer  as  Sleidan,  the  well-known 
historian  of  the  period  of  Charles  V.,  calls  his  chronicle  De 
quattuor  monarchies,  and  in  spite  of  all  the  indications  which  he 
produces  of  the  disintegration  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  he 
firmly  retains  a  belief  in  its  continuance,  because,  according  to 
the  prophecies  of  Daniel,  a  fifth  earthly  world-monarchy  is  impos- 
sible." The  seventeenth  century  first  saw  a  practical  arrangement 
of  material.  It  was  the  philologians  and  men  of  letters  who 
first  felt  the  need  for  some  definite  expression  to  denote  the 
obvious  difference  between  the  classical  and  mediaeval  language 
and  literature,  on  the  one  hand,  and  between  the  latter  and  the 
literary  culture  which  followed  the  Renaissance  on  the  other. 
As  a  result  there  arose  the  term  media  cetas  or  medium  cevum 
for  the  literary  period  ranging  from  Augustus  or  from  the  Anto- 
nines  down  into  the  fifteenth  century.  It  was  Professor  Christo- 
pher Cellarius  of  Halle  (1634-1707)  who  introduced  this  mode 
of  division,  as  applied  to  history  in  general,  into  his  works : 
Historia  antiqua  was  used  to  denote  the  period  down  to  the 
time  of  Constantino  the  Great  (it  did  not  stop  with  Augustus 
because,  as  he  expressly  explains,  the  inner  and  outer  power  of 
the  Roman  Empire  endured  far  beyond  the  time  of  Augustus)  ; 
Historia  medii  eevi  represented  the  subsequent  period  down  to 
the  conquest  of  Constantinople  by  the  Turks,  and  Historia  nova 
the  following  epoch.  This  method  of  division  gradually  obtained 
recognition,  though  not  without  vigorous  opposition.*  Thus 

*  How  slowly  this  matter  was  settled  and  how  it  aroused  conflict  even  down 
to  the  present  day,  is  but  little  known.  An  article  by  George  Goyan  in  the  Revue 
des  Deux  Mondes  of  January  15, 1907,  on  the  important  Belgian  historian  Gode- 
f roid  Kurth,  contains  the  following  remarks  with  respect  to  the  attitude  of  the 
French  Academy  towards  the  term  "  Middle  Ages  "  :  Leg  cinq  premieres  edition* 
du  dicticmnaire  de  V  Academie  jranqaite  contiennient  au  mot  "  moyen  age  "  I'article 
suivant :  "  On  appelle  autheurt  du  moyen  age  let  autheurt  qui  ont  ecrit  depuis  la 
decadence  de  I'empire  romainjusque  vers  le  X  siecle  ou  environ."  C'est  seulement 
dam  la  6e  edition  (1835)  qu'on  lit :  "  Moyen  age,  le  temps  qui  s'est  icautt  depuis 
la  chute  de  I'empire  remain,  en  475,  jusqu'd  la  prise  de  Constantinople,  par 
Mahomet,  en  1453."  Kurth  himself  was  in  very  decided  opposition  to  the  con- 
cept and  term  "  Middle  Ages."  In  Qu'est  ce  que  le  moyen  age  he  wishes  to 
secure  the  recognition  of  a  single  main  division  —  the  commencement  of 
Christianity  ;  accordingly,  his  great  work  Let  origines  de  la  civilisation 


HISTORY  335 

"  modern  "  was  defined  with  respect  to  the  Middle  Ages  also. 
To  follow  the  subsequent  fate  of  the  expression  in  the  Modern 
World  would  lead  us  into  an  unlimited  discussion,  and  is  by  no 
means  essential  to  our  task.  This  much  we  have  seen :  that 
the  term  "modern"  is  much  less  modern  than  is  usually  sup- 
posed, and  that  the  concept  is  of  a  very  elastic  description. 

So  much  for  the  history  of  the  expression  ;  now  for  a  few 
words  as  to  the  problem  itself.  The  ultimate  source  of  the  lively 
movement  and  conflict  which  centres  round  the  concept  modern 
is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  for  the  happy  progress  of  civilisa- 
tion there  is  necessary  not  only  a  bringing  forth  of  what  is  new 
but  a  retention  of  what  is  old.  Our  progress  would  be  slow 
indeed  if  we  had  always  to  begin  afresh,  if  our  work  did  not 
attain  to  a  safe  possession  of  suitable  instruments  and  paths  of 
least  resistance,  if  much  which  at  first  required  a  full  effort  of 
conscious  activity  did  not  subsequently  acquire  an  unconscious 
and  habitual  form,  thus  leaving  more  free  time  for  progressive 
activity.  For  example,  how  useful,  nay,  indispensable,  to 
philosophy  is  the  rich  store  of  concepts  and  technical  terms 
with  which  the  connected  work  of  millenniums  has  provided  us. 
But  the  matter  goes  yet  deeper.  The  measure  of  truth  and  of 
spiritual  content  in  general  to  which  the  race  has  attained  can 
win  the  conviction  and  devotion  of  man  only  by  elevating  itself 
above  every  temporal  change  and  rejecting  every  alteration.  In 
so  far  as  we  possess  genuine  truth  we  stand  above  the  movement 
of  time.  It  was  this  mode  of  thought  which  gave  rise  to  the 
saying : 

41  Die  Wahrheit  war    chon  langst  gefunden, 

Hat  edle  Geistenchaft  verbunden: 

Dot  alte  Wakre,  /as«'  e»  an  !  " 

("  The  Truth  has  long  ago  been  found, 
Has  lofty  minds  together  bound ; 
The  ancient  Truth— Now  seize  it  fast !  ") 


mnderne  (3rd  edit.,  1898)  treats  the  "Middle  Ages"  as  the  beginning  of  the 
modern  world.  In  the  former  and  smaller  work  he  says :  Loin  que  le  moyen 
Age  soit  interme'diairc  entre  la  civilisation  antique  et  la  civilisation  moderne,  le 
moyen  Age  e»t  lui-meme  le  commencement  de  la  civilisation  moderne.  Loin  qu'il 
faille  faire  descendre  le  point  de  depart  de  celle-ci  aiuti  bos  que  Vepoque  de  la 
Rcnaistance,  ilfaut  constater  au  contraire  qu'elle  tort  dn  christianisme. 


336  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

This  justified  a  High  appreciation  of  the  old  and  a  demand 
for  its  close  connection  with  our  own  work,  for  an  avoidance  of 
each  and  every  sharp  breach.* 

But  the  advocates  of  modernity  have  much  to  say  on  the  other 
side.  Spiritual  things  are  not  easily  transferred  from  one  age 
to  another,  after  the  manner  of  outward  things  ;  they  continually 
demand  to  be  recognised  and  appropriated  afresh,  and  in  this 
reappropriation  it  will  be  hard  to  avoid  a  certain  alteration. 
Even  if  the  outward  state  remains  the  same  the  valuation  of  the 
separate  parts  and  their  relation  to  one  another  will  easily 
undergo  change ;  men  will  see  new  aspects  of  the  old  and  lay 
emphasis  upon  different  portions  of  it.  Moreover,  new  positions 
are  found,  presenting  us  with  new  problems,  and  humanity 
cannot  meet  these  problems  without  a  corresponding  inward 
forward  movement.  Civilisations  become  exhausted  and  new 
races  appear  with  fresh  mental  characteristics.  Is  it  right  that 
the  position  of  spiritual  life  should  remain  quite  unaffected  by  all 
this?  Further,  is  it  a  matter  of  absolute  certainty  that  the 
traditional  life  is  based  upon  unquestionable  truth  and  that  the 
chosen  path  leads  directly  to  the  goal?  Nay,  is  there  any 
genuine  life  at  all  without  personal  decision,  and  can  there  be 
personal  decision  without  doubt  and  struggle,  without  trans- 
formation and  reconstruction  ? 

The  alterations  which  result  may  at  first  appear  to  take  place 
within  a  world  of  indubitable  validity  ;  nay,  for  a  long  time  they 
may  not  be  felt  at  all.  Then,  however,  there  comes  a  point 
when  the  tension  becomes  excessive  and  a  breaking  away  from 
the  old  becomes  indispensable  to  the  freshness  and  genuineness 

*  In  the  field  of  philosophy  this  gave  rise  to  the  idea  of  a  philosophic. perennit, 
which,  already  contained  in  Scholasticism,  was  maintained  with  especial 
vigour  by  Agostino  Steuco,  who  wrote  De  perenni  philosophia  lib.  X,  Basel, 
1512.  Leibniz  took  up  the  expression,  but  owing  to  his  idea  of  a  continually 
progressive  evolution  he  gave  it  a  different  meaning.  Of  recent  years,  Trencle- 
lenburg,  in  particular,  and  again  in  distinctive  fashion,  has  defended  the  idea 
of  the  stability  of  philosophical  work  :  "  Philosophy,"  he  says,  "  will  not  regain 
its  ancient  power  until  it  acquires  permanence,  and  it  will  not  acquire  perma- 
uence  until  it  grows  like  the  other  sciences  do,  evolving  in  continuity,  taking 
up  its  problems  historically  and  developing  them,  instead  of  making  a  fresh 
beginning  and  again  coming  to  a  stop  in  the  mind  of  each  individual ''  (Preface 
to  the  2ml  edit,  of  the  Logische  Untertuchungen,  p.  vuij. 


HISTORY  337 

of  life,  a  time  when  spiritual  self-preservation  imperatively 
demands  a  breach  with  tradition  and  a  creation  directly  out  of 
the  present.  Historical  experience  alone  can  inform  us  whether 
such  transformations  are  necessary  and  when  they  become 
necessary ;  to  an  impartial  mind  they  are,  however,  sufficiently 
evident.  Such  a  transformation  (and  perhaps  the  most  radical 
we  know)  is  to  be  seen  in  the  appearance  of  Christianity,  with 
its  fundamentally  new  standard  of  values ;  the  Reformation  and 
the  new  science  may  also  claim  with  justice  to  have  brought 
about  great  transformations.  The  religious  life  of  the  Modern 
World  could  not  have  developed  its  power  and  inwardness 
without  a  new  and  independent  setting  and  an  uprising  of 
elemental  forces,  and  it  would  have  been  just  as  impossible  for 
the  new  science,  with  its  entirely  new  methods  and  points  of 
departure,  to  have  gradually  evolved  itself  out  of  the  scholastic 
philosophy.  In  order  that  it  may  remain  in  fresh  movement  and 
develop  its  full  depth,  human  life  certainly  requires  continuity, 
but  not  less  does  it  require  discontinuity.  In  the  case  of  these 
new  movements  the  only  matter  of  dispute  must  be  whether  they 
are  impelled  and  governed  by  spiritual  necessities,  or  whether  it 
is  only  a  human  craving  for  change  which  is  in  question. 

It  is  by  no  means  to  be  denied  that  all  change  does  not  spring 
from  such  spiritual  necessities.  There  is  operative  in  human 
existence,  more  especially  in  our  social  life,  a  merely  subjective 
fatigue  on  the  part  of  man  with  regard  to  the  old,  a  mere  craving 
for  change  ;  this  is  peculiarly  well  illustrated  by  the  vagaries  ot 
fashion.  In  this  way,  different  periods  become  widely  separated 
from  one  another ;  some  ages  are  contented  to  quietly  pursue  the 
old  paths,  while  others  show  a  marked  unrest,  a  discontent  with 
everything  which  is  found  already  in  existence,  a  preference  for 
all  that  is  new.  This  difference  of  character  on  the  part  of  dif- 
ferent ages  is  closely  associated  with  the  position  of  spiritual 
life.  The  unrest  is  significant  of  a  gap  between  inner  necessities 
and  outward  possessions,  and  under  these  circumstances  we  are 
apt  to  be  dominated  by  a  merely  human  thirst  for  newness,  and 
to  develop  an  inclination  to  reject  the  old  because  it  is  old,  and 
to  welcome  the  new  because  it  is  new. 

Hence  we  must  distinguish  between  true  and  false  modernity. 

22 


338    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

There  is  a  modernity  in  which  a  spiritual  necessity  is  operative 
and  a  modernity  which  is  the  expression  of  merely  human  whims 
and  moods :  these  two  are  fundamentally  different  in  their  effects 
and  prospects.  If  the  movements  are  the  result  of  a  mere  desire 
for  change  on  the  part  of  humanity,  an  instability  of  mood,  they 
may  violently  excite  the  surface  of  life,  hut  they  cannot  penetrate 
deeply  or  win  any  creative  power ;  the  same  wind  which  brought 
them  will  soon  blow  them  away  again,  while  the  rapid  change, 
which  allows  men  to  swing  so  easily  from  one  extreme  to 
another,  must  ultimately  give  rise  to  severe  fatigue.  Sad  will  be 
the  lives  of  the  men  and  the  ages  which  devote  themselves 
to  such  a  modernity. 

It  is  a  totally  different  matter,  however,  if  a  genuine  modernity 
represents  a  new  movement  on  the  part  of  historical  life  and 
aims  at  securing  the  recognition  of  its  content  of  truth  :  now  the 
modernity  bears  within  itself  a  spiritual  necessity,  to  the  pene- 
trating power  of  which  no  permanent  resistance  can  be  offered. 
Such  a  modernity  possesses  marvellous  power.  Events  which 
were  apparently  scattered  and  isolated  are  now  seen  to  point  in 
the  same  direction :  quite  different  spheres  of  life  are  dominated 
by  the  new  mode  of  thought,  by  the  spirit  of  the  age,  which 
finds  its  way  into  the  most  remote  corners,  affecting  even  those 
who  regard  themselves  as  distinct  opponents ;  in  the  face  of 
such  a  movement,  deeply  rooted  opinions  and  even  selfish 
interests  lose  their  power.  Difficulty  arises,  however,  from  the 
fact  that  as  things  appear  upon  the  surface,  true  and  false  are 
usually  closely  entangled.  Some  believe  themselves  able  not 
only  to  reject  the  superficial  modernity  but  the  true  spiritual 
movement  of  the  age  with  it,  while  others,  under  cover  of  the  idea 
of  true  progress,  fall  a  prey  to  the  most  transitory  situations  and 
moods.  The  champions  of  the  old  usually  feel  that  they  stand 
for  order,  while  the  friends  of  the  new  regard  themselves  as  the 
representatives  of  liberty;  the  former  claim  moral,  the  latter 
intellectual,  superiority;  the  former  believe  themselves  to  be 
protecting  the  interests  of  society,  the  latter,  the  interests  of  the 
individual.  At  the  same  time  the  matter  bears  within  itself  a 
peculiar  dialectic.  What  is  now  old  was  once  new ;  even  Thomas 
Aquinas  was  once  reckoned  as  a  "modern"  That  which  is 


HISTORY  339 

new  to  us  will  one  day  be  old  and  have  in  its  turn  to  defend 
itself  against  what  is  then  new.  The  uprising  modern  move- 
ments of  to-day  owe  no  small  portion  of  their  strength  to  the  mere 
fact  that  they  are  in  opposition.  In  the  hour  of  victory  this 
advantage  will  disappear  and  will  now  be  found  on  the  side  of 
fresh  movements. 

The  perplexities  which  may  result  from  such  a  conflict  have 
made  themselves  felt  with  peculiar  force  in  the  life  of  to-day. 
On  the  one  hand  we  find  a  most  determined  resistance  to  all 
that  is  new,  a  resistance  which  is  represented  in  the  first  place 
by  a  great  world-power,  the  Roman  system — nominally  catholic, 
but  in  reality  as  far  removed  from  Catholicism  as  is  well 
possible ;  for  it  devotes  its  whole  energy  to  guiding  the  move- 
ment of  humanity  into  particular  channels  of  its  own,  thus 
keeping  the  movement  permanently  confined  within  a  mediaeval 
form.  On  the  other  hand,  a  superficial  modernity  is  spreading 
far  and  wide  and  is  being  powerfully  assisted  by  the  most  recent 
developments  of  civilised  life.  The  speed  of  life  has  become 
accelerated  to  an  appalling  extent ;  more  and  more  people  are 
crowding  into  our  great  cities  and  world-capitals ;  nothing  is 
listened  to  that  is  not  self-assertive,  loud,  nay,  shrieking  ;  atten- 
tion is  paid  only  to  that  which  is  new,  exciting,  unheard  of,  that 
which  claims  to  be  a  novelty  not  to  be  missed  by  any  considering 
themselves  really  cultured.  Thus  we  have  an  exaggeration  and 
overvaluation  of  the  new.  The  new  is  valued  merely  because  it 
is  new,  however  empty  or  foolish  it  may  be  in  itself.  At  the 
same  time  we  perceive  an  endless  amount  of  vain  appearance,  a 
dislike  of  all  that  is  earnest  and  deep  in  life,  a  delight  in  mere 
bold  negation,  as  a  whole,  a  wretched  pseudo-culture,  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  semi-educated  mass  to  dominate  the  spiritual 
movement  of  humanity  and  to  make  itself  the  judge  of  good  and 
evil,  of  truth  and  untruth. 

It  will  be  impossible  for  the  genuine  modernity  to  make  pro- 
gress unless  it  separates  itself  in  the  sharpest  possible  manner 
from  the  superficial  modernity  and  takes  up  a  vigorous  struggle 
against  it.  The  right  of  true  modernity  cannot  be  in  the  least 
affected  by  the  aberrations  of  false  modernity.  The  whole 
course  of  our  investigation  must  have  shown  us  that  our  age  is 


340    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  snch  a  nature  that  it  cannot  quietly  pursue  traditional  paths  ; 
it  must  seek  new  ones  through  an  energetic  self-recollection  and 
self-deepening  of  life.  Under  these  circumstances  all  wilful 
connection  with  the  old  is  branded  as  a  bare  and  sterile 
conservatism.  It  is  our  duty  to  maintain  our  independence 
and  secure  an  open  way  for  the  spiritual  necessities  which  are 
now  striving  upwards.  In  this  way  it  will  be  possible  to  retain 
eternal  truth  while  at  the  same  time  we  eagerly  and  joyously 
seize  what  the  present  offers  us  ;  old  and  new  will  then  be  able 
to  assist  one  another. 


3.   SOCIETY  AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL 

(SOCIALISM) 

(a)  The  Relationship  between  Society  and  the 
Individual 

1.  HISTORICAL 

TO-DAY  the  problem  of  society  occupies  a  position  similar  to 
that  occupied  by  the  historical  problem.  The  nineteenth 
century  saw  a  reaction  against  the  Enlightenment,  a  reaction 
which,  although  still  in  full  operation,  has  already  produced 
a  counter-reaction.  Thus  movements  and  counter-movements 
cut  across  one  another,  giving  rise  to  a  highly  complicated 
situation.  To  escape  from  this  will  be  no  easy  task. 

It  will  be  well,  at  first,  to  devote  a  little  space  to  such 
an  explanation  of  terms  as  may  seem  necessary.  "Individual " 
and  "  individuality  "  are  of  ancient  origin,  although  the  Modern 
World  first  saw  them  come  into  more  general  use.  The 
primary  meaning  of  "  individual  "  was  indivisible,  incapable  of 
being  separated.  Cicero  uses  the  word  as  a  translation  of 
aro/uiov.  This  meaning  predominated  during  the  latter  days 
of  the  Ancient  World*  and  on  into  the  Middle  Ages — the 
oldest  German  translation  is  unspaltig  (Notker).  But  towards 
the  end  of  the  Ancient  World  the  word  had  also  come  to 
mean  the  separate  thing  as  something  unique,  different  from 
anything  else,  occurring  only  once  in  its  particularity.!  The 

*  Thus,  for  example,  Seneca  (De  provid.  5)  has:  qiuedam  teparari  a 
quibutdam  non  possunt,  coherent,  individua  sunt. 

f  In  this  connection,  the  works  of  the  highly  influential  Boethius  are 
especially  noteworthy ;  we  may  quote  the  following  passage  from  his  Com 
mentary  upon  Porphyry  (edit.  Bas.  1570,  p.  65) :  Individuum  auteni  pluribui 

Ml 


342    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Middle  Ages  extended  this  use  further  and  also  coined  (at 
any  rate  as  soon  as  the  twelfth  century)  the  expressions 
individualis  and  individualitas.  Leibniz  first  brought  these 
into  general  use,  acting  in  his  familiar  capacity  as  mediator 
between  the  old  and  the  new. 

The  early  stages  of  civilisation  reveal  the  individual  as  a 
fragment  of  a  more  or  less  extensive  society,  depending  in  his 
action  and  inaction  essentially  upon  his  connection  with  the 
community.  As  life  develops  further,  the  tendency  is  more 
and  more  towards  strengthening  the  individual :  the  latter 
gains  in  independence,  begins  to  ask  questions  as  to  the  basis 
of  the  traditional  social  order  and  to  enquire  into  its  validity, 
and  finally  reaches  the  point  of  endeavouring  to  throw  off  all 
restraint  and  make  his  own  opinion  the  standard  of  truth,  his 
own  welfare  the  sole  object  of  action.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  those  who  are  concerned  for  society  as  a  whole,  this 
appears  to  be  a  ruinous  subversion :  hence  they  resist  it  with 
all  their  power,  and  endeavour,  by  granting  him  certain  rights, 
to  restore  the  individual  to  a  connection  with  the  whole  and 
win  him  over  to  their  purpose ;  it  is  the  function  of  spiritual 
work  to  restore  what,  as  a  natural  possession,  was  lost.  The 
conception  of  society  as  an  organism  (with  which  we  are 
already  acquainted)  was  at  first  employed  with  the  purpose  of 
again  fitting  the  individual  into  the  social  whole:  it  seems 
peculiarly  adapted  to  serve  as  a  means  for  reconciling  the 
respective  claims  of  society  and  the  individual ;  in  a  real 
body,  the  more  each  limb  develops  its  own  character  and 
strength,  the  more  useful  it  is  for  the  whole ;  the  whole,  on 

dicitur  modis.  Dicitur  individuum  quod  omnirw  gecari  non  potest,  ut  unitas  vel 
mens ;  dicitur  individuum  quod  de  soliditatem  dividi  nequit,  ut  adamas ;  dicitur 
individuum  cujug  prtedicatio  in  reliqua  similia  non  convenit,  ut  Socrates :  nam 
cum  illi  tunt  cceteri  homines  similes,  non  convenit  proprietas  et  prcedicatio 
Socratis  in  cceteris,  ergo  ab  Us  qua  de  uno  tantum  prccdicantur  genus  differt, 
eo  quod  de  pluribus  prcedicetur.  In  Porphyry,  the  chief  passage  runs  (see 
Prantl,  Geschichte  der  Logik,  i.  629) :  aro/*a  Xlytrai  TO.  roiavra,  OTI  t£  Ifiort'jTdJv 
<rvvtffTT]Kev  EKaffTov,  wv  TO  d€poifffta  OVK  av  iir'  aAAou  rivof  TOTS  TO  auro  yivoiro 
TWV  (card  uipoq.  This  definition  persisted  through  the  course  of  the  ages 
down  to  the  time  of  Leibniz,  whose  teacher,  Jacob  Thomasius,  still  made  use 
of  the  definition  :  individuum  est  quod  constat  ex  proprietatibus  quarum  collectio 
numquam  in  olio  eadem  esse  potest. 


SOCIETY  AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL          343 

the  other  hand,  stands  higher,  the  more  highly  differentiated 
are  its  several  parts.  The  fact  that  all  the  activities  of  the 
separate  limhs  remain  absolutely  dependent  upon  the  whole 
constitutes,  however,  a  rigid  limitation.  The  separate  limb 
ceases  to  possess  any  life  or  useful  capacity  at  all  as  soon  as 
it  becomes  detached  from  the  whole,  and  this  organic  conception 
does  not  tolerate  any  individual  rights  as  against  the  whole. 
When  this  doctrine  is  applied  to  the  world  as  a  whole  (as 
was  first  really  consciously  done  by  the  Stoics)  it  appears  to 
be  a  special  design  of  providence  that  even  the  smallest  things 
are  not  absolutely  alike,  that  no  two  hairs,  two  grains  of 
wheat  or  two  leaves  are  completely  identical.* 

This  organic  solution  of  the  problem  is  closely  related  to 
the  hierarchic.  The  latter  originated  during  the  latter  end 
of  the  Greek  Period  t  and  attained  its  fullest  development 
within  the  Christian  Church  and  during  the  Middle  Ages. 
It  still  has  immense  influence.  The  whole  is  here  conceived 
of  as  a  continuous  series  of  ascending  steps  or  grades,  drawing 
nearer  and  nearer  to  life ;  a  kind  of  ladder  down  which  life 
may  be  passed  from  grade  to  grade ;  each  grade  has  to 
receive  from  the  one  above  and  hand  on  to  the  one  next 
below.  In  this  scheme  each  part  has  its  own  special  value 
and  its  own  special  work  so  long  as  it  remains  within  the 
structure  of  the  whole ;  it  lapses  into  nothingness  as  soon  as 
it  makes  itself  separate.  This  conception  of  life  took  his- 
torical shape  not  only  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  Church,  but 
also  in  the  feudal  system  of  the  Middle  Ages,  in  which  every 
power  vested  in  any  individual  was  regarded  as  a  loan  from 
the  grade  above. 

Both  these  systems  regard  the  individual  as  deriving  value 
solely  from  his  relationship  to  the  whole  ;  it  is  denied  that 
he  has  any  value  in  himself.  The  conception  which  might 
be  described  as  the  microcosmic  was  the  first  to  assign  such 
an  independent  value  to  the  individual.  Instead  of  being  a 

•  See  Cicero,  Acad.  quast.  II.  :  dicit  nihil  idem  quod  tit  aliud ;  Stoicum 
est  quidem  nee  admodum  credibile,  nullum  esse  pilum  omnibus  rebut  talem,  qualit 
tit  pilus  aliut,  nullum  granum,  c£c. 
^  t  The  influence  of  Plotinus  was  the  most  important  in  this  connection. 


344    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

mere  fragment  in  the  world,  the  individual  is  now  raised  to 
the  position  of  being  himself  a  whole  world,  a  kind  of  centre 
where  reality  is  concentrated,  a  sanctuary  in  which  life  is 
immediately  present  in  all  its  infinite  greatness.  The  whole 
thus  consists  of  worlds  within  worlds  and  is  beyond  the  reach 
of  all  definite  comprehension.  This  point  of  view  also 
originated  towards  the  end  of  the  Greek  Period,  and  again  it 
is  Plotinus  who  claims  chief  credit  for  it :  he  it  was  who 
first  fully  and  clearly  enunciated  the  conception  of  man  as 
containing  within  himself  a  world  of  his  own  which,  in  its 
own  peculiar  way,  reflects  the  whole;  "each  one  of  us  is  a 
spiritual  world."  Moreover,  it  was  the  Neo-Platonic  school 
of  philosophy  which  first  brought  the  term  microcosm  into 
common  use  —  though  it  dates  back  to  Democritus  and 
Aristotle.  This  tendency  of  thought  was  preserved  throughout 
the  Middle  Ages  chiefly  by  the  speculative  mystics,  and 
through  the  medium  of  various  later  thinkers  (such  as  Nicholas 
of  Cusa  and  Giordano  Bruno)  it  came  down  to  modern  times 
to  take  more  precise  form  in  Leibniz's  theory  of  "  monads." 
Closely  related  to  this  species  of  thought  is  the  cult  of 
individuality  and  personality  which  prevailed  during  the 
classical  period  of  German  literature.  Here,  too,  we  note  a 
continuous  chain  of  thought  stretching  from  the  end  of  the 
Greek  Period  down  to  the  zenith  of  the  New  Period. 

The  organic  and  hierarchic  conceptions  of  life,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  microcosmic,  on  the  other,  are  so  plainly  in 
complete  contrast  that  a  conflict  between  them  is  unavoidable : 
one  represents  the  individual  as  a  mere  member,  the  other 
as  an  independent  whole;  in  the  one  case  he  can  have  no 
share  in  spiritual  things  except  as  one  of  a  body,  in  the 
other  he  can  approach  them  directly  and  alone.  The  whole 
content  of  life  differs  according  to  which  of  these  positions 
we  take  up.  Is  action  undertaken  for  the  community  or 
the  development  of  the  inner  life  of  the  separate  individual 
to  be  our  chief  ideal  ?  In  the  latter  case,  the  community  can 
receive  its  form  and  its  strength  only  from  the  individual, 
and  should  never  be  regarded  by  him  as  an  end  in  itself. 
This  liberation  results  in  the  life  of  the  individual  acquiring 


SOCIETY  AND  THE   INDIVIDUAL  345 

an  important  content — scientific,  artistic  or  religious:  this  is 
due  first  and  foremost  to  the  establishment  of  a  direct  relation- 
ship with  infinity,  with  the  sources  of  creative  life.  Thus, 
closely  involved  with  the  struggle  between  society  and  the 
individual,  is  the  question  whether  the  chief  task  of  our  lives 
should  be  sought  in  human  intercourse  or  in  relationship  to 
the  whole — whether  we  should  strive,  in  the  first  place, 
towards  a  social  or  a  cosmic  scheme  of  life.  It  is  not 
possible  at  present  to  trace  the  historical  development  of 
these  problems  ;  we  must  turn  our  attention,  without  further 
digression,  to  the  consideration  of  present-day  thoughts  and 
tendencies. 

Our  age  is  subject  to  the  influence  of  three  tendencies  of 
different  breadth  and  strength :  these  are  the  general  trend 
of  the  Modern  World  towards  the  individual,  the  nineteenth- 
century  reaction  in  favour  of  society,  and  the  resuscitation  of 
individualism  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

The  emancipation  of  the  individual  is  in  all  probability  the 
most  prominent  feature  of  the  whole  of  modern  life.  The  indi- 
vidual sought  and  won  in  this  emancipation  not  only  a  direct 
relationship  to  God  and  the  whole,  but  an  independent  position 
with  regard  to  the  social  whole.  Beginning  with  the  Kenais- 
sance  and  the  Keformation,  this  gradually  spread  over  the  whole 
of  existence,  sinking  deeper  and  deeper  in  and  making  it  through- 
out fresher,  stronger,  and  more  mobile.  Just  as  the  new  science 
was  able  to  ascend  through  a  disintegration  of  the  traditional 
quantities  (such  as  time,  space,  mass,  and  so  forth)  into  discrete 
elements,  so  modern  life,  too,  depends  upon  a  growing  indepen- 
dence and  separation  of  individuals.  From  the  treatment  of  the 
most  inward  questions  to  the  externals  of  social  custom  and  inter- 
course,* such  an  independence  has  more  and  more  overcome  all 
resistance.  The  object  is  by  no  means  to  remove  all  mutual 
relationships,  but  instead  of  being  forced  upon  individuals 

*  For  example,  Ihering  (Der  Zweck  im  Recht,  ii.  439)  regards  the  sesthetical 
development  of  the  common  meal  in  modern  times  as  indicating  a  highly 
important  step  forward,  as  compared  with  the  past,  since  it  signifies  "  an 
elevation  from  communism  to  individualism."  Formerly,  all  who  sat  at  table 
employed  common  plates,  cups,  &c.,  whereas  now  each  individual  uses  his 
own  alone. 


346    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

from  without  the  ties  must  proceed  from  their  own  personal 
decision  and  free  agreement.  Still  less  does  the  individualisation 
of  existence  mean  an  abandonment  of  all  inner  relationships  ;  on 
the  contrary,  on  the  highest  level  of  spiritual  work,  in  the  casa 
of  such  men  as  Kant  and  Luther,  the  growth  of  man's  indepen- 
dence with  regard  to  man  is  only  one  side  of  the  life-process,  the 
other  being  the  absolute,  though  free,  subjection  to  invisible 
forces.  Those  who  either  praise  or  blame  such  men  as  the 
advocates  of  a  mere  individual  freedom  are  simply  demonstrating 
their  own  complete  ignorance  of  the  real  essence  of  the  matter. 

In  the  broader  current  of  the  age  the  matter  is  less  free  from 
doubts  and  perplexities.  In  Germany,  subsequent  to  the  Sturm- 
und  Drangzeit,  the  movement  towards  the  individual  acquired  a 
predominantly  artistic  and  literary  character :  the  individual  of 
that  age  raised  himself  above  the  average  through  artistic  creation 
and  felt  himself,  as  a  "  genius,"  to  be  far  superior  to  all  "  Philis- 
tinism." This  self-conscious  elevation  of  the  artistic  individual 
is  a  phenomenon  which  has  been  repeated  frequently  :  we  see 
it,  to  begin  with,  in  Romanticism,  which  looked  upon  individuality 
as  man's  greatness  (Schleiermacher) ,  and  through  an  exaggera- 
tion of  this  type  of  thought  proclaimed  the  unlimited  right  of 
"  infinitely  free  subjectivity  "  ;  at  the  same  time  art  and  science 
tended  to  take  decided  precedence  over  political  life.*  Similar 
modes  of  thought  came  to  the  front  later  in  young  Germany  and 
in  the  individualism  of  to-day.  The  classical  period  of  German 
literature  set  a  high  value  upon  the  individual,  and  the  chief 
educators,  Pestalozzi  and  Herbart,  carried  this  mode  of  thought 
over  into  the  educational  world,  f  But  in  this  case  the  individual 
did  not  aspire  to  independence  in  order  to  remain  in  opposition 

*  Fr.  SchlegePs  words  are  characteristic  of  this  tendency :  "  Scatter  not  thy 
faith  and  love  in  the  world  of  politics,  but  in  the  divine  world  of  science  and 
art,  pour  thy  most  inward  treasures  into  the  fiery  and  holy  stream  of  eternal 
development." 

t  Pestalozzi,  in  particular,  was  an  energetic  protagonist  of  the  individual  as 
compared  with  the  merely  collective ;  he  makes  sport  of  "collective  actions," 
the  "collective  conscience,"  and  "regimental  convictions,"  and  declares:' 
"The  collective  existence  of  our  race  can  only  civilise  us;  it  cannot  cultivate 
us"  (Werke,  xii.  154).  In  this  connection,  Rousseau's  great  influence  can 
never  be  forgotten :  he  first  rendered  the  contrast  between  society  and  the 
individual  clearly  evident  throughout  life  as  a  whole. 


SOCIETY  AND  THE   INDIVIDUAL          347 

to  the  world  and  to  his  social  environment  and  to  wrap  himself 
up  in  a  consciousness  of  proud  superiority  ;  he  returned  joyfully 
to  society,  extended  his  sphere  of  life  further  and  further,  finally 
growing,  in  harmony  with  all  environment,  to  a  world -embracing 
personality.  This  is  more  especially  to  be  seen  in  Goethe's 
spiritual  nature  and  life-work. 

The  first  resistance  to  this  predominance  of  the  individual 
came  from  idealism  itself ;  for  the  idea  of  a  world-embracing 
process,  driven  forward  by  its  own  movement,  transferred  the 
centre  of  gravity  of  human  existence  from  the  individual  to 
humanity  as  a  whole.  Then  came  realism  with  its  movement 
towards  the  visible  world.  This  gave  rise  to  an  immeasurable 
wealth  of  tasks,  the  performance  of  which  demanded  a  linking  up 
of  isolated  forces,  forced  man  out  of  his  previous  state  of  separa- 
tion to  a  closer  union,  and  compelled  him  to  work  with  order  and 
system.  The  desire  for  political  freedom  tended  in  the  same 
direction,  also  the  aspiration  towards  a  social  order  based  upon 
the  power  and  wish  of  the  citizens  themselves,  and  the  building 
up  of  national  circles  which  embraced  the  individuals  within 
a  larger  whole  and  united  them  in  the  pursuit  of  great  tasks : 
this  movement  was  still  further  assisted  by  the  undreamt-of 
development  of  technical  science,  which  had  the  effect  of  still 
further  correlating  work  and  still  more  firmly  uniting  the  work- 
men, and  by  modern  industrial  life,  with  its  gigantic  businesses, 
its  production  of  sharp  contrasts  and  its  accumulation  of  huge 
masses.  The  modern  acceleration  of  life,  the  way  in  which  men 
continually  draw  nearer  to  one  another,  and  the  manifold  inter- 
ramification  of  different  departments  of  life,  all  contribute  not  a 
little  to  the  elimination  of  individual  traits  and  to  imparting  an 
overwhelming  power  to  those  tendencies  which  work  towards 
a  summation  of  individual  characteristics  as  mass  phenomena. 
In  the  age  of  the  press,  of  railways  and  telegraphs,  public 
opinion  is  rapidly  formed  and  acquires  great  power ;  it  surrounds 
the  individual  even  in  his  growth,  and  causes  that  which  in 
reality  has  been  communicated  to  him  by  the  environment  to 
appear  as  his  own  work. 

Finally  theory,  too,  receiving  and  reacting,  enhances  the 
dependence  of  the  individual :  for  the  more  modern  social 


348  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

science,  "sociology"  (Comte,  Quetelet,  and  others),  eagerly 
endeavours  to  show  the  complete  limitation  of  man  by  his 
social  environment,  his  milieu ;  *  from  this  point  of  view  man 
seems  dominated  even  in  his  wishes  and  dreams  by  what 
society  communicates  to  him  ;  even  a  violent  struggle  on  the  part 
of  the  individual  against  society  is  rooted,  ultimately,  in  the 
needs  of  the  whole,  and  therefore  lies  within  the  whole.  At  the 
same  time  the  concept  of  the  social  average,  of  the  normal  man, 
comes  to  the  front ;  it  is  shown  that  the  variations  of  the 
individual  from  this  norm,  so  far  as  they  are  measurable,  fall 
within  much  narrower  limits  than  would  at  first  seem  probable,  t 
Our  attention  is  therefore  drawn  rather  to  the  similarity  of  indi- 
viduals than  to  their  differences,  I  and  the  analysis  of  the  psychic 

*  "Milieu,"  as  an  exact  term,  was  most  probably  first  employed  by  Lamarck 
in  his  Philos.  zoologique;  Comte  extended  its  use  from  zoology  to  sociology, 
•while  Taine  was  peculiarly  addicted  to  its  employment  in  the  latter  sphere.  It 
was  due  to  him  that  the  term  became  fashionable  in  Germany. 

f  In  this  connection  Quetelet's  Anthropometrie  is  worthy  of  particular 
attention. 

J  The  idea  of  equality,  together  with  that  of  the  equal  value  and  equal  right 
of  all  men,  has  older  roots,  although  it  did  not  attain  full  development  until 
within  the  last  few  centuries.  It  was  unknown  in  the  ancient  Classical  Period, 
and  those  factors  which  worked  in  its  favour  during  the  latter  days  of  the 
Ancient  World  failed  to  produce  an  impression  in  face  of  the  actual  differences 
between  man  and  man.  The  root  of  the  idea  of  equality  lies  in  religion,  and, 
for  our  civilisation,  in  Christianity.  It  was  our  relationship  to  God  which 
caused  all  human  differences  to  disappear ;  it  was  the  idea  of  infinity  which 
caused  all  finite  differences  to  seem  negligible.  To  begin  with,  however, 
exceedingly  little  attention  was  paid  to  the  consequences  of  these  religious 
relationships  and  ideas  for  human  existence,  and  in  the  further  history  of 
Christianity  the  idea  of  the  universal  priesthood  sank  far  into  the  background 
as  compared  with  that  of  the  hierarchy.  That  which  had  come  down  from 
isolated  secondary  tendencies,  being  laboriously  enough  preserved  by  the  Middle 
Ages,  attained  a  fuller  manifestation  during  the  Eeformation,  and  consequences 
for  the  shaping  of  the  life  of  the  community  were  energetically  drawn  from 
it  by  the  Calvinistic  reformers,  in  particular.  It  was  from  this  standpoint,  too, 
that  the  transference  to  the  political  sphere  occurred,  and  under  Cromwell 
there  was  drawn  up  the  first  constitution  containing  a  demand  for  universal 
suffrage  (1647).  The  Enlightenment,  with  its  appeal  to  reason,  alike  in  all 
men,  lent  still  further  influence  to  the  idea  of  equality :  thus  Descartes,  for 
example,  says  (at  the  commencement  of  the  De  methodo) :  Rationem  quod  attinet, 
quia  per  illam  solam  homines  sumus,  cequalem  in  omnibus  esse  facile  credo. 
Finally,  Eousseau  was  particularly  energetic  in  bringing  the  idea  of  equality 
into  the  general  life  of  humanity.  The  idea  of  the  rights  of  man  probably 
originated  in  America.  Fichte  was  responsible  for  the  formula  of  the  "  Equality 


SOCIETY   AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL          349 

life  of  the  individual,  wherein  lay  the  strength  of  our  great  poets, 
gives  place  to  the  study  of  masses,  a  form  of  investigation  which, 
in  statistics,  has  forged  for  itself  a  useful  instrument. 

All  this  is  no  mere  outward  alteration.  It  carries  with  it  an 
inner  transformation  of  life.  For,  from  this  point  of  view,  the 
main  thing  in  life  becomes  the  achievement  for  the  community, 
not  what  we  do  and  think  in  our  own  personal  sphere.  All  power 
is  energetically  called  into  manifestation,  while  the  honds  which 
link  the  individual  to  the  whole  are  brought  more  into  promi- 
nence. Moreover,  this  tendency  gives  rise  to  a  specific  construc- 
tion of  spiritual  life.  The  all-dominating  goal  of  life  becomes 
the  betterment  of  the  social  condition.  Morality  becomes 
altruism,  a  working  for  the  good  of  society  ;  art  finds  no  higher 
task  than  the  sympathetic  and  accurate  representation  of  social 
conditions ;  education  endeavours  rather  to  elevate  the  general 
level  of  culture  than  to  develop  anything  individual.  In  this 
case  it  is  more  especially  work  which  holds  the  individuals 
together,  a  work  which  develops  vast  complexes  and  fixed 
methods,  thereby  becoming  strong  enough  to  take  up  a  conflict 
against  the  whole  of  the  irrational  element  in  existence,  and  to 
produce  an  essential  betterment  in  the  conditions  of  existence. 
For  the  time  being  it  was  hardly  realised  that  the  affirmation 
carried  with  it  a  negation,  that  the  gain  was  accompanied  by 
a  loss. 

This  co-operation  of  closely  intertwined  forces  works  against 
the  individual  in  a  more  or  less  concealed  fashion.  Quite  open, 
however,  is  the  anti-individualistic  influence  of  the  tremendous 
accession  of  strength  which  has  fallen  to  the  part  of  the  state 
in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century.  This  accession  has 
been  due  for  the  most  part  to  economic  complications  in  the 
face  of  which  every  merely  individual  effort  has  seemed  hopeless. 
This  is  no  more  than  the  main  feature  of  a  general  phenome- 
non. The  increasing  complication,  the  technical  development  of 

of  everything  which  bears  the  human  visage  " ;  see,  for  example,  iv.  423  and 
vii.  573.  The  eighteenth  century  brought  with  it,  too,  the  linking  together 
of  freedom  and  equality,  in  the  first  place  in  the  sphere  of  social  life.  Thus 
Montesquieu,  in  his  Lettres  Persanet  (first  published  in  1721),  already  has; 
A  Parit  rtgne  la  libertt  et  Vegalitt  (Book  II.). 


350    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

civilisation,  demands  a  closer  correlation  of  the  separate  forces  and 
more  organisation  of  the  whole,  and  therefore  calls  for  a  guiding 
centre.  This  has  had  the  unavoidable  effect,  for  example,  of 
producing  a  greater  centralisation  of  education.  Moreover,  this 
movement  in  our  civilised  life  has  not  lacked  the  inspiring  power 
of  a  thought- world.  The  elevation  of  the  state  to  be  the  chief 
vehicle  of  civilised  work  corresponds  to  the  modern  conviction 
of  an  indwelling  absolute  reason  in  our  reality ;  it  is  no  accident 
that  the  chief  systematisers  of  pantheistic  thought — Spinoza  and 
Hegel — were  powerful  pioneers  of  the  idea  of  the  state,  that 
Spinoza  wished  to  have  men  swear  not  by  God  but  by  the 
welfare  of  their  country,  and  that  Hegel  honoured  the  state  as 
"  earthly  yet  divine."  Thus  the  visible  power  of  the  state  and 
the  invisible  power  of  society  are  united  against  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  individual.  Those  who  escape,  or  believe  them- 
selves to  escape,  the  one,  are  all  the  more  likely  to  fall  victims 
to  the  other. 

But  a  complete  victory  often  brings  in  its  train  an  exaggera- 
tion, and  hence  a  reaction,  and  in  this  case  the  hemming  in  of 
man  by  state  and  society  gave  rise,  towards  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  to  a  new  movement  of  assertion  on  the  part  of 
the  individual.  The  manner  in  which  this  movement  manifested 
itself  was  frequently  far  from  edifying,  as,  for  example,  the  self- 
deification  of  affected  genius  and  the  exaggeration  of  merely 
subjective  moods  to  a  state  of  supposed  superiority  to  all  the 
world  besides.  The  matter  cannot,  however,  be  settled  by 
merely  poking  fun  at  these  accretions.  At  the  back  of  all  this 
problematical  element  there  stands  a  defensive  movement  on  the 
part  of  the  individual  and  the  subject  against  its  threatened 
limitation  and  stifling.  This  reaction  brings  to  full  consciousness 
the  limitations  and  negations  involved  in  the  movement  towards 
society.  An  elimination  of  individual  traits,  an  imperilling  of 
independence,  and  an  impediment  of  original  life  and  creation 
seem  to  be  indissolubly  connected  with  the  social  type  of  civilisa- 
tion. Just  as  history  depresses  the  present,  and  a  depressed 
present,  in  its  turn,  cannot  see  the  greatness  of  history,  it  would 
seem  that  society,  through  thus  reducing  the  individual,  must 
itself  suffer  an  unavoidable  reduction.  Do  we  not  perceive 


SOCIETY  AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  351 

clearly  enough  how  in  the  midst  of  all  the  imposing  triumphs  of 
technical  science  clearly  marked  personalities  are  becoming 
scarcer  and  scarcer,  while  at  the  same  time  the  level  of  our 
common  life  is  sinking  ?  Work,  the  essence  of  the  modern  con- 
struction of  life,  was  to  have  strengthened  the  soul.  We  are 
now  realising  that  the  gigantic  modern  developments  of  work 
weaken,  nay  crush,  man's  soul.  This  necessarily  stimulates  the 
soul  to  defence,  to  a  resistance  of  social  civilisation  and  a 
denial  of  the  value  of  its  results.  At  the  same  time  the  indi- 
vidual tries  as  far  as  possible  to  separate  himself  from  his  social 
ties;  it  becomes  his  object  to  develop  himself  in  complete 
freedom,  to  "  live  himself  out  "  to  the  fullest  extent,  to  give  pro- 
minence to  his  distinctive  characteristics,  and  to  mark  himself 
off  in  some  fashion  from  the  average  run  of  humanity. 

However  much  of  the  foregoing  may  appear  exaggerated  and 
perverted,  it  nevertheless  exerts  an  influence  over  the  present 
age.  Although  it  may  be  poor  in  positive  achievement,  in 
criticism  it  is  powerful ;  it  has  severely  shaken  the  belief  in  the 
all-sufficiency  of  a  merely  social  civilisation.  In  spite  of  this, 
however,  work,  with  its  direction  towards  the  condition  of 
society,  continues,  while  its  pressure  upon  the  individual,  and 
still  more  our  realisation  of  the  pressure,  grow  greater  and 
greater.  We  are  accordingly  drawn  in  opposite  directions  :  the 
social  type  of  civilisation  dominates  our  work,  while  an  indivi- 
dual civilisation  claims  our  souls.  Must  we  helplessly  surrender 
to  this  division  or  is  it  possible  to  resist  it  and  to  strive  towards 
some  sort  of  unity  of  life  ? 

2.  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  TO-DAY 
o.  The  Inadequacy  of  a  merely  Social  Civilisation 

It  is  one  thing  to  recognise  the  importance  of  a  social  civilisa- 
tion ;  it  is  another  to  look  upon  it  as  comprising  the  whole 
existence  of  man.  At  the  present  day  a  crowd  of  factors  work 
together  towards  such  a  recognition.  It  is  obvious  that  from 
the  very  beginning  man  could  only  develop  his  peculiar  cha- 
racteristics in  a  community ;  also  that  during  later  stages  man's 
whole  condition  was  essentially  dependent  upon  the  nature  of 


352    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

his  social  life.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  the  effect  of  social  life 
penetrates  far  more  deeply  into  the  life  and  soul  of  the  indi- 
vidual than  it  has  in  the  past  been  customary  to  suppose.  Our 
own  age  has  been  the  first  to  fully  recognise  that  man  is  a 
social  being.  Our  newly  acquired  insight  at  once  gives  rise, 
however,  to  tasks  of  the  most  fruitful  description.  Seeing  that 
we  are  so  dependent  upon  society,  and  that  our  happiness  is 
so  bound  up  with  its  success,  it  becomes  particularly  important 
to  raise  the  level  of  society  and  bring  all  its  latent  forces  into 
full  activity.  Closer  social  relationships  have  enabled  humanity 
to  make  continual  progress  in  its  fight  against  the  irrational, 
and  have  helped  it  to  create  a  happier  state  of  existence;  a 
stricter  organisation  of  society  has  raised  each  individual,  and 
social  action  has  become  more  effective,  because  it  has  attacked 
general  relationships  instead  of  operating  in  a  merely  individual 
and  accidental  manner.  The  closer  union  of  humanity  in  its 
immediate  social  life  has  opened  up  rich  sources  of  moral 
feeling,  has  developed  sympathy  for  others,  and  has  produced 
a  consciousness  of  complete  solidarity.  Moreover,  the  fact  of 
working  together,  the  necessity  for  mutual  support  and  mutual 
accommodation,  has  brought  more  discipline,  manhood,  and  power 
into  life  (which  readily  weakens  when  isolated). 

Considering  these  successes,  it  is  not  surprising  that  exag- 
gerated hopes  were  formed,  hopes  which  went  far  beyond  any- 
thing actually  accomplished,  that  what  had  already  accomplished 
so  much  believed  itself  capable  of  accomplishing  anything,  and 
that  the  social  construction  of  life  (gesellschaftliche  Lebens- 
fiihrung)  deemed  itself  able  to  supply  the  whole  existence  of 
man  with  an  adequate  content  and  to  satisfy  all  his  wishes. 
In  attempting  to  carry  this  out  it  has  imparted  a  characteristic 
form  to  each  separate  department  of  life.  The  meaning  of 
ethics  is  sought  in  achievement  for  the  benefit  of  the  social 
environment,  in  altruism  ;  the  training  of  the  individual  for 
the  purposes  of  the  community  becomes  the  goal  of  education ; 
art  makes  social  conditions  the  chief  object  of  its  work  and 
aims  at  serving  the  widest  circles  ;  science  endeavours  to  study 
man,  not  as  an  isolated  individual,  but  "  socio-psychologically," 
from  the  point  of  view  of  society  as  a  whole  ;  while  pragmatism 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  353 

even  makes  capacity  for  advancing  the  welfare  of  humanity  the 
standard  of  truth  itself.  Since,  in  all  the  above,  our  life  and 
conduct  is  very  directly  related  to  the  living  and  feeling  man 
as  a  whole,  it  appears  to  gain  in  spiritual  nearness  and  takes 
on  a  fresher,  a  more  direct,  and  (it  even  seems)  a  more  truthful 
form.  All  religious  and  metaphysical  difficulties  are  kept  in 
the  background,  and  the  more  insecure  the  modern  man  becomes 
with  regard  to  such  matters,  the  more  he  is  inclined  to  welcome 
such  a  riddance. 

But  although  this  movement  opens  up  such  fruitful  prospects 
and  provides  us  with  such  important  tasks,  il  can  reckon  upon 
a  full  and  joyful  acceptance  only  so  long  as  the  negative  side 
which  accompanies  the  positive  side  remains  unnoticed — and 
this  negative  side  is  very  important.  Life  cannot  be  made 
simply  a  question  of  relationship  to  environment  and  of  the 
development  of  mutual  relationships  (as  this  tendency  would 
have  it)  without  the  independence  of  the  isolated  factor  being 
most  seriously  reduced.  And  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
individual  is  the  sole  source  of  original  spiritual  life ;  corporate 
social  life  can  do  no  more  than  unite  and  utilise.  The  main- 
tenance of  the  strength  and  freedom  of  this  original  life  would 
be  less  important,  and  its  limitation  would  be  more  easily 
endurable,  if  human  life  stood  upon  a  firm  foundation  and  needed 
only  to  follow  quietly  in  a  naturally  appointed  direction.  In 
reality,  life  is  not  only  full  of  separate  problems,  but  being 
situated  (as  it  is)  between  the  realm  of  mere  nature  and  the 
spiritual  world,  it  must  begin  by  systematically  directing  itself 
aright  and  ascending  from  the  semi- spiritual  to  the  truly 
spiritual  construction  of  life.  It  is  hence  called  upon  to 
perform  great  tasks,  which  cannot  be  carried  out  without 
serious  effort  and  the  mobilisation  of  all  our  spiritual  forces. 
This  necessarily  leads  us  back  to  the  original  sources  of  strength, 
and  hence  to  the  individual. 

The  social  mode  of  life,  on  the  other  hand,  is  directed  chiefly 
towards  an  improvement  of  outward  circumstances.  It  elevates 
and  advances,  alleviates  and  smooths,  but  although  making  life 
easier  and  more  agreeable,  at  the  bottom  its  effect  is  destructive, 
because  it  treats  the  spiritual  content  of  life  as  a  means  towards 

23 


354     MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

human  welfare.  Every  spiritual  manifestation  inevitably  de- 
teriorates unless  it  be  regarded  entirely  as  an  end  in  itself. 
Utilitarianism,  whatever  form  it  may  take,  is  an  uncompro- 
mising enemy  of  all  genuine  spiritual  culture.  As  a  mere 
means,  spiritual  life  can  never  become  an  inner  necessity  of 
man  and  can  never  be  essential  to  self-preservation ;  hence  it 
will  not  really  possess  man's  soul  and  compel  him  to  original 
creative  activity.  In  spite  of  all  outward  development,  this  path 
will  never  lead  to  any  inward  elevation  of  man.  In  this  direc- 
tion is  no  original  creation,  no  direct  relationship  to  the  whole, 
no  inner  independence.  Such  a  life  cannot  contribute  anything 
essentially  new,  nor  indicate  high  goals  to  uplift  human  exist- 
ence. It  binds  man  down  to  his  own  natural  condition,  and 
makes  him  a  slave  to  himself.  It  permits  man  to  grace  and 
decorate  his  existence,  but  provides  no  fundamental  distinction 
between  higher  and  lower,  and  is  therefore  incapable  of  stimu- 
lating man  to  rise  above  the  average  dead  level,  or  of  properly 
counteracting  that  confusion  of  nature  with  spirit,  of  the  pettily 
human  with  the  universally  valid,  which  distinguishes  ordinary 
human  existence.  In  spite  of  its  immense  activity  and  im- 
measurable diligence,  this  type  of  life  is  lacking  in  true  vigour 
and  decision,  in  the  courage  to  say  definitely  "  Yes  "  or  "  No." 
It  possesses  no  true  content  and  meaning.  A  merely  human 
culture  such  as  is  here  placed  before  us  may  appear  endurable 
as  long  as  we  consider  it  in  detail  only  and  do  not  look  beyond 
the  great  variety  of  separate  interests  and  activities  which  it 
undoubtedly  offers :  but  on  going  into  the  matter  more  deeply, 
and  asking  what  is  the  final  meaning  of  the  whole,  the  empti- 
ness, the  meagre  and  inadequate  character  of  this  type  of  life 
must  become  obvious. 

When  the  disciples  of  this  merely  social  type  of  culture 
believe  it  possible  to  escape  from  such  an  inner  emptiness, 
they  usually  do  so  in  the  conviction  that  a  union  of 
elements  gives  rise  to  something  essentially  higher  than  is 
present  in  the  separate  elements ;  the  welfare  of  society,  for 
example,  is  looked  upon  as  something  far  superior  to  that  of 
the  individual,  and  public  opinion  seems  to  constitute  a  vehicle 
of  truth  as  compared  with  the  chaos  of  individual  opinions.  In 


SOCIETY  AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  355 

reality  this  appearance  of  an  inner  elevation  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  new  matter  is  added,  derived  from  relationships  of  a 
different  kind;  a  new  stage  of  life  could  never  under  any 
circumstances  come  into  being  as  the  result  of  a  mere  mingling 
or  juxtaposition.  The  error  in  this  line  of  argument  is  one  not 
uncommon  in  the  present  age — the  unperceived  conversion  of 
the  quantitative  into  the  qualitative:  if  there  is  no  goal  other 
than  that  of  natural  self-preservation,  if  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  the  formation  of  an  essential  spiritual  being,  the  combination 
of  separate  spheres  in  the  social  structure  cannot  give  rise  to 
anything  essentially  new ;  even  when  extended  to  its  utmost, 
the  merely  useful  and  agreeable  proper  to  the  natural  stage  of 
life  does  not  in  any  way  approximate  to  real  good.  In  the  same 
way  the  development  of  certain  average  opinions,  however  firmly 
they  may  be  established  and  however  confidently  they  may  assert 
themselves,  does  not  bring  us  the  smallest  step  nearer  to  the 
concept  of  a  genuine  truth  acting  as  a  standard  for  all  human 
aspiration.  Good  and  true  are  always  presupposed  if  deduced 
from  a  union  of  elements. 

Such  a  conviction  compels  us  to  strong  scepticism  in 
respect  of  the  well-known  doctrine  of  the  summation  of 
reason  in  the  community,  a  doctrine  of  which  Aristotle  was 
the  first  philosophical  representative.*  Aristotle  maintained 
that  the  whole,  as  a  body,  is  better  fitted  for  judgment, 
either  political  and  artistic,  than  are  the  separate  indi- 
viduals of  whom  it  is  composed,  because  one  person  pos- 
sesses better  judgment  in  one  direction,  another  in  another, 
and  collectively  a  certain  adjustment  will  take  place.  He 
also  believed  that  the  community,  as  a  whole,  is  less  subject 
to  anger  and  other  passions  than  are  separate  individuals. 
We  must  not  forget  that  he  had  in  mind,  however,  a  civic 
State,  limited  in  scope  and  held  inwardly  together  by  common 
traditions  and  fixed  customs,  not  any  conceivable  mass  of 
people,  perhaps  uncontrollably  large.  Thus  there  remains  a 
wide  gap  between  his  democratic  opinions  and  such  a  belief 
in  the  mass  of  the  people  as  was  held  by  Rousseau.  In  support 

*  See  Politic*,  1281  b,  8,  34.     For  further  particulars  see  my  collected  essays 
Gcsammelte  Aufsatzc,  p.  62  ff .). 


356    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  the  former  we  may  bring  forward,  in  the  first  place,  the 
ancient  experience  (with  which  Aristotle  was  acquainted)  that 
outstanding  literary  achievements  are  usually  recognised  by  the 
general  public  rather  than  by  specialists,  not  on  account  of  any 
moral  defect  on  the  part  of  the  latter,  but  because  specialists  are 
too  apt  to  move  within  a  fixed  circle  of  thought.  The  unpreju- 
diced attitude  of  the  larger  body  with  regard  to  such  unusual 
productions  is  in  this  case  more  valuable  than  special  technical 
knowledge.  Further,  along  with  this  doctrine  of  the  summa- 
tion of  reason  goes  the  conviction  that  there  is  an  appeal  from 
the  accidental  nature  of  the  moment  and  the  individual  (in 
particular,  too,  from  the  narrowness  of  the  party  standpoint) 
to  humanity  as  a  whole,  a  conviction  based  upon  confidence  in 
some  sort  of  victory  of  the  good  even  within  the  human  sphere. 
Without  such  a  faith,  those  who  are  in  the  minority  must  indeed 
feel  every  outward  effort  to  be  objectless.  The  realm  of  politics, 
in  particular,  has  hence  been  penetrated  by  this  belief.  More- 
over, historical  experience  bears  abundant  witness  to  the  fact 
that  the  truly  great  has  proved  victorious  in  spite  of  persecution 
in  the  early  stages ;  the  stone  which  the  builders  rejected  has 
often  proved  itself  to  be  the  corner-stone.  What  helped  to 
bring  this  about,  if  it  were  not  the  greater  whole,  the  wider 
circles,  less  fixed  in  their  opinions  and  more  open  to  new 
impulses?  But  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  this  penetrating 
capacity  of  the  truly  great  was  a  result  of  a  mere  summation 
of  human  opinion  ;  it  was  due  rather  to  the  compulsion  of  a 
spiritual  necessity  which  made  this  higher  element  appear  more 
and  more  distinct  from  the  lower  until  finally  it  became  irre- 
sistible. It  is,  therefore,  not  belief  in  the  multitude,  but  in  a 
spiritual  necessity  ruling  within  humanity,  which  justifies  this 
hope  in  the  victory  of  reason  even  in  the  human  sphere.  In 
contact  with  such  a  spiritual  necessity  alone,  and  as  its  repre- 
sentative, does  public  opinion  obtain  a  real  right  and  a  sure 
superiority ;  otherwise  it  may  easily  remain  inferior  to  the 
opinions  of  the  separate  individuals  and  may  tend  towards 
unreason  rather  than  reason.  There  are  ages  in  which  the 
average  level  raises  the  individual,  and  other  ages  in  which  it 
tends  to  drag  him  down.  In  any  case  it  is  not  a  question  of  the 
mere  multitude. 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  357 

Since  the  social  type  of  civilisation  places  itself  entirely 
within  the  domain  of  immediate  existence,  it  will  unavoidably 
make  the  multitude  the  chief  vehicle  of  life ;  for  good  or  for  evil 
it  will  countenance  the  fashion  in  which  the  great  mass  of  the 
population  deals  with  the  main  problems  of  human  culture  and 
civilisation ;  and  the  mass  is  apt  to  be  hasty  and  excited,  to  be 
immoderate  alike  in  affirmation  and  in  negation,  to  cling  to  the 
outward  and  obvious  impression,  to  seek  the  greatest  possible 
excitement,  to  be  tossed  between  contrasts,  and  to  be  dis- 
inclined for  either  calm  reason  or  justice.  At  the  same  time,  the 
individual  will  be  pushed  more  and  more  into  the  background 
and  even  when  he  accomplishes  something  indisputably  great, 
he  will  be  reckoned  as  a  mere  tool  of  society  *  and  not  credited 
with  any  specific  value  of  his  own.  It  may  be  freely  admitted 
that  even  the  greatest  achievement  has  its  historical  and  social 
conditions  and  relationships ;  all  creation  takes  shape  in  some 
particular  spiritual  atmosphere  and  hence  inevitably  bears  the 
impress  of  its  age — Augustine  could  not  have  been  a  contem- 
porary of  Kant,  nor  Kant  of  Augustine ;  such  a  life  and  work  as 
Goethe's  would  not  have  been  possible  at  the  time  of  the 
Crusades — yet  to  recognise  such  limitations  need  not  mean  that 
we  admit  society  as  a  whole  to  be  the  productive  force,  and  the 
individual,  in  his  own  specific  nature,  an  entirely  indifferent  tool. 
In  spite  of  all  inner  connection  the  truly  great  has  usually  been 
related  to  the  general  level  of  its  age  in  the  sense  of  a  contrast ; 
it  has  generally  developed  its  greatness  through  knowing  how 
victoriously  to  assert  a  necessity  of  its  own  being  in  the  face 
of  the  age  as  a  whole,  the  victory  being  not  in  the  sphere 
of  immediate  existence,  but  in  that  of  spiritual  work.  Truly 
great  achievement  is  distinguished,  in  the  first  place,  by  the 
fact  of  its  being  individual,  incomparable,  and  therefore  not 
deducible.  With  the  aid  of  this  independence  alone  does  it 
become  possible  to  pick  out  the  spiritual  element  which  sprung 
forth  and  came  into  activity  in  a  given  age  (almost  inseparably 
mingled  as  it  was,  in  its  outward  manifestations,  with  lower  and 

*  See,  for  example,  Comte,  Court  de  phil.  pos.,  iv.  269 :  Les  hommes  de  genie 
ne  se  pregentaient  essentiellement  que  comme  lei  organes  d'un  mouvement  pr&- 
d6termin6,  qui,  a  leur  dtfaute,  gefitt  ouvert  d'autres  issues. 


358    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

alien  matter)  and  to  bring  it  to  a  clearer  and  more  powerful 
form,  to  raise  it  to  the  level  of  a  moving  and  elevating  force.  In 
the  course  of  this  process,  the  spiritual  itself  undergoes  an 
individvalisation,  which  impels  the  fate  of  humanity  to  take  a 
specific  form.  We  see  this  with  peculiar  clearness  in  the  sphere 
of  religion.  For  there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  such  men 
as  Augustine  and  Luther  did  not  merely  gather  up  that  which 
the  environment  offered  them :  they  solved  the  problems  with 
which  the  historical  position  of  humanity  had  provided  their  age 
in  a  thoroughly  individual  and  characteristic  fashion,  thereby 
imposing  their  own  spiritual  nature  upon  whole  epochs.  Every 
age  of  powerful  spiritual  movement  contains  different  poten- 
tialities ;  which  of  these  potentialities  will  be  translated  into 
actuality,  depends,  in  the  first  place,  upon  the  leading  individuals 
of  the  period.  This  alone  is  sufficient  to  prevent  history  being 
based  upon  any  formula. 

The  great  once  being  there,  it  can  attract  to  itself  everything 
in  any  way  allied  to  it,  assist  all  that  is  striving  upward,  unite 
all  that  is  scattered  and  originate  a  whole  movement.  The 
great  itself  is  no  mere  product  of  summation ;  on  the  contrary, 
without  it  the  summation  is  not  possible.  For  a  summation,  a 
linking  up  of  scattered  elements,  easy  though  it  may  seem  to  the 
exponents  of  social  civilisation,  is  in  reality  an  exceedingly 
difficult  problem.  An  age  may  contain  many  different  and  even 
contradictory  elements.  A  summation  may  be  possible  in  many 
directions  and  upon  widely  separated  levels.  The  genuine  and 
valuable  forces  which  are  making  their  way  upwards  at  isolated 
points  frequently  fail  to  unite,  and  are  hence  as  good  as  lost  to 
the  whole.  If  this  linking  up  of  ascending  forces  will  not  come 
to  pass,  the  age  may  be  severely  handicapped.  Our  own  age 
suffers  from  such  a  disadvantage.  It  is  the  peculiar  task  of  the 
great  men  of  a  period,  through  the  happy  moulding  of  a  spiritual 
character  and  through  a  vigorous  advance,  to  prepare  the  way  for 
a  summation  in  a  particular  upward  direction  and  to  carry  this 
through.  Great  men  have  been  the  masters,  not  the  servants  of 
their  age.  Do  we  speak  of  the  age  of  Goethe  because  during  the 
second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  a  humanistic  and  artistic 
type  of  thought,  after  the  fashion  of  Goethe,  was  widely  pre- 


SOCIETY  AND  THE   INDIVIDUAL  359 

valent,  or  because  his  dominating  personality  created  forms  and 
assigned  goals  which  served  as  rallying-points  to  attract  and 
elevate  that  which  was  less  clearly  marked  ? 

Social  civilisation,  on  the  other  hand,  places  the  differences  of 
level  in  the  background  and  aspires  towards  the  greatest  possible 
equality.  Its  aim  is  certainly  of  the  best,  namely,  to  raise  the 
general  level,  to  lead  as  many  as  possible,  and  if  possible  all,  to 
the  highest  level,  yet  without  this  level  being  in  any  way  lowered. 
But  in  this  case,  too,  the  actual  nature  of  the  things  themselves 
is  stronger  than  the  human  intention :  imperceptibly,  the  position 
of  those  who  are  to  be  raised  becomes  itself  the  measure  of 
spiritual  movement  and  the  level  of  the  whole  unavoidably  sinks ; 
work  cannot  be  directed  chiefly  towards  producing  an  effect 
upon  others  without  suffering  injury  in  itself.  Schopenhauer 
divided  thinkers  into  such  as  think  for  others  and  such  as  think 
for  themselves,  and  would  allow  the  latter  only  to  reckon  as  true 
thinkers;  if  he  was  right  in  this,  as  we  believe  him  to  have 
been,  then  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  danger  of 
a  movement  chiefly  directed  towards  communication  and  in- 
fluence. The  resulting  diffusion  must  result  in  shallowness  if 
it  be  not  accompanied  by  an  original  creation  to  balance  the 
diffusion. 

With  this  is  associated  the  inclination  not  only  to  take  up 
responsibility  for  the  weaker,  which  is  undeniably  right  and 
noble,  but  to  place  ourselves  as  far  as  possible  in  their  position 
and  to  arrange  the  whole  of  life  in  their  interest.  "  Hard  "  and 
"soft"  periods  are  apt  to  alternate;  to-day  "softness"  is 
undoubtedly  predominant  and  tends  to  give  rise  to  the  idea  that 
the  weak  are  good  and  the  strong  bad,  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  latter  to  give  way  to  the  former  the  moment  there  is  a 
conflict  of  interests.  Thus  there  is  a  widespread  modern 
tendency  to  take  sides  with  the  child  against  the  parent,  with 
the  pupil  against  the  teacher,  and  in  general  with  those  in 
subordination  against  those  in  authority,  as  if  all  order  and  all 
discipline  were  a  mere  demonstration  of  selfishness  and  brutality. 
Kant's  saying :  "  If  justice  be  defeated  it  is  no  longer  worth 
while  for  man's  life  on  this  earth  to  continue,"  would  hardly  find 
acceptance  in  this  quarter.  In  connection  with  this  tendency 


360    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

we  should  mention  also  the  feminism  with  which  we  are  now 
threatened  :  this  does  not  aim  merely  at  assisting  women 
to  their  due  rights ;  it  would  like  to  shape  education  and  the 
whole  of  civilisation,  as  far  as  possible,  from  the  point  01 
view  of  feminine  interests  alone — thus  co-education,  highly  pro- 
blematical though  it  is,  is  recommended,  in  the  first  place, 
simply  because  it  will  enable  women  to  obtain  precisely  as  much 
and  precisely  the  same  as  men.  This  sort  of  worship  of  equality 
will  inevitably  cause  civilisation  to  become  flaccid  and  colourless, 
to  avoid  everything  powerful  and  all  clearly  defined  individuality, 
as  it  would  avoid  evil  or  error ;  and  what  is  still  worse,  it  will 
cause  it  to  lose  that  which,  according  to  Goethe's  saying, 
"  Nobody  brings  with  him  into  the  world,  yet  which  is  all- 
important  if  a  man  is  to  become  a  whole  man  " — veneration.* 

Movements  of  this  kind,  tending  towards  expansion  and 
superficiality,  may  be  endured  for  a  time,  since  they  are 
balanced  by  the  traditional  construction  of  life  ;  for  a  time  one 
may  live  very  well  on  inherited  capital.  But  the  richest  hoard 
cannot  last  for  ever.  The  question  of  original  production  cannot 
be  permanently  set  aside ;  and  as  soon  as  it  comes  to  the  front 
the  limits  of  social  civilisation  can  no  longer  be  overlooked. 
Social  civilisation  cannot  base  spiritual  life  upon  man  without 
inwardly  raising  him ;  it  cannot  entrust  the  highest  goods  to 
society  without  making  society  something  greater.  But  of  its 
own  strength  it  cannot  produce  such  an  elevation ;  on  the  con- 
trary, it  tends,  with  the  weakening  and  stagnation  of  spiritual 
life,  to  destroy  the  conditions  of  true  greatness,  and  therefore  it 
cannot  prevent  a  merely  human  and  mass  civilisation  over- 
whelming and  extinguishing  an  essential  spiritual  civilisation. 

Do  not  such  experiences  force  themselves  upon  us  to-day  in 
the  clearest  and  most  painful  manner  ?  Could  we  see  our  own 

*  The  sway  which  Nietzsche  exercises  over  men's  mind  is  due,  in  the  first 
place,  to  a  powerful  reaction  against  the  dulling  and  deadening  character  of 
this  gospel  of  equalisation :  "  Life,  life  itself,  struggles  to  ascend  to  the  heights  ; 
by  steps  and  stages  it  forces  itself  ever  upwards ;  its  desire  is  to  perceive  vast 
horizons  and  it  looks  ever  outward  and  forward  towards  blessed  and  rapturous 
beauties — therefore  it  demands  height.  And  because  it  demands  height,  it 
demands  stages,  and  a  denial  of  these  stages  and  of  the  climbers !  Life  will 
iscend — and  ascending,  overcome  itself."  (Thus  spake  Zarathustra.) 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  361 

age  from  within  and  as  a  whole,  as  great  historians  have  revealed 
bygone  ages  to  us,  we  should  see  a  moving  picture  in  the  midst 
of  all  the  glamour  of  an  external  civilisation.  We  should  see  a 
humanity  seeking  to  raise  and  enrich  life,  through  establishing 
closer  relationships  and  developing  an  increase  of  power,  a 
society  believing  itself  strong  enough  of  itself  to  produce  all 
spiritual  life,  and  endeavouring,  with  restless  activity,  to  raise  a 
tower  as  high  as  heaven:  in  spite  of  all  outward  triumphs, 
however,  modern  humanity  undergoes  an  inner  defeat ;  nay,  it  is 
no  longer  able  to  concentrate  itself,  to  understand  itself;  it  is 
threatened  with  an  inner  collapse.  On  every  hand  we  see 
opposition  and  strife,  an  increasing  passion  of  conflict,  a  dis- 
solution into  parties,  a  disappearance  of  common  ideas  and 
goals.  We  sought  to  secure  unity  by  ourselves,  setting  aside 
all  cosmic  problems,  and  hoped  for  the  richest  fruits  from 
such  unity,  but  a  confusion  01  speech  was  the  result.  If 
we  do  not  succeed  in  overcoming  this  chaos,  and  in  again 
placing  human  existence  in  great  relationships  and  giving  it 
a  firmer  foundation,  we  shall  more  and  more  become  the  victims 
of  disintegration. 


So  far  we  have  been  concerned  with  the  problem  of  social 
civilisation  in  general.  We  will  now  devote  a  few  words  to  dis- 
cussing the  position  of  the  state  in  the  spiritual  life  of  the 
present  day.  To-day  we  are  all  conscious  of  an  increase  in  the 
power  of  the  state,  and  social  perplexities  in  particular  are 
tending  to  cause  a  still  further  increase :  hence  arises  the 
danger,  and  it  is  no  insignificant  one,  of  what  we  may  call 
"politicism" — the  whole  of  spiritual  life  threatens  to  fall 
more  and  more  under  the  influence  of  the  state,  to  receive,  as  it 
were,  an  official  stamp.  The  leading  idea  of  the  state  is  and 
remains  the  development  of  power ;  now  power,  as  we  have 
said,  is  not  by  any  means  a  thing  evil  in  itself,  but  it  is 
morally  indifferent ;  it  knows  no  goal  higher  than  itself.  The 
endeavour  to  treat  all  spiritual  manifestation  as  a  mere  means 
towards  its  end  is  inherent  in  its  nature  ;  it  recognises  no  inde- 
pendence on  the  part  of  other  spheres  of  life.  When,  however, 


362    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

these  spheres  are  valued  and  judged,  in  the  first  place,  according 
to  what  they  accomplish  for  the  life  of  the  state,  they  lose  their 
self-value,  and  their  original  creative  activity  must  at  the  same 
time  suffer  severe  injury.  Moreover,  when  the  whole  of  life  is  domi- 
nated by  the  idea  of  the  state  there  must  be  an  extreme  narrow- 
ing down  of  the  specific  nature  and  free  movement  of  the  individual. 
When  a  man  concentrates  his  mind  and  thought  in  the  first 
place  upon  entering  the  governmental  service  and  upon  securing 
official  promotion,  when  he  is  valued  according  to  his  official 
position  and  accomplishment,  the  centre  of  gravity  of  his  life  is 
situated  externally  and  the  man's  independence  and  originality 
must  unavoidably  be  injured.  Whether  the  political  system 
tends  towards  democracy  or  aristocracy  is  of  little  consequence 
in  this  connection.  That  political  greatness  may  go  hand  in 
hand  with  a  lack  of  spiritual  productivity  is  illustrated  in 
the  most  striking  fashion  by  Roman  history :  for  it  is 
an  exceedingly  remarkable  fact  that  notwithstanding  their 
political  power,  their  wisdom,  and  their  discipline,  the  Roman 
people  never  produced  of  their  own  capacity  so  much  as  a 
single  great  philosophical  thought  or  a  single  great  artistic 
achievement. 

In  connection  with  this  problem,  we  Germans,  too,  must  not 
be  unmindful  of  the  dangers  which  our  own  development  is 
bringing  with  it.  More  particularly  in  the  Prussian  state  we  are 
confronted  by  this  all-dominating  power  of  the  state,  this  poli- 
ticism :  there  was  certainly  a  time  when  the  subordination  of 
every  task  to  the  idea  of  the  state  was  an  imperative  necessity  if 
the  latter  was  to  fulfil  its  great  work  in  human  history ;  the  con- 
ception of  power  was  then  linked  in  the  closest  possible  manner 
to  the  idea  of  duty,  thus  becoming  inwardly  ennobled.  It  was 
the  union  of  these  two  ideas  of  power  and  duty  which  produced 
those  magnificent  achievements  which  alone  made  modern 
Germany  possible.  But  in  spite  of  all  this  we  must  not  over- 
look the  danger  of  spiritual  unproductivity,  of  the  strangulation 
of  the  individual,  of  a  uniform  and  mechanical  moulding  of  life. 
Spiritual  creation  and  genuine  personal  life-conduct  absolutely 
demand  treatment  as  objects  in  themselves,  while  politicism,  no 
matter  how  noble  the  forms  which  it  may  adopt,  has  a  utilitarian 


SOCIETY  AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  363 

bias   which   inevitably   makes    mere  means   and  tools  of   the 
personal  and  spiritual. 

|3.   The  Inadequacy  of  a  merely  Individual  Civilisation 

The  reaction  against  social  civilisation,  which  is  consummated 
by  the  modern  individual,  arose,  in  the  first  place,  not  so  much 
from  any  anxiety  about  the  spiritual  content  of  life  as  from  a 
desire  to  avoid  the  injuries  with  which  the  progress  of  this 
civilisation  threatened  the  individual.  At  the  same  time  deeper 
problems  stood  in  the  background  and  helped  to  make  the 
opposition  sharper. 

The  social  type  of  civilisation  treats  the  individual  as  a  mere 
cog  in  its  great  machine.  It  values  him  solely  according  to  his 
achievements,  and  finds  it  necessary  for  its  purposes  to  impose 
numerous  restrictions  upon  him.  Moreover,  with  its  piecing 
together  of  elements,  its  accumulation  of  masses,  its  crude  and 
mechanical  methods,  it  tends  overpoweringly  towards  the  sup- 
pression and  elimination  of  individual  traits ;  it  eliminates  the 
quietude  essential  to  the  development  of  an  individual  nature  : 
it  produces  average  types  who  set  themselves  up  as  standards  of 
good  and  evil,  of  truth  and  untruth.  The  individual  of  a  more 
powerful  type  ultimately  rebels  against  such  a  confinement  and 
levelling  down  and  maintains  that  man  is  by  no  means  merged 
in  the  relationship  to  social  environment,  but  that,  on  the 
contrary,  the  most  valuable  element  in  his  nature,  the  unity  and 
inwardness  of  life,  lies  outside  this  relationship.  In  this  con- 
nection he  can  appeal  to  the  witness  of  the  whole  history  of 
humanity,  for  all  predominantly  social  civilisations  and  systems  of 
human  culture  have  tended  towards  a  superficial  and  mechanical 
life,  and  it  has  been  no  mere  self-assertion  on  the  part  of  the 
individual  which  has  driven  him  to  resent  such  a  social  civilisa- 
tion ;  the  motive  force  has  been  his  imperative  desire  for  more 
inner  life.  In  the  sphere  of  religion,  in  particular,  the  social 
development  as  a  church  inevitably  brings  with  it  the  inclination 
to  place  the  outward  achievement  (divine  service,  pious  deeds, 
orthodox  opinions,  the  so-called  religious  duties  in  general) 
before  the  inner  feelings,  the  personal  life,  the  independence  of 
the  inner  man.  Hence  a  struggle  against  the  church  has  been 


364    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

continually  necessary  in  the  truest  interests  of  religion  itself.* 
Along  with  this  defence  of  individual  independence  is  associated 
a  hot  protest  against  the  machine-like,  "  dead-level "  con- 
struction of  civilisation  with  which  society  threatens  life.  Are 
not  the  average  levels  which  thus  result  of  a  very  inferior  kind, 
and  do  they  not  readily  lead  to  a  fixation  of  life  upon  a  level  of 
unimportant  mediocrity  ?  Is  it  not  true  that  spiritual  force  and 
noble  sentiment  are  rare,  and  do  they  not  require  for  their  develop- 
ment full  freedom  and  (if  they  are  to  influence  the  whole)  a 
sharp  definition  and  a  secure  establishment  in  the  narrow 
sphere  of  a  small  band  of  disciplet  ?  Hence  there  has  been  no 
essential  progress  on  the  part  of  human  culture  and  civilisation 
without  a  division  of  humanity ;  a  higher  must  first  be  pro- 
duced in  order  to  be  able  to  attract  the  rest ;  a  column  of  fire 
must  go  before  the  host  to  show  it  the  way  through  the  wilder- 
ness. In  spite  of  every  objection,  precaution,  and  protest,  there 
has  continually  resulted  a  contrast  between  esoteric  and  exoteric 
life-conduct ;  even  the  most  radical  political  constitution  has  not 
prevented  the  formation  of  sharp  social  distinctions,  reaching 
down  even  to  the  outward  circumstances  of  custom  and  propriety; 
men  being  what  they  are,  the  ambition  to  imitate  those  who 
stand  above  is  an  indispensable  incentive  to  movement.  And 
does  not  all  spiritual  activity  remain,  for  each  individual,  some- 
thing dead  and  external  if  it  fails  to  become  bound  up  with  his 
individual  nature  and  itself  to  acquire  an  individual  shape,  if  in 
struggling  for  it  the  individual  is  not  attaining  to  his  own  true 
being  ?  Constructive  development  means  separation,  differentia- 
tion, individualisation  ;  thus  separation  has  been  a  universal  and 
indispensable  means  towards  movement  and  progress. 

With  such  considerations  in  mind,  the  individual  proceeds 
from  defence  to  attack,  and  boldly  charges  social  civilisation  with 
its  limitations.  Man,  as  a  thinking  being,  is  capable  of  entering 
into  a  direct  relationship  with  reality,  he  is  no  mere  link  in  a 

*  On  the  occasion  of  the  burial  of  a  leader  oi  tne  German  Catholic  Party,  a 
prelate  of  high  rank  emphasised,  as  a  praiseworthy  characteristic,  the  fact  that 
the  deceased  left  the  care  of  his  soul  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  church.  Is  it 
not  horrible  that  even  to-day  such  an  inner  abandonment  of  life  can  meet  with 
praise? 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  365 

chain,  he  can  confront  infinity  and  wrestle  with  it,  he  becomes 
conscious  of  the  narrowness  of  mere  subjectivity  and  can  aspire 
beyond  it  to  the  truth  of  the  things  themselves.  This  endeavour 
is  certainly  met  by  countless  difficulties  and  obstacles,  but  even 
as  an  aspiration  it  demonstrates  the  superiority  of  man  to  the 
merely  social  sphere.  Is  it  not  absurd  to  communicate  spiritual 
life  to  such  a  cosmic  being  through  society  alone,  and  hence  to  try 
to  bind  him  down  to  the  measure  of  that  spirituality  which  has 
been  attained  by  the  integration  of  forces  ?  Shall  a  being  who 
possesses  an  infinite  value  on  account  of  his  fundamental  re- 
lationship to  the  spiritual  world  be  adjudged  his  value  according 
to  human  estimation  alone  ?  Shall  he  exist  dependent  upon 
human  favour  and  hence  lose  all  independence  of  feeling  ?  Must 
the  guarantee  of  society  be  obtained  before  man  can  enjoy  the 
secure  possession  of  a  truth,  nay,  a  spiritual  existence?  Shall 
the  production  of  spiritual  goods  take  place,  if  not  in  the  market- 
place, at  any  rate  for  the  market  of  life,  and  shall  these  goods  be 
thereby  degraded  to  mere  marketable  commodities  ? 

According  to  the  foregoing  arguments,  the  individual  (that  is, 
the  spiritually  directed  individual)  appears  as  the  representative 
of  spiritual  culture  as  opposed  to  a  merely  human  culture,  of  an 
inner  infinity  as  compared  with  all  outward  limitation.  He 
appears  as  a  force  combating  superficiality,  shaking  humanity 
out  of  old  ruts,  holding  up  necessary  aims,  ever  anew  leading  the 
aspirations  of  humanity  back  to  their  true  bases.  And  if  this 
high  valuation  of  the  individual  acting  from  spiritual  motives 
necessarily  brings  with  it  a  separation  from  the  average  level  of 
society  it  will  also  have  no  hesitation  in  proudly  rejecting  the 
intolerance  of  any  sort  of  superiority  which  is  characteristic  of 
this  average  level.  There  is  a  common  envy  and  hatred  on  the 
part  of  the  mediocre  against  the  higher,  since  the  latter  reflects 
on  the  poverty  of  the  former.  When  the  higher  conducts  itself 
modestly  and  humbly,  politely  apologises  for  its  existence  and 
carefully  avoids  displaying  any  consciousness  of  power,  it  is 
barely  endured,  and  then  only.  Hence  modesty  is  a  virtue 
much  honoured  of  the  "Philistines."  Nearly  related  is  the 
practice  of  employing  the  same  concepts  to  cover  things  of  quite 
different  types  and  values,  the  use  of  really  meaningless  labels 


366    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

of  praise  and  blame ;  this  lukewarm  and  insipid  type  of  thought 
is  alike  incapable  of  powerful  love  or  powerful  hate  and  allows 
light  and  shadow  to  merge  into  a  grey  mist.  In  the  face  of  this 
sort  of  thing  the  individual  has  a  perfect  right  to  work  towards 
an  intensification  of  feeling,  a  sharpening  of  judgment,  a  division 
of  opinion — nay,  it  is  his  sacred  duty  so  to  do. 

In  reality,  however,  the  individual  can  become  superior,  in 
the  genuine  sense  of  the  word,  only  if  he  has  a  spiritual  world 
behind  him  and  is  capable  of  drawing  upon  its  strength.  Now, 
this  is  far  from  being  the  position  taken  up  by  modern  indivi- 
dualism, in  its  most  usual  form ;  on  the  contrary,  it  allows  the 
individual  no  basis  outside  his  immediate  existence  and  expects 
him  to  shape  life  from  this  position  ;  it  is  particularly  concerned 
to  loosen  all  invisible  relationships,  to  abolish  not  only  depend- 
ence upon  men,  but  dependence  upon  a  spiritual  world.  It  is 
therefore  left  with  nothing  but  the  immediate  condition  of  the 
soul,  the  subjective  state.  Hence  this  becomes  the  essence  of 
all  life  and  individualism  merges  into  subjectivism.  It  is  obvious 
that  this  gives  rise  to  a  specific  type  of  reality :  this  subjective 
state  permits  of  being  fixed  and  enhanced,  that  which  has  a 
specific  character  may  develop  itself  without  limit,  life  may 
spring  forth  ever  anew  while  its  position  undergoes  continual 
alteration.  Hence  we  have  a  great  facility,  freshness,  and 
fluidity.  Life  appears  to  be  dependent  upon  nothing  outside 
itself,  and  with  this  freedom  it  seems  to  become  finer,  more 
delicate,  and  more  intimate  than  in  any  other  form.  The  con- 
cept of  truth,  too,  loses  its  customary  difficulty  and  rigidity. 
For  henceforth  only  that  reckons  as  true  which  is  experienced 
by  the  soul  of  the  individual,  and  experienced,  moreover,  in  the 
present.  Thus  the  concept  of  a  single  truth  gives  way  to  that 
of  innumerable  truths.  Every  man  has  now  his  own  truth. 
This  attitude  acquires  a  peculiar  joy  and  self-consciousness  in 
contrast  with  society,  whose  institutions  and  regulations  so 
often  conflict  with  the  life-consciousness  of  the  individual ;  the 
subjective  attitude,  on  the  other  hand,  stands  for  the  continual 
preservation  of  life  in  a  state  of  freedom  and  fluidity  and  for  the 
greatest  possible  strengthening  and  advancement  of  all  that  is 
individual  and  characteristic. 


SOCIETY  AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL          367 

This  could  not,  however,  get  heyond  a  condition  of  formless 
excitation  and  indefinite  movement  without  somehow  converting 
itself  into  spiritual  work,  and  this  conversion  takes  place  in  the 
movement  towards  art  and  literature.  Art,  in  its  manifold 
ramifications,  now  hecomes  the  chief  means  of  grasping  and 
determining  in  some  way  the  otherwise  restlessly  heaving  and 
swelling  life,  of  strengthening  it  through  giving  it  more  definite 
shape,  of  completely  developing  it  by  itself  and  making  it  inde- 
pendent of  external  relationships.  The  concentration  of  life  in 
itself  and  the  enhancement  of  its  power  hence  hecomes  the  main 
task  of  art.  Art  hecomes  the  soul  of  an  individual-aristocratic 
culture,  which,  being  the  more  exclusive,  feels  itself  far  superior 
to  the  practical-social  type ;  art  can  act  this  part,  in  the  first 
place,  because  it  stands  itself  above  all  mere  utility  and  causes 
man  to  rely  for  the  most  part  upon  his  individual  capacity ;  in 
the  second  place,  because,  in  the  midst  of  all  the  confusion  and 
false  conceptions  of  the  general  life  of  humanity,  it  can  perceive 
the  simple  fundamental  characteristics  of  human  existence,  can 
seize  the  eternally  youthful  element  in  it,  and  rescue  this  element 
from  becoming  petrified  in  the  conventional. 

Such  a  gradation  of  life  is  easily  transferred,  however,  to  the 
consciousness  of  the  individuals  and  in  this  way  very  soon  finds 
itself  upon  a  downward  path.  Not  only  those  who  personally 
participate  in  the  activities  of  the  new  type  of  life,  but  those 
who  merely  express  their  adhesion  to  it,  fancy  themselves 
superior  to  the  rest  of  mankind  and  to  social  civilisation ;  this 
results  in  an  inclination  to  lay  emphasis  upon  the  disparity,  to 
do  what  is  unusual,  to  take  pleasure  in  detachment  and  to  regard 
it  as  greatness.  At  the  same  time  the  claim  is  more  and  more 
being  made  on  the  part  of  the  individual  to  develop  his  own 
nature  according  to  his  own  whim  and  pleasure,  heedless  of 
generally  accepted  standards,  of  moral  custom  and  law,  to  "  live 
himself  out "  without  heed  or  restraint.  The  individual  culture 
may  not  wish  to  produce  these  results,  but  under  human  condi- 
tions they  are  difficult  to  avoid.  We  need  hardly  point  out  that 
subjective  movements  and  moods  of  this  kind  play  a  great  part 
in.  the  most  modern  construction  of  life.  It  is  only  the  name, 
indeed,  which  is  new ;  the  thing  itself  is  old  in  the  extreme. 


368    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

For,  as  if  in  regular  cycles,  there  again  and  again  come  periods 
when  the  direct  life-consciousness  is  dissatisfied  with  the  type  of 
human  culture  it  finds  around  it  and  the  complete  emancipation 
of  the  individual  is  proclaimed  as  the  way  of  salvation,  when  his 
immediate  feeling,  his  self-imposed  standards,  his  artistic  taste, 
is  looked  to  to  bring  about  a  change  for  the  better.  Plato's 
Gorgias  illustrates  the  close  relationship  between  the  ancient 
Sophists  and  the  modern  subjectivists.  In  Germany  this  species 
of  emancipation  of  the  individual  was  unheard  of  until  the  "Age 
of  Genius,"  the  forerunner  of  the  classical  period  of  German 
literature ;  at  that  time  "  genius,"  "  force-genius,"  and  "  original 
genius  "  were  fashionable  phrases,  such  as  the  modern  "  super- 
man" ("beautiful  souls"  is  also  related  to  this  movement).* 
Then  came  a  new  movement  in  the  shape  of  Romanticism,  which 
is  closely  and  obviously  related  to  the  aesthetical  subjectivism  of 
to-day. 


It  is  difficult  to  pass  correct  judgment  upon  the  whole  because 
it  is  clear  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  transitional  phenomenon, 

*  Hildebrand  (in  Grimm's  Deutsches  Worterbuch)  treats  the  origin  and 
development  of  the  expression  "genius"  (Genie)  in  a  manner  which  is  both 
exemplary  and  exhaustive.  We  should  like,  however,  to  add  a  quotation  from 
the  recently  published  correspondence  between  Goethe  and  Lavater ;  this 
passage  is  of  importance  in  the  task  of  drawing  a  sharper  distinction  between 
"genius"  and  "talent."  Goethe  writes  (Schriften  der  Goethe-Gesellschaft, 
vol.  16,  p.  125)  on  July  24,  1780  :  "  With  regard  to  Wieland's  Oberon  you  make 
use  of  the  word  '  talent '  as  if  it  stood  for  the  opposite  of  '  genius  '  and  were  (if 
not  quite)  at  any  rate  greatly  subordinate.  We  should  take  into  consideration, 
however,  that  true  talent  can  be  nothing  other  than  the  language  of  genius." 
To  this  Lavater  replied  (August  5,  1780)  with  a  lengthy  explanation  of  the 
difference  between  talent  and  genius  (p.  130  ff.),  from  which  we  will  quote  only 
the  following  passage:  "Just  a  word  with  respect  to  'talent'  and  'genius': 
two  terms  which  in  their  meanings  and  contents  are  perhaps  about  as  different 
as  '  beautiful '  and  '  noble."  Talent,  so  it  appears  to  me,  does  with  facility 
what  a  thousand  others  can  do  only  with  extreme  slowness  and  laboriousness, 
or  it  does  with  joy  and  grace  what  others  can  do  only  with  accuracy  and 
correctness.  Genius  does  what  no  one  can  do.  Works  of  talent  give  rise  to 
pleasurable  admiration.  Genius  arouses  veneration ;  it  excites  a  feeling  which 
approximates  to  worship." 

The  best  information  with  regard  to  "schone  Seele"  (beautiful  soul)  is  to  be 
found  in  the  most  recent  edition  of  Buchmann's  Gefliigelten  Worten  (edited  by 
Ippel). 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  369 

which  becomes  more  right  and  reasonable  the  more  it  fits  itseil 
into  wider  relationships  and  points  to  something  beyond  itself, 
and  becomes  more  false  the  more  firmly  it  consolidates  and 
isolates  itself.  In  addition,  we  are  in  this  case  prevented,  by 
the  interdiction  of  all  binding  norms,  from  making  any  definite 
separation  of  higher  and  lower,  of  spiritual  necessity  and  human 
fancy;  the  most  varied  elements  are  mingled  together  and 
it  is  almost  impossible  to  avoid  the  danger  of  being  indulgent 
towards  the  lower  while  recognising  the  higher,  of  being  unjust 
towards  the  higher  while  guarding  against  the  lower.  Never- 
theless, we  cannot  well  avoid  the  duty  of  attempting  some  kind 
of  estimation. 

Why  must  a  system  of  human  culture  founded  upon  the  mere 
individual  and  his  subjective  condition  be  unsatisfactory  ?  There 
are  two  main  reasons : — 

1.  The  individual  of  immediate  existence — and  he  alone  is 

in  question — is  neither  independent  nor  self-contained ; 

2.  The  life  which   he   develops  becomes   more  and  more 

empty  and  inadequate  the  more  fully  it  develops  its 
own  consequences. 

The  empirical  individual  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  anything 
rather  than  independent :  for  heredity,  environment,  and  edu- 
cation not  only  determine  him  in  innumerable  ways,  but  seem 
to  be  entirely  responsible  for  him ;  they  spin  such  a  fine  web 
around  him  that  neither  cunning  nor  force  can  break  through. 
It  is  certain  that  this  determination  reaches  into  that  inner  soul 
which  individualism  holds  to  be  completely  free  of  outward 
influences  :  at  any  rate,  we  cannot  regard  it  as  free  merely 
because  the  immediate  impression  feels  no  dependence.  For 
let  the  individualist  assert  himself  against  the  world  as  much  as 
he  likes  and  seem  completely  to  separate  himself  from  it,  he 
still  remains  overshadowed  and  overpoweringly  influenced  by  the 
world  and  subject  to  its  limitations.  His  supposed  independence 
is  usually  another  kind  of  dependence,  an  indirect  dependence. 
The  individualist  is  inclined  to  say  and  do  the  opposite  of  what 
those  in  his  environment  say  and  do  ;  thus  it  is  still  the  environ- 

24 


merit  which  prescribes  his  course ;  the  connection  is  not  broken. 
The  individualist  feels  himself  superior  to  the  environment,  but 
he  cannot  measure  the  height  to  which  he  has  risen  above  it,  in 
order  to  take  satisfaction  in  his  elevation,  without  retaining  the 
environment  in  mind ;  here,  too,  he  remains  dependent  upon  it. 
He  delights  in  the  proud  consciousness  of  independence,  but  at 
the  same  time  he  must  continually  think  of  those  around  him  as 
spectators  and  admirers  of  his  greatness.  Hence  this  type  ol 
life  does  not  attain  to  firm  tranquillity  and  joyous,  indepen- 
dent, creative  activity — it  does  not  base  itself  upon  its  own 
necessities.  Therefore  it  cannot  give  up  the  relationship  to 
man ;  it  must  live  upon  the  contrast  and  derive  its  nourishment 
from  thence.  Thus  it  never  gets  beyond  a  condition  of  inner 
dependence. 

Moreover,  in  the  case  of  such  an  attitude  as  this,  there  is  a 
danger  of  the  consciousness  of  greatness  becoming  infected  by 
vanity.  It  is  true  that  there  are  sharp  differences  of  life  and 
being,  and  that  the  degrees  in  which  spirituality  is  vivified  differ 
very  greatly.  The  common  levelling  down  which  clumsily  throws 
everything  together  is  justly  repudiated  by  the  individualists. 
Far  be  it  from  us  to  obscure  or  diminish  in  any  way  the 
importance  of  individuality !  It  is  indispensable  to  the  full 
truth  and  development  of  spiritual  creation ;  if  this  creation  does 
not  attain  to  the  fullness  of  its  peculiar  strength  at  the  specific 
individual  point  where  it  completely  unfolds  its  own  nature, 
then  it  will  never  overcome  its  obstacles ;  but  a  superior 
necessity  of  the  life-process  must  be  in  control  throughout,  a 
spiritual  compulsion  must  drive  man  forward  and  guide  him ; 
then  alone  does  the  movement  remain  genuine  and  healthy. 
It  becomes  artificial  and  unhealthy  when  the  individual  sets 
himself  as  far  as  possible  to  demonstrate  his  greatness  and 
individuality  at  every  opportunity,  when  he  purposely  lays 
emphasis  on  the  difference  between  himself  and  the  common 
crowd,  and  even  derives  pleasure  from  its  contemplation,  while 
all  the  while  its  true  carrying  out  demands  pure  devotion  and 
selfless  love — every  withdrawal  behind  the  matter  itself,  every 
demonstration  of  vain  self-consciousness,  weakens  spiritual  power 
and  loosens  that  connection  with  the  inner  necessities  upon 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  371 

which  all  success  depends  :  "  One  must  have  originality,  not 
strive  for  it  "  (J.  Burckhardt). 

There  is  certainly  much  work  done,  apparently  under  the 
influence  of  modern  individualism,  that  is  far  superior  to  such 
reflective  subjectivism  with  its  Epicurean  self-gratification.  In 
particular,  the  eagerness  and  earnestness  of  modern  plastic  art, 
together  with  the  unmistakable  greatness  of  its  achievement, 
can  be  understood  only  through  the  appearance  of  fresh  positive 
tasks,  fresh  impulses  towards  creation,  which  open  up  new 
aspects  of  reality  and  lead  to  a  more  inward  relationship  to 
reality.  But  the  more  important  the  work  is,  the  more  it  comes 
under  the  influence  of  inner  relationships  and  necessities,  the 
more  it  subjects  creation  to  a  superior  truth,  the  more 
it  liberates  from  mere  subjectivism  and  individualism.  In 
this  case,  the  individual,  as  a  thing  apart  from  the  spiritual 
world,  becomes,  unperceived,  the  individual  with  the  spiritual 
world.  To  such  an  one,  however,  the  storm  and  struggle  of 
to-day  can  signify  only  a  transition  to  a  higher  stage  of  truth. 

In  the  same  way,  in  the  case  of  the  problem  of  the  content  of 
life,  pure  individualism  and  subjectivism  is  preserved  from  unbear- 
able emptiness  only  by  being  continually  supplemented.  Con- 
sidered strictly,  it  must  disintegrate  the  soul  into  a  number  of 
separate  processes,  finally  into  mere  moods,  which  pursue  and  dis- 
place one  another  in  rapid  succession.  Sicoe  each  moment  has 
just  as  good  a  right  as  another,  each  would  have  its  own  truth. 
Thus  that  which  may  at  first  have  seemed  an  advantage  is 
finally  seen  to  be  a  severe  loss-  Human  life  does  not  by  any 
means  completely  exhaust  itself  in  a  number  of  separate 
moments.  The  moments  and  their  experiences  are  not  com- 
pletely swallowed  up ;  they  come  back,  they  present  themselves 
to  our  souls ;  hence  man  must  compare  them  and  link  them 
together,  measure  them  and  judge  them ;  he  thus  stands  above 
the  mere  moments.  Occupying  this  position,  he  must  also 
experience  that  what  to-day  reckons  as  true  becomes  untrue ; 
hence  he  feels  the  transitory  and  unreal  character  of  the  whole 
affair,  and  becomes  convinced  that  a  truth  for  yesterday  or  to- 
day is  no  truth  at  all,  and  that  his  life  loses  each  and  every  truth 
when  it  remains  tied  down  to  the  mere  moment.  Is  there  anything 


372    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

more  tiring  and  more  profoundly  depressing  than  the  incessant 
change  of  opinions  and  moods,  the  eager  denunciation  of  that 
which  has  just  been  enthusiastically  honoured,  the  degradation 
of  all  spiritual  movement  to  a  matter  of  mere  whims  and  moods  ? 
Individualism  would  like  to  assist  life  to  the  full  development 
of  its  power  and  give  it  as  far  as  possible  the  character  of  great- 
ness. That  is  an  aspiration  which  can  be  at  once  understood 
and  appreciated.  If  man  stands  at  a  critical  point  of  the  whole, 
if  a  higher  stage  of  reality  begins  in  him,  then  it  becomes  our 
duty  to  seize  this  higher  and  cause  it  to  prevail  against  all  con- 
tradiction in  everyday  life,  to  live,  as  Marcus  Aurelius  puts  it, 
upon  a  mountain.  Thus,  from  the  earliest  times,  whenever  the 
gap  between  the  demands  of  spiritual  life  and  the  average 
position  of  humanity  came  to  clear  consciousness,  there  has 
arisen,  with  imperative  necessity,  the  thought  of  a  higher  species 
of  life,  the  idea  of  man's  inner  greatness.  This  thought  can  be 
traced  from  the  height  of  Greek  culture  through  manifold 
changes  down  to  the  present  day.*  But  will  modern  indivi- 
dualism attain  to  a  true  greatness  if  it  abandons  all  inner 
relationships  and  hence  all  possibility  of  an  enlargement  of  man 
to  a  cosmic  being  ?  There  could  hardly  be  a  more  violent  con- 
tradiction than  to  desire  to  lead  man  to  a  superior  inwardness 
and  at  the  same  time  entirely  and  bitterly  to  oppose  an 
independent  inner  world.  The  present  position  of  religion, 
which  stands  in  the  first  place  for  this  independent  inner  world, 
may  be  in  many  respects  unsatisfactory  ;  as  free  men  we  should 

*  It  would  be  an  interesting  task  thus  to  follow  up  this  problem  through  the 
ages.  Aristotle's  detailed  investigations  with  respect  to  great  natures 
(fiejaXotyvxoe)  would  form  the  scientific  point  of  departure  for  such  a  study. 
Here,  the  concepts  are  still  fluid ;  the  idea  of  a  greatness  within  the  human 
sphere  converts  itself,  almost  imperceptibly,  into  the  idea  of  a  greatness  in  con- 
trast to  all  that  is  human.  In  the  Ancient  World  the  idea  of  greatness  involved 
more  particularly  a  rest  and  independence  superior  to  the  routine  of  human 
activity,  while  in  the  Modern  World  it  stands  rather  for  a  superior  power  of 
achievement  and  a  power  of  spiritual  creation :  here,  too,  we  perceive  the  con- 
trasting ideals  of  permanence  and  movement.  The  exaggerated  talk  of 
greatness  probably  originated  more  particularly  in  the  time  of  Louis  XIV. ;  at 
any  rate  the  writers  of  that  period  were  peculiarly  intoxicated  with  the  concept. 
Among  more  recent  investigations  dealing  with  historical  greatness,  the  most 
important  is  perhaps  that  by  Jakob  Burckhardt  in  his  ireltgeschichtlichen 
Betrachtungen. 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  373 

nevertheless  form  our  concepts  and  convictions  with  regard  to 
the  highest  things,  not  according  to  what  the  environment  pro- 
vides, hut  according  to  what  the  necessity  of  our  own  life 
demands.  Without  a  reversal  of  the  first  position,  without 
metaphysics,  there  is  no  independent  inner  world,  no  true  great- 
ness of  life.  Hence  whenever  any  figure  towers  conspicuously 
above  its  fellows  in  the  confusion  of  modern  life,  a  metaphysical 
tendency  is  not  far  to  seek.  Consider  Nietzsche,  for  example  :  in 
his  concepts  he  emphatically  opposes  all  metaphysics,  hut  in  his 
mental  attitudes  there  is  operative  a  world  completely  different 
from  that  of  first  appearances,  and  it  is  precisely  as  the  artistic 
creator  of  this  world,  as  the  metaphysician  of  a  particular  frame 
of  mind,  that  he  has  obtained  his  sweeping  power  over  men's 
minds.  The  same  may  he  said  with  regard  to  the  whole  modern 
tendency  towards  Romanticism.  The  mere  frame  of  mind,  how- 
ever, will  never  under  any  circumstances  suffice  to  develop  and 
carry  out  a  greatness  in  opposition  to  the  depressing  and  super- 
ficialising  effects  of  the  environment;  it  gives  only  a  greatness  of 
opinion,  not  of  reality.  Nothing  can  be  built  up  from  nothing, 
and  the  mere  mental  attitude  has  nothing  behind  it. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  desire  for  power.  To-day,  in 
particular,  in  the  face  of  difficult  complications  and  great  tasks 
of  life  as  a  whole,  we  need  much  power,  more  power  than  the 
merely  social  type  of  human  culture  can  yield.  But  through  a 
merely  subjective  self-elevation,  a  self-persuasion  of  power,  a 
placing  of  oneself  above  other  people,  we  shall  never  under  any 
circumstances  attain  to  real  power.  The  actual  experiences  of 
modern  life  illustrate  this  well  enough.  It  would  hardly  be 
possible  to  talk  about  power  more  than  we  do  to-day  ;  but  have 
we  become  strong,  does  our  literary  and  political  life  produce 
a  sufficiency  of  strong,  self-shaped,  clearly  defined  personalities, 
does  it  offer  us  great  and  elevating  creative  works  ? 

7.  The  Necessity  for  an  Inner  Overcoming  of  the  Antithesis 

When  neither  the  merely  social  nor  the  individualistic  type  of 
human  culture  is  equal  to  the  tasks  which  confront  it,  when 
neither  gives  life  a  real  content,  and  when  at  the  same  time  it 
is  beyond  doubt  that  only  the  most  deplorable  obtuseness  can 


374    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

attempt  a  direct  compromise  between  the  two,  a  division  of  life 
into  the  social  and  the  individual,  then  it  becomes  imperatively 
necessary  for  us  to  become  superior  to  the  contrast.  Society  and 
the  individual  are  necessary  aspects  and  modes  of  appearance  of 
spiritual  life ;  individuals  are  essential  to  its  originality,  society 
to  its  consolidation.  Both  society  and  the  individual,  however, 
draw  their  power  and  truth  not  from  themselves  but  from  the 
spiritual  relationships  which  surround  them.  The  relationship 
between  society  and  the  individual  will  take  different  forms  at 
different  historical  epochs;  when  consolidation  is  above  all 
necessary,  after  times  of  upheaval  and  disintegration  (as  for 
example  towards  the  end  of  the  Ancient  World) ,  the  general  trend 
of  life  will  be  towards  the  social  type  of  civilisation.  Augustine 
enables  us  to  see  what  it  was  that  at  that  time  imperatively 
drove  even  the  most  powerful  individuals  to  fall  back  upon 
society.  The  movement  towards  the  individual,  on  the  other 
hand,  will  be  uppermost  when  fresh  upward-striving  forces  feel 
the  traditional  order  of  life  to  be  too  narrow  and  rigid,  and  are 
able  to  seek  new  paths  only  through  a  liberation  from  this  order. 
This  was  the  main  tendency  of  the  Modern  World  on  into  the 
nineteenth  century ;  then  came  a  reaction,  and  at  the  present  time 
society  and  the  individual  are  both  striving  for  an  increase  of 
power,  a  social-practical  and  an  artistic-individual  type  of  culture 
struggling  for  the  leadership  of  humanity.  This  shows  with 
peculiar  clearness  the  inner  division  of  our  age,  a  division  which 
must  at  the  same  time  operate  as  an  imperative  impulse  to- 
wards an  elevation  above  the  antithesis,  towards  a  transition 
from  a  merely  human  culture  to  an  essential  and  spiritual 
culture  capable  of  embracing  the  contrast.  This  division  can 
be  met  and  overcome  only  through  an  inner  forward  movement 
of  life,  for  what  is  generally  true  of  a  real  problem  is  in  this 
case  particularly  true ;  namely,  that  it  is  not  a  conflict  of  opinion 
with  opinion  but  of  specific  life-development  with  specific  life- 
development. 

b.  The  Social-Democratic  Movement 

In  dealing  with  the  spiritual  and  intellectual  tendencies  of  the 
age  we  cannot  pass  over  Social  Democracy.     This  subject  has, 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  375 

however,  been  discussed  and  written  about  to  the  point  of  satiety, 
and  it  will  be  desirable  strictly  to  confine  ourselves  to  the  speci- 
fically philosophical  aspect  of  the  matter. 

From  the  philosophical  point  of  view,  the  most  characteristic 
thing  about  the  social-democratic  movement  is  its  comprehension 
of  three  different  movements,  all  of  which  it  employs  to  further 
its  ends :  the  democratic,  the  economic,  and  the  political 
movements.  It  is  a  question,  in  the  first  place,  of  the  trans- 
ference of  the  centre  of  gravity  of  social  life  to  the  masses,  then 
of  the  elevation  of  the  economic  problem  to  be  the  dominating 
soul  of  this  life,  and  finally  of  the  recognition  of  the  state  as 
the  sole  vehicle  of  power  and  intelligence.  The  central  idea  is 
to  bring  about  an  economic  revolution  for  the  benefit  of  the 
masses  through  the  agency  of  the  state,  and  to  maintain  this 
new  position;  at  this  point  all  the  separate  threads  combine. 
The  whole  derives  strength  more  particularly  from  the  fact  that 
the  separate  movements  had  already  aroused  men  and  given  rise 
to  much  enthusiasm  before  their  union,  and  that  their  coalescence 
seems  to  be  no  more  than  the  completion  of  what  would  other- 
wise have  remained  indefinite  and  unable  to  face  its  own 
consequences.  Let  us  glance  over  the  history  of  these  move- 
ments. 

By  democracy  we  do  not  mean  the  state  alone,  but  the  whole 
social  life  of  humanity  and  the  whole  relationship  of  individuals 
to  the  common  goods  of  life.  The  Modern  World  is  favourable 
to  this  tendency  if  only  for  the  reason  that  many  severe  ob- 
stacles, peculiar  to  previous  ages,  have  been  removed.  In  the 
Ancient  World,  the  limitation  of  civilisation  to  certain  special  races 
(so  that  even  the  best  men  saw  nothing  wrong  in  slavery)  militated 
against  a  recognition  of  the  equality  of  all  men.  In  Christianity 
there  was  certainly  an  element  favourable  to  democracy — the 
revelation  of  the  direct  and  equal  relationship  of  all  individuals 
to  God;  but  this  was  placed  very  much  in  the  background, 
partly  by  the  hierarchical  system,  which  reached  back  to  the 
earliest  times,  and  partly  by  the  transcendental  attitude  towards 
life.  It  attained,  for  the  first  time,  to  a  more  vigorous  develop- 
ment in  certain  separate  branches  of  the  Keformation,  soon, 
however,  passing  over  into  the  modern  movement.  The  Modern 


376    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

World  directed  man  more  and  more  exclusively  towards  the 
outer  world :  at  the  same  time,  its  chief  tendency,  the  Enlighten- 
ment, assigned  the  first  place  in  man's  life  to  something 
lying  outside  all  individual  differences — abstract  reason,  pure 
thought;  the  more  this  raised  itself  to  full  consciousness  and 
the  more  it  penetrated  into  the  convictions  of  the  individuals, 
the  more  irresistible  it  became;  therewith  humanity  in- 
creasingly allowed  all  social  differences  to  pale,  and  the  recog- 
nition of  the  equality  of  all  that  bore  the  human  feature  became 
more  and  more  inescapable. 

The  Modern  World  is,  however,  by  no  means  free  from  counter- 
acting influences  tending  to  favour  the  aristocratic  system  oi 
life.  We  inherit  from  history  great  differences  in  political 
position,  in  wealth,  and  in  education.  More  aristocratic  than 
any  of  these  traditional  factors  is  and  remains  nature  with  its 
differences  of  physical  and  mental  equipment.  A  peculiar  kind 
of  aristocracy  is  produced,  too,  by  modern  civilisation  with  its 
elaborate  technical  division  of  work,  its  increasing  ramification  : 
for  the  more  this  tendency  increases,  the  more  division  and 
gradation  results,  the  more  arrangement  and  governing  control 
society  requires  and  the  greater  is  the  trend  towards  a  new 
aristocratic  system.  Nevertheless,  no  such  resistance  on  the 
part  of  the  actual  form  of  life  hinders  the  progress  of  the 
democratic  movement  in  human  conviction ;  now  the  gradation  is 
opposed  as  artificial,  or  at  any  rate  as  having  become  artificial, 
now  it  is  put  aside  as  being  of  secondary  importance  ;  under  any 
circumstances  it  is  not  accepted  as  a  final  act  of  destiny,  but 
reduced  as  far  as  possible  by  human  counter-influences.  The 
smaller  currents  may  to  a  great  extent  flow  backwards,  but  the 
main  stream  still  continues  to  run  towards  democracy. 

Moreover,  the  independence  and  predominance  of  economic 
questions  is  a  product  of  the  Modern  World.  The  concern  for 
the  mine  and  the  thine  has  certainly  been  the  commanding  prob- 
lem for  the  individual  in  all  ages ;  only  by  a  gross  error  could 
it  be  supposed  that  the  Ancient  World  was  dedicated  solely  to 
ideal  tasks,  because  philosophers  made  a  point  of  strongly  stig- 
matising the  too  powerful  desire  for  material  possessions ;  but 
the  economic  sphere  was  not  valued  in  principle  in  antique 


SOCIETY   AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  37? 

civilisation.  This  was  due  in  the  first  place  to  the  fact  that 
complete  satisfaction  was  awaited  from  the  unrolment  of  a  fixed 
and  limited  nature,  and  such  a  development  as  this,  demands 
only  a  limited  employment  of  outward  means ;  a  further  cause 
was  that  this  ethical  and  artistic  ideal  of  life  was  carried  over 
without  hesitation  from  the  individual  to  society,  and  in  the 
latter  case,  too,  the  same  fixed  limit  was  recognised.  Christianity, 
with  its  direction  of  thought  towards  a  super-sensual  world,  was 
still  more  unfavourable  to  an  appreciation  of  economic  goods. 
In  the  case  of  Christianity,  the  theory  still  remained  entirely 
subject  to  influences  derived  from  the  Ancient  World.  The 
Modern  World,  on  the  other  hand,  with  its  trend  towards  a 
maximum  development  of  power  and  towards  the  immediate 
world,  took  up  quite  another  attitude  from  the  very  beginning. 
Material  goods  were  now  looked  upon  as  an  indispensable  lever 
with  which  to  set  forces  in  motion ;  they  seemed  both  to  initiate 
progress  and  to  advance  it.  The  economic  movement  was 
further  strengthened  and  ennobled  through  the  building  up  of 
national  unities.  As  economics  took  on  the  form  of  national 
economy  the  old  doubts  faded  away.  This  altered  valuation  was 
already  visible  at  the  time  of  the  Renaissance,  and  in  seven- 
teenth century  France  've  see  its  effects  in  the  politics  of  a  great 
nation.  Thus  the  general  circumstances  were  such  as  to  pre- 
pare the  world  for  the  new  views,  when  finally  the  economic 
theory  of  Adam  Smith  made  the  economic  movement  the  core 
and  standard  type  of  the  whole  of  civilised  life,  and  declared  the 
aspiration  towards  a  better  standard  of  life  to  be  the  main 
motive  force  of  all  movement,  even  in  science,  art,  education, 
and  religion.  There  was  no  lack  of  decisive  opposition  to  this 
exaltation  of  the  economic  factor,  but  on  the  other  hand  the 
unceasing  growth  of  a  technical  and  elaborate  civilisation  tended 
continually  to  increase  the  importance  of  material  things; 
moreover,  further  support  was  lent  to  the  economic  movement  by 
the  swelling  tide  of  realism,  which  clearly  exhibited  the  de- 
pendence of  spiritual  life  upon  natural  conditions  and  wished  to 
deduce  the  inner  entirely  from  the  outer.  Seeing  that  recent 
developments  of  work  have  produced  serious  economic  complica- 
tions (in  complete  contradiction  to  Adam  Smith's  optimism  !)  it 


378    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

cannot  be  regarded  as  very  surprising  if  salvation  for  the  whole 
of  life  is  awaited  from  a  solution  of  these  complications  through 
the  establishment  of  a  new  economic  order. 

The  third  tendency  is  political ;  it  represents  the  valuation 
and  over-valuation  of  the  state.  How  many  important  factors 
worked  in  this  direction  during  the  nineteenth  century  we  have 
already  seen.  The  inclination  to  place  the  state  first  in  all 
things  and  to  grant  it  the  leadership  in  the  whole  work  of 
civilisation  and  human  culture  is  obviously  still  on  the  increase. 
Here,  too,  social  democracy  merely  gives  full  and  strong  expres- 
sion to  that  which  dominates  most  of  us,  though  in  a  weaker 
and  vaguer  form.  At  any  rate  it  is  no  accident  that  in  Ger- 
many, with  its  inclination  towards  the  omnipotence  of  the  state, 
the  social-democratic  movement  has  made  peculiarly  rapid  pro- 
gress, while  it  has  spread  much  more  slowly  among  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  nations. 

This  union  of  democracy,  economics,  and  politics  is  in  itself 
by  no  means  essential.  Nay,  it  may  well  be  said  that  it 
involves  sharp  contradictions.  In  particular,  does  not  the  free- 
dom of  the  individual,  upon  which  democracy  insists,  come  into 
irreconcilable  conflict  with  the  constraining  power  of  the  state  ? 
Whatever  may  be  the  case,  however,  with  regard  to  the  justifi- 
ability of  this  union,  it  is,  in  the  first  place,  a  historical  fact, 
and  it  grips  the  people  of  the  present  day  with  all  the  power  of 
a  fact.  Moreover,  in  spite  of  all  their  differences,  these  main 
tendencies  possess  an  inner  relationship  which  is  more  especially 
noticeable  in  their  negative  characteristics :  everything  tran- 
scendental and  metaphysical  is  consistently  rejected — hence  no 
independent  spiritual  world  is  tolerated ;  the  whole  desires  to  be 
entirely  immanent,  to  be  a  culture  and  civilisation  purely  and 
simply  for  the  present  world.  It  hence  becomes  a  merely  human 
culture.  This  fundamental  conviction  is  revealed  in  the  belief 
in  the  masses,  in  the  exaltation  of  economic  goods,  and  in  the 
elevation  of  the  state  to  be  the  vehicle  of  reason.  It  is  hence  an 
error  to  suppose  that  a  religious  conviction  can  be  united  to  this 
thought-world,  or  that  the  latter  may  even  be  transferred  into 
the  religious  domain.  For  a  secular  and  merely  human  character 
is  essential  to  this  movement ;  it  is  by  no  means  a  mere  adjunct 


SOCIETY  AND   THE   INDIVIDUAL  379 

given  to  it  by  individuals.  It  is  not  a  case  of  partial  theories 
which  may  be  applied  in  this  way  or  that,  but  of  a  synthesis 
of  life  as  a  whole,  of  an  all-embracing  thought-world  which 
appeals  to  the  whole  man  and  claims  his  whole  soul.  To-day, 
the  movement  receives  its  main  strength  in  the  first  place  from 
the  fact  that  it  demands  the  whole  man  and  subjects  his  activity, 
in  all  its  manifoldness,  to  an  all-dominating  idea. 

Specific  developments  of  life  can  be  met  only  by  specific 
developments  of  life ;  all  mere  criticism,  however  ingenious  or 
intelligent,  stands  in  the  same  relationship  to  them  that  a 
shadow  stands  in  to  the  solid  body  which  produces  it.  Thus, 
in  this  case,  too,  criticism  will  be  confined  as  narrowly  as  possible 
to  that  which  specially  concerns  the  philosophy  and  view  of  life 
associated  with  the  movement. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  obvious  that  our  conviction  as  a  whole 
is  sharply  and  irreconcilably  opposed  to  the  life-ideal  operative 
in  this  movement.  We  set  ourselves  in  the  most  resolute  possible 
manner  against  all  merely  human  culture.  This  is  because  we 
regard  man  as  the  meeting-place  of  two  worlds,  and  because  it  is 
only  by  seizing  the  higher  that  a  meaning,  a  value,  and  a  right 
movement  can  be  imparted  to  our  life.  This  seizure,  however, 
demands  an  energetic  transformation  not  only  of  the  first  appear- 
ance of  the  world,  but  still  more  of  man's  own  being ;  it  cannot 
be  accomplished  without  powerful  disturbances,  elevations,  and 
renewals.  In  this  way  alone  can  we  attain  to  a  culture  which  is 
spiritual  and  rooted  in  the  essential  nature  of  things,  a  culture 
capable  of  giving  man  an  inner  greatness.  Resting  upon  such 
convictions  we  resist  the  democratic  system  of  life  (Demokratis- 
mus)  because  it  is  guilty  of  a  false  idealisation  of  the  sensuous 
and  merely  natural  man,  and  is  inclined  to  subordinate  the 
spiritual  world  to  what  is  merely  human  ;  we  resist  the  economic 
system  of  life  (Oekonomismus)  because  its  construction  from  with- 
out inward  involves  a  denial  of  the  independent  problems  of  the 
inner  life,  and  because  it  believes  the  complete  happiness  of  man 
to  be  secured  by  the  establishment  of  conditions  of  comfort  and 
freedom  from  care  ;  and  finally  we  reject  the  political  system  of  life 
(Politismus)  because  it  represses  the  independence  of  personality 
and  hence  endangers  the  originality  of  spiritual  creation,  and 


380    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

further  because  it  is  ready  to  sacrifice  the  self-value  of  spiritual 
goods  for  merely  utilitarian  considerations.  In  all  these  ten- 
dencies we  see  an  inner  sinking  in  the  midst  of  all  outward 
progress,  a  treatment  of  the  chief  things  as  secondary  things  j 
we  see  man  becoming  spiritually  smaller. 

We  have  thus  a  complete  antithesis  and  a  decisive  negation. 
But  the  mere  negation  leaves  it  unexplained  how  the  whole 
could  obtain  so  much  power  over  man,  how  it  could  not  merely 
arouse  passion  but  give  rise  to  great  sacrifice  and  gain  the 
adherence  of  many  noble  minds.  Behind  that  which  in  its  more 
exact  form  endangers  life,  there  must  be  operative  problems  of 
a  more  general  nature,  which  we  others,  too,  cannot  reject — 
difficulties  which  will  give  us  no  peace  until  they  have  found 
some  kind  of  solution  or,  at  any  rate,  alleviation. 

A  problem  of  this  more  universal  kind  is  contained  in  the  idea 
of  democracy.  It  is  the  question  of  an  expansion  of  human 
culture  and  civilisation,  of  a  more  equal  division  of  its  goods, 
of  a  more  powerful  participation  of  separate  individuals  in 
spiritual  life.  In  spite  of  the  work  of  millenniums,  things  are 
still  deplorable  enough  in  this  respect :  notwithstanding  all  our 
progress,  how  small  is  that  portion  of  the  treasures  of  human 
development  and  education  which  falls  to  the  lot  of  the  vast 
majority  !  How  narrow  is  that  section  of  society  which  par- 
ticipates in  the  movement  towards  a  higher  and  more  inward 
culture !  Christianity  has  been  operative  amongst  us  for  more 
than  a  thousand  years,  yet  in  this  time  (so  lengthy,  according  to 
human  standards)  how  little  has  it  become  for  us  a  transforming 
power,  a  firm  inner  possession,  a  conviction  penetrating  oui 
whole  being  !  Along  with  all  the  talk  of  progress  and  spiritual 
life,  our  spiritual  beliefs  have  remained  far  too  much  a  mere  cloak 
cast  over  an  existence  dominated  by  merely  natural  instincts ; 
the  great  contrasts  and  states  of  tension,  and  also  the  great 
possibilities  which  our  life  contains,  are  far  too  little  worked  out 
for  the  consciousness  of  the  individual.  Now,  however,  we  are 
beginning — and  that  is  in  itself  a  turn  for  the  better — to  feel 
it  as  an  unreality  that  a  higher  kind  of  life  is  indeed  operative 
somewhere  in  humanity,  but  remains  inwardly  strange  and  remote 
to  the  majority  of  individuals ;  when  such  a  feeling  has  once 


SOCIETY   AND  THE   INDIVIDUAL  381 

become  aroused,  then  it  will  somehow  have  to  be  satisfied ;  even 
if  in  the  struggle  for  such  goals  the  limits  of  human  capacity 
become  ever  so  noticeable,  it  makes  an  immense  difference 
whether  the  situation  we  deplore  is  accepted  as  a  destiny,  or 
the  struggle  for  the  larger  participation  of  all  is  taken  up,  and 
hence  the  guilt  removed  as  far  as  possible  from  humanity. 

These  considerations  are  strengthened  by  an  observation  to 
which  no  unprejudiced  person  can  close  his  eyes.  Our  age 
exhibits  many  signs  of  senility;  a  refined  Epicureanism  con- 
quers more  and  more  ground ;  many  circles  chosen  to  lead  show 
themselves  mentally  indolent  and  obtuse,  and  maintain  lofty 
claims  while  imparting  no  worthy  content  to  their  life.  Is  it 
remarkable  that  the  conviction  is  continually  gaining  ground 
that  to-day  it  is  almost  more  a  question  of  needing  new  men 
than  new  ideas,  fresh  and  unspoiled  individuals,  upward-striving, 
mentally  and  spiritually  thirsty  sections  of  society  ?  Those  who 
recognise  this  need  not  by  any  means  commit  themselves  to 
Social  Democracy  and  regard  its  methods  of  reform  as  the  correct 
ones,  but  they  will  understand  the  desire  for  a  better  state  of 
affairs. 

Economism,  as  a  system  claiming  the  leadership  in  life, 
threatens  to  guide  us  along  a  problematical  and  descending 
path.  It  can  obtain  an  ascendancy  over  us  only  if  there  is 
no  independent  inner  life  and  the  problems  of  the  soul  are 
neglected.  At  the  same  time,  the  economic  elevation  would  not 
be  greeted  as  a  deliverance  from  all  our  necessities  if  care  for 
the  maintenance  of  life  did  not  press  with  painful  heaviness 
upon  many  of  us  :  it  would  assuredly  be  no  source  of  happiness 
if  the  table  of  life  were  ready  spread  for  us  and  we  had  only 
to  enjoy  ourselves,  if  all  care  and  struggle  disappeared ;  but 
it  remains  profoundly  sad  that,  as  is  usually  the  case,  this 
one  care  for  the  preservation  of  life  so  greatly  predominates 
and  so  overpoweringly  absorbs  men's  thoughts  and  feelings. 
Life  thus  falls  under  a  heavy  yoke,  which  tends  to  produce 
inner  littleness  and  degradation,  and  to  cause  a  dulling 
mediocrity  inhibiting  all  fresh  and  free  upward  movement. 
It  is  true  that  necessity  has  often  given  rise  to  much  that  is 
great ;  but,  as  Pestalozzi  lastly  observes :  "  There  is  a  poverty 


382    MAIN   CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

which  leads  to  the  building  up  of  human  powers  and  serves 
as  the  foundation  of  man's  happiness  and  inner  greatness. 
But  there  is  also  a  poverty  that  is  the  parent  of  despair" 
(Wke.,  viii.  98).  The  Modern  World  has  done  much  to  remove 
this  pressure  and  inner  degradation.  May  we  not  venture  to 
assert  that  far  more  still  remains  to  be  done,  that  much  might 
be  other  and  better  than  it  is,  not  only  as  regards  the  attitude 
and  feeling  of  the  individual,  but  also  as  regards  general 
conditions  ? 

We  have  repeatedly  referred  to  the  questionable  element  in 
the  political  movement.  Not  only  the  freedom  of  the  individual, 
but  the  soul  of  life  as  a  whole,  are  threatened  with  danger  from 
this  quarter.  "  If  everything  should  be  governed  by  rule  and 
regulation,  then  life — difficult  already — must  become  absolutely 
unbearable  "  :  thus  spake  Plato  more  than  two  thousand  years 
ago.  Why  then  does  the  idea  of  the  state  make  such  immense 
progress  to-day,  precisely,  too,  in  the  very  circles  which  are 
more  particularly  interested  in  the  cause  of  freedom?  It  is 
surely  because  the  individual,  on  account  of  the  breaking  down 
of  traditional  relationships  and  the  thorough  insecurity  of  his 
own  position,  yearns  after  some  sort  of  firm  hold,  because 
he  wishes  to  see  his  existence  in  some  way  valued  and  protected 
by  the  whole.  This  reaches  far  beyond  all  economic  problems 
into  the  inner  life  and  life  as  a  whole.  At  the  time  of  the 
breaking  up  of  the  Ancient  World  such  a  desire  for  more  support 
and  more  valuation  contributed  not  a  little  to  win  men's  hearts 
over  to  the  Christian  Church :  to-day,  the  same  desire  seems  to 
be  breaking  out  again  with  renewed  strength.  We  must  take 
care  not  to  underestimate  these  movements  because  they  move 
quietly  and  secretly  beneath  the  surface  of  life;  for  it  is  in 
such  movements  that  psychic  conditions  are  fostered  which  later 
break  out  suddenly  with  irresistible  force  and  drive  the  whole 
of  visible  life  along  completely  new  paths.  To-day,  inner  re- 
arrangements, molecular  transformations,  if  the  expression  be 
permitted,  are  in  progress.  What  shaping  of  human  conditions 
will  result  therefrom  lies  for  the  time  being  in  profound  obscurity. 

Moreover,  we  must  not  assign  too  low  a  value  to  the  unity 
of  the  thought-world  which  is  operatire  in  the  social-democratic 


SOCIETY   AND  THE   INDIVIDUAL  383 

movement.  It  is  true  enough  that  in  view  of  our  rejection  of 
all  merely  human  culture  the  specific  character  of  this  unity, 
with  its  deification  of  man,  must  appear  a  disastrous  error. 
But  unity  is  unity.  Unity  alone  makes  it  possible  for  the 
several  departments  of  work  mutually  to  support  one  another, 
and  for  the  whole  man  to  be  active  at  each  separate  point. 
The  only  other  system  which  to-day  offers  an  all-embracing 
unity  is  ecclesiastical  Catholicism,  which,  being  closely  united 
to  the  mediaeval  mode  of  thought,  is  unavoidably  placed  in  an 
ever-increasing  opposition  to  the  movements  of  the  present  age 
and  the  needs  of  the  modern  man,  nay,  to  the  inner  necessities 
of  spiritual  life  itself.  Within  the  sphere  of  the  Modern  World 
itself  the  Enlightenment  possessed  a  kind  of  life-unity  and  at 
the  same  time  offered  an  all-embracing  ideal ;  but  since  it  broke 
up  we  have  found  ourselves  involved  in  a  serious  inner  division, 
which  is  becoming  increasingly  intolerable.  In  particular,  it 
is  customary  for  those  who  wish  to  arrange  life  upon  a  basis 
of  freedom  to  be  guilty  of  the  truly  amazing  paradox  that  on 
the  practical  side  they  are  never  tired  of  exalting  the  greatness, 
dignity,  and  capacity  of  man,  while  on  the  theoretical  side  they 
heatedly  oppose  that  view  of  life  which  is  alone  capable  of 
supporting  such  an  estimate  of  man ;  they  fancy  themselves 
all  the  more  secure  in  their  freedom  the  more  negative  and 
the  more  empty  is  their  thought- world  (see  p.  427).  In  thus 
supporting  only  negative  and  superficial  views  of  life,  they  them- 
selves undermine  the  very  ground  upon  which  their  aspirations 
rest :  such  an  absence  of  clarity,  or  rather  such  thoughtlessness, 
is  incapable  of  producing  any  deep  effect. 

It  is  impossible  to  avoid  recognising  that  we  are  face  to  face 
with  a  severe  crisis.  It  will  have  to  be  decided  whether  the 
human  culture  and  society  of  to-day  contains  the  power  to  accom- 
plish an  inner  synthesis  and  spiritual  elevation  of  life,  and  hence 
to  offer  resistance  to  the  disintegration,  or  whether  it  is  incapable 
of  rising  to  the  occasion.  In  the  first  case,  the  attack  upon  it 
can  only  serve  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  culture  into  contact 
with  its  own  depths  and  liberating  it  from  the  petty  human 
element ;  in  the  second  case,  the  culture  and  society  of  to-day 
must  go  under,  and  it  would  then  deserve  no  better  fate.  The 


334    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

spiritual  world  itself,  together  with  its  effective  relationship 
towards  humanity,  stands  as  firm  and  secure  above  such  changes 
as  do  the  stars  ahove  the  trivial  turmoil  on  the  surface  of  the 
earth,  it  may  even  he  that  a  downright  negation  of  all  inde- 
pendent spirituality  and  a  dissolution  of  all  invisible  relationships 
will  be  desirable,  in  order  that  humanity,  through  an  indirect  proof, 
should  again  have  the  indispensability  of  the  spiritual  world 
emphatically  brought  to  its  consciousness,  and  thus  life  should 
be  again  helped  to  attain  to  that  content  of  truth  which  is  to-day 
so  painfully  lacking. 


4.  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  MORALITY 

(a)  The  Present  Insecure  Position  of  Morality 

TO-DAY,  our  conception  and  our  valuation  of  morality  are  alike 
extremely  unsettled.  From  one  point  of  view,  morality  seems 
to  offer  a  solid  foundation  in  the  midst  of  the  upheaval  of 
philosophical  and  religious  convictions,  to  afford  a  basis  of 
agreement  for  all  those  elements  that  would  otherwise  fall 
apart :  for  if  all  else  be  insecure,  there  still  remains  man 
and  his  relationship  to  man  ;  our  social  life  offers  us  tasks, 
the  reality  of  which  is  beyond  dispute.  Hence  there  has  arisen 
a  movement  in  the  direction  of  ethical  culture,  and  great  interest 
(extending  beyond  the  limits  of  this  particular  sphere)  has  been 
taken  in  all  that  tends  to  further  the  welfare  of  our  fellow-men, 
and  in  so  doing  to  give  our  own  lives  also  a  valuable  content. 
Morality  is  here  practically  synonymous  with  altruism.  It  is 
interpreted  as  action  for  others,  the  placing  of  other  people's 
interests  before  our  own.  This  tendency  forms  a  main  element 
in  modern  civilisation ;  great  movements  to  remove  pain  and 
necessity,  to  soften  strictness  and  hardness,  to  make  our  exist- 
ence more  humane,  have  drawn,  and  are  continually  drawing, 
their  inspiration  from  this  source. 

But  in  the  midst  of  all  these  achievements  there  remains,  in 
principle,  much  that  is  doubtful  and  contradictory.  Perhaps 
men  unite  so  readily  on  the  basis  of  altruistic  morality  because 
it  places  the  deeper  moral  problems  in  the  background — if  not 
actually  denying  their  existence.  After  all,  is  it  certain  that 
morality  is  identical  with  altruism,  with  action  for  others? 
The  expression  "  altruism  "  is  derived  from  Comte's  philosophy, 
that  is,  from  a  system  which  entirely  surrenders  the  inde- 

25 


386    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

pendence  of  the  soul  and  reduces  the  whole  of  life  to  a  mere 
matter  of  relationship  to  environment.  Should  this  conception 
of  morality  be  adopted,  just  as  it  stands,  by  those  who  do  not 
accept  this  philosophy  ?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  identification 
of  morality  with  altruism  means  that  the  former  will  become 
narrow  in  scope  and  shallow  in  content.  Does  social  and 
humanitarian  activity  exhaust  the  whole  meaning  of  morality? 
Have  we  not  to  face  great  tasks  within  ourselves,  in  the  develop- 
ment of  our  own  souls  and  in  our  relationship  to  the  world  and 
external  things  in  general?  Throughout  our  whole  lives  we 
are  faced  by  this  alternative  ;  shall  our  conduct  serve  our 
own  pleasure,  or  shall  it  be  determined  by  motives  of  an 
objective  character?  The  creative  work  of  an  artist,  for  ex- 
ample, may  be  guided  by  all  sorts  of  different  motives  ;  he  may 
be  seeking  fame,  recognition,  or  personal  profit ;  he  may  aim  at 
satisfying  the  whims  and  desires  of  the  public ;  or,  finally,  he 
may  be  following  solely  the  inner  necessities  of  his  creative 
work,  obeying  these,  if  necessary,  with  heroic  courage,  in  spite 
of  all  the  opposition  which  his  environment  may  offer,  in  spite, 
possibly,  of  personal  danger :  does  not  such  truth  to  ourselves 
and  our  work  come  under  the  head  of  moral  conduct?  Similarly, 
spiritual  self-preservation  may  lead  the  investigator  or  the  man 
of  religious  conviction  into  the  sharpest  opposition  to  environ- 
ment, and  may  drive  him  to  the  complete  loss  of  peace  and 
comfort.  In  fact,  the  whole  movement  towards  spirituality, 
with  its  demands,  troubles,  and  doubts,  may  appear  as  a  dis- 
turbance of  our  equilibrium  and  an  enemy  to  immediate  happi- 
ness. Nevertheless,  do  we  not  recognise  in  it  a  moral  task? 
If  this  be  true,  then  morality  is  certainly  something  deeper  and 
better  than  mere  altruism. 

Further,  it  may  be  brought  forward  against  the  altruistic 
position  that  it  does  not  understand  how  to  base  morality 
upon  the  depth  of  the  soul  itself,  how  to  make  it  a  matter  of 
spiritual  self-preservation :  it  is  favoured  to-day,  however,  by 
the  insecurity  which  surrounds  the  more  spiritual  position ;  we 
are  influenced  by  two  different  thought-worlds  from  the  past, 
representing  more  inward  types  of  morality ;  the  world  of  re- 
ligion and  that  of  immanent  idealism.  In  the  one  case  it  was 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  MORALITY  387 

the  relation  to  a  being  superior  to  the  world,  and  in  the  other 
man's  own  reason,  which  was  to  give  rise  to  tasks  comprehend- 
ing the  whole  of  life  and  to  provide  an  ethical  valuation  for  our 
whole  conduct.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  spiritual  life  of 
to-day,  both  types  are  not  only  shaken  to  the  foundation,  but 
their  content  has  become  largely  doubtful.  The  religious  world 
has  totally  disappeared  from  the  horizon  of  large  masses  of 
people,  while  immanent  idealism  has  increasingly  lost  its  force 
and  vitality.  At  the  same  time,  the  general  tendency  of  the 
age  regards  religious  morality  as  too  soft  and  too  passive,  while 
the  morality  based  upon  reason  appears  too  abstract  and  its 
strict  idea  of  duty  makes  too  stern  an  impression.  Thus  social 
morality,  with  its  altruism,  remains  the  only  unchallenged  posi- 
tion— and  this  we  have  already  found  to  be  too  shallow  and 
narrow. 

It  only  remains,  therefore,  to  point  out  the  fact  that  our  age 
possesses  no  morality  at  all,  corresponding  to  the  present 
spiritual  state  of  the  world's  historical  development ;  it  is 
without  a  characteristic  morality  capable  of  satisfying  its  most 
inward  necessities.  Regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  inner- 
most nature,  morality  is  to-day  at  least  as  insecure  as  is  religion.* 
How  greatly  the  fact  that  we  have  no  morality  of  our  own 
reduces  the  power  of  morality  in  the  present  age,  and  how 
very  easy  it  makes  it  for  the  opponents  of  morality  to  carica- 
ture it,  to  mock  at  their  caricatures,  and  then  to  believe 
morality  itself  refuted  and  abolished,  is  made  abundantly  clear 
by  numerous  observations  of  modern  life.  We  shall  not  be 
able  to  face  these  complications  if  we  do  not  succeed,  through 
a  self-recollection  and  a  self-deepening  of  life,  in  again  obtaining 
a  self-experienced  morality  of  our  own.  This  is  perhaps  the 
most  urgent  of  all  present-day  needs. 

•  In  spite  of  this  fundamental  insecurity  our  age  offers  an  abundance  of 
moral  treatises  and  books  for  moral  instruction.  And  why  not,  indeed  ?  Lich- 
tenberg  said  well  when,  with  regard  to  Hamlet's  saying  that  there  were  many 
things  in  heaven  and  on  the  earth  not  contained  in  our  philosophies,  he 
remarked  :  "  Good  ;  but  on  the  other  hand  there  are  a  multitude  of  things  in 
our  philosophies  that  are  not  to  be  found  either  in  heaven  or  upon  the  earth." 
See  Vennitchte  Schriften  (1801),  ii.  356, 


388    MAIN   CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

(6)  Morality  and  Metaphysics 

To-day  there  is  a  widespread  inclination  to  separate  morality 
wholly  from  the  problems  of  cosmic  philosophy  and  to  grasp 
it  directly  as  a  thing  in  itself.  Many  believe  that  this  will 
result  in  a  great  liberation  and  simplification  of  life,  while  a 
number  of  historical  examples  are  brought  forward  in  support 
of  the  movement.  In  particular,  an  appeal  is  made  to  the  great 
name  of  Kant. 

From  the  earliest  times,  man  has  tended  to  turn  away  from 
the  perplexities  of  cosmic  philosophy  and  to  seek  refuge  in  a 
well-ordered  life.  The  individual  may  be  justified  in  so  doing, 
but  can  the  same  be  said  of  humanity  as  a  whole?  Does 
not  this  action  on  the  part  of  the  individual  presuppose  the 
existence,  independent  of  him,  of  a  secure  and  recognised 
morality  ?  In  particular,  only  an  entire  misunderstanding 
could  attribute  to  Kant  the  intention  of  abandoning  cosmic 
problems  and  taking  refuge  in  the  haven  of  practical  work. 
His  thought  is  concerned,  not  with  the  antithesis  of  theory 
and  practice,  but  with  that  of  theoretical  and  practical  reason ; 
but  where  reason  enters  into  the  discussion  then  we  have  in- 
variably to  deal  with  cosmic  relationships ;  thus  Kant  does 
not  abandon  ultimate  convictions  with  regard  to  the  whole  of 
reality;  he  merely  seeks  the  point  at  which  these  convictions 
must  be  decided  in  a  different  quarter  from  that  in  which  it 
was  sought  by  the  old-fashioned  speculative  philosophy ;  he  does 
not  make  morality  the  centre  of  his  thought-world  without 
announcing  it  as  the  appearance  of  a  new  order  of  things,  of 
an  intelligible  kingdom  of  reason.  Kant  is  a  metaphysician 
of  his  own  kind  ;  but  a  metaphysician  he  is,  through  and 
through.  The  every-day  wisdom  which  places  practical  work 
before  thought  can  claim  no  fellowship  with  him. 

In  reality,  it  is  only  needful  to  examine  its  phenomena 
a  little  more  closely  to  perceive  that  morality  comes  into 
the  sharpest  conflict  with  the  immediate  view  of  the  world. 
However  much  our  conceptions  of  morality  may  differ,  they 
always  involve  a  detachment  of  life  and  aspiration  from  the 
mere  ego,  a  progress  beyond  mere  natural  self-preservation : 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  389 

as  soon  as  it  is  discovered,  with  regard  to  any  action  that 
has  been  praised  as  moral,  that  the  feeling  behind  it  has  been 
derived  (even  in  a  concealed  or  indirect  manner)  from  mere 
motives  of  self-preservation,  we  regard  its  moral  character  as 
destroyed.  Now,  even  nature  shows  certain  beginnings  of  a 
liberation  of  life  from  mere  self-preservation,  but  these  remain 
scattered  and  impure,  so  that  it  signifies  a  change — indeed,  a 
revolution — when  the  new  type  of  conduct  develops  in  its  purity 
and  claims  dominion  over  life.  New  meanings  and  new  values 
now  reveal  themselves.  Shall  we  not  need  a  new  world  in  which 
to  connect  and  consolidate  these  ? 

Further,  conduct  does  not  possess  a  moral  character  unless  it 
proceeds  from  free  decision  and  manifests  an  original  life  :  if, 
in  any  way,  it  comes  to  light  that  a  presumably  moral  action 
proceeds  from  mere  habit,  mechanical  compulsion,  or  the 
pressure  of  authority,  and  does  not  involve  personal  decision 
and  application,  the  action  at  once  loses  its  distinctive  character 
and  drops  out  of  the  moral  sphere.  Now,  the  natural  world, 
with  its  thoroughgoing  causal  connection,  does  not  afford  the 
least  room  for  this  self-activity  and  free  decision.  Its  structure 
resists  every  attempt  to  loosen  its  rigidity.  Hence,  if  there  be 
no  domain  other  than  that  of  nature,  and  if  its  order  be  valid 
for  spiritual  life  also,  then  there  is  no  room  for  any  sort  of 
morality  which  aims  at  being  anything  more  than  a  "  policing  " 
of  social  life. 

When  the  moral  demand  attains  to  full  self-consciousness  it 
makes  the  claim  to  be  incomparably  superior  to  all  other  aims. 
It  then  rejects  all  considerations  of  mere  utility  and  brings  an 
absolute  directly  into  human  life.  It  stands  or  falls  with  the 
saying :  "  For  what  is  a  man  profited  if  he  gain  the  whole 
world  and  lose  his  own  soul?"  But  how  is  this  possible  if 
a  new  type  of  reality  does  not  stand  behind  this  valuation  ? 
And  were  it  possible,  would  it  not  then  involve  an  undue  strain  ? 
For  in  immediate  existence  all  purposes  must  fit  into  one 
another  and  be  judged  by  one  another ;  in  this  sphere  there 
is  nothing  absolute  to  raise  itself  to  a  position  of  complete 
superiority. 

Thus,  no  matter  from  what  side  we  regard  it,  morality  in- 


390    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

volves  the  demand  for  a  new  world.  It  brings  with  it  a  reversal 
of  the  first  appearance  of  things,  and  is  therefore  metaphysical. 
Hence  by  having  recourse  to  morality  we  do  not  rid  ourselves  of 
metaphysics.  If  we  are  really  earnest  in  keeping  morality  free 
from  all  metaphysics  we  unavoidably  reduce  it  to  a  state  01 
lamentable  superficiality.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  cer- 
tainly good  reason  for  liberating  morality  from  the  complicated 
deductions  of  the  older  speculative  philosophy  and  for  making 
it  more  than  a  secondary  phenomenon  dependent  upon  a  cosmic 
philosophy  of  totally  independent  origin. 

Our  concept  of  spiritual  life  as  the  orientation  of  reality 
towards  an  inner  life  of  its  own,  again  reveals  a  passage 
between  Scylla  and  Charybdis.  For  we  look  upon  spiritual 
life  as  the  "  coming-to-itself  "  of  the  world-process,  the  winning 
of  an  essential  being  and  meaning  over  against  the  meaningless 
network  of  relationships  and  self-preservative  activities  which 
result  from  the  regime  of  the  mere  individual.  With  the 
recognition  of  this  new  world  nature  necessarily  sinks  to  a 
second  and  lower  form  of  being.  But  just  as  the  higher  must 
be  kept  up  by  unceasing  self-activity  so  it  must  first  be 
awakened  at  each  individual  centre,  and  there  appropriated 
through  self-activity.  Such  a  self-active  appropriation  of  the 
spiritual  world  is  nothing  other  than  morality,  which  is  thus 
a  penetration  of  life  to  truthfulness  and  essential  being,  a 
winning  of  a  new,  infinite  self,  a  "becoming  infinite"  from 
within.  For  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  the  spiritual  stage 
consists  essentially  in  the  direct  participation  of  each  individual 
in  the  life  of  the  whole,  the  individual  no  longer  receiving 
such  life  through  the  mediation  of  isolated  impressions. 

Thus  conceived,  morality  is,  in  the  first  place,  a  movement 
within  the  realm  of  personal  life,  an  endeavour  to  reach 
ourselves,  a  wrestling  for  our  own  being.  But  since  this 
being  now  exhibits  a  cosmic  character,  a  cosmic  movement 
is  now  directly  revealed  in  this  labour  upon  ourselves.  It  is 
a  consideration  of  these  facts  which  bids  us  demand  the  closest 
connection  between  morality  and  metaphysics  and  makes  us 
regard  a  morality  without  metaphysics  as  an  absurdity. 
Morality  does  not  demand  cosmic  concepts  merely  for  its 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  391 

explanation.  As  a  result  of  its  very  existence  it  directly 
develops  a  new  world  which  encircles  us  with  an  illuminating 
present.  The  connection  between  morality  and  metaphysics 
can  be  rejected  only  by  those  whose  conception  of  metaphysics 
is  that  of  the  old  school-metaphysics  which,  from  a  supposed 
necessity  of  thought,  devised  a  new  world  in  addition  to  the 
existing  one,  or  by  those  who  would  reduce  morality  to  a 
mere  social  order,  a  "policing"  of  life — the  latter  assuredly 
needs  no  new  world,  but  neither  is  it  morality,  except  in  a 
merely  nominal  sense !  It  is  our  conviction  that  all  morality 
sinks  to  a  mere  appearance,  if  the  spiritual  life — the  appro- 
priation of  which  is  the  object  of  morality — does  not  form  the 
core  of  reality. 

Armed  with  this  conception  of  morality  it  will  be  possible 
for  us  to  confront  the  problems  and  difficulties  with  which 
morality  has  to  deal,  and  with  which  so  much  error  and 
misunderstanding  is  associated.  Morality,  as  thus  viewed,  is 
primarily  the  elevation  of  life,  the  winning  of  a  true  self  as 
opposed  to  a  merely  apparent  self,  the  appropriation  of  the 
whole  infinite  universe;  but  this  elevation  does  not  spring 
from  immediate  existence  through  a  mere  refinement  of  the 
natural  life;  it  must  be  conceived  of  as  opposed  to  this 
existence,  as  a  task,  a  claim,  a  command.  The  limitations 
and  negations  which  are  involved  in  this  claim  operate 
ultimately  towards  the  affirmation  of  life ;  the  idea  of  duty 
which  originates  here  springs  from  our  own  being  and  is  not 
imposed  from  without.  Thus  we  attain  to  an  affirmation  of 
life  which,  far  from  asserting  any  deification  of  mere  nature 
and  selfhood,  meets  all  such  pretensions  with  a  decisive 
"No." 

Looked  at  from  this  point  of  view,  morality  signifies  no 
mere  achievement  within  a  given  world  but  the  gaining  of  a 
new  world,  no  conflict  within  the  world  but  a  struggle  for 
supremacy  between  different  worlds ;  it  is  not  a  question  of  a 
new  kind  of  action,  but  of  a  new  kind  of  being,  though  one 
which  must  certainly  be  continually  translated  into  corre- 
sponding action.  Now  man  is  the  meeting-place  of  different 
stages  of  reality,  nay  of  opposed  worlds,  and  his  decision 


must  settle  which  of  these  worlds  is  to  be  dominant.  Nay, 
since  henceforth,  from  his  own  particular  station,  he  has  to 
maintain  the  higher  stage  of  reality,  since  here  the  new  world 
can  come  to  full  realisation  only  through  his  action,  his 
conduct  reaches  out  beyond  the  individual  standpoint  and 
wins  a  meaning  that  is  universal.  And  with  this  comes  the 
surest  liberation  from  mere  egotism,  an  expansion  of  the 
soul,  an  elevation  above  all  mere  subservience  to  utility ;  an 
incomparable  greatness  and  dignity  is  added  to  man. 

This  greatness  is  indeed  associated  with  serious  perplexities. 
For  the  task  cannot  be  magnified  in  this  fashion  without 
bringing  to  light  the  widest  disparities  and  the  most  deter- 
mined resistances  between  man  and  man.  Before  all  else 
the  natural  world  keeps  man  bound  down  to  the  mere  ego ; 
in  the  face  of  this  resistance  the  movement  towards  spirituality 
makes  but  little  impression,  it  threatens  to  remain  a  mere 
intention,  to  sink  to  a  mere  appearance  ;  it  becomes  clearly 
visible  that,  as  compared  with  the  strength  of  the  mere  man, 
something  impossible  is  being  demanded.  Therefore  man 
must  become  something  more  than  mere  man.  How  could 
cosmic  life  be  turned  in  a  new  direction  except  by  a  cosmic 
force? — thus  a  cosmic  force  must  be  operative  in  man  from 
the  very  outset ;  there  must  be  a  receptivity  corresponding 
to  man's  activity,  a  hand  from  above  to  draw  the  climber 
up ;  yea,  in  freedom  itself  there  must  shine  out  some  revela- 
tion of  grace.  Truly  a  transformation  of  life's  first  aspect ! 
The  original  affirmation  has  become  intolerable,  but  out  of 
the  negation  has  arisen  a  new  affirmation.  Here  are  great 
demands  and  great  upheavals,  gigantic  tides  of  life  sweeping 
men  along  and  transforming  them,  much  incompleteness  and 
insecurity,  much  stubborn  resistance  and  paralysing  constraint ; 
but  in  the  midst  of  all  doubts  and  resistances,  life  continues 
to  maintain  itself,  greater  depths  are  opened  up,  an  inner 
infinitude  becomes  increasingly  manifest.  If  anything  can 
show  us  that  our  life  is  not  a  matter  of  indifference,  that  in 
it  something  significant  takes  place,  it  is  morality  that  can 
do  it. 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  393 

(c)  Morality  and  Art 

(The  Ethical  and  dEsthetical  Views  of  Life) 

That  art  and  morality  have  been  in  frequent  conflict  from  the 
earliest  times  and  that  their  relationship  to  one  another  has 
been  one  of  tension  and  hostility  is  by  no  means  a  mere 
consequence  of  human  error.  There  is  a  reason  for  it  in  the 
very  nature  of  things.  The  two  spheres  seem  to  place  life 
under  opposed  tasks  and  valuations :  morality  demands  a 
subordination  to  universally  valid  laws,  art  on  the  other  hand 
desires  the  freest  development  of  individuality;  morality 
speaks  with  the  stern  voice  of  duty,  art  invites  the  free  play 
of  all  our  forces ;  morality  has  its  dwelling-place  in  the 
sphere  of  pure  inwardness  and  is  prone  to  think  but  little  of 
visible  achievement,  while  art  values  only  that  which  can  be 
outwardly  embodied.  In  order  to  arrive  at  a  correct  valuation 
of  this  contrast  and  conflict  it  will  be  advantageous  brieflv  to 

•/ 

review  the  historical  development  of  the  problem,  if  only  as  a 
safeguard  against  individual  prejudice  and  bias. 

1.  ON  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

It  is  a  singular  fact  that  the  Greeks,  superior  as  they  were 
to  all  other  peoples  in  artistic  achievement,  did  not  assign  an 
important  place  to  art  in  their  philosophical  work.  The  case 
against  art  was  maintained  by  no  less  a  thinker  than  the 
greatest  artist  among  the  philosophers — Plato :  many  different 
tendencies  in  Plato's  work  combined  to  make  him  find  fault 
with  art ;  his  desire  for  a  truly  genuine  and  non-sensuous 
being  forced  him  to  regard  art  as  the  mere  shadow  of  a 
shadow;  he  was  further  repelled  by  the  ever-varying  nature 
of  its  forms,  as  seen  more  particularly  in  the  case  of  dramatic 
art,  by  the  impurity  of  the  mythological  thought -world  which 
dominated  art,  and,  finally,  by  the  feverish  excitation  of 
emotional  life,  which  he  saw  continually  increasing.  Undis- 
turbed by  such  accusations,  art  pursued  its  way  and  retained 
its  leading  place  in  the  life  of  the  Ancient  World.  But  the 
more  it  lapsed  into  subjective  virtuosity  —  now  eccentric 


394    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

exaggeration  and  now  effeminate  dilettantism — and  the  more 
formal  polish  replaced  real  content,  the  stronger  became  the 
reaction  in  favour  of  a  hard  and  severe  morality,  the  more 
Cynicism  and  Stoicism  became  the  refuge  of  those  proud 
souls  who  scorned  to  render  homage  to  the  mere  enjoyment 
of  the  beautiful. 

It  was  in  connection  with  the  rising  religious  movement  that 
art  for  the  first  time  secured  full  recognition  of  its  independent 
value,  as  is  seen  more  particularly  in  the  philosophy  of 
Plotinus :  the  inward  deepening  which  morality  thereby  ex- 
perienced had  also  the  effect  of  deepening  the  task  of  art. 
According  to  Plotinus  the  beautiful  involved  a  mastering  of 
the  lower  by  the  higher,  of  the  body  by  the  soul,  of  matter 
by  thought ;  creative  power  does  not  lose  itself  in  the  stone, 
it  remains  spiritually  free  and  passes  from  soul  to  soul ;  the 
visible  work  of  art  has  value  only  as  a  medium  for  the  soul's 
feeling.  Art  is  no  longer,  as  it  was  with  Plato,  a  mere 
imitation  of  nature ;  it  endeavours  to  depict  the  highest  reason 
operative  in  nature,  and  in  so  doing  it  may  very  well  achieve 
more  than  nature  itself.  But  the  fundamental  religious 
temper  here  operative  did  far  more  to  bring  the  beautiful  into 
sympathy  with  the  interests  of  mystical  contemplation  than  with 
those  of  artistic  creation.  Hence  we  find  an  artistic  temper 
pervading  the  whole  of  life,  but  rather  evading  than  seeking 
a  palpable  form  of  expression. 

It  was  impossible  for  Christianity  to  transfer  the  centre  of 
gravity  of  life  from  the  artistic  to  the  moral  without  the  reputa- 
tion and  status  of  art  at  first  suffering  the  severest  injury. 
Moreover,  the  type  of  art  which  prevailed  during  the  latter  days 
of  the  Ancient  World  could  only  encourage  the  abandonment  of 
art.  But  although  in  the  general  life  of  the  age  art  developed 
in  a  fashion  which  was  often  very  unedifying  and  not  infrequently 
deteriorated  into  a  contempt  for  all  form,  its  development  on  the 
higher  levels  of  culture  was  of  a  very  different  kind  :  the  deepen- 
ing of  spiritual  life  which  had  been  effected  by  religion  led  art 
into  new  pathways.  This  is  more  particularly  to  be  seen  in  the 
case  of  Jesus  Himself.  It  is  true  in  general  of  the  founders  of 
the  historical  religions  that  only  the  possession  of  a  conspicuously 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  395 

creative  imagination  enabled  them  to  make  an  invisible  world 
obviously  and  overpoweringly  present,  and  indeed  to  make  it 
man's  chief  world ;  it  is  particularly  true  of  Jesus.  In  His  case 
this  world  presentation  was  marked  by  a  quite  peculiar  warmth, 
tenderness,  and  inwardness.  By  clearly  and  plainly  holding  up 
the  kingdom  of  God  to  man  as  a  kingdom  of  true  love  and 
childlike  confidence,  thereby  awakening  latent  feelings  and  filling 
men's  minds  with  a  deep  yearning,  He  effected  an  artistic  trans- 
figuration of  human  existence.  This  is  to  be  seen  with  peculiar 
clearness  in  the  discovery  of  the  purity,  innocence,  and  devotion 
of  child-life  and  in  the  wonderful  manner  in  which  the  simplest 
processes  of  nature  were  employed  as  illustrations  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  human  soul.  So  that  in  this  case,  notwithstanding 
the  setting  aside  of  all  sensuous  art,  a  secure  pathway  was 
prepared  for  spiritual  art.  Later  on  the  Greek  idea  of  beauty 
became  more  and  more  influential.  We  see  this  illustrated  in 
Gregory  of  Nyssa  and  Augustine.  It  is  true  that  the  latter,  to  a 
very  large  extent,  fell  under  the  influence  of  tendencies  hostile 
to  art,  and  his  conversion  to  Christianity  was  due  in  no  small 
measure  to  his  profound  dissatisfaction  with  a  formal  and  literary 
education  and  to  the  desire  for  a  genuine  life-content ;  but  in 
his  own  sphere  of  thought  he  clung  firmly  to  the  beautiful, 
through  which  the  ascent  to  an  all-embracing  unity  was  made, 
and  he  taught  that  all  manifoldness  was  to  be  understood  as  a 
work  and  witness  of  this  unity.  Finally,  he  came  to  regard  the 
whole  cosmos  as  an  ethical  work  of  art,  as  an  order  completely 
reconciling  justice  and  love.  At  the  same  time  Augustine  was 
himself  a  conspicuous  master  of  language ;  his  work  reveals  the 
whole  power  and  tenderness  of  a  mind  moving  to  and  fro 
between  the  contrasts  of  existence.  He  imparted  a  wonderfully 
musical  tone  to  the  Latin  language,  and  as  employed  by  him  it 
became  a  suitable  medium  for  the  expression  of  the  deepest 
inner  life. 

The  ecclesiastical  system  of  the  Middle  Ages  brought  with 
it  a  certain  far-reaching  reconciliation  of  the  main  opposing 
tendencies,  and  it  did  not  omit  to  give  the  beautiful  a  place 
within  its  system.  In  the  general  construction  of  life,  this  is  to 
be  seen  in  the  prominent  place  assigned  to  the  order  and  har- 


396    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

mony  of  the  whole ;  in  the  more  detailed  arrangement,  it 
appears  in  the  manifold  ways  in  which  art  is  called  upon  to 
glorify  religion  and  the  Church. 

The  Modern  Period,  with  its  greater  vitality  and  its  intensifi- 
cation of  all  contrasts,  destroyed  the  mediaeval  equilibrium. 
During  its  whole  course  the  struggle  and  contrast  has  never 
ceased.  At  the  very  commencement,  the  Renaissance  and  the 
Reformation  gave  the  contrast  its  most  decisive  expression.  In 
the  Renaissance  an  aesthetical  view  of  the  world  and  of  life 
in  general  attained  full  consciousness  for  the  first  time;  now 
the  beautiful  became  the  chief  instrument  in  the  development  ot 
life,  the  most  important  means  for  the  expression  of  every  kind 
of  power  and  for  the  self-realisation  and  self-enjoyment  of  man. 
Art  taught  life  to  find  itself,  to  reach  its  own  highest  level. 
At  the  same  time  life  rejected  as  unreal  all  invisible  ties ; 
predominantly  devoted  to  immediate  reality,  it  aspired,  through 
the  control  of  inner  and  outer  nature,  to  realise  a  full  and 
boundless  happiness.  Filled  with  a  powerful  desire  for  life  and 
a  proud  self-consciousness,  it  was  easy  for  men  to  look  upon 
morality  as  a  restriction  imposed  from  without,  as  a  rigid 
ordinance  and  a  tiresome  constraint ;  the  stronger  the  indi- 
viduality the  more  he  seemed  justified  in  shaking  off  all  such 
constraint  and  following  solely  his  own  inclination.  Hence  arose 
the  immorality  of  the  Renaissance,  a  chief  reason  for  its  collapse 
as  a  world-dominating  power.  At  its  best,  however,  there  was 
no  lack  of  personalities  who  overcame  the  opposition,  grasping 
art  with  the  whole  force  of  their  being  and  giving  it  the 
form  of  an  ethical  life-work — we  need  refer  only  to  Michael 
Angelo.  After  the  Renaissance  the  artistic  movement  pursued 
the  line  of  the  grotesque  and  rococo.  And  yet  from  time  to 
time  a  wave  of  the  old  feeling  would  draw  men  back  to  the 
Renaissance. 

The  strength  of  the  Reformation  lay  in  the  great  importance 
assigned  to  morality  and  in  the  deepening  of  personal  respon- 
sibility. Thus  it  brought  a  great  earnestness  into  life,  and  this 
exerted  an  influence  reaching  far  beyond  the  reformers  them- 
selves or  even  their  followers.  An  inward  deepening  of  this 
kind  was  not  directly  favourable  to  art :  moreover  art,  with  its 


THE   PROBLEMS  OF  MORALITY  397 

wealth  of  sensuous  imagery,  seemed  to  render  the  approach  of 
man  to  God  more  difficult ;  and  to  gain  a  direct  relationship  to 
God  was  the  all-important  object  of  life.  Hence  an  intense 
scorn  for  every  species  of  image  and  ornament,  for  did  not 
these  obscure  the  living  presence  of  God  in  the  soul  and  so 
tend  to  make  life  superficial  and  effeminate  ?  But,  although,  in 
this  manner,  modes  of  feeling  hostile  to  art  became  very 
influential,  art  of  another  kind  grew  up  on  a  higher  creative 
level — an  art  comparatively  separate  from  the  sphere  of  sense 
but  more  deeply  rooted  in  the  soul.  In  illustration  one  may 
mention  Luther  and  Bach. 

The  rationalistic  character  of  the  Enlightenment,  with  its 
insistence  upon  logical  clarity,  its  deliberate  and  resourceful 
purposiveness,  its  unhistorical  mode  of  thought,  was  but  little 
favourable  to  art,  which  was  now  ranked  far  below  morality. 
At  the  same  time  the  latter  acquired  no  particular  depth. 
With  the  rise  of  the  New  Humanism  and  the  dawning  of  a  new 
epoch  the  desire  for  beauty  grew  proportionately  stronger.  The 
humanistic  tendency,  at  its  best,  as  instanced  by  the  leading 
German  poets  and  thinkers,  brought  the  good  and  the  beauti- 
ful into  helpful  co-operation.  Kant  made  the  moral  idea  the 
corner-stone  of  life,  but  this  did  not  prevent  him  recognising 
the  independence  and  self-value  of  the  beautiful,  and  in  fact  he 
was  the  first  clearly  to  distinguish  it  from  both  the  good  and 
the  agreeable ;  he  founded  it  in  the  centre  of  the  soul  itself, 
and  securely  raised  it  above  all  mere  utility  and  enjoyment. 
Thus  Goethe  found  "  the  main  ideas  of  the  Critique  of  Judg- 
ment quite  in  sympathy  with  his  previous  convictions  con- 
cerning art,  thought,  and  conduct."  Goethe  himself,  however, 
notwithstanding  the  greatness  of  his  artistic  creation,  was  far 
removed  from  undervaluing  morality  and  from  confessing  to  an 
aesthetical  view  of  life  ;  his  artistic  work  was  far  too  much  an 
earnest  and  diligent  seeking  of  his  own  innermost  being,  a 
conscientious  labour  upon  himself.  Those  who  favour  a  lax 
view  of  this  problem  have  no  right  to  appeal  to  Goethe,  if  his 
whole  drift  be  taken  into  account  and  not  merely  isolated 
expressions.  Although  it  is  true  enough  that  he  would  not 
hear  of  art  and  artistic  culture  being  limited  by  "  conventional 


398    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

moral  ideas"  or  by  "pedantry  and  conceit,"  yet  in  demanding 
that  man  should  seize  the  order  of  the  world  as  an  order  of 
freedom,  and  set  himself  his  own  limit,  he  assigned  a  moral 
task  which  embraces  the  whole  of  life  and  puts  man  into  contact 
with  a  high  and  universal  duty.  Finally,  Schiller,  half  poet 
and  half  thinker,  was  never  tired  of  working  towards  a  recon- 
ciliation of  the  good  and  the  beautiful,  for  "freedom  in  the 
phenomenon."  As  Kiihnemann  puts  it :  "  The  characteristic, 
nay  the  unique  quality  of  Schiller's  mode  of  thought  consisted 
in  a  high  purity  of  moral  standpoint  combined  with  the  fullest 
possible  recognition  of  the  independence  of  artistic  life." 

Then  the  two  tendencies  again  became  divided.  Roman- 
ticism gave  a  peculiarly  definite  and  self-conscious  expression 
to  the  priority  of  art  and  the  aesthetical  view  of  life,  while 
Fichte  and  the  other  leaders  of  the  national  movement  exerted 
a  powerful  influence  in  the  direction  of  strengthening  morality. 
The  social  and  industrial  type  of  civilisation,  which  became 
more  and  more  powerful  during  the  course  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  was  inclined,  with  its  tendency  towards  social  welfare 
and  utility,  to  assign  a  subordinate  part  to  art.  Modern  art 
rises  in  protest  against  this  and  is  ambitious  to  influence  the 
whole  of  life :  it  promises  to  impart  more  facility,  more  joy 
and  more  individuality  to  life ;  in  opposition  to  morality  it 
holds  up  an  aesthetic  view  of  life  as  being  alone  justifiable. 
Hence  at  the  present  time  the  two  spheres  again  stand  wide 
apart. 

Our  historical  examination  shows  that  this  antithesis  has 
existed  for  thousands  of  years.  It  is  no  temporary  state  of 
affairs :  again  and  again  morality  has  reproached  art  with 
disintegrating  life  and  rendering  it  effeminate  and  inert,  and  in 
its  turn  morality  has  been  charged  with  being  hard,  mechani- 
cal and  soulless.  Further,  we  have  convinced  ourselves  that 
these  same  two  elements,  which  become  so  widely  separate 
on  the  lower  levels  of  life,  tend  on  the  highest  level  to 
approach  one  another;  in  the  case  of  creative  minds,  the 
opposition,  if  not  entirely  removed,  is  at  any  rate  greatly 
reduced ;  such  minds  clearly  prove  that  spiritual  life  cannot 
dispense  with  any  of  its  aspects,  and  that  the  blame  for  this 


399 

state  of  division  must  be  attributed  to  man  rather  than  to 
the  nature  of  the  problem  itself.  In  reality,  morality  and  art 
cannot  take  up  their  own  tasks  in  a  really  worthy  manner 
without  each  recognising  the  other  to  be  not  only  important 
but  indispensable  ;  they  cannot  fulfil  their  respective 
missions  without  taking  their  places  in  a  comprehensive 
whole  of  spiritual  life,  and  seeking  an  understanding  in  this 
relationship. 

When  morality  endeavours  directly  to  take  over  the  whole  of 
life,  it  usually  develops  into  a  system  of  rules  and  regulations 
which  makes  a  stern  appeal  to  man  while  promising  him  a  high 
reward  for  its  fulfilment.  In  this  manner  life  has  been  stirred 
up  and  much  severe  concentration  has  been  attained,  but  being 
conceived  of  predominantly  as  a  command,  morality  has  not  here 
won  its  way  to  full  inner  appropriation,  nor  has  it  given  rise  to 
love  and  joy.  Man  was  thus  easily  tossed  to  and  fro  between  a 
consciousness  of  helpless  weakness  and  a  self-conscious  Phari- 
saism. As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  always  a  certain  mediocre 
type  of  bourgeois  or  ecclesiastical  life  which  was  satisfied  with 
mere  morality ;  taking  their  average  level,  neither  the  early  cen- 
turies of  Christianity  nor  the  age  of  the  Enlightenment  pos- 
sessed an  important  spiritual  content,  in  spite  of  their  moral 
enthusiasm.  Morality  itself  was  able  to  escape  the  danger  of  be- 
coming rigid  and  superficial  only  by  entering  into  wider  relation- 
ships. When  this  movement  took  place,  however,  in  so  far  as  it 
led  towards  the  appropriation  of  a  new  reality,  and  in  so  far  as 
it  came  to  mean  not  merely  the  correct  fulfilment  of  command 
but  an  inward  renewal  of  man,  a  progress  towards  newness  of 
life,  it  found  art  absolutely  indispensable :  for  this  new  matter 
could  not  be  comprehended  as  a  whole,  and  become  really  present 
and  alive,  without  the  assistance  of  artistic  activity ;  nor  could 
it  become  really  universal  in  the  absence  of  the  constructive 
labour  of  art,  weaving  inward  and  outward  together.  When  the 
great  object  is  to  attain  to  a  new  world  and  a  new  life,  to  rise 
above  the  petty  aims  of  the  mere  man  and  mere  everyday  life, 
then  art,  with  its  quiet  and  sure  labour,  conditioned  by  the  inner 
necessities  of  things,  with  its  inner  liberation  of  the  soul,  and  with 
its  power  to  bring  the  whole  infinitude  of  being  inwardly  near  to 


400    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

us,  and  to  make  it  part  of  our  own  life,  must  be  directly  reckoned 
as  moral. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  type  of  art  which  thinks  highly  of  itself 
and  its  task  cannot  possibly  despise  morality.  There  has  hardly 
ever  been  a  creative  artist  of  the  first  rank  who  professed  the 
sesthetical  view  of  life,  for  such  an  one  cannot  look  upon  art  as  a 
separate  sphere  dissociated  from  the  rest  of  life ;  he  must  put 
his  whole  soul  into  his  creation,  he  cannot  be  satisfied  with  a 
mere  technique,  and  he  is  far  too  conscious  of  the  difficulties  and 
shortcomings  of  this  creation  to  make  it  a  mere  matter  of  enjoy- 
ment. As  a  matter  of  fact  the  sesthetical  view  of  life  is  professed 
not  so  much  by  artists  themselves  as  by  dilettantists  who 
study  art  from  the  outside,  and  often  enough  force  their  theories 
upon  the  artists,  who,  not  much  disposed  to  abstract  discus- 
sion, and  indeed  defenceless  against  it,  hardly  realise  that  this 
separation  of  art  from  life  as  a  whole  does  not  elevate  art  but 
degrades  it. 

The  mutual  dependency  of  art  and  morality  will  be  more  par- 
ticularly recognised  when  our  world  is  not  looked  upon  as  finished 
and  complete  but  as  being  in  process  of  evolution,  nay,  as  being 
a  world  in  which  what  already  exists  has  not  merely  to  be  con- 
tinued but  a  new  stage  of  reality  has  to  be  inaugurated.  For 
this  purpose  we  need  an  independent  decision,  an  awakening  of 
the  whole  being,  an  energetic  activity  embracing  the  whole  of 
existence.  It  is  clear  that  in  the  first  place  we  are  not  called  to 
comfortable  enjoyment  or  to  contemplation,  but  to  action  and 
creation.  At  the  same  time  a  powerful  and  artistic  construction 
will  be  essential  if  the  new  world  is  not  to  remain  vague  and 
undefined,  and  if  it  is  to  capture  the  whole  soul.  In  the  con- 
struction of  a  new  life  art  is  indispensable. 

2.  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  PRESENT  DAY 
a.  Modern  JEstheticism 

After  the  preceding  remarks  it  will  hardly  be  necessary  to 
explain  our  position  with  regard  to  sestheticism.  But  against 
the  aestheticism  of  the  present  day,  in  particular,  we  have  to 
make  a  charge  of  inner  untruthfulness  :  to-day,  the  world  and 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  401 

life  in  general  exhibit  far  too  much  that  is  dark  and  irrational 
and  the  great  contradictions  of  existence  stir  us  far  too  pro- 
foundly for  it  to  be  possible  for'  us,  with  our  whole  souls  and  with 
complete  devotion,  to  convert  our  existence  predominantly  into 
enjoyment  and  to  experience  the  harmony  of  the  whole  with 
pure  joy.  This  aestheticisui  is  not  so  much  a  true  expression  of 
the  modern  attitude  towards  life  as  an  attempt  to  escape  from 
life's  difficulty  and  earnestness.  This  can  only  be  accomplished 
by  a  union  with  modern  subjectivism,  a  union  which  gives  rise 
to  attitudes  of  mind,  noteworthy  as  signs  of  the  times,  but 
destitute  of  all  creative  capacity  and  all  power  to  elevate 
the  soul. 

A  tendency  compounded  of  individualism  and  aestheticism  has 
evolved  the  catchword  "  new  ethic,"  a  phrase  which  has  acquired 
considerable  influence,  more  particularly  in  feminine  circles. 
Even  a  movement  of  this  kind  must  not  be  straightway  depre- 
ciated ;  its  root  principles  must  be  impartially  considered.  What 
society  calls  morality  is  nothing  more  than  an  order  of  social 
life  to  which  custom  and  use  has  imparted  an  appearance  of 
sanctity  ;  hence,  in  spite  of  its  insufficiency,  it  is  very  liable  to 
assert  itself  with  great  self-consciousness,  just  as  servants  are 
very  apt  to  be  more  arrogant  than  their  masters.  Now  as  the 
progress  of  history  changes  the  type  of  social  life,  alterations 
may  become  necessary ;  the  rigid  conservation  of  the  traditional 
type  may  give  rise  to  painful  pressure  and  may  convert  right 
into  wrong  and  wrong  into  right.  The  Modern  Period  has 
produced  such  a  great  alteration  in  mutual  relationships  and 
in  the  type  of  work  in  general  that  a  revision  of  this  social 
order  and  hence  of  conventional  morality  is  necessary  in  various 
directions. 

But  in  recognising  this  we  are  far  from  expressing  our 
approval  of  the  hasty  and  summary  manner  in  which  difficult 
and  responsible  questions  are  settled  by  the  representatives 
(and  perhaps  more  particularly  the  feminine  representatives) 
of  an  SBsthetical  subjectivism.  To  begin  with,  morality  itself 
is  something  other  than  its  visible  representative,  social  order; 
and  moral  conduct  is  not  identical  with  social  correctness.  On 
the  highest  levels  of  moral  creation  this  correctness  has  been 

26 


402    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

but  little  valued.  The  idea  of  making  the  mere  means  into 
the  dominating  aim  has  heen  decisively  rejected.  Nevertheless, 
in  spite  of  its  inadequacy,  the  means  is  by  no  means  valueless. 
It  does  not  follow  because  certain  institutions  have  become 
problematical  that  all  social  order  should  be  decried  as  an 
undue  restraint ;  as  human  affairs  are,  it  is  an  indispensable 
means  of  raising  life  to  a  certain  level  and  offering  an  adequate 
resistance  to  the  ceaselessly  active  disruptive  forces.  Only  an 
unlimited  optimism,  so  naive  that  we  are  tempted  to  call  it 
childish,  could  possibly  cherish  the  delusion  that  if  humanity 
were  granted  unlimited  freedom  the  whole  of  life  would  become 
joyful  and  harmonious.  Such  optimism  might  be  described  as 
amiable  if  the  superficiality  with  which  it  fascinates  semi-edu- 
cated people  did  not  make  it  dangerous.  It  may  seem  regret- 
table that  man  should  need  social  order  for  the  disciplining  of 
his  desires,  but  that  is  not  the  fault  of  the  order ;  those  who 
object  to  it  should,  if  they  are  logical,  reject  every  medicine 
which  does  not  taste  agreeable.  If  we  were  to  break  down  all 
restraints  in  the  interests  of  a  too  idealistic  view  of  life, 
should  we  not  be  only  too  apt  to  accomplish  the  very  opposite 
of  that  which  we  desire?  "L'homme  n'est  ni  ange  ni  bete; 
et  le  malheur  veut  que  qui  veut  faire  1'ange  fait  la  bete " 
(Pascal). 

In  view  of  the  term  "  new  ethic,"  we  must  protest  against 
such  a  misuse  of  the  word  ethic.  Words  are  not  to  be  treated 
lightly.  Their  misuse  may  contribute  towards  the  obscuration 
of  genuine  problems.  We  have  been  accustomed  to  understand 
by  morality  an  order  removed  from  mere  individual  whim  or 
desire  and  associated  with  a  high  respect  for  duty  and  con- 
science. That  which  aesthetical  subjectivism  offers  us  under 
the  catchword  of  the  "  new  ethic  "  is  in  reality  a  finer  form 
of  Epicureanism,  a  self-indulgence  on  the  part  of  the  individual, 
who  frees  himself  from  every  restriction ;  those  who  find  satis- 
faction in  it  should,  in  consistency,  reject  both  ethics  and  re- 
ligion as  fundamentally  erroneous  and  remove  them  from  their 
sphere  of  thought.  They  should  not,  however,  make  use  01 
these  names  to  gloss  over  a  mode  of  thought  which  is  essentially 
different.  There  is  no  mistaking  the  sharp  contradiction.  Is 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  403 

man  nothing  more  than  the  sum  total  of  his  natural  inclinations, 
and  does  human  wisdom  consist  solely  in  bringing  these  in- 
clinations into  a  state  of  the  best  possible  equilibrium,  or  do 
we  possess  a  spiritual  power  capable  of  converting  our  existence 
into  free  action  and  of  enabling  us  to  become  masters  of  our- 
selves ?  Is  our  relationship  to  reality  predominantly  receptive 
or  active?  Is  our  subjective  happiness  the  highest  of  all 
good,  or  is  there  an  inner  necessity  driving  us  beyond 
such  a  limitation  ?  This  opposition  has  been  clear  to  us 
since  the  days  of  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans,  and  it  admits 
of  no  compromise.  The  old  Epicureans,  however,  thought 
with  greater  precision  than  do  their  modern  followers,  for 
they  did  not  announce  themselves  as  the  representatives  of  a 
new  ethic !  * 

It  is  in  its  treatment  of  the  sensuous,  more  particularly  in  the 
sphere  of  sex,  that  modern  subjectivism  comes  most  sharply 
into  conflict  with  other  convictions.  No  one  can  deny  that  the 
subject  is  a  complicated  one.  In  Christianity,  more  particularly 
Catholic  Christianity,  a  disparagement,  nay,  a  contempt  of  the 
sense  element,  is  still  largely  in  evidence — an  attitude  of  mind 
which  originated  in  the  tendencies  of  the  decadent  Classical 
Period,  and  the  struggle  Christianity  then  fought  against  a 
degenerate  sensualism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have  to  deal 
with  a  Manichaean  element  which  has  forced  its  way  into 
Christianity,  and,  in  spite  of  all  outward  strictness,  tends  to 
produce  inward  shallowness ;  for  shallowness  it  is  when  the 
chief  care  of  life  is  to  carry  on  a  struggle  against  the  sensuous, 

*  The  distinguished  Swedish  philosopher  Vitalis  Norstrom  has  expressed 
himself  with  regard  to  this  problem  with  singular  power  and  depth  in  his 
book  Das  Tausendjahrige  Reich  (Germ,  trans.  1907).  He  says,  for  example, 
on  p.  31 :  "  How  extraordinary  is  that  shallow  sentimentality  which  cherishes 
the  idea  of  building  up  a  stable  psychical  equilibrium  upon  the  satisfaction  of 
the  senses  I  What  a  poverty-stricken  soul  must  dwell  in  that  wisdom  which 
knows  no  higher  aim  than  that  of  having  a  permanent  '  good  time ' — if  one  may 
employ  the  phrase !  This  world  of  universal  indulgence  (in  so  far  as  it  were 
possible  at  all)  would  not  bring  out  man's  best  qualities — the  elevation  above 
mere  satisfaction,  the  overcoming  of  self :  it  would  shut  out  that  which,  in  a 
condition  of  affairs  which  certainly  needs  betterment,  nevertheless  involves  a 
certain  sacredness  and  solemnity ;  that  which  a  countryman  of  Zola's,  the 
noble  Alfred  de  Vigny,  haa  celebrated  as  the  '  majesty  of  human  suffering.' " 


404  MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

to  weaken,  degrade,  and  stultify  it  as  far  as  possible,  and  when 
those  who  have  been  peculiarly  successful  in  thus  stamping  out 
the  sense  element  are  honoured  as  heroes  and  selected  as 
patterns,  no  matter  how  hard  or  shallow  they  may  be.  For, 
after  all,  what  inner  purification  of  the  soul  or  development  of 
spiritual  life  is  gained  by  such  a  misuse  of  the  senses  ?  More- 
over, this  repression  of  the  senses,  like  everything  unnatural, 
must  produce  greater  evils  than  those  which  it  undertakes  to 
remove.  Nature  is  in  the  habit  of  taking  a  severe  revenge  for 
misuse.  But  the  matter  does  not  end  with  the  rejection  of 
this  type  of  asceticism ;  it  is  not  so  simple  as  it  often  appears 
to  be  from  the  point  of  view  of  aesthetical  subjectivism.  The 
sensuous  and  sexual  side  of  life  shows  us  man  associated  in 
the  most  intimate  manner  with  nature ;  here,  more  than  any- 
where else,  nature  holds  him  fast.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  the 
development  of  spiritual  life  has  raised  him  far  above  nature, 
and  therefore  the  simple  and  unsophisticated  attitude  is  no 
longer  possible.  The  sensuous  has  become  a  problem  which 
from  the  point  of  view  of  spiritual  life  admits  of  various  solu- 
tions. Should  it  be  free  to  follow  its  own  course  in  complete 
freedom,  without  reference  to  the  higher  aims  of  the  spirit, 
according  to  the  whim  and  desire  of  the  individual,  or  should 
it  subordinate  itself  to  the  purposes  of  the  spiritual  life,  here 
finding  its  measure?  Those  who,  bearing  in  mind  the  indis- 
putable rights  of  nature,  decide  in  favour  of  the  former  course, 
usually  overlook  the  fact  that  in  our  complex  and  frequently 
perverted  civilisation  we  have  no  longer  to  deal  with  pure 
nature  ;  the  sense  element  in  modern  life  is  often  refined 
and  artificial,  nay,  degenerate.  In  order  to  separate  what  is 
genuine  in  nature  from  what  is  not,  we  need  the  assistance  of 
spiritual  work.  A  simple  capitulation  to  the  so-called  sense 
element  in  the  life  of  to-day  is  absolutely  out  of  the  question. 

/3.  The  Position  of  Art  in  Modern  Life 

In  the  life  of  to-day  art  is  again  pushing  victoriously  to  the 
front  and  exerting  immense  influence  upon  men's  minds  ;  hence 
we  cannot  be  surprised  that  it  rejects  all  idea  of  dependence  and 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  405 

insists  upon  complete  independence.  This  desire  finds  an 
expression  in  the  well-known  formula,  Vart  pour  Vart.*  No 
friend  of  art  will  contradict  the  negative  side  of  this  statement. 
Art  should  not  serve  foreign  purposes :  it  should  not  lend  aid  to 
morality,  politics,  or  religion,  and  thereby  sink  to  the  level  of 
"art  with  a  purpose,"  which  may  he  ahle  to  fascinate  for  a 
moment,  hut  which  cannot  promote  any  real  progress.  It  is 
not  so  easy,  however,  to  interpret  this  saying  in  a  positive 
sense.  To-day  it  is  often  asserted  that  art  should  be  indifferent 
to  all  matter  and  content,  concerning  itself  solely  with  the 
perfection  of  its  form ;  in  this  way  only  will  it  be  able  to  stand 
entirely  alone  and  be  able  to  go  its  own  way  in  perfect  freedom. 
But  is  such  a  separation  from  the  rest  of  life  conducive  to  the 
interests  of  art  itself;  can  it  under  these  circumstances  achieve 
the  highest  of  which  it  is  capable  ?  There  is  very  great  danger 
that  in  following  this  path,  art  may  degenerate  into  a  mere 
mastery  of  form,  a  fascinating  and  dazzling  display  of  highly 
technical  skill  which  neither  has  the  whole  man  behind  it  nor  is 
able  to  influence  the  whole  man.  Art  of  this  type  may  make 
great  discoveries  in  the  sphere  of  sense  experience ;  it  may  be 
able  to  enrich  and  perfect  our  sensibilities  in  undreamt-of 
fashion ;  it  may  revel  in  the  overcoming  of  difficulties,  but  it 
can  bring  but  little  benefit  to  the  human  soul,  and  it  will 
not  be  able  perceptibly  to  elevate  spiritual  life.  Was  it  not 
characteristic  of  the  great  works  of  art  which  have  made  a 
permanent  appeal  to  man  that  in  them  all  opposition  between 
form  and  content  was  overcome  ;  in  their  perfection  of  form  have 
they  not  at  the  same  time  given  full  expression  to  the  content 
of  the  inner  life  ?  Should  not  art  take  up  the  problems  of 


*  This  expression  (see  Buchmann's  Geftiigelte  Worte,  21st  edit.,  p.  326)  had 
(as  first  employed  by  Victor  Cousin  in  lectures  at  the  Sorbonne,  1818)  quite  a 
harmless  significance  :  II  faut  de  la  religion  pour  la  religion,  de  la  morale  pour 
la  morale,  de  Vart  pour  Vart.  It  was  not  until  considerably  later  that  the  latter 
phrase  became  the  creed  of  a  school  and  an  apple  of  contention  between  different 
artistic  factions.  It  may  be  added  that  Comte,  too,  concerned  himself  at  one 
time  with  this  catchword,  employing  it,  however,  in  a  very  external  fashion. 
Cultiver  Vart  pour  Van  Iui-in6me  signified  to  him  nothing  more  than  ne  te 
proposer  iiabitueUement  d'autre  bout  reel  que  de  divertir  It  public  (Court  dephil. 
posit.,  vi.  167;. 


406    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

humanity  and  attempt  to  solve  them  after  its  own  fashion  ?  * 
The  inhabitants  of  the  northern  countries,  in  particular,  cannot 
afford  to  abandon  this  inwardness.  They  do  not  possess  the 
natural  faculty  for  sensuous  representation  which  is  character- 
istic of  the  southern  nature ;  only  with  difficulty  do  they 
find  a  path  leading  from  within  outwards ;  hence  it  is  easy  for 
the  centre  of  the  soul  to  remain  unexpressed,  its  greatest  depth 
unrevealed.  Accordingly,  art  is  to  them  an  indispensable 
means  of  finding  themselves,  of  taking  full  possession  of  their 
inheritance,  of  in  some  way  bridging  over  the  division  in  the 
inner  being.  The  most  perfect  form  as  mere  form  will  never 
be  able  to  satisfy. 

Those  who  reject  content  as  something  dangerous  and  foreign 
to  art  usually  have  in  their  minds  a  product  of  thought,  an 
abstract  idea.  But  is  spiritual  life  the  same  thing  as  thought ; 
is  there  no  spiritual  content  other  than  a  thought  element? 
The  old  intellectualism  might  have  answered  this  question  in 
the  affirmative,  but  to-day  we  no  longer  aim  at  being  intellec- 
tualists ;  how  then  can  we  continue  to  be  bound  down  by 
obsolete  standards  and  prevented  from  aspiring  towards  a 
content  for  the  whole  man,  a  content  in  the  deepest  and 
widest  sense  of  the  word? 

In  our  opinion  this  setting  aside  of  content  constitutes  a 
danger  for  that  very  independence  of  art  in  the  interests  of 
which  it  is  demanded.  To  become  independent  of  material 

*  With  regard  to  this  problem,  too,  Norstrom  has  expressed  himself  in  the 
most  admirable  fashion.  He  remarks,  for  example,  in  dealing  with  the  widely 
prevalent  idea  that  Greek  culture  was  directed  merely  towards  beauty  (Das 
tausendjahrige  Reich,  p.  73) :  "  It  is  frequently  imagined  that  the  basic  force  of 
Greek  life  was  an  irresistible  yet  spontaneous  impulse  towards  beauty  of  form  ; 
that  is,  a  need  to  still  more  beautify  an  already  beautiful  existence.  This  is  far 
from  being  the  truth :  in  reality  the  productions  of  Greek  art  were  of  essential 
value  in  liberating  imprisoned  moral  energies,  illuminating  obscure  elements 
in  consciousness  and  collecting  scattered  forces  to  work  towards  common, 
practical  ends."  And  further:  "  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  may  be  said  of  all 
great  and  true  art  that  it  more  or  less  subordinates  the  form  to  the  content  it 
seeks  to  express  and  maintains  an  attitude  of  indifference  towards  the  pleasure 
or  displeasure  which  it  may  arouse — either  in  the  artist  or  in  others — its  object 
being  solely  to  communicate  its  content  through  its  images.  True  art  reveals 
to  us  the  depths  of  the  creative  imagination  rather  to  free  us  from  a  merely 
pleasurable  existence  than  to  confirm  us  in  the  same." 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  MORALITY  407 

does  not  mean  to  attain  pure  independence.  An  art  devoted 
preponderatingly  to  form  easily  becomes  a  mere  matter  of 
professional  dexterity,  the  first  concern  of  which  is  to  display 
(to  itself  if  not  to  others)  its  own  skill.  This  gives  rise  to  a 
predilection  for  the  eccentric,  paradoxical,  and  exaggerated,  and, 
in  seeking  after  effects  of  this  kind,  the  promised  freedom  only 
too  easily  becomes  merely  another  kind  of  dependence,  a 
dependence  of  the  artist  upon  others  and  upon  his  own  moods. 
Genuine  independence  is  to  be  found  only  when  the  creative 
work  proceeds  solely  from  an  inner  necessity  of  the  artist's  own 
nature.  But  this  cannot  take  place  unless  there  is  something 
to  say,  nay,  something  to  reveal.  Mere  virtuosity  knows  no 
such  necessity. 

We  should  like  to  devote  a  few  words  to  the  relationship 
between  modern  art  and  the  sex  question.  Only  an  inartistic 
mode  of  thought  can  object  to  art  occupying  itself  thoroughly 
with  this  subject  rather  than  withdrawing  from  it.  But  that 
art  should  often,  with  such  visible  predilection,  place  sex  in  the 
foreground  and  dwell  upon  it  as  much  as  possible ;  that  it 
should  brood  over  it  and  refine  upon  it  to  the  point  of  absolute 
disgust,  is  a  sign  of  moral  corruption  rather  than  of  technical 
ability.  There  is  no  aesthetical  theory  capable  of  defending 
such  a  state  of  affairs. 

However  much  plastic  art  may  be  involved  in  movement  and 
conflict,  it  has  certainly  no  lack  of  distinguished  personalities 
and  brilliant  achievements  to  represent  it.  In  the  realm  of 
literature  the  outlook  is  less  favourable.  The  age  offers  no 
lack  of  motives  and  tasks.  Old  systems  of  thought  are 
passing  away,  and  new  ones  are  arising;  man  has  become 
exceedingly  uncertain  of  his  position  in  the  cosmos ;  the  sphere 
of  humanity  itself  is  full  of  movement  and  change.  But  the 
increasing  speed  of  life  gives  us  no  opportunity  for  adequate 
self-recollection  ;  hence  our  existence  has  become  confused,  and 
we  have  largely  ceased  to  understand  ourselves.  In  the  face  of 
such  a  situation  as  this  literature  has  an  obvious  task.  It 
should  help  to  clarify  our  ideas,  to  bring  to  clear  expression  all 
that  is  around  us  and  within  us,  to  point  out  simple  lines  of 
development  amidst  the  chaos  of  appearances  with  which  we  are 


408    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

surrounded.  It  should  as  far  as  possible  gather  life  into  a  whole 
and  at  the  same  time  assist  in  the  work  of  developing  it.  For  this 
purpose  it  has  need  of  an  inner  superiority  to  raise  it  above  the 
oppositions  of  the  age,  of  an  energetic  synthesis  which  can  reject 
as  well  as  absorb,  of  a  courageous  and  powerfully  progressive 
spiritual  creation.  There  is  no  lack  of  attempts ;  but  in 
general  it  must  be  said  that  our  German  literature — the  litera- 
ture of  one  of  the  greatest  of  civilised  nations — does  not  reach  the 
highest  level  of  the  age,  and  that  it  offers  but  little  assistance 
to  the  modern  man  in  his  struggle  for  spiritual  self-preservation 
and  in  his  endeavour  to  win  a  meaning  for  life.  It  is  our  duty 
to  state  this  in  plain  terms. 


5.  PERSONALITY   AND   CHARACTER 

(a)  Personality 
1.  ON  THE  HISTORY  OP  THE  TERM 

To  follow  the  history  of  the  term  person,  one  of  the  few  terms 
of  Latin  origin,  from  its  source  through  its  manifold  ramifica- 
tions (apparent  even  during  the  Ancient  World),  and  to  set 
forth  its  significance  iu  Roman  law  and  in  Christian  theology, 
would  lead  us  too  far  away  from  our  present  task.*  Hence  we 
shall  keep  to  philosophy,  at  the  same  time  pressing  forward 
as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  present  day. 

The  newer  philosophy  took  the  term  from  the  Scholastics, 
\\iio  in  their  turn  followed  the  definition  of  Boethius — a  person 
is  a  rational  individual  being,  t  Serious  complications  arose 

*  Technical  details  with  regard  to  the  expression  will  be  found  in  Pauly's 
Realcnzyklopadie.  In  Good  Words  of  June,  1866,  there  is  a  stimulating 
article  by  Max  Miiller  on  its  origin  and  development  (up  to  the  Middle  Ages). 
Of  greater  importance  is  an  investigation  of  Trendelenburg's  which  I  found 
among  his  papers  and  published  in  the  Kant-Studien,  vol.  xiii.,  nos.  1,  2. 

t  More  exactly  it  runs  (see  De  duabus  naturit,  edit.  B.  Peiper,  p.  193-4) : 
persona  est  rationalis  naturae  individua  substantia.  In  the  early  Middle  Ages 
' '  person  "  was  etymologically  explained  as  per  te  una.  With  regard  to  the 
different  views  of  the  concept  held  by  the  more  important  mediaeval  thinkers, 
see  Baumgartner,  Die  Philosophic  des  Alanus  de  Insults,  p.  45.  Since  Thomas, 
more  especially  in  his  investigation  of  the  Trinity  (in  the  first  book  of  the 
Summa  Theologia),  further  develops  the  doctrine  of  Boethius,  he  emphasises 
that  persons  rum  solum  aguntur,  sed  per  te  agunt :  he  defends  the  application 
of  the  term  to  God,  although  it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  Bible.  Like  other 
schoolmen,  Thomas,  too,  has  personalitas,  which  had  already  been  given  a 
German  form  by  Eckhardt  in  personlichkeit  (Eckhardt  also  made  frequent  use 
of  personlich).  In  the  later  scholastic  philosophy  the  most  usual  definition  of 
"person"  was  suppositum  intelligent;  supposition,  however,  meant,  in  this 
connection,  a  substantia  singularis  viva.  Zesen  rendered  persona  by  Selbstand 
(see  Paul  Piur,  Studien  zur  sprachlichen  Wilrdigungs  Christian  Wolff's,  p.  58), 
while Clauberg  (Wke.  (1691),  p.  321)  translated  it  by  lelbstandig  veritandig  Ding. 

109 


410    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

from  the  application  of  this  definition  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  (Roscellin),  but  they  did  not  prevent  its  employment  in 
Scholasticism.  Philosophical  problems  of  an  important  descrip- 
tion were  not  taken  up  in  this  connection. 

Not  until  the  Modern  World  was  the  matter  dealt  with  in 
more  active  fashion.  The  concept  person  now  became  a  chief 
means  of  conserving  man's  distinctive  position  in  the  face  of  the 
tendency  towards  a  general  and  uniform  order  in  the  world. 
The  concepts  person  and  personality,  borrowed  from  Scholasti- 
ticism,*  were  now  defined  more  exactly  and  more  in  accordance 
with  psychological  knowledge.  Leibniz  led  this  movement,  since 
he  placed  the  true  essence  of  personality  in  self-consciousness, 
that  is,  the  consciousness  of  identity  during  the  different  periods 
of  an  individual's  own  existence ;  in  support  of  this  view  he 
sharply  separated  the  immortality  of  man  from  the  indestruc- 
tibility of  the  lower  beings,  t  Wolff  and  the  philosophy  of  the 
Enlightenment  took  up  this  conception,  and  Herbart  carried 
it  forward  into  the  nineteenth  century,  t 

*  In  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  connection  with  Scholas- 
ticism was  still  very  close,  and  the  expressions  were  looked  upon  as  mere 
technical  Scholastic  terms;  this  is  to  be  seen  in  Walch's  widely  employed 
philosophical  dictionary,  where  it  says  under  "person"  (even  in  Henning's 
fourth  edition  of  1775) :  "  Person  means,  in  metaphysics,  a  specific,  complete, 
and  rational  substance,  which  contains  in  itself  its  being  and  its  subsistence- 
The  abstractum  thereof,  or  the  subsistence  of  such  a  being,  has  been  called 
personalitas." 

f  TheodicSe,  i. ,  §  89  :  L'immortaliU,  par  laquelle  on  entend  dans  I'homme,  non 
seulement  que  Vdme,  mais  encore  que  la,  personality  subsiste :  c'est-d-dire,  en  disant 
que  I'ame  de  I'homme  est  immortelle,  on  fait  subsister  ce  qui  fait  que  c'est  la 
meme  personne,  laquelle  garde  ces  quality's  morales,  en  conservant  la  conscience  ow 
le  sentiment  reflexif  interne  de  ce  qu'elle  est :  ce  qui  la  rend  capable  de  ch&timent 
et  de  recompense.  Further,  in  the  correspondence  with  Wagner  (De  vi  activa 
corporis  et  de  anima  brutorum),  p.  466  b  of  Erdmann's  edit. :  Itaque  non  tantum 
vitam  et  animam,  ut  bruta,  sed  et  conscientiam  sui  et  memoriam  pristini  status,  et, 
ut  verbo  dicam,  personam  servat. 

I  Thus  Wolff  says  (Psych,  rationalis,  §  741) :  Persona  dicitur  ens,  quod 
memoriam  sui  conservat,  hoc  est,  meminit,  se  esse  idem  illud  ens  quod  ante  in  hoc 
vel  isto  fuit  statu.  Further,  in  the  Verniinftige  Gedanken  von  Gott,  der  Welt 
und  der  Seele  des  Menschen,  §  924  (quoted  by  Trendelenburg) :  "  Now  we  call 
'  person '  a  thing  which  is  conscious  of  the  fact  that  it  is  itself  that  which 
has  previously  been  in  this  or  that  situation :  thus  animals  are  not  persons. 
Human  beings,  on  the  other  hand,  are  conscious  that  they  it  was  who  were 
previously  in  this  or  that  situation :  therefore  they  are  persons."  Herbart 
says  (Wke.,  iii.  60) :  "  Personality  is  self-consciousness,  wherein  the  ego  regards 
itself  as  being  one  and  the  same  in  all  its  manifold  situations." 


PERSONALITY  AND   CHARACTER          411 

So  far,  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  personality  had  been 
intelligence.  Now,  however,  begins  a  new,  an  ethical  phase. 
After  manifold  preparation,  Kant  carried  out  this  alteration 
in  that  he  placed  practical  reason  in  the  forefront.  Per- 
sonality is  one  of  the  chief  ideas  affording  the  new  mode  of 
thought  an  opportunity  of  definite  expression.  In  the  case  of 
Kant,  it  becomes  something  far  more  than  mere  intelligence ; 
it  is  made  to  reveal  an  essentially  higher  order  founded  in 
freedom.  Personality  means,  namely:  "Freedom  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  mechanism  of  the  whole  of  nature " ;  "  that 
which  raises  man  above  himself  (as  a  portion  of  the  sensuous 
world),  that  which  connects  him  with  an  order  of  things  which 
only  reason  can  think,  an  order  which  at  the  same  time  has 
under  it  the  whole  sensuous  world  and  with  it  the  empirically- 
determined  existence  of  man  in  time  and  the  whole  of  all  pur- 
poses" (v.  91,  Hart.)-  As  persons,  rational  beings  are  ends  in 
themselves  (Zivecke  an  sich)  and  may  never  be  employed  as  mere 
means.  There  may  be  distinguished  in  man  animality, 
humanity,  and  personality.  Man  is  in  the  first  place  a  living 
being,  then  a  living  and  rational  being,  and  finally,  as  a 
personality,  he  is  a  rational  being  responsible  for  his  actions 
(vi.  120). 

Later  thinkers  (such  as  the  elder  Schelling  and  J.  H.  Fichte) 
attempted  to  supplement  and  deepen  this  ethical  view  of  the 
concept  of  personality  on  the  metaphysical  side.*  On  the 
whole,  however,  Kant's  position  was  retained.  It  has  been 
established  (at  the  least)  since  his  time  that  the  subject  stand- 
ing superior  to  all  separate  actions,  described  as  personality, 
is  also  to  be  provided  with  practical  reason  ;  that  not  merely 
self-consciousness,  but  self-determination,  appertains  to  its 
being. 

*  A  history  of  the  concept  of  personality  in  the  nineteenth  century  is  a  task 
which  would  well  repay  the  doing.  With  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
term  is  employed  by  different  peoples,  Alexander  Chamberlain  remarks  (in 
Harper's  Monthly  for  July,  1903,  p.  281):  "The  word  personality  is  not 
a  native  English  term,  but  has  been  borrowed,  ultimately  from  mediaeval  Latin, 
and  subsequently  rescued  from  the  lawyers.  The  corresponding  French  term, 
personnalite,  was  admitted  to  the  Academy's  dictionary  so  recently  as  1762. 
The  German  Persunlichkeit  was  once  entirely  in  the  possession  of  the  mystics." 


412    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

2.  ON  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  CONCEPT 

We  now  propose  to  give  a  short  sketch  of  the  history  of  the 
concept,  understood  in  the  sense  which  has  just  been  elaborated 
(as  the  self-conscious  and  self-active  subject).  Greek  philo- 
sophy did  not  attain  to  a  clear  concept  of  personality,  partly 
because  the  question  of  the  unity  of  psychic  life  had  not  at  that 
time  come  to  the  front,  and  partly  because  the  prevailing  intel- 
lectualism  regarded  thought  as  the  core  and  true  self  of  man. 
Nevertheless,  the  great  investigators  of  human  nature  (almost 
in  opposition  to  their  chief  doctrines)  did  not  fail  to  discover 
a  certain  concept  of  personality  which  was  effective  in  their 
thought-world :  this  is  to  be  seen  in  the  case  of  Plato,  and 
still  better  in  the  case  of  Aristotle  (whose  ethics  clearly  enough 
progresses  beyond  separate  actions  to  a  being  experiencing 
itself  in  action).  The  latter  days  of  antiquity  placed  man 
more  and  more  upon  the  basis  of  his  own  inner  life,  and  also 
developed  the  concept  of  self-consciousness ;  *  a  complete  con- 
cept of  personality  was  not,  however,  attained.  Prominent 
thinkers  emphatically  rejected  a  view  of  the  Divinity  analogous 
to  our  concept  of  personality,  t 

*  See  Siebeck,  Geschichte  der  Psychologic,  i.  2,  pp.  331-42  :  Die  HerausUl- 
dung  des  Bewusstseinsbegriffes.  In  the  article  quoted,  Trendelenburg  has 
explained  in  detail  how  greatly  the  Stoics  assisted  in  the  development  of  this 
concept ;  he  shows  how,  "  In  the  case  of  the  Stoics,  who  directed  their  lives 
towards  self-agreement,  towards  the  consequential  development  of  a  character 
at  harmony  with  itself,  we  see  the  TTPOOWTTOV,  the  persona,  become  the  expression 
of  the  ethical " ;  and  further,  ' '  The  right  course  of  action  is  to  live,  as  was 
demanded  by  the  first  principle  of  the  Stoics,  according  to  nature ;  that  is,  to 
follow  reason,  which  is  the  basic  principle  of  nature ;  further,  the  right  course 
of  action  individualises  the  general  according  to  the  specific  nature  of  the 
individual,  and  bases  it  upon  a  rational  central  point." 

f  This  was  first  done,  as  is  well  known,  by  the  Academician  Karneades 
(213-14  to  129  B.C.),  and  later  by  Plotinus  with  the  greatest  power  and  pene- 
tration. See  Zeller's  great  work,  and  also  his  Grand,  der  Gesch.  der  griech 
Philosophic.  Karneades  sought  to  demonstrate  (see  Grund.,  6th  edit.,  p.  242  ff .) : 
"  that  one  could  not  conceive  of  the  Divinity  as  a  living,  rational  being  (fyjiov 
Xoyucov)  without  attributing  to  it  properties  and  conditions  which  contradict 
its  eternity  and  perfection."  In  accordance  with  his  whole  view  of  life, 
Plotinus  struggled  with  peculiar  energy  against  the  idea  of  attributing  thought 
or  will,  or  even  self -consciousness,  to  a  fundamental  Being,  as  he  conceived  it, 
absolutely  infinite  and  superior  to  all  particularity  (see  Zeller,  as  above, 
p.  293  ff.)  "Thus  the  denial  of  the  personality  of  God,  as  led  up  to  by 


PERSONALITY  AND   CHARACTER          413 

In  ancient  Christianity  the  idea  of  God  acquired  a  more  vital 
and  spiritually  intimate  meaning,  and  it  now  became  much 
easier  to  speak  of  a  divine  personality  and  a  personal  relation- 
ship between  man  and  God.  The  danger  of  anthropomorphism 
which  lay  in  this  view  did  not  pass  unnoticed  ;  this  is  illustrated 
by  the  violent  conflict  which  raged  round  the  problem  whether  a 
feeling  such  as  anger  could  be  attributed  to  the  Highest  Being. 
The  problems  involved  in  the  concept  of  God  finally  found  a 
solution  under  the  influence  of  Augustine  in  the  sense  that  a 
human  and  personal  conception  was  superimposed  upon  the 
basis  of  a  speculative  and  mystical  one.  God  is  at  the  same 
time  moral  personality  and  absolute  being.  The  less  vital  mode 
of  thought  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  conscious  of  no  contradiction 
in  the  juxtaposition  of  these  two  conceptions.  In  this  case  also, 
however,  the  Modern  World  rapidly  converted  into  an  "  either — 
or"  what  the  Middle  Ages  had  peaceably,  nay,  willingly, 
accepted  as  a  "both — and." 

Hence  the  Modern  World  saw  energetic  division  of  opinion 
with  regard  to  the  concept  of  God.  The  tendency  which  moved 
towards  immanence  and  insisted  upon  universal  cosmic  concepts 
fought  against  the  personal  conception  as  an  unbearable 
anthropomorphism.  The  movement  in  opposition  to  pantheism, 
on  the  other  hand,  relied  upon  the  idea  of  personality  in  its 
desire  for  a  living  Divine  Being,  and  laid  peculiar  emphasis  upon 
the  word.  Up  till  then  there  had  been  much  discussion  as  to 
the  relationship  of  the  three  persons  in  the  Divine  Being,  but 
little  as  to  the  personality  of  God.*  Now,  however,  personality 
became  an  article  of  faith  and  a  pet  phrase  of  the  anti- 
pantheists  :  Jakobi,  for  example,  in  his  well-known  discussion 
with  Lessing,  affirms  his  belief  in  an  "  intelligible  personal 
cosmic  cause"  and  finds  Spinoza's  "substance"  lacking  in 

Karneades,  here  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  definite  and  decided  form  " 
(Zeller).  Plotinus'  reasons  have  retained  their  authority  with  regard  to  the 
speculative  rejection  of  the  personality  of  God  ;  even  Spinoza  hardly  added 
anything  new. 

*  We  may  again  call  upon  Walch  as  witness ;  in  the  article  "  Person  "  he 
speaks  of  the  persons  of  the  Trinity  but  not  of  the  personality  of  God,  and  in  a 
detailed  discussion  of  the  nature  of  God  makes  absolutely  no  mention  of 
personality. 


414    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

"a  specific  individual  reality  of  its  own"  and  in  "personality 
and  life."  From  this  time  onward  the  conflict  continues  through 
the  nineteenth  century  down  to  the  present  day.  Whenever  the 
life-process  takes  on  a  predominantly  artistic  or  intellectual  form, 
then  the  idea  of  personality  easily  seems  too  narrow  and  small 
to  be  capable  of  dominating  the  whole  of  reality  ;  when  on  the 
other  hand  the  ethical  tendency  is  foremost,  men  are  unwilling 
to  dispense  with  this  concept,  and  aspire  towards  an  interpre- 
tation of  it  which  will  be  comprehensive  enough  to  include  the 
idea  of  God  (Lotze  and  Ritschl) . 

In  modern  times  the  problem  of  personality  has  commanded  a 
great  deal  of  attention ;  the  cultivation  of  this  idea  has  often 
appeared  to  be  a  safe  panacea  for  all  evils.  Art,  religion, 
morality,  and  life  in  general  all  desire  a  more  powerful  develop- 
ment of  personality ;  it  appears  as  an  indispensable  help  in 
overcoming  the  threatened  de-spiritualisation  of  existence,  a 
means  towards  the  rejection  of  the  obsolete  and  outlived,  the 
only  way  towards  the  much  desired  rejuvenation  and  simplifi- 
cation of  life;  men  hope  to  discover,  in  personality,  a  secure 
inner  basis  in  the  face  of  the  upheaval  of  cosmic  concepts,  to 
find  in  it  a  centre  around  which  humanity  can  unite  in  the  midst 
of  unbearable  division  and  disintegration. 

When  so  many  factors  meet  together  it  is  only  to  be  expected 
that  there  should  be  great  confusion.  It  would  be  a  very 
remarkable  thing  if  such  a  simple  development  as  a  mere  self- 
recollection  could  save  us  from  the  immeasurable  complications 
by  which  we  are  to-day  surrounded.  Presumably  the  help  is 
either  merely  apparent  or  the  idea  of  personality  involves  more 
and  demands  more  than  is  customarily  attributed  to  it.  Let  us 
see  how  the  matter  stands. 

8.  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

Much  of  the  conflict  with  regard  to  personality  is  doubtless 
merely  verbal.  An  understanding  is  out  of  the  question  so  long 
as  some  assign  the  term  a  narrower  and  lower,  others  a  wider 
and  higher  meaning.  But  in  this  case,  as  in  many  others,  the 
verbal  conflict  is  only  the  outward  appearance  of  an  actual 


PERSONALITY   AND   CHARACTER          415 

antithesis.  Important  thinkers  have  continued,  up  to  the 
present  day,  to  set  a  high  value  on  personality  not  because 
they  were  fascinated  by  the  mere  word,  but  because  the  term 
denoted  (however  incompletely)  a  thought  and  asserted  a  fact 
which  they  have  regarded  as  indispensable.  Since  "  person  " 
and  "personality"  have,  from  the  earliest  times,  given  expres- 
sion to  the  supremacy  of  man,  of  the  spiritual  being,  it  is  a 
fundamental  belief  in  spiritual  life  and  its  content  and  value, 
which  has  created,  in  this  term,  an  instrument,  however 
inadequate.  Those  who  believe  in  personality  as  a  portion  of  a 
view  of  life  as  a  whole,  assert  thereby  that  spiritual  life  is  no 
mere  appendix  of  nature  but  a  specific  type  of  being  ;  they  main- 
tain that  this  life  does  not  consist  solely  in  isolated  faculties 
or  manifestations,  but  contains  a  unity  comprehending  these 
and  superior  to  them,  thereby  acquiring  spiritual  freedom  and 
becoming  a  self-dependent  life :  they  maintain,  further,  that 
this  self-dependent  life  is  no  mere  centre  of  union  for  elements 
there  brought  together,  but  is  itself  active,  exerting  a  trans- 
forming influence  upon  everything  which  it  receives  and  raising 
the  whole  of  existence  to  a  higher  level.  Only  when  all  the  fore- 
going is  understood  does  personality  bring  anything  essentially 
new  into  our  existence  and  thereby  justify  the  enthusiasm  with 
which  the  idea  has  been  so  widely  received. 

However,  these  assertions  as  a  whole  are  right  only  if  thorough- 
going transformations  are  accomplished  in  the  image  of  reality 
as  a  whole  and  our  position  in  it.  That  which  is  not  true 
as  a  whole  and  thoroughly  grounded  in  its  relationships  cannot 
be  true  at  any  particular  point.  If  this  movement  towards 
personality  were  a  merely  private  affair  on  the  part  of  man,  then 
it  and  its  view  of  the  world  would  be  mere  illusion ;  it  would 
thus  fall  into  vacuity.  It  cannot  penetrate  to  the  truth  itself 
unless  spiritual  life  constitutes  the  depth  of  reality  in  which  it 
attains  to  its  own  being.  Only  when  resting  upon  a  new  stage 
of  the  world  and  in  connection  with  this  stage  can  the  individual 
accomplish  the  movement  towards  personality,  and  humanity 
develop  personal  life.  Nay,  this  new  life  must  be  present  in 
man's  soul  as  a  whole  and  operate  in  him  in  order  to  raise  man 
above  the  natural  order  which  in  the  first  place  surrounds  and 


416    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

dominates  him.  If  he  does  not  participate  in  an  inner  infinity 
he  will  not  be  equal  to  the  outer  infinity.  Thus  personality  is  a 
question  of  a  new  fundamental  relationship  to  the  world,  of  a 
new  species  of  life  and  being. 

If  that  is  the  state  of  affairs,  then  personality  is  no  ready-made 
thing  for  man  which  can  be  comfortably  and  rapidly  appro- 
priated, no  safe  point  of  departure  which  can  be  taken  up 
without  effort;  its  meaning  to  man  is  that  of  a  great  and 
difficult  task  demanding  a  complete  reversal  of  existing  con- 
ditions. We  are  conce?ned  not  with  the  development  or 
adornment  of  the  natural  self,  but  with  the  gaining  of  a  new 
self.  The  movement  will  not  attain  to  full  earnestness  and 
weight  unless  it  also  involves  a  decided  negative,  a  denial  of 
natural  self-preservation,  an  endeavour  to  rise  above  the  merely 
human  form  of  spiritual  life.  And  such  a  negation  must  form 
no  mere  transitory  stage  of  development;  it  must  remain  con- 
tinually present  and  be  energetically  retained,  if  the  aspiration 
towards  the  new  being  is  not  continually  to  fall  back  to  the 
natural  form  of  life. 

Nay,  within  the  spiritual  life,  too,  personality  forms  an 
ascent  and  a  concentration  which  is  reached  only  through  the 
experiences  and  decisions  of  the  whole  man.  Life  passes 
through  the  three  stages  of  a  basal,  a  struggling,  and  an  over- 
coming spirituality.  The  first  question  is  the  recognition  of  a 
spiritual  task  at  all,  an  elevation  of  life  above  nature,  a 
development  of  spiritual  quantities  and  goods  beyond  natural 
self-preservation.  This  results  in  the  separation  of  an  idealism 
from  naturalism,  which  latter  looks  upon  all  spiritual  life  as  a 
continuation  of  mere  nature.  This  is  the  first  division  of 
opinion.  But  upon  the  basis  of  idealism  there  at  once  arises  a 
new  problem  :  in  the  domain  of  experiences  there  exist  powerful 
resistances  to  the  order  demanded  by  idealism.  It  will  be  asked, 
Will  this  resistance  bring  the  movement  to  a  standstill  or  will 
it  be  overcome?  In  the  first  case  we  are  confronted  by 
pessimism,  with  its  abandonment  of  the  task ;  in  the  second,  we 
must  believe  in  some  kind  of  strengthening,  some  kind  of 
further  development  of  spiritual  life.  This  it  is,  however, 
which  is  asserted  in  the  movement  towards  personal  being. 


PERSONALITY   AND   CHARACTER          417 

The  state  of  being  personal  now  appears  as  the  highest  point 
of  a  spiritual  movement,  and  a  point  of  such  a  nature  that  it 
unites  the  movement  together  to  form  a  whole,  since  it  retains 
the  earlier  stages  as  permanent  factors.  For  life  never  ceases 
to  be  in  a  state  of  flux.  The  ascent  from  nature  to  spirit  must 
be  accomplished  ever  anew ;  ever  anew  must  we  experience  the 
resistance  to  the  spiritualisation  of  existence,  ever  anew  must 
we  seek  an  inner  overcoming.  Thus  the  whole  remains  a 
continuous  action,  an  increasing  ascent,  and  it  is  only  to  be 
expected  that  the  whole  field  of  existence  should  not  enter  into 
this,  that  personal  being  should  find  inner  resistance  in  our 
own  selves,  for  this  being  is  not  so  much  our  whole  existence  as 
its  motive  force,  the  soul  of  souls ;  it  is  thus  obviously  not  a 
possession  but  the  highest  goal ;  it  is  rather  a  becoming  personal 
than  a  being  personal.  Just  as  our  aspiration  has  unceasingly 
to  resist  an  influx  of  the  natural  ego,  so  our  concepts  have  con- 
tinually to  be  preserved  from  sinking  back  into  merely  human 
ideas,  a  danger  to  which  they  are  always  exposed  in  the 
presence  of  lassitude  of  thought. 

Those  who  recognise  such  tasks  and  complications  in  the 
development  of  personality  will  also  know  how  to  value  the 
struggles  which  are  associated  with  this  problem.  In  the 
sphere  of  religion  the  idea  of  personality  is  often  resisted,  pre- 
ference being  given  to  an  impersonal  spiritual  life  because  per- 
sonality seems  rigidly  to  fix  man's  natural  ego,  while  at  the 
same  time  the  highest  Being  is  conceived  of  in  too  human  a 
fashion  ;  on  the  other  hand,  belief  in  an  impersonal  Being,  accom- 
panied by  the  demand  for  a  complete  merging  of  the  individual 
in  the  ocean  of  infinity,  seems  to  be  a  finer,  larger,  and  purer 
mode  of  thought;  consider,  for  example,  pantheistic  specula- 
tion and  mysticism,  the  Indian  religions  at  their  height,  and 
Spinoza  with  his  saying  that  the  man  who  truly  loves  God 
cannot  desire  that  God  should  love  him  in  return.  This  point 
of  view  is  right  in  its  rejection  of  the  petty  human  form  of 
existence,  but  this  negation,  this  submersion  in  the  bottomless 
ocean  of  eternity,  can  satisfy  only  those  who  do  not  recognise  new 
and  independent  reality  in  spiritual  life,  those  who  perceive  in 
it  a  liberation  from  the  toil  and  confusion  of  human  existence, 

27 


418    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

from  restless  and  transitory   time,    from   the   narrowness   and 
limitation  of  the  petty  ego,  but  who  do  not  realise  that  a  new 
life  rises  up   and  can   be   gained.     Only  a  contemplative  and 
predominantly  passive   method   of  life,   a   weak,  languid,  and 
invertebrate  type  of  thought,  can  be  content  with  the  negation. 
Whenever  spiritual  life  develops  more  power  and  confidence  it 
will  attempt  the  apparently  impossible  and  will  desire  to  rise 
above  the  negation  to  an  affirmation ;  it  will  pursue  the  paths 
which  lead  to  the  idea   of  personality.     This  aspiration  will, 
however,  be   continually   accompanied    by   the    dangers   of    a 
reversion  to  the  natural  form  of  life ;  in  fact,  in  the   case  of 
religions,    a   higher   and   a  lower  type   usually   exist   mingled 
together  :  on  the  one  hand,  there  is  an  aspiration  towards  a 
new  world,  a  new  life  and  a  new  domain  of  thought,  for  which 
our  human  existence  does  no  more  than  provide  symbols;   on 
the  other,  there  is  the  inclination  to  make  the  best  of  the  given 
existence,  to  regard  the  new  world  as  a  mere  counterpart  of  the 
old  and  to  construct  the  highest  concepts  anthropomorphically, 
the  whole  being  far  more  a  fixation  of  the  pettily  human  than 
an  ascent  to  new  heights.     As  a  rejection  of  this  latter  type  of 
thought  with  its  obscuration  of  the  indispensable  negation  the 
resistance  to  the  idea  of  personality  is  quite  justified,  and  is 
certainly  indispensable  to  the  historical  movement  as  a  whole. 
It  falls,  however,  into  error  when  along  with  the  lower  species 
it  rejects  the  higher  and  thus  abandons  all  hope  of  a  positive 
construction  of  spiritual   life.     All  hope  of  a  thorough  over- 
coming of  lower  life-instincts  depends,  finally,  upon  the  gaining 
of  such  a  construction.     For  a  positive  movement  cannot  ulti- 
mately be  met  by  anything  except  another  positive  movement. 
No  energy  of  negation,  no  yearning  towards  an  absorption  in 
the  infinite,  will  undermine  selfishness  so  completely  as  will  the 
building    up  of  a   new  spiritual   self  charged  with   great   and 
imperative  tasks.     Thus  we  stand  face  to  face  with  the  question 
whether  the  positive   desire  for  life  and  happiness  permits  of 
being  lifted  above  mere  nature  and  communicated  to  the  spiritual 
stage  or  not.     If  the  answer  be  given  in  the  negative,  all  our 
immeasurable  labour  will  be  ultimately  wasted. 

Civilisation,  too,  exhibits  at  this  point  problems  similar  u> 


PERSONALITY   AND  CHARACTER          419 

those  of  religion.  Both  the  artistic  and  the  intellectual  views  of 
life  agree  in  their  disinclination  to  assign  a  leading  place  to 
personality.  For  they  perceive  in  personality  a  withdrawal  of 
spiritual  work  to  the  mere  man  and  an  unfortunate  interference 
with  its  own  progress  through  an  admixture  of  petty  human 
cares.  Spiritual  life  seems  to  be  ahle  to  unfold  itself  purely 
and  completely  only  when  completely  detached  from  man  and 
his  purposes ;  it  can  then  follow  its  own  inherent  necessities 
alone  and  consolidate  itself  within  its  own  domain  to  form  an 
independent  construction  of  life  with  its  own  specific  laws. 

But  here,  too,  lower  and  higher  conceptions  of  personality  are 
mingled  together,  and  along  with  that  which  tends  to  drag  us 
down,  something  is  surrendered  which  is  necessary  to  the  work 
of  human  culture  if  this  work  is  to  reach  its  full  height.  Rightly 
understood,  the  being  and  the  unity  which  are  the  goal  of  the 
aspiration  towards  personality  do  not  lie  side  by  side  with  work 
but  within  work ;  the  latter  is  to  be  brought  to  such  a  point 
that  a  self-life  comes  to  light  in  it,  that  a  spiritual  being 
realises  itself  in  it,  converts  outward  experiences  into  personal 
experiences,  and  for  the  first  time  imparts  a  content  to  events. 
For  there  is  absolutely  no  content  without  a  self  which  unfolds 
itself  in  activity  and  actual  events  Only  a  self  thus  existing 
within  spiritual  life  secures  for  the  latter  a  soul  and  a  basis, 
guards  it  from  the  danger  of  becoming  an  empty  mechanism  or 
a  soulless  culture-process,  and  gives  it  power  to  master  its  own 
work  instead  of  being  mastered  and  smothered  by  it.  More- 
over without  such  a  self,  life  cannot  win  a  full  reality  or  feel 
secure  of  a  reality  ;  in  the  absence  of  such  a  core  it  leads  a 
dreamy  and  shadowlike  existence  and  reduces  everything  it 
receives  to  this  level.  India  provides  us  with  a  classical  example 
of  such  a  dissipation  of  reality. 

Obviously  we  have  here  to  do  not  with  a  more  energetic  sub- 
jective appropriation  of  a  given  reality,  but  with  a  real  elevation 
and  conversion  of  the  whole  of  reality.  It  is  a  question  of  the 
ultimate  issue  of  human  culture  and  civilisation,  of  the  possi- 
bility of  a  new,  more  genuine,  and  more  inspired  ideal  of 
culture.  The  decisive  factor  in  the  matter,  for  individuals 
and  for  peoples,  is,  ultimately,  the  energy  of  the  life-feeling 


420    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

(Lebensajfekt) ,  the  more  or  less  powerful  "gripping"  of 
life.  The  actual  decision,  however,  does  not  rest  with  con- 
ceptual considerations  but  with  the  possibility  of  the  develop- 
ment of  a  new  reality.  Never  at  any  time  do  we  draw  nearer 
than  we  do  here  to  the  ultimate  axioms  of  our  spiritual  existence. 

From  such  a  standpoint  as  this,  which  demands,  on  behalf  of 
the  development  of  personality,  the  building  up  of  a  new  world 
and  a  reversal  of  natural  being,  the  present-day  movement 
towards  personality  must  seem  confused,  nay,  in  many  respects 
false.  The  customary  treatment  of  the  matter  does  not  go 
beyond  the  desire  for  a  more  powerful  concentration  and 
strengthening  of  the  mere  subject,  for  a  greater  independence 
with  regard  to  environment.  But  how  is  this  to  take  place  if 
man  remains  a  mere  fragment  of  the  existing  world  and  does 
not  attain  to  an  inward  participation  in  a  new  world  ?  If  there 
is  no  reversal  of  the  first  appearance  of  reality  and  no  winning 
of  a  new  basis  for  life,  it  will  be  easy  for  this  tendency  to  do 
more  harm  than  good,  since  it  must  develop  into  a  mere  adorn- 
ment of  natural  life-instincts,  an  exaggeration  of  self- conscious- 
ness, a  mere  enjoyment  and  pleasant  arrangement  of  life  on  the 
part  of  the  subject ;  moreover,  when  the  movement  is  regarded 
as  a  means  of  evading  the  great  cosmic  problems,  when  it 
signifies  a  retreat  within  a  special  circle,  it  becomes  no  more 
than  a  glorification  of  a  narrow  and  barren  Philistinism.  One 
cannot  make  anything  new  out  of  a  man  by  labelling  him  a 
personality  !  Unless  a  new  world  be  gained  and  personal  life  be 
itself  elevated,  this  whole  movement  will  remain  no  more  than 
one  of  those  convenient  makeshifts  which  serve  to  conceal  the 
deeper  problems  of  humanity  and  to  obscure  the  seriousness  of 
the  present  state  of  affairs.* 

It  is  our  belief  that  personal  life  must  develop  a  new  view  of 
the  world ;  from  its  own  vivification,  its  own  experiences  and  its 
own  developments,  it  must  produce  a  domain  of  basal  and  life 
truths.  Even  if  these  are  not  capable  of  being  translated  into 

*  It  would  be  just  as  well  if  Goethe's  endlessly  quoted  passage,  "  The  highest 
happiness  granted  to  the  children  of  this  earth  is  personality  itself,"  were 
allowed  a  rest :  the  pleasing  and  graceful  passage  in  which  it  is  to  he  found  (in 
the  Westostlichcn  Divan)  was  not  intended  to  be  taken  so  seriously. 


PERSONALITY  AND   CHARACTER          421 

suitable  mental  images  they  remain  the  truths  which  ultimately 
support  knowledge  as  well  as  all  the  rest  of  spiritual  life ;  they 
are  the  central  truths,  compared  with  which  all  other  opinions 
are  merely  peripheral.  Now  our  intellectual  attitude  and  our 
spiritual  position  in  general  acquire  a  powerful  state  of  tension 
from  the  fact  that  there  remains  a  division  between  what  is 
central  or  personal  and  what  is  peripheral  or  impersonal,  that 
there  is  no  direct  transition  from  the  former  to  the  latter. 
Nevertheless  we  may  not  divide  reality  into  two  finally  separated 
spheres,  and  rigidly  close  the  domain  of  personal  life  to  the 
great  world.  For  that  would  be  to  divide  life  between  empty 
subjectivity,  and  soulless  work ;  it  would  be  an  abandonment  of 
its  inner  unity  and  at  the  name  time  of  its  full  truth.  Hence  an 
effort  towards  unity  must  be  made  from  both  sides.  Our  task 
is  bravely  to  retain  tho  goal  as  a  motive  and  directing  force, 
although  we  have  no  prospect  of  completely  attaining  to  it 
and  thus  bringing  the  two  points  of  departure  into  full  contact. 

Looked  at  from  this  point  of  view  we  see  a  personal  and  a  sub- 
jective construction  of  work  and  culture,  clearly  separate  from 
one  another.  The  subjective  type  places  itself  apart  from 
reality,  and  cannot  go  beyond  itself  without  carrying  its  specific 
nature  with  it ;  the  personal  aims  at  penetrating  to  the  very  life 
of  the  things  themselves,  not  as  if  to  something  remote  and 
strange  but  as  if  to  something  in  which  the  spiritual  being  attains 
to  itself,  to  the  truth  of  its  own  being.  With  the  conversion  of 
things  into  a  self-life  there  is  here  accomplished  an  overcoming 
of  the  contrast  between  subjective  and  objective  treatment,  the 
result  being  a  treatment  which  may  be  called  sovereign  or 
eigenstdndlich.  For  here  alone  the  creation  attains  to  full 
independence,  the  necessity  inherent  in  the  object  itself  becoming 
man's  direct  personal  impulse ;  now  for  the  first  time  there  is 
attained  a  complete  union  with  the  object  itself,  upon  the  basis 
of  which  union  it  can  express  its  own  nature  in  purity  and 
simplicity.  This  personal  or  sovereign  type  alone  rises  above 
that  which  usually  stands  between  man  and  the  object  itself. 
Man  cannot  directly  grasp  the  object  ;  he  needs  manifold  means 
to  attain  to  it,  such  as  technical  equipment,  practice,  learning, 
&c.  The  danger  now  arises  that  what  is  only  a  means  and  a 


422    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

path  will  become  a  goal,  an  end  in  itself,  that  it  will  ahsorb 
man's  attention,  diverting  him  from  what  is  of  real  primary 
importance.  There  is  no  people  more  exposed  to  this  danger 
than  are  we  Germans,  with  our  thorough  but  heavy  and  plodding 
nature ;  for  us  it  is  particularly  difficult  completely  to  over- 
come technique  by  creation,  to  attain  to  that  experiencing  of 
oneself  in  the  things  without  which  our  work  cannot  obtain  any 
purely  human  greatness  and  genuine  simplicity.  Thus,  to-day 
in  particular,  there  exists,  in  our  life,  a  serious  discrepancy 
between  the  production  of  intellectual  and  artistic  work  and  the 
origination  of  creations  which  appeal  to  and  elevate  the  whole 
man.  If  the  desire  for  a  more  personal  culture  means  that 
simple  fundamental  lines  of  development  are  to  be  selected  from 
the  surrounding  confusion,  thence  to  operate  upon  the  whole  of 
human  being,  then  the  movement  is  worthy  of  joyful  encourage- 
ment. But  the  question  of  personality  is  far  from  being  a 
matter  which  can  be  quickly  decided ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  one 
of  the  most  difficult  of  problems,  needing  for  its  solution  not 
only  the  greatest  possible  exertion  of  strength,  but  also,  in  no 
small  degree,  the  favour  of  fate.  The  present  age  affords  ample 
confirmation  of  this  difficulty :  how  little  has  all  the  subjective 
affirmation  of  the  value  of  personality  brought  us  inwardly 
forward  and  to  what  a  small  extent  has  it  produced  strong  and 
original  personalities  1 

(b)  Character 

1.    ON    THE   HlSTOEY   OF   THE    TfiBM   AND    CONCEPT 

Among  the  Greeks  the  word  character  was  employed  to  denote 
not  only  the  instrument  employed  in  making  drawings  or  other 
impressions  but  the  impression  itself,  the  trace  of  the  tool.  The 
Ancient  World  already  saw  the  obvious  transition  to  the 
spiritual  and  intellectual  sphere,  which  took  place  in  connection 
with  ethics  as  well  as  art  and  literature.  The  ethical  "  char- 
acters" which  bear  the  name  of  Theophrastes,  the  pupil  and 
follower  of  Aristotle,  are  indeed,  in  all  probability,  a  collection 
made  at  a  later  period  from  the  author's  larger  works,  but  the  in- 


423 

clination  towards  exact  observation  and  sharp  delineation  of  dif- 
ferent human  types  *  goes  back  to  Aristotle,  the  great  student  and 
friend  of  everything  real,  and  has  remained  characteristic  of  his 
school.  The  influence  of  the  later  comedy  and  of  the  rhetori- 
cians was  exerted  in  the  same  direction,  so  that  the  later 
Classical  Period  acquired  a  sharpened  perception  for  the  various 
characteristic  human  types  and  actions.!  At  the  same  time, 
however,  character  denoted  the  specific  nature  of  artistic  and 
literary  representation,  the  individual  impression  and  so  forth. 
In  ecclesiastical  terminology,  it  was  used,  after  the  period  of 
Augustine,  as  a  technical  term  for  a  spiritual  sign  imprinted 
upon  the  soul  by  certain  sacraments  (in  the  Middle  Ages bap- 
tism, confirmation,  priestly  dedication)  in  such  a  manner  that  it 
could  never  be  obliterated  (called  later  character  sacramentalis, 
also  spiritualis) .  It  occurs  occasionally,  too,  in  Middle  High 
German  (where  it  was  sometimes  employed  to  signify  the 
written  letter — the  characters  a,  b,  c — as  well  as  in  the  above 
technical  sense).  The  literal  meaning  has  persisted  down 
to  the  present  day,  and  is  more  or  less  connected  with  the 
official  custom  of  referring  to  "  characters "  of  rank  and 
title. 

In  the  case  of  Germany  the  term,  in  all  probability,  came  into 
more  general  use  in  the  psychological  and  ethical  sense  through 


*  Typus  and  typisch  in  their  now  usual  sense,  as  denoting  general  forms  of  life 
and  being,  are  probably  derived  from  medicine.  Dilthey  remarks  (Sitzungs- 
berichte  der  K.  Preuss.  Akad.  der  WissenscJiaften,  1896,  xiii.,  p.  18):  "In  this 
sense  we  find  the  expression  employed  at  first  technically  when  the  physician 
Goelius  (probably  in  the  second  century  A.D.)  speaks  of  the  typus  of  recurring 
fever,  understanding  thereby  the  rule  according  to  which  it  runs  its  course. 
Thus  we  speak  in  general  of  a  typical  course." 

t  With  regard  to  the  whole  matter  see  Sauppe,  Philodemi  de  rittts,  1.  X.,  p.  7 : 
Peripatetici  discipline  SUCK  principis  et  auctoris  exemplum  nulla  in  re  magit  tecuti 
sunt,  quam  ut  omnia  qua  vel  in  natura  rerum  exuterent  vel  in  vita  hominum  et 
publica  et  privata  usu  venirent  accuratissime  observarent  et  observata  rive  librit 
singularibui  explicarent  tive  ad  tententias  suas  firmandas  et  illustrandas  adhiber- 
ent.  P.  8  :  Neque  vita  ipsa  tantum  exempla  suppeditabat,  sed  maximam  notationum 
copiam  nova  comcedia  habebat.  Qua  ut  eidem  sceculi  ingenio  originem  debebat, 
atque  aristoteleum  illud  studium  vitam  quotidianam  moresque  hominum  obtervandi, 
ita  qucedam  fortasse  ex  Aristotelis  vel  Theophratti  librit  detumta  in  utum  tuum 
converterat,  sed  multa  phtra  certe,  quam  acceperat,  deinde  philusophit  et  rhetoribut 
tuppeditavisse  censenda  ett. 


424    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Theophrastes  after  passing  through  the  French.*  In  the  year 
1687  appeared  La  Bruyere's  Les  caracteres  de  Theophraste,  avec 
les  caracteres  ou  leg  mceivrs  de  se  siecle,  a  book  which  also 
attracted  great  attention  and  exerted  much  influence  among 
other  nations.  Along  with  other  German  writings  dealing  with 
the  depiction  of  character  (works  certainly  connected  with  the 
foregoing)  we  may  mention  Gellerts'  Moralische  Charaktere,  a 
supplement  to  his  moral  lectures.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  character 
is  equivalent  to  likeness  (which  term  sometimes  serves  to  trans- 
late it),  drawing,  or  portrait  (see  Rabener,  for  example,  in  his 
satire  Originalen  zu  meinen  Charaktereri) .  This  meaning  is 
still  preserved  in  the  expression  "  characterise."  The  expression 
was  later  transferred  from  the  representation  to  the  thing  itself, 
and  was  employed  to  denote  the  psychical  and  more  particularly 
the  moral  nature  of  man's  fundamental  being.  In  this  sense 
there  may  exist  a  wealth  of  different  characters,  good  and  bad  ; 
to  have  no  character  means,  in  this  case,  to  possess  no  sharply 
defined  features.  It  is  not  decided  whence  the  character  is 
derived,  whether  it  is  the  gift  of  nature  or  the  work  of  free 
action. 

It  was  Kant  who  first  raised  the  concept  to  a  height  which 
made  it  an  important  ethical  thesis  and  a  difficult  problem.  He 
drew  a  sharp  line  between  physical  and  moral  character :  the 
latter,  only,  is  character  pure  and  simple ;  the  former,  com- 
prising natural  disposition  and  temperament,  shows  what  can  be 
made  out  of  the  man ;  true  character,  on  the  other  hand,  signifies 
that  which  he  is  prepared  to  make  out  of  himself.  "  A  char- 
acter, in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  means  that  property  of  the 
will  according  to  which  the  subject  binds  himself  to  definite 
practical  principles,  which  he  has  unchangeably  prescribed  for 
himself  through  his  own  reason"  (vii.  614).  "This  is  not  a 
question  of  what  nature  makes  out  of  man,  but  of  what  man 
makes  out  of  himself."  "  The  foundation  of  a  character  is  the 
absolute  unity  of  the  inner  principle  of  life-conduct  in  general  " 

*  On  this  subject  we  possess  an  investigation  which  reveals  both  fine  under- 
standing and  great  penetration — E.  Hildebrand's  Charakter  in  der  Sprache  des 
Vorigen  Jahrhunderts  (Zeitschrift  filr  d.  deutschen  Unterricht,  series  6, 
vol.  7).  Upon  this  work  our  account  of  the  period  is  based. 


PERSONALITY  AND  CHARACTER          425 

(617).  In  this  sense  Kant  would  not  say  a  man  had  this  or  that 
character,  but  simply  that  he  had  a  character,  "  which  must  be  a 
single  one,  only,  or  none  at  all." 

This  Kantian  conception,  with  its  elevation  of  life  to  the  level 
of  spiritual  self- activity,  came  rapidly  into  use ;  *  the  high  tone 
in  which  the  following  age  spoke  of  character  and  the  value 
which  it  assigned  to  the  formation  of  character  are  traceable  to 
Kant.  But  along  with  the  ethical  conception  the  older  empirical- 
psychological  view  has  also  been  maintained ;  otherwise  one 
could  not  speak,  as  one  frequently  does,  of  an  "  inherited 
character,"  a  character  resulting  from  adaptation  and  custom, 
and  so  forth.  Here  again  we  see  in  a  commonplace  word  the 
mingled  influences  of  different  ages  and  different  views  of  life. 

2.  THE  PRESENT  POSITION 

The  ethical  concept  of  character  is  very  closely  related  to  the 
concept  of  personality ;  it  more  particularly  emphasises,  how- 
ever, man's  self-activity.  Until  comparatively  recently  character 
had  not  been  precisely  defined  ;  but  the  idea  of  attaining  inde- 
pendence and  superiority  to  the  world  by  the  exercise  of  personal 
will-power  is  very  ancient ;  it  came  to  the  front  at  times  when 
the  breaking  up  of  traditional  social  systems  forced  the  indi- 
vidual to  stand  entirely  upon  his  own  feet.  Its  classical 
expression  is  seen  in  the  philosophy  of  the  Stoics,  who  were 
responsible  for  a  characteristic  type  of  life,  the  influence  of 
which  has  made  itself  felt  throughout  the  whole  of  history,  a 
type  which  was  again  brought  into  prominence  and  strengthened 
by  some  of  the  greatest  philosophers  of  the  Enlightenment; 
Kant's  teaching  with  regard  to  character  was  in  many  respects 
Stoic  and  he  was  very  fond  of  making  use  of  thoughts  emanating 
from  the  Stoic  school.  The  danger  of  this  tendency  is  that  the 
individual  may  develop  an  attitude  of  harsh  isolation  and  proud 
self-sufficiency,  that  he  may  ignore  the  dependence  of  the  unit 
upon  invisible,  if  not  upon  visible,  connections  with  the  whole. 
Notwithstanding  this  danger,  however,  the  Stoic  attitude  re- 

*  How  quickly  Kant's  ideas  spread  is  to  be  seen,  for  example,  in  an  article  on 
character  by  E.  Biester,  in  the  Abhand.  d.  K.  Pr.  Akad.  d.  Witt.,  1803. 


426    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

raained  the  only  means  by  which,  during  certain  periods,  it  was 
possible  for  men  to  ensure  their  spiritual  self-preservation. 

The  concept  of  character,  however,  reaches  beyond  such  a 
comparatively  narrow  application.  Since  it  stands  for  the  self- 
value  and  independence  of  the  inner  life  as  opposed  to  all  that 
is  merely  external,  and  bears  witness  to  the  superiority  of  the 
inner  over  the  outer  goods,  it  may  receive  honour  even  where 
this  isolation  of  the  individual  is  rejected.  But  the  concept  then 
approximates  so  closely  to  that  of  personality  that  it  becomes 
unnecessary  to  discuss  it  separately.  Therefore  we  shall  do  no 
more  than  briefly  indicate  how  the  problem  of  character  and  its 
development  stands  when  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  our 
own  age. 

The  present  age,  although  much  occupied  with  the  problem  of 
character,  at  the  same  time  bitterly  complains  of  the  modern 
lack  of  strong  characters  and  clearly  denned  personalities  ;  it 
appeals  to  civilisation  in  general,  and  to  education  in  particular, 
for  more  attention  to  the  training  up  of  men  and  women  of 
character.  But  in  all  this  we  again  notice  the  lack  of  clarity 
and  thoroughness  which  is  apt  to  accompany  such  popular 
movements.  Frequently  it  appears  to  be  believed  that  a 
moral  backsliding  has  unawares  taken  place,  and  that  in  order 
to  make  everything  right  again  an  impressive  admonition  or  an 
ingenious  arrangement  is  all  that  is  needed.  But  the  matter 
is  not  so  simple.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  lack  of 
original  and  independent  men,  of  which  we  are  to-day  so 
painfully  conscious,  has  deeper  roots.  In  the  course  of  the 
centuries  the  inner  world  which  man  has  so  laboriously  won 
has  been  increasingly  shaken  or  obscured;  its  goods  hence 
exercise  a  continually  diminishing  attraction,  while  man's  soul 
becomes  increasingly  empty.  In  addition  we  must  take  into 
account  the  intense  absorption  of  the  modern  man  in  the 
external  world,  the  petty  strife  for  visible  success,  the  growing 
struggle  for  existence,  and  the  appalling  "  speeding-up"  of  life, 
the  division  of  man  by  a  type  of  work  which  grows  increasingly 
technical  and  complicated,  and  the  cheapening  influence  of  a 
civilisation  and  culture  which  has  become  largely  popularised 
and  vulgarised.  Can  such  a  bustling  civilisation  leave  any  room 


PERSONALITY   AND   CHARACTER          427 

for  the  development  of  independent  characters  or  allow  them  any 
meaning  ? 

Those  who,  trusting  in  the  inner  necessity  of  the  thing  itself, 
press  forward  towards  the  goal  of  character  will  not  make  the 
mistake  of  thinking  its  attainment  too  easy :  they  will  sharply 
differentiate  themselves  from  those  modern  tendencies,  the 
upholders  of  which  affirm  their  helief  in  personality  and 
character  with  the  greatest  possible  emphasis  but  at  the 
same  time  do  all  they  can  to  destroy  the  very  conditions  which 
can  alone  secure  a  place  for  these  factors.  In  the  case  of  cosmic 
questions,  our  advanced  social  reformers,  for  example,  frequently 
welcome  with  peculiar  delight  every  thing  which  causes  man  to 
appear  small  and  tends  to  make  him  an  indifferent  and 
dependent  fragment  of  a  soulless  nature  ;  yet  at  the  same 
time  in  practical  matters  they  wax  enthusiastic  on  behalf  of 
the  greatness  and  dignity  of  man,  warmly  espouse  the  cause  of 
humanity,  and  are  indignant  when  they  perceive  a  lack  of 
independent  characters  and  an  oppressive  growth  of  petty 
competition.  Such  an  increasing  externality  as  we  are  to-day 
conscious  of  in  manifold  forms  is  a  serious  evil  indeed,  but  how 
can  it  be  successfully  opposed  if  man  possesses  no  independent 
inner  world,  if  he  is  nothing  more  than  a  somewhat  higher  type 
of  animal,  and  therefore  knows  no  aim  other  than  natural  self- 
preservation  ? 

We  shall  never  achieve  solid  progress  in  the  formation  of 
character  until  the  problems  of  the  inner  man  again  take  the 
central  place  and  unite  together  to  form  a  ^iew  of  life  as  a  whole, 
a  view  capable  of  seizing  men's  minds  with  an  awakening, 
directing,  and  elevating  force.  For  the  time  being  we  are  still  far 
removed  from  such  a  position.  But  although  we  must  utterly 
reject  the  idea  that  the  development  of  personality  and  character 
is  a  matter  which  can  be  treated  in  any  offhand  fashion,*  it  is 
nevertheless  possible  to  do  a  certain  amount  of  direct  work  in 
this  direction  even  under  existing  conditions.  Let  us  briefly 

•  We  may  here  call  attention  to  Pestalozzi's  plain,  though  not  unjustified 
words  (Wke.,  xii.  217) :  "  Toadstools  may  easily  spring  forth  from  a  dunghill 
when  it  rains,  but  human  dignity,  spiritual  depth,  and  greatness  of  character 
do  not  grow  out  of  routine,  even  when  the  sun  shines." 


428    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

consider  in  what  particular  directions  this  work  can  and  must 
be  done. 

In  the  first  place,  the  genuine  values  in  life  must  be  better 
recognised  and  more  highly  honoured.  Mere  appearance  and 
pretence  must  be  rated  at  what  they  are  really  worth  ;  they  must 
not  be  allowed  to  usurp  a  high  position  in  life. 

In  attempting  to  attack  these  false  elements  we  are  hindered 
more  especially  by  the  Epicureanism  of  a  ripe,  nay,  an  over-ripe, 
civilisation ;  we  are  confronted  with  a  society  which  permits 
each  individual  to  pursue  as  far  as  possible  his  own  individual 
comfort,  while  anxiously  shunning  all  conflict  and  willingly 
bowing  to  every  social  convention.  Under  these  circumstances 
a  man  no  longer  stands  upon  his  own  feet  and  assigns  himself 
his  own  value ;  he  allows  the  success  of  his  life  to  depend  upon 
the  recognition  of  others,  thus  unavoidably  lowering  himself  to 
be  their  servant.  In  this  respect  each  nation  has  its  own 
peculiar  dangers.  With  us  Germans  it  is  undeniable  that 
artificial  distinctions,  questions  of  rank,  decorations,  and  titles — 
the  mere  paraphernalia  of  life — play  far  too  large  a  part,  and 
thereby  interfere  with  the  self-dependence  and  full  manliness  of 
life.  It  is  impossible  for  secondary  things  to  be  treated  as 
primary  things  without  primary  things  being  degraded  to  a 
secondary  position.  Every  profession  and  every  man  has  a 
right  to  respect  and  recognition,  a  respect  which  should  be  fought 
for  if  denied ;  but  it  will  not  be  obtained  by  the  concession, 
from  outside,  of  class  distinctions  or  decorations,  but  by  each 
profession  or  individual  bringing  its  or  his  work  (with  its  own 
inherent  strength  and  independent  character)  fully  to  bear  upon 
life  as  a  whole. 

This  brings  us  to  the  second  of  the  requirements  for  the 
development  of  character.  That  is  independence,  free  decision, 
and  personal  responsibility  within  our  sphere  of  life.  We 
Germans  are  accustomed  to  complain  of  over-government,  of 
the  hindrance  which  bureaucracy  offers  to  free  development, 
and  certainly  in  so  far  with  justice  as  there  is  inherent  in 
bureaucracy  a  tendency  to  elevate  a  single  central  point  to  full 
independence,  to  make  everything  else  depend  upon  it  and  to 
regard  all  authority  as  derived  from  this  point.  But  bureaucracy 


PERSONALITY   AND   CHARACTER          429 

would  never  have  attained  to  such  power  among  our  people  if  it 
did  not  correspond  to  an  inborn  inclination,  if  there  did  not  exist 
in  us  a  desire  to  regulate  and  mechanically  to  systematise  life,  to 
exercise  a  police  authority  over  others  and  obstinately  to  force 
others,  too,  to  accept  our  own  mode  of  thought.  We  are  largely 
lacking  in  willingness  to  tolerate  the  specific  nature  of  others, 
to  give  them  the  right  of  free  play  even  when  they  are  in  sharp 
opposition  to  ourselves;  such  a  laissez-faire  attitude,  we  are 
prone  to  think,  indicates  a  lukewarmness  in  our  own  feelings,  an 
abandonment  of  our  own  convictions.  The  thought  of  freedom 
is  apt  to  call  to  mind  in  the  first  place  the  dangers  of  a  possible 
abuse.  In  order  to  prevent  this  we  prefer  to  depress  the  whole 
level  of  life,  to  shape  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  exception 
rather  than  of  the  rule,  and  to  confine  and  limit  it  as  far  as 
possible.  Thus  we  tend  to  produce  conventional  figures,  typical 
men,  mere  specimens  of  a  species,  while  the  development  of  the 
individual  nature  is  suppressed  and  something  lost  which  is  in 
the  highest  degree  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  inner 
independence.  In  modern  life  how  many  forces  co-operate  to 
reduce  human  individuality  and  shape  men  according  to  pattern, 
and  to  what  a  serious  extent  mass-influence  threatens  the 
development  of  individuality — and  not  least  among  the  very 
people  who  lay  particular  emphasis  upon  the  right  of 
individuality !  For  our  individualists  are  often  nothing  more 
than  the  representatives  of  a  particular  type  exhibiting  thoroughly 
uniform  features. 

Moreover,  the  free  development  of  individuality  needs  more 
leisure,  more  inner  composure,  than  the  bustle  of  modern  life 
usually  permits.  Overpressure  of  work — which  affects  not  only 
innumerable  individuals  but  whole  sections  of  society — is 
becoming  a  serious  danger  to  inner  development,  for  it 
hinders  all  calm  self- recollection,  all  persistent  concentration, 
and  all  connected  construction  of  life.  We  Germans  possess  a 
magnificent  body  of  teachers,  the  finest  in  the  world,  the  born 
representatives  of  a  true  inner  culture ;  but  these  teachers  are 
heavily  overburdened,  to  some  extent  with  merely  mechanical 
work,  of  which  they  could  very  well  be  relieved. 

It  is  insufficiently  borne  in  mind  that  fresh  and  cheerful  men 


430    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

work  immeasurably  better  than  men  who  are  tired  and  jaded — 
or  if  it  is  remembered,  no  thorough  remedy  is  found.  Those  who 
are  assisting  in  this,  as  in  other  spheres  of  life,  to  create  more 
free  room  for  inner  development,  for  spiritual  freedom  in  life, 
are,  at  the  same  time,  helping  on  the  movement  towards  those 
high  aims  with  which  the  problem  of  character  is  associated. 
When  so  much  is  at  stake,  that  which  in  itself  may  seem  a  small 
matter  becomes  important. 


6.  THE   FREEDOM   OF  THE    WILL 

(a)  Introduction 

"  THE  problem  of  freedom  gives  rise  to  a  discussion  which  is 
apparently  endless.  Each  side  possesses  unlimited  resources." 
Thus  wrote  the  great  critic  Bayle  in  his  remarks  upon  the  Free 
Will  question.*  On  the  other  hand,  a  distinguished  modern 
German  scholar  declares  that  the  controversy  between  deter- 
minism and  indeterminism  is  "concluded."!  Which  of  them 
is  right?  Thinkers  have  for  long  been  irreconcilably  divided 
by  this  problem.  Is  it  true  that  the  last  few  centuries  have 
brought  such  a  powerful  new  light  to  bear  upon  it  that  we  may 
now  look  upon  the  matter  as  finally  settled  ?  Or  do  we,  per- 
haps, regard  the  question  as  concluded  merely  because  we  study 
it  from  a  special  point  of  view,  because  we  are  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  special  kind  of  thought  ?  Let  us  examine  how  the 
matter  really  stands,  and  see  if  the  triumph  of  determinism 
is  to  be  accepted  as  an  accomplished  fact. 

Determinism  is  in  its  essence  old,  though  the  details  of  its 
external  form  and  argumentative  support  have  altered  from  time 
to  time.  The  Stoic  philosophers  may  be  looked  upon  as  the 
earliest  conscious  determinists.  J  They  were  influenced  by  the 

*  CEuv.  div.  (La  Hague,  1727),  iii.  794  a:  On  nejinit  point  quand  on  $' engage 
aux  questions  de  la  liberty,  chaque  parti  a  det  ressourcet  infinies. 

t  See  Meinong,  Psychologisch-ethitche  Untemtchungen  tvr  Werttheorie,  p.  209 : 
"  It  is  not,  however,  the  deterministic  controversy  which  we  are  proposing  to 
take  up  :  in  my  opinion,  at  any  rate,  this  is  a  matter  which  was  concluded 
long  ago,  for  those  who  believe  in  the  law  of  causality  cannot  logically  be  inde- 
terminists."  Hdffding  quotes  this  passage  (Ethik,  2nd  German  edit.,  p.  102), 
and  expresses  the  opinion  that  a  different  impression  would  be  received  from  a 
study  of  the  Danish  literature  bearing  on  the  subject. 

t  In  a  very  careful  investigation  (Die  Zurechnungtlehre  det  Arittotelet,  1903), 
E.  Loning  has  shown  that  Aristotle  was  by  no  means  an  indeterminist,  but  had 
not  yet  brought  the  problem  into  a  condition  of  complete  clarity. 

431 


432    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

thought  of  a  causal  connection  existing  throughout  the  world  and 
making  the  freedom  of  any  part  of  it  impossible.  Stoic  deter- 
minism was  due  rather  to  a  view  of  life  as  a  whole  than  to 
psychological  analysis.  The  moral  and  practical  tendency  of 
Christianity,  in  its  earliest  stages,  again  assigned  a  decidedly 
predominant  position  to  free  will,  hut  without  bringing  forward 
any  scientific  arguments  whatever.  This  was  succeeded  by 
Augustine's  theocentric  conception  of  reality,  which  involved 
complete  determinism  and  conceived  of  every  personal  human 
decision  as  a  suspension  of  the  omnipotence  and  omniscience  of 
God.  The  subsequent  softening  down  of  this  position  (com- 
pleted by  the  Church  and  the  Middle  Ages)  was  utterly  repu- 
diated after  the  Reformation  (especially  by  the  early  Reformers), 
and  the  most  rigid  religious  determinism  was  again  insisted 
upon.  At  the  zenith  of  the  Enlightenment  cosmic  determinism 
held  the  field  and  took  classic  form  in  Spinoza's  system.  Leib- 
niz apparently  opposed  determinism,  but  in  reality  he  only  gave 
it  a  more  subtle  form.  The  Kantian  rescue  of  freedom,  in  an 
intelligible  realm,  does  not  adequately  help  us  in  our  life  and 
conduct,  situated  as  they  are  in  the  flux  of  time.* 

It  is  thus  seen  that  even  prior  to  the  nineteenth  century 
determinism  undoubtedly  held  the  leading  place  in  the  spiritual 
and  intellectual  world.  On  the  highest  planes  of  thought,  in 
particular,  it  acquired  a  peculiar  clearness  and  forcefulness, 
seeming  rather  to  increase  life-energy  than  to  diminish  it.  At 
the  commencement  of  the  Christian  era  no  one  stood  nearer  to 
determinism  than  Paul  did,  and  yet  no  one  worked  as  he  worked. 
Augustine,  too,  was  a  man  of  unceasing  activity,  with  a  prodi- 
gious capacity  for  organisation.  During  the  struggles  of  the 
Reformation  period  the  conviction  that  man  depended,  in  all  his 
actions  and  conditions,  solely  and  alone  upon  God,  and  upon  no 
kind  of  earthly  power,  was  the  chief  source  of  a  firm  confidence 
and  an  unbending  power  of  will. 

The  new  determinism,  inaugurated  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
is  the  successor  of  all  these  historical  phases.  Formerly  deter- 
minism originated  in  religious  or  speculative  convictions.  But 

*  Strictly  understood,  this  intelligible  freedom  must  condemn  our  whole  life 
in  time  to  inactivity,  depriving  it  of  all  possibility  of  personal  action. 


THE   FREEDOM  OP  THE   WILL  433 

now  it  sprang  from  a  more  thorough  examination  of  experience, 
the  results  of  which  seemed,  from  whatever  quarter  they  came, 
to  make  for  determinism.  Never  before  had  the  case  for  deter- 
minism been  so  obvious  and  so  impressive.  The  great  network 
of  causality  closed  ever  tighter  around  man.  A  more  exact  form 
of  expression  had  the  effect  of  giving  ancient  experiences  a  new 
and  increased  weight.  It  was  pointed  out  that  man  has  obvi- 
ously inherited  the  groundwork  of  his  nature,  while  his  further 
development  depends  upon  his  social  surroundings  and  educa- 
tion ;  by  the  time  he  awakens  to  clear  consciousness  he  is 
already  essentially  complete,  fate,  not  his  own  will,  having 
shaped  him.  In  recent  years  the  study  of  social  science  has 
gone  to  show  that  our  actions,  down  to  their  very  roots,  are 
determined  by  the  integral  effect  of  our  surrounding  influ- 
ences, while  from  the  historical  standpoint  it  appears  that  we 
cannot  possibly  be  anything  more  than  the  children  of  our  age — 
even  in  taking  sides  against  it.  Modern  psychology,  moreover, 
gives  us  a  closer  view  of  the  intricacies  of  the  inner  life,  and 
shows  us  every  action  as  a  link  in  a  chain,  conditioned  and 
determined  on  every  side  :  it  allows  no  scope  whatever  for  inde- 
terminate action.  In  spite  of  all  this  it  is  hoped  to  do  full 
justice  to  the  moral  side  of  life.  The  attempt  is  made  to  show 
that  even  when  freedom  has  disappeared,  the  essentials  of 
morality,  such  as  responsibility,  still  remain;  it  even  appears 
that  morality  itself  is  actually  a  gainer  by  the  process,  on 
account  of  the  close  relationship  established  between  each 
separate  action  and  our  life  as  a  whole  and  between  the  latter 
and  social  history  in  general.  Hence,  when  the  improvement 
of  these  relationships  is  made  the  chief  object  of  human  action, 
the  latter  is  placed  upon  a  broader  basis,  and  is,  at  the  same 
time,  provided  with  definite  points  of  application.  There  is  also 
a  stronger  development  of  the  feeling  of  moral  solidarity  and 
a  tendency  to  regard  the  transgressions  of  individuals  more 
leniently.  Under  the  influence  of  determinism  a  strong  humani- 
tarian movement  has  made  itself  felt,  more  especially  in  the 
sphere  of  criminal  jurisprudence.  When  every  interest  seems 
to  point  in  the  same  direction,  and  when  thought  thousands  of 
years  old  acquires  a  new  power  through  being  brought  more 

28 


434    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

closely  into  touch  with  the  life  of  the  day,  it  appears  as  if  all 
opposition  must  cease  and  determinism  be  left  in  a  position  of 
final  and  undisputed  triumph.  Belief  in  determinism  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  scientific  circles.  In  Germany,  at  any  rate, 
it  is  looked  upon  as  essential  to  the  education  of  a  really 
enlightened  man,  and  those  who  still  retain  any  doubts  upon 
the  subject  are  classed  as  ignorant  old  fogies  and  looked  down 
upon  with  no  little  scorn  by  the  apostles  of  modern  wisdom. 
Such  dogmatism  seems,  however,  somewhat  premature  when 
we  call  to  mind  that  there  is  still  a  considerable,  and  apparently 
an  increasing,  number  of  eminent  thinkers  opposed  to  deter- 
minism.* Moreover,  we  notice  that  among  other  civilised 
nations  the  revolt  against  determinism  has  not  by  any  means 
fallen  into  such  utter  discredit  as  is  the  case  in  Germany. 
France  is  a  particularly  good  example  to  the  contrary:  here 
the  "philosophy  of  discontinuity  "  deliberately  and  energetically 
rejects  determinism,  and  no  less  a  thinker  than  Boutroux  stands 
for  the  "  contingency  "  of  the  natural  laws,t  while  Bergson,  too, 
in  a  most  living  picture  of  the  life  of  the  soul,  includes  freedom 
as  an  essential.  This  may  perhaps  be  taken  as  evidence  that 
the  matter  is  not  really  settled,  though  it  may  appear  to  be  when 
looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of  certain  special  tendencies  of 
German  thought.  1 

(6)  Remarks  on  the  Determinist  Position 

A  problem  so  full  of  complication  and  one  which  so  sharply 
divides  both  epochs  and  thinkers  can  hardly  be  dealt  with  in 
this  somewhat  casual  manner  without  exposing  ourselves  to  the 
charge  of  being  altogether  too  audacious.  But  in  considering 

*  Among  other  recent  works  we  may  mention:  Die  Willensfreiheit  u.  ihre 
Gegner,  Kohland  (1905) ;  Freiheit  u.  Notwendigkeit,  Froehlich  (1908) ;  Der  freie 
Wille,  Joel  (1908). 

t  E.  Boutroux,  Ueber  den  Begriff  des  Naturgesetzes  in  der  Wissenschaft  u.  trader 
Philosophic  der  Gegenwart  (German  trans.,  1907);  see  also  Boelitz,  Die  Lehre 
vom  Zufall  bei  Emile  Boutroux  (1907). 

J  Windelband  has  recently  made  a  very  valuable  contribution  to  the  clarifi- 
cation of  this  problem  (Ueber  Willensfreiheit,  2nd  edit.,  1905)  in  pointing  out  the 
necessity  for  a  separation  of  different  forms  "  which  are  usually  comprised, 
without  any  critical  examination,  in  the  phrase  '  Freedom  of  the  Will '  "  (see 
p.  222). 


THE   FREEDOM   OF  THE   WILL  435 

the  tendencies  of  modern  thought  it  is  necessary  to  pay  some 
attention  to  the  movements  which  come  to  the  front  in  connec- 
tion with  the  subject  of  determinism. 

The  manner  in  which  determinism  to-day  displays  itself  as  a 
popular  view  of  life  appears  to  us  excessively  dogmatic.  This 
ancient  problem  is  looked  at  much  too  narrowly,  too  exclusively 
in  the  light  of  the  ideas  of  our  own  particular  age  alone.  A 
historical  examination  does  not  produce  the  impression  that 
determinism  was  related  to  its  opposing  tendency  in  the  manner 
of  a  higher  plane  of  thought  to  lower  planes,  nor  that  an  increase 
in  human  enlightenment  brings  with  it  a  corresponding  decrease 
of  opposition.  Determinism  has  already  been  before  the  world 
some  thousands  of  years,  but  counter-movements  have  continually 
sprung  up — not  only  among  the  comparatively  non-intellectual 
classes,  but  in  the  ranks  of  the  great  thinkers — nay,  most 
significant  fact  of  all,  among  the  leading  determinists  them- 
selves !  Moreover,  determinism  has  never  been  completely  and 
logically  carried  out  at  any  period.  When  the  Stoic  philosophers 
converted  the  whole  cosmos  into  a  causal  structure  and  placed 
the  destinies  of  men  entirely  within  its  framework,  man's  power 
of  personal  decision  still  remained ;  he  might  recognise  the 
worldwide  chain  of  causes  and  acquiesce  in  it,  or  he  might  resist 
and  be  reluctantly  dragged  along  by  the  determining  factors. 
The  possibility  of  such  decision  (the  very  core  of  Stoic  morality) 
is  obviously  in  direct  opposition  to  the  detenninist  doctrine. 

Augustine  was  a  rigid  determinist  only  so  long  as  his  mind  was 
dominated  by  the  theocentric  conception  of  man ;  the  moment 
he  concerned  himself  with  problems  of  human  conduct,  and  in 
particular  with  practical  Church  affairs,  he  looked  upon  men  as 
called  to  independent  co-operation  and  individual  decision. 
Luther,  too,  later  on  in  life,  considerably  modified  the  original 
rigidity  of  his  determinism. 

And  in  Spinoza's  case,  although  he  so  strongly  maintained 
that  man  is  situated  entirely  within  a  flawless  network  of  cosmic 
connections,  the  fact  remains  that  man  has  to  be  won  over  to  a 
recognition  of  his  position,  and  this  recognition  imparts  quite  a 
new  complexion  to  the  whole  of  life.  It  ceases  to  be  a  web  of 
human  illusion  and  becomes  a  domain  of  unalloyed  truth. 


436    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Further,  speaking  of  a  more  empirical  form  of  determinism, 
such  as  we  have  to  deal  with  to-day,  does  it  not  finally  make  an 
immense  difference  whether  we  are  conscious  of  the  network  of 
causality  and  adopt  it  as  a  motive  of  action,  or  whether  we 
remain  entirely  unconscious  of  its  influence  ?  It  is  universally 
true  that  the  fact  of  a  causal  order  existing  does  not  carry  its 
own  recognition  with  it ;  our  own  affirmative  or  negative  attitude 
in  this  connection,  however,  fundamentally  alters  the  outlook  of 
life.  Hence  human  decision  after  all  does  not  seem  to  be  a 
matter  of  indifference. 

The  determinists  of  to-day  might  have  learnt  the  danger  of 
over-confidence  from  a  consideration  of  Kant's  position  with 
regard  to  the  free  will  question.  They  too  look  upon  Kant  as  a 
great  thinker  and  his  system  as  the  most  important  philosophical 
achievement  of  the  modern  era :  and  freedom  is  an  indispens- 
able corner-stone  of  this  system ;  it  cannot  be  removed  without 
the  collapse  of  the  whole  structure.*  We  must  not  forget  that 
Kant  describes  the  ideality  of  space  and  time  and  the  reality  of 
the  conception  of  freedom  as  the  two  hinges  upon  which  his 
criticism  of  reason  hung,  and  that  the  idea  of  freedom  formed, 
from  the  very  commencement,  a  portion  of  his  theory  of  know- 
ledge. One  may  adopt  as  critical  an  attitude  as  one  likes 
towards  the  particular  manner  in  which  Kant  solved  the  problem 
of  freedom;  but  the  fact  still  remains  that  this  great  thinker 
believed  freedom  to  be  absolutely  indispensable. 

What  is  it  after  all  which,  in  spite  of  an  accumulation  of 
apparently  unanswerable  arguments  in  its  favour,  again  and 
again  causes  men  to  strive  beyond  determinism?  It  is  the 
fact  that  the  logical  consequence  of  determinism  can  be  nothing 
less  than  the  destruction  of  everything  which  is  characteristic  of 
the  spiritual  and  intellectual  life  of  man.  From  the  determinist 
point  of  view  the  soul  of  man  and  the  objects  of  the  external 

*  We  need  refer  only  to  Kant's  expressions  in  the  preface  to  the  Critique  of 
Practical  Reason:  "The  concept  of  freedom,  as  far  as  its  reality  is  proved  by 
an  apodictical  law  of  practical  reason,  constitutes  the  coping-stone  of  the  whole 
structure  of  a  system  of  pure,  even  of  speculative  reason"  (v.  3,  Hart.;. 
Further:  "Freedom  is,  moreover,  the  only  one  of  all  the  ideas  of  speculative 
reason  of  which  we  know  the  possibility  a  priori,  yet  without  comprehending  it, 
because  it  is  the  condition  of  the  moral  law,  which  we  already  know  "  (v.  4). 


THE   FREEDOM   OF  THE  WILL  437 

world  are  simply  given  quantities  ;  these  quantities  come  together 
in  a  certain  way  and  a  certain  result  then  follows  of  absolute 
necessity.  In  this  case  can  there,  strictly  speaking,  be  any 
question  of  personal  action  ?  Have  we  any  inner  responsibility 
at  all  ?  If  we  really  adhere  fully  and  logically  to  the  determinist 
position  (and  do  not  unconsciously  allow  our  views  to  be  in  any 
way  influenced  or  supplemented  by  the  traditional  conception  of 
human  life  and  being),  then  we  can  conceive  of  ourselves  only  as 
passive  spectators  of  what  is  being  wrought  upon  us,  upon  the 
soul  just  as  much  as  upon  the  body ;  our  entire  future  develop- 
ment appears  to  be  already  completely  mapped  out  and  it  only 
remains  for  us  to  play  the  part  assigned,  to  travel  patiently 
further  and  further  along  the  allotted  path,  the  absolute  slaves 
of  fate.  This  involves  the  disappearance  of  the  present,  in  any 
real  sense  of  the  word.  When  there  is  no  demand  for  decision, 
no  tension  and  no  room  for  original  action,  when  the  future 
grows  out  of  the  past  like  a  flower  out  of  its  bud,  then  there  can 
be  only  the  shadow  of  a  present.  At  the  same  time  all  inner 
relationship  in  life  and  all  dominating  unity  vanishes.  Such  a 
unity  cannot  be  handed  on  passively ;  it  is  the  product  of  original 
personal  activity  and  of  nothing  else;  it  must  continually  be 
re-created.  Hence,  when  regarded  from  the  determinist  point 
of  view,  our  soul  becomes  a  mere  juxtaposition  of  separate 
elements,  which  may  look  like  a  whole  from  outside,  but  is  in 
reality  devoid  of  all  inner  solidarity.  In  short,  it  is  the  complete 
denial  of  any  ultimate  spontaneity  which  in  particular  stigmatises 
determinism.  When  we  seriously  consider  what  this  renuncia- 
tion of  original  action,  this  condition  of  being  driven  and  pushed 
by  an  obscure  fate  really  means,  it  is  seen  to  be  something  so 
terrible  as  to  be  absolutely  intolerable.  The  horror  of  being 
bound  up  with  an  all-powerful  and  unavoidable  fate  which  is 
potent  over  our  entire  existence  has  been  realised  in  a  special 
degree  and  with  overwhelming  force  by  the  more  profound 
Indian  thinkers,  and  they  made  it  in  consequence  their  dearest 
hope  and  most  earnest  desire  to  be  delivered  from  destiny,  from 
the  process  of  incarnation. 

It  is  urged  in  reply,  What  is  the  use  of  resisting  in  the  face 
of  relentless  necessity  ?     The  only  reasonable  attitude  open  to 


438    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

man  under  the  circumstances  is  one  of  surrender  and  resignation. 
Is  it  not  true  that  his  nature  is  an  inevitable  heritage?  Is  it 
not  a  combination  of  this  with  environment  (in  the  broadest 
sense  of  the  term)  which  has  made  him  what  he  now  is  ?  Is  it 
not  fate  which  assigns  this  or  that  role  to  the  men  who  have 
been  thus  shaped,  despatching  them  hither  or  thither?  More- 
over, are  not  definite  motives  essential  to  human  action,  and 
would  not  life  sink  into  confusion  and  chaos  if  men  were 
perfectly  free  to  choose  between  these  motives,  if  it  were  possible 
(in  the  absence  of  any  connection  with  preceding  action)  for 
good  men  to  make  evil  decisions  or  bad  men  good  ones? 

Let  us  by  all  means  allow  these  truths  their  full  weight. 
But  that  is  not  the  same  thing  as  admitting  that  they  really 
exhaust  the  matter,  that  they  do  complete  justice  to  the 
characteristic  quality  of  man  as  endowed  with  a  spiritual  nature. 
It  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  man  (considering  in  the  first 
place  his  thought  alone)  does  not,  as  animals  do,  remain  entirely 
within  the  chain-like  process  of  existence.  He  steps  outside 
this  enchainment  and  is  able  to  confront  it  and  review  it  as  a 
whole.  If  he  could  not  do  this  there  would  be  no  search  after 
truth,  and  the  mere  fact  that  there  is  such  a  search  at  all  implies 
an  important  further  development  of  life.  Is  it  not  just  the 
same  with  regard  to  action  ?  We  do  not  ascend  by  a  series  of 
disconnected  impulses;  we  raise  ourselves  to  a  superior  unity 
and  hence  acquire  a  self-activity  as  a  new  stage  of  life.  From 
this  position  we  can  survey  the  region  of  multiplicity  and 
estimate  the  true  value  of  each  factor.  This  value  is  not  given 
to  us  directly  as  a  ready-made  thing.  It  varies  according  to  the 
unity  upon  which  it  is  dependent,  and  a  reorganisation  of  this 
unity  carries  with  it  a  change  in  the  value.  If  it  be  asked  how 
such  a  self-activity,  such  a  breaking  forth  of  primordial  spiritual 
life  in  man,  is  possible,  and  how  it  can  be  explained  in  relation 
to  things  as  a  whole,  we  must  confess  with  complete  frankness 
our  inability  to  offer  any  answer.  But  how  poor  we  should  be 
if  we  were  to  deny  everything  we  could  not  explain !  We  see 
around  us  a  prodigious  number  of  conscious  and  feeling  beings, 
each  a  characteristic  life-unit.  These  units  are  continually 
being  renewed.  Is  there  any  explanation  of  this  ?  If  this  was 


THE  FREEDOM   OF  THE   WILL  439 

not  an  indisputable  fact,  could  it  not  be  rejected  as  impossible, 
just  as  easily  as  an  awakening  of  self-activity  can  be  thus 
rejected?  For  it  does  not  seem  as  if  new  life-units  could 
possibly  result  either  from  a  combination  of  lifeless  matter  or 
from  a  division  of  living  matter.  Therefore  new  life-units 
cannot  come  into  being.  Yet  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  they 
are  being  continually  produced !  It  therefore  becomes  necessary 
to  subordinate  our  conception  of  possibility  to  the  reality  of 
things.  We  must  not  force  reality  until  it  fits  the  standard 
of  our  narrow  intelligence — at  the  bottom  the  chief  prop  of 
determinism  is  intellectualism. 

Moreover,  in  considering  this  problem  we  must  not  forget  the 
peculiar  position  of  man  and  the  complications  attaching  to 
it.  On  the  one  side  he  belongs  to  nature,  and  on  the  other  he 
forms  the  commencement  of  a  new  stage  of  reality,  a  realm  ot 
spiritual  freedom :  this  converts  his  whole  life  into  a  problem, 
for  the  solution  of  which  his  own  decision  is  imperatively 
necessary.  His  life  is  thus  brought  under  the  influence  of 
opposing  impulses ;  the  motives  on  the  one  side  are  utterly 
incomparable  with  those  on  the  other;  on  the  one  hand  we 
have  natural  or  social  existence  with  its  pleasures,  on  the  other 
a  spiritual  order  with  its  new  and  infinite  self.  Is  it  possible 
directly  to  compare  the  result  of  an  action  in  giving  rise  to  selfish 
pleasure  with  the  effect  which  the  fulfilment  of  duty  and  the 
development  of  love  may  have  in  uplifting  our  being  ?  *  In  this 
case  it  is  obviously  not  a  question  of  isolated  actions,  but  of  the 
main  tendency  of  life  as  a  whole ;  it  is  a  matter,  not  so  much 
of  what  we  do,  as  of  what  we  are,  or  rather  of  what  we  chiefly 
set  our  hearts  upon.  The  soul  of  man  does  not  simply  form  an 
arena,  in  which  two  stages  of  reality  meet ;  it  is  itself  called 
upon  to  co-operate  :  in  this  sphere  spiritual  life  can  attain  to 
full  reality  only  by  means  of  self-active  appropriation.  The 
decisions  which  are  involved  in  this  problem  cannot  be  made 

*  We  must  reject  also  the  idea  that  our  motives  are  fixed  and  given  quantities 
which  operate  within  the  soul  like  weights  on  a  pair  of  scales,  thus  effecting  a 
decision.  Must  all  conduct  result  from  given  motives — cannot  new  motives 
arise  from  inner  transformations  of  life?  And,  moreover,  must  not  the  soul 
continually  assign  fresh  values  to  the  motives? 


440    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

at  a  given  moment ;  they  are  the  product  of  our  whole  life.  A 
continual  affirmation  and  strengthening  is  necessary.  Spiritual 
life,  as  we  have  seen,  cannot  maintain  a  constant  level ;  it  must 
be  perpetually  renewed,  or  it  will  very  rapidly  sink.  Our  life  is 
thus  kept  in  a  constant  state  of  tension.  We  are  never  allowed 
quiet  and  undisturbed  possession  of  its  spiritual  content.  From 
this  point  of  view  free  activity  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  matter 
of  mere  momentary  choice,  nor  its  direction  as  determined  by 
some  sudden  whim.  Although  it  is  true  that  a  moment  may 
attain  to  supreme  importance,  it  can  only  do  so  in  connection 
with  a  greater  whole,  by  virtue  of  its  position  as  the  crowning 
point  of  continuous  effort.  It  is  in  the  first  place  a  question 
of  the  ivhole,  of  the  main  tendency  of  life,  and  not  of  isolated 
points  of  decision. 

The  development  of  a  spiritual  individuality  is  a  peculiarly 
good  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  freedom  and  fate  work 
together  in  the  shaping  of  our  lives  and  are  dependent  each 
upon  the  other.  Mere  decisions  cannot  possibly  produce  such 
development.  Fate  precedes  and  determines  the  line  along 
which  it  shall  take  place  :  but  in  so  far  as  the  individuality 
is  spiritual  it  must  first  be  won  by  our  own  effort,  identified 
with  our  own  personal  activity,  separated  from  what  is  alien 
to  it,  and  recognised  as  central.  The  core  of  our  strength 
must  first  be  laid  bare  and  appropriated.  The  search  after 
one's  own  self,  the  soul  of  our  soul,  may  mean  a  desperate 
struggle  and  cost  us  many  a  severe  lesson;  one  may  wander 
far  afield  before  reaching  that  point.  And  when  it  has  been 
found  it  needs  a  further  struggle  and  more  work  to  hold  it  fast 
and  base  one's  life  upon  it.  Thus  the  course  of  our  life,  from 
being  a  dispensation  of  fate,  becomes  more  and  more  a  personal 
achievement,  more  and  more  uplifted  to  the  level  of  self-activity. 

The  same  thing  is  true  of  whole  nations  and  epochs.  What 
is  given  to  our  hand  is,  from  a  spiritual  point  of  view,  only  a 
possibility  which  cannot  take  shape  as  a  concrete  reality 
except  by  our  own  act  and  deed.  We  can  take  up  a  merely 
passive  and  receptive  attitude  and  allow  ourselves  to  be  driven 
by  our  environment,  or  we  can  attain  to  independence  of  our 
environment  and  from  this  position  wring  from  circumstance 


THE   FREEDOM   OF  THE  WILL  4*1 

its  spiritual  possibilities.  History,  as  far  as  its  spiritual  content 
is  concerned,  is  not  built  up  in  peaceful  security  upon  a  given 
basis ;  it  is  continually  open,  as  a  whole,  to  have  doubt  cast 
upon  it;  we  find  it  continually  necessary  to  secure  a  new 
foundation  ;  it  is  continually  our  duty  to  grasp  history,  as  a 
whole,  from  a  new  point  of  view. 

With  such  convictions  in  our  minds  we  obtain  an  essentially 
different  picture  of  reality  from  that  produced  by  determinism  : 
above  everything  else  a  different  picture  of  our  own  inner  life. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  determinism  everything  appears  to  lie 
upon  the  same  dead  level,  or  at  any  rate  to  proceed  from  a  given 
groundwork.  In  reality  our  life  is  not  so  simple,  and  its  content 
not  so  uniform.  Different  possibilities  and  different  levels  of 
life  cross  one  another,  so  that  we  are  drawn  now  in  one  direction, 
now  in  another.  During  the  course  of  life,  one  particular  point 
of  view  comes  to  dominate  the  others,  and  is  then  easily  mistaken 
for  the  whole  of  our  life  and  being.  But  it  is  only  necessary  for 
a  radically  new  task  to  present  itself,  a  great  upheaval  or  reversal 
to  take  place,  and  something  absolutely  new,  something  totally 
unexpected,  rises  up  within  us,  while  the  old  pales  and  disappears. 
We  are  inwardly  altered,  and  all  our  values  are  changed.  What 
formerly  filled  our  souls  may  now  appear  unspeakably  little  and 
insignificant.  This  is  not  due  to  any  mechanical  process  work- 
ing in  us.  It  takes  place  as  a  consequence  of  our  own  excitation 
and  activity.  After  that  it  becomes  clear  that  what  we  formerly 
took  for  the  whole  was  only  a  certain  stratum,  a  particular  pos- 
sibility alone  ;  that  we  have  been  realising  only  a  portion  of  our 
being.  The  conditions  of  our  social  existence  and  the  necessity 
of  earning  our  daily  bread  have  the  effect  of  forcing  us  into  some 
such  specialisation  :  a  man  settles  down  in  the  routine  of  some 
particular  profession  ;  he  is  expected  to  devote  himself  to  it  as 
far  as  possible,  and  anything  not  falling  within  the  boundaries 
that  are  thus  created  is  put  down  to  his  discredit ;  to  become 
paralysed  and  ossified  is  the  natural  fate  which  awaits  him  who 
is  confined  within  such  narrow  limits  and  who  does  not  preserve 
a  wider  life,  with  doors  open  to  new  possibilities ;  he  does  not 
so  much  act  himself  as  allow  action  to  take  place  through  him. 
He  does  undoubtedly  travel  along  a  path  which  has  already  been 


442    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

mapped  out,  as  the  determinist  would  have  us  believe  that  we  all 
do.  Sorrow,  or  any  great  upheaval  in  life,  brings  a  blessing,  in 
that  it  has  the  power  of  lifting  us  out  of  our  several  ruts  and 
placing  us  in  a  new  relationship  to  the  sources  of  life. 

In  this  connection  art  has  a  task  of  the  greatest  importance 
to  fulfil ;  it  should  hold  up,  in  contrast  to  the  customary 
narrowness  of  life,  the  vision  of  a  wider  realm  filled  with  new 
possibilities ;  in  the  face  of  the  limitations  of  circumstance  it 
should  strive  towards  freeing  the  soul.  The  crux  of  the  matter 
is  always  the  same ;  does  our  life  consist  of  ready-made  data, 
pieced  together,  or  is  it  still  in  a  plastic  condition  ? 

What  has  been  said  of  individuals  also  applies  to  mankind  as 
a  whole.  Just  as  the  individual  is  tied  down  and  limited  by  the 
special  character  of  his  profession  and  personal  destiny,  so 
humanity  falls  into  established  modes  of  thought,  peculiar  to 
special  types  of  human  culture,  and  tends  to  remain  bound  down 
by  these.  This  paralyses,  as  well  as  narrows  life.  It  only 
remains  for  humanity  to  follow  an  appointed  path,  to  become 
the  mere  means  by  which  some  service  is  carried  out.  Those 
who  have  attained  to  the  height  of  some  such  system  of  culture 
believe  themselves  able  to  explain  with  absolute  certainty  how 
everything  has  come  to  pass,  and  how  it  could  not  have  occurred 
otherwise  ;  from  their  point  of  view  the  whole  of  history  is  a 
chain  of  inevitable  sequences. 

But  systems  of  human  culture,  too,  live  their  lives  out,  fade, 
and  grow  old.  It  would  be  a  terrible  thing,  indeed,  if  humanity, 
in  its  cosmic  relationship,  did  not  contain,  and  could  not  seize 
and  develop,  opportunities  other  than  those  it  has  already 
experienced.  Is  the  new  life  we  see  around  us  capable  of 
being  derived  in  any  way  from  the  ancient  world?  Could 
Grecian  thought  by  any  possibility  have  predicted  the  form 
which  civilisation  subsequently  took  through  the  agency  of 
Christianity  and  the  uprising  of  the  new  races?  From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Middle  Ages,  was  the  direction  the  modern 
era  gave  to  life  at  all  to  be  anticipated?  And  now,  as  we 
become  increasingly  conscious  of  the  inherent  limitations  of 
modern  culture,  of  the  senility  of  its  inner  content,  what  is 
it  encourages  us  to  continue  joyfully  working  and  striving 


THE   FREEDOM   OF  THE  WILL  443 

except  the  hope  that  humanity  has  not  already  exhausted 
itself  along  the  former  lines  of  effort,  and  that  entirely  new 
possibilities  still  lie  hefore  us?  But  without  our  own  self- 
activity  such  possibilities  will  hardly  become  real ;  we  must 
not  be  mere  passive  spectators,  we  are  called  to  co-operation. 

Should  not  such  a  mode  of  thought,  with  its  broadening  and 
vitalising  influence  over  our  view  of  reality,  be  held  to  apply  to 
the  cosmos  as  a  whole  ?  We  moderns  are  far  too  apt  to  regard 
the  world  in  its  present  manifestation,  as  it  now  surrounds  us, 
as  the  sole  possibility,  the  sum-total  of  reality.  Is  it  not, 
perhaps,  only  a  special  form,  which  can — nay,  must — be 
accompanied  by  others '?  The  complications  and  contradictions, 
the  manifold  signs  of  incompleteness  which  we  see  in  the 
world  about  us,  and  the  mixture  of  reason  and  unreason  which 
it  exhibits,  may  be  taken  as  indications  ot  this.  Looking  at 
the  matter  thus,  to  bind  the  whole  development  of  reality  down 
to  the  "  given  facts  "  must  appear  to  be  a  stubborn  and  narrow 
dogmatism.  This  conception  of  "  given  facts  "  is  in  the  highest 
degree  unfortunate  and  misleading.  It  proclaims  as  self-evident 
an  assertion  which  is  really  most  problematical  and  rejects  all 
self- activity  with  its  accompanying  originality.  To-day  a  timid 
mode  of  thought  is  hardly  conscious  of  the  degradation  of  spiritual 
energy  which  is  involved  in  this  complete  adherence  to  what  is 
"  given."  "  The  spirit  takes  the  food  that  is  offered  it  without 
a  murmur,  clinging  to  the  '  given '  "  (J.  Burckhardt). 

There  is  not  sufficient  space  in  this  short  sketch  to  give  an 
explanation  of  the  problem  of  freedom  and  determination  as  it 
would  appear  from  our  own  point  of  view.  We  hope  soon  to  go 
into  this  subject  more  in  detail  in  a  work  upon  the  foundation 
of  ethics.  But  we  should  like  to  point  out  at  this  juncture  that 
determinism  is  based  upon  quite  definite  assumptions  as  to  the 
nature  of  reality,  and  a  recognition  of  what  these  assumptions 
really  are  at  once  destroys  the  self-evident  character  of 
determinism.  The  latter  regards  the  world  as  given  and 
closed,  and  man  as  a  mere  cog  in  the  great  machine.  If 
this  view  is  correct,  it  becomes  sheer  imbecility  to  doubt  the 
truth  of  determinism  for  a  moment.  But  if  the  world  is  still 
plastic,  and  if  we  ourselves  can  take  part  in  the  work  of  pro- 


444    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

gressive  creation,  then  those  who  take  up  a  different  position 
can  hardly  be  looked  upon  as  intellectually  lost.  At  the  very 
worst  they  can  console  themselves  with  the  society  of  Plato 
and  Kant. 

At  the  same  time  we  do  .not  wish  in  any  way  to  belittle  the 
important  services  which  have  been  rendered  by  modern 
determinism  in  bringing  the  problem  of  freedom  to  the  front 
and  throwing  light  upon  it.  The  whole  matter  has  been 
essentially  deepened  and  the  naive  affirmation  of  freedom  has 
been  made  absolutely  impossible.  It  cannot  be  overlooked 
that  there  is  much  necessity  in  our  lives,  that  our  way  is 
mapped  out  to  a  large  extent  by  fate ;  but  it  remains  doubtful 
whether  this  is  the  whole,  whether  freedom  does  not  at  the 
same  time  retain  rights  of  its  own,  and  whether  it  is  not 
precisely  the  collision  between  freedom  and  necessity  which 
imparts  to  our  life  its  specific  character,  which  first  makes 
life,  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  possible.  We  agree  with 
Schelling's  saying:  "If  there  were  no  contradiction  between 
freedom  and  necessity,  not  only  philosophy  but  every  higher 
spiritual  aspiration  would  decay  and  perish." 


E.    ULTIMATE    PROBLEMS 


1.    THE   VALUE   OF  LIFE 

(a)  Introduction  :  On  the  History  of  the  Terms 

To  give  any  estimate  of  the  value  of  life  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  individual,  so  uncertain  and  accidental  as  this 
is,  must,  of  course,  be  impossible :  if  the  problem  of  optimism 
and  pessimism  *  has  no  other  meaning  it  is  not  worth  while  to 
take  the  matter  up  at  all.  At  the  same  time  it  is  impossible 
entirely  to  suspend  passing  any  judgment  upon  life,  if  only  for 
the  reason  that  life  does  not  carry  with  it  an  absolute  convic- 
tion in  the  same  simple  and  irresistible  manner  as  does  a  state- 
ment of  fact.  Life  demands  either  active  assent  on  our  part 
or  some  other  attitude  of  mind.  We  may  either  cheerfully  ally 
ourselves  with  the  stream  of  life,  lending  it  our  best  assistance, 
or  we  may  oppose  it  and  try,  in  our  own  case,  to  bring  it  as 
far  as  possible  to  a  standstill.  Great  historical  developments 
have  taken  place  illustrative  of  both  these  positions.  Indian 

*  The  expressions  "optimism"  and  "pessimism"  are  of  comparatively 
modern  origin.  The  former  was  first  employed  to  denote  the  Leibnizian  doctrine 
of  the  best  possible  world.  In  this  connection  Brucker  remarks  (iv.  2,  p.  385)  : 
Non  tacendum  vero,  ipsos  Jesuitat  Trivaltinos,  magnot  cetera  Leibnizii  ad- 
miratores,  cum  recensions  Theodicea  facia  sententiam  dicerent  (as  a  note  adds, 
1737,  Febr.,  art.  1)  laudata  ingenti  lectionit  et  judicii  copia,  et  tractationit 
ordine,  accuratione  et  concinnitate  systematica,  fateri  tamen,  multos  erroret 
philosophum  tummum  admisisse,  maxime  vero  optimi  mundi  atsertionem  (optimit- 
mum  vacant)  non  nisi  larvatum  niaterialismum  et  spiritualem  Spinozismum 
involvere ;  see  also  p.  415.  Voltaire  in  particular  helped  to  spread  the  use  of  the 
term  with  his  Candide  ou  I'optimitme. 

In  connection  with  pessimism  it  is  usual  to  think  in  the  first  place  of 
Schopenhauer,  though  he  himself  made  but  little  use  of  the  term.  Caldwell, 
in  his  excellent  work  upon  Schopenhauer,  remarks  (p.  522) :  "  He  rarely  uses 
the  word  '  pessimism ' — perhaps  three  or  four  times  in  all — and  then  only 
about  the  philosophy  of  others,  and  generally  in  the  adjective  form  as  opposed 
to  an  optimistic  view  of  things." 

m 


448    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

civilisation  at  its  height  was  inspired  hy  the  conviction  that  life, 
with  its  endless  sorrow,  struggle,  and  necessity,  is  first  and  fore- 
most suffering,  and  that  the  height  of  human  wisdom  lies  in 
endeavouring  to  free  ourselves  from  life,  or,  at  any  rate,  in 
trying  to  reduce  its  vigour.  In  opposition  to  this  negation 
of  life  stands  the  attitude  of  our  Western  civilisation.  According 
to  our  valuation,  life  is  a  great  good.  It  should  be  earnestly 
held  fast,  augmented,  and  enriched.  Western  thinkers  have 
consequently  exerted  themselves  to  establish  this  affirmative 
position,  and  to  demonstrate  the  value  of  reality. 

The  historical  development  of  the  Western  tendency  may  be 
divided  into  three  chief  phases :  the  Greek  thinkers  regarded 
the  world  as  a  complete  work  of  art,  an  all-embracing  harmony, 
and  in  this  manner  endeavoured  to  rise  above  its  obscurities  and 
contradictions ;  the  Christian  thinkers,  like  Augustine,  for 
example,  in  so  far  as  they  were  occupied  with  the  problem, 
saw  a  moral  order  in  reality  which  completely  obliterated  the 
contrast  between  justice  and  love ;  while,  finally,  in  the 
opinion  of  modern  thinkers  the  world  is  to  be  looked  upon 
as  a  progressive  current  of  life,  a  continual  growth  of  power, 
and  from  this  point  of  view  even  what  at  first  seems  to  be 
mere  disorder  and  contradiction  appears  to  justify  itself  as  an 
incentive  and  a  source  of  movement. 

These  attempts  to  harmonise  life  have  frequently  been  made 
the  objects  of  bitter  attack  and  even  of  mockery.  They  would 
have  deserved  such  treatment  had  they  been  the  fruit  of  mere 
idle  speculation,  if  there  had  been  no  deep  movements  behind 
them.  The  latter  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  case ;  for  these 
attempts  to  justify  life  were  rooted  in  an  actual  moulding  of  life, 
in  a  self-concentration  which  separated  a  kernel  from  the 
remainder  of  existence  and  endeavoured,  with  it  as  a  basis, 
to  further  develop  the  whole.  The  Greek  attempts  to  represent 
the  world  as  a  work  of  art  would  have  been  entirely  lacking  in 
content  and  power  had  they  not  been  supported  and  vitalised 
by  that  magnificent  plastic  and  artistic  construction  of  life  and 
reality  as  a  whole  which  rendered  Greek  civilisation  so 
admirable ;  this  creative  artistic  work,  with  all  its  joy  and 
power,  armed  the  Greek  world  against  the  unreasonable  element 


THE   VALUE   OF   LIFE  449 

in  existence  (an  element  which  it  by  no  means  underrated)  and 
gave  it  sufficient  confidence  to  confront  sorrow  and  mystery. 
There  ensued  a  division  of  life  into  a  higher  and  lower  grade, 
into  form  and  absence  of  form,  and  man  was  able  to  take  sides 
with  the  higher  and  work  for  it  in  his  own  sphere. 

Christianity  took  up  a  similar  position.  Evil  was  un- 
doubtedly most  keenly  realised,  but  the  consciousness  of  being 
a  member  (and  one  who  could  not  be  lost)  of  a  moral  order 
dominating  the  whole  world  imparted  greatness  and  confidence 
to  man,  provided  him  with  full  occupation,  and  braced  him  to 
take  up  with  confidence  the  hard  struggle  against  rank  unreason. 

It  must  be  obvious  to  all  of  us  that  the  Modern  World  has  not, 
in  the  main,  departed  from  this  point  of  view.  At  the  back  oi 
our  belief  in  our  capacity  for  development  there  is  an  actual 
increase  of  life  and  a  restless  endeavour  towards  the  betterment 
of  human  existence.  Without  such  an  experience  of  progress 
the  belief  in  development  would  not  have  stirred  our  hearts  so 
deeply. 

It  was  thus  thoroughly  characteristic  constructions  of  life, 
independent  concentrations  of  life,  syntheses  of  actions  (not 
mere  conceptual  structures),  vital  energies,  which  bore  in  upon 
men  the  conviction  that  they  were  connected  with  the  bases  of 
reality  and  received  power  from  thence,  and  raised  them  out 
of  an  attitude  in  which  they  merely  let  life  slide  by  them,  to 
place  them  in  a  position  of  activity,  and  to  fill  them  with  joy  and 
courage.  This  did  not  do  away  with  the  unreasonable  element ; 
it  appeared  rather  to  increase  it.  But  man  had  no  longer  to 
face  it  alone  and  unarmed,  he  could  now  co-operate  in  the  con- 
struction of  reality ;  his  life  had  now  won  a  meaning  and  with 
it  a  value.  He  who  bears  such  syntheses  in  mind  will  be  the 
less  likely  to  undervalue  the  attempts  of  great  thinkers,  however 
unsatisfied  he  may  be  with  the  details  of  their  proofs.  Life 
never  drew  its  strength  from  proofs. 

(b)  The  Perplexities  of  the  Present  Situation 

To-day  this  problem  takes  up  a  position  similar  to  that 
occupied  by  so  many  others ;  from  so-called  possession  we  have 
again  passed  into  a  state  of  enquiry  and  experiment.  Each  of 

29 


450    MAIN  CURRENTS  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

the  above  systems  of  life  has  been  shaken  in  the  most  severe 
manner,  its  content  and  its  power  being  alike  affected.  With 
regard  to  the  artistic  and  ethical  systems  this  is  obvious,  but  the 
idea  of  progress,  too,  has  lost  its  former  power  and  glamour — 
we  are  not  so  sure  now  where  the  onward  movement  is  going  to 
take  us  or  who  is  going  to  profit  by  it ;  moreover,  its  actuality, 
in  the  case  of  the  deeper  problems  of  life,  has  become  extremely 
uncertain.  A  hollow  phraseology  often  conceals  the  real  core 
of  the  matter  and  lowers  its  whole  level.  The  life  of  to-day  is 
not  only  altogether  lacking  in  firmness  and  solidarity  and  in 
any  central  dominating  purpose ;  it  is  devoid  of  the  strength 
required  to  master  the  ever-increasing  body  of  reality,  to  inwardly 
assimilate  it,  and  to  find  a  great  and  conscious  purpose  in  thus 
transforming  existence  into  activity.  This  weakness  becomes 
increasingly  apparent  in  proportion  as  the  development  of  the 
Modern  World  brings  with  it  a  prodigious  increase  in  the  extent 
and  complication  of  our  environment,  and  causes  it  to  assume 
a  much  greater  importance  in  our  eyes,  and  to  penetrate  more 
deeply  into  our  beings  than  it  ever  did  before.  Thus  the  world 
conquers  us  more  and  more,  and  increasingly  reduces  us  to  a 
position  of  the  merest  subordination.  Hence  all  the  expansion 
of  life  going  on  around  us  only  brings  with  it  inner  weakness  and 
faintness  of  heart.  There  is  an  increasing  tendency  to  pick  out 
from  amidst  our  manifold  experiences  more  particularly  every- 
thing which  reduces  the  importance  of  humanity  and  deprives 
it  of  its  distinctive  character.  On  every  hand  it  seems  that  we 
are  being  placed  rather  in  the  position  of  victims  of  fate  than  in 
that  of  masters  of  material  things,  beings  capable  of  attaining 
to  an  inner  relationship  with  reality.  We  are  depressed  not  so 
much  by  the  increase  of  the  external  world  as  by  the  fact  that 
we  have  nothing  to  set  up  in  opposition  to  it,  and  this  it  is 
which  makes  us  perceive  the  negative  portion  of  the  content 
of  reality  rather  than  any  other. 

This  tendency  becomes  apparent  in  the  first  place  in  our 
relationship  to  the  greatness  of  nature.  We  are  chiefly  im- 
pressed by  its  immeasurability,  its  infinitude  in  space  and  time, 
and  its  boundlessness  in  both  great  and  small.  Earlier  ages 
were  rejoiced  and  inwardly  elevated  by  the  contemplation  of 


THE  VALUE   OF   LIFE  451 

this  infinite  greatness,  they  were  glad  to  see  the  boundless 
fullness  of  life  made  manifest  in  reality  ;  *  moreover,  they  inter- 
preted it  as  redounding  particularly  to  the  glory  of  man,  since 
thought  could  lift  him  outside  all  narrowing  limitations  to  share 
in  the  infinite  and  the  eternal.  To-day  we  do  not  think  so 
much  about  the  inward  presence  of  infinity  as  about  its  presence 
around  us  in  space  and  time  and  its  reduction  of  our  whole 
existence  to  a  vanishing  smallness.  Human  life  appears,  in 
fact,  to  become  a  matter  of  absolute  indifference.  We  are  told 
that  nothing  which  occurs  on  this  tiny  little  planet  can  possibly 
have  any  importance  when  we  consider  the  innumerable  wonders 
revealed  by  the  scientific  work  of  modern  times.  The  standard 
is  an  external  one.  We  know  no  other. 

At  the  same  time  nature  (in  an  inward  sense)  remains  secret 
and  aloof;  it  withdraws  its  fundamental  verities  farther  and 
farther  from  our  gaze  the  more  science  penetrates  into  its 
territory.  Earlier  ages  possessed  definite  religious  or  artistic 
convictions  with  regard  to  nature,  but  we  stand  in  no  sort  of 
inner  relationship  to  it.  We  have  no  room  for  any  thought 
other  than  that  of  the  limitation  of  humanity ;  we  seem  to  be 
confined  to  a  particular  sphere  and  to  know  no  path  leading 
beyond  it.  If  we  are  thus  isolated  from  these  great  relation- 
ships, it  becomes  foolish  and  baseless  conjecture,  fanciful 
anthropomorphism,  for  us  to  endeavour  in  any  way  to  understand 
or  interpret  nature  and  its  forms.  It  remains  a  profound  secret, 
an  absolutely  insoluble  conundrum.  It  produces  innumerable 
forms,  which  we  can  endeavour  to  comprehend  only  by  employ- 
ing the  analogy  of  action  directed  towards  an  end.  But  when 
it  comes  to  the  purposes  of  nature,  these  seem  to  contradict 
and  mutually  to  stultify  one  another.  With  most  admirable  and 
elaborate  care  nature  prepares  a  special  sort  of  creature ;  then, 
with  equal  care,  it  equips  another  to  destroy  the  first.  It 
appears  to  negate  in  one  direction  what  it  affirms  in  another. 
It  stirs  up  its  creatures  one  against  the  other,  and  drives  them 
into  a  relentless  struggle  for  existence.  Units  of  life  are  per- 

*  The  classical  period  of  the  Ancient  World  avoided  the  infinite  because  it 
possessed  no  limits  and  was  incapable  of  artistic  construction.  It  was  Plotinui 
who  first  assigned  a  positive  value  to  the  concept. 


452    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

fected  in  immense  quantities,  often  by  most  elaborate  and 
roundabout  methods ;  but  they  are  sacrificed  in  equally  immense 
quantities.  In  the  midst  of  the  struggle  we  cannot  avoid 
perceiving  the  upward  trend  of  life  ;  the  construction  of  the 
organisms  grows  more  and  more  complicated,  the  differentiation 
of  parts  becomes  more  delicate,  the  activity  of  the  soul  con- 
tinually increases.  But  within  the  sphere  of  nature  itself  this 
upward  movement  seems  to  result  in  no  real  profit.  If  the 
highest  stage  is  still  merely  a  stage  of  self-preservation  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  then,  in  all  essentials,  precisely  the  same 
object  is  being  achieved  as  that  aimed  at  on  the  lower  stages, 
only  it  is  arrived  at  in  a  much  less  direct  manner.  This  is 
more  like  retrogression  than  progress  !  What  a  sharp  and 
terrible  contrast  there  is,  in  this  case,  between  the  immense 
desire  for  life  on  the  one  hand  and  the  complete  emptiness 
of  the  laboriously  attained  life  on  the  other.  Each  individual 
creature  holds  fast  to  existence,  and  considers  no  sacrifice  of 
power  and  passion  too  great  for  its  maintenance.  Yet  what 
does  this  existence  offer  to  living  creatures,  what  do  they  gain 
by  it  ?  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  whole  process  ?  We  find 
no  answer.  And  because  we  find  none  we  feel  depressed  and 
confused,  as  soon  as  we  consider  the  matter  as  a  whole.*  Some 
sort  of  reason  seems  to  be  in  control,  but  it  seems  bound  and 
limited ;  nay,  it  seems  continually  to  be  engaged  in  thwarting 
itself.  We  appear  to  lose  sight  of  it  in  an  immensity  of  life 
devoid  of  inner  connection.  Further,  the  doctrine  of  evolution 
shows  us  this  mysterious  process  much  more  closely  knitted 
together  than  the  people  of  earlier  ages  at  all  realised  to  be 
the  case ;  more  and  more  bonds  are  continually  being  dis- 
covered to  unite  us  to  the  stages  below  us ;  our  souls  as  well 
as  our  bodies  seem  to  be  dominated  by  exactly  the  same  forces 
that  direct  lower  life.  Thus  our  own  lives  share  in  the  puzzling 
obscurity  of  the  world  around  us ;  a  necessity  hems  us  in  and 
drives  us  before  it,  and  how  far  it  expresses  any  reason  we 
cannot  understand. 

But  man  still   retains  the  power  to  turn  away  from  nature 

*  Hence  in  considering  the  whole  we  may  well  think  of  the  Aristotelian 
saying :  r;  <j>vffi£  caipovla,  a\X'  ov  Seia  (463  6,  14). 


THE   VALUE   OF   LIFE  453 

and  devote  himself  to  culture.  He  is  able  to  construct  a 
domain  of  his  own  in  which  he  shall  find  his  greatness  and 
discover  a  value  in  his  life.  But  to-day  even  this  aspect  of 
life,  when  regarded  as  a  whole,  exhibits  more  complications 
than  clear  profit.  At  the  present  time  it  is  no  longer  doubted 
that  culture  does  not  directly  satisfy  individuals  and  make  them 
happy.  Hence  it  must  ensure  them  something  which  goes 
beyond  happiness,  though  what  this  is  we  do  not  know.  It 
is  undeniable  that  our  power  over  our  environment  is  being 
continually  increased,  and  at  the  same  time  the  conditions  o°f 
human  existence  are  being  unceasingly  improved;  we  are 
carrying  on  a  successful  war  against  pain  and  necessity,  while 
we  have  enormously  increased  onr  opportunities  for  obtaining 
pleasure.  We  have  even  succeeded  in  prolonging  the  length 
of  human  life.  But  all  this  put  together  does  not  give  life, 
considered  as  a  whole,  any  meaning  and  value.  Yet  every 
thinking  and  observing  being  must  inevitably  enquire  after 
some  such  meaning  and  value.  In  spite  of  all  its  great 
achievements  our  modern  culture  is  lacking  in  that  inward 
concentration  of  life  which,  as  we  have  seen,  gave  humanity 
something  to  lay  hold  of,  and  the  consciousness  of  standing 
in  an  inner  relation  to  reality  as  a  whole,  while  imparting  to 
life  the  form  of  a  great  and  promising  task.  Consequently 
it  has  become  impossible  for  us  resolutely  to  face  our  per- 
plexities and  rise  superior  to  them — perplexities  which  are 
found  in  every  type  of  human  culture,  and  more  particularly 
in  that  of  the  present  day. 

Great  complexes  result,  forces  join  together  and  become  inter- 
twined ;  through  this  joining-up,  work  frees  itself  from  individual 
accidents  and  chances  and  attains  to  an  independence  which 
enables  it  to  follow  its  own  paths  and  achieve  splendid  triumphs. 
But  at  the  same  time  the  individual  increasingly  sinks  to  the 
position  of  a  mere  tool,  and  the  more  this  occurs  the  more  his 
soul  loses  touch  with  human  culture  as  a  whole,  the  less  able  he 
becomes,  in  working  for  the  latter,  to  assert  a  spiritual  self.  The 
greatest  outward  activity,  the  most  breathless  acceleration  of 
life,  may  be  combined  with  an  inner  indifference,  an  absence  of 
true  power  and  joy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  life  is  split  up  into  a 


454    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

multitude  of  isolated  phenomena  and  has  almost  become  a 
stranger  to  itself.  When  culture  contains  no  dominating  and 
directing  soul  it  is  difficult  to  prevent  the  petty  human  element 
(which  accompanies  every  cultural  development)  from  growing  in 
rank  profusion  and  making  itself  felt  with  unusual  force.  When 
we  consider,  as  a  whole,  the  extent  to  which  small  and  unworthy 
purposes  are  commingled  with  all  our  endeavours,  the  complete 
untruthfulness  of  the  usual  human  routine  (which  proclaims 
high  purposes  while  teaching  those  concerned  to  pursue  in  the 
first  place  their  own  interests)  and  the  manifold  vanity  which 
causes  every  success  to  redound  to  the  credit  of  the  petty  ego, 
we  are  liable  to  experience  a  strong  feeling  of  disgust  with  the 
whole  affair.  We  feel  that  we  are  face  to  face  with  forces  which 
we  dare  not  allow  to  overpower  us  ;  yet  at  the  same  time  we  do 
not  seem  to  be  able  successfully  to  confront  them.  Moreover 
the  idea  of  progress,  which  for  a  time  seemed  to  offer  a  solution, 
becomes  less  and  less  able  to  provide  us  with  any  effective  help, 
for  obviously  progress  does  not  affect  these  elementary  circum- 
stances ;  in  this  sphere,  natural  desires  and  passions  seem  to 
set  a  limit  to  all  upward  endeavour,  a  limit  of  which  we  cannot 
cease  to  be  painfully  conscious.  Thus  it  cannot  be  maintained 
that  the  man  of  to-day  finds  in  human  culture  a  satisfactory 
meaning  and  value  for  his  life,  and  that  to  work  for  the  sake  of 
culture  raises  him  securely  above  the  doubts  and  necessities  of 
existence. 

But  human  culture  does  not  form  an  absolute  limit  to  our 
endeavour.  With  a  bold  upward  effort,  man  can  raise  himself 
above  its  entire  sphere  and  take  up  a  position  founded  upon  his 
own  inner  life.  With  this  as  a  basis  and  occupying  himself 
with  the  development  of  a  world-embracing  personality,  he  can 
rise  superior  to  all  this  confusion  and  sham  and  seek  to  establish 
a  direct  relationship  with  reality.  The  Stoic  philosophers  were 
the  first  consciously  to  attempt  this ;  dating  from  their  time  this 
species  of  thought  may  be  traced  as  a  constant  type  through  the 
whole  of  history  ;  it  was  especially  influential  during  the  period 
of  the  Enlightenment.  By  developing  a  direct  relationship  with 
God,  religion  seeks  another  method  of  raising  man  above  all  the 
perplexities  of  immediate  existence.  We  will  not  here  discuss 


THE   VALUE   OF  LIFE  455 

whether  this  separation  from  the  world  and  withdrawal  within 
the  individual  soul,  which  is  thus  recommended,  has  not  its 
dangers  and  limitations  (it  certainly  involves  a  division  of  ex- 
istence) ;  we  will  only  ask  if  it  is  possible  to  tread  this  path 
to-day.  This  separation  from  the  visible  world  and  the  activities 
of  humanity  demands  an  inner  world  as  its  secure  possession  if 
it  is  not  to  lapse  into  vacuity.  Such  an  inner  world  can  result 
only  from  a  direct  relationship  to  a  superior  power,  which  may 
be  conceived  of  as  a  divinity  or  a  world-reason.  But  the 
modern  man  is  no  longer  sure  of  the  reality  of  such  a  power,  so 
that  in  his  case  there  is  no  real  foundation  for  an  independent 
inner  world,  and  in  its  absence  there  disappears  the  possibility 
of  achieving  an  independent  position  with  regard  to  the  visible 
world  and  human  affairs  in  general.  With  this  basis  gone,  the 
consciousness  of  personal  value  becomes  an  irrational  vanity  and 
the  concept  an  empty  phrase.  Without  a  domain  of  independent 
and  original  inner  life,  what  has  man  to  set  against  a  world 
which  continually  surrounds  him  with  overwhelming  power? 
The  specific  nature  of  modern  civilisation  further  increases  the 
feeling  of  dependence  because  it  binds  the  work  of  humanity 
more  and  more  down  to  its  environment  and  increasingly  renders 
work  and  creation  mechanical.  When  the  capacity  of  the 
individual  appears  so  small  and  so  limited  there  must  ensue  a 
lessening  of  impulse  towards  personal  activity ;  moreover,  when 
we  are  in  a  less  spiritual  condition,  we  seem,  in  our  own  opinion, 
to  be  even  more  dependent  than  we  really  are ;  we  incline,  on 
every  hand,  to  seek  union  with  others,  to  obtain  their  support 
rather  than  rely  on  our  own  will ;  without  such  union  we  have 
no  feeling  of  security ;  in  addition,  we  expect  a  great  deal  from 
the  power  of  common  institutions  when  the  chief  thing  should 
be  the  attitude  of  the  individual.  In  a  word,  we  reduce  the  energy 
of  life  and  that  without  any  imperative  necessity.  When  such  a 
mood  preponderates  can  an  appeal  for  independence  be  expected 
to  be  of  much  avail  ?  * 

•  This  lack  of  self-confidence,  this  continual  reliance  upon  others  is  perti- 
nently described  in  an  article  in  the  Spectator,  entitled  "  English  Pessimism  " 
(11  August,  190G),  where  we  read  (p.  190) :  "  If  we  were  to  suggest  the  spirit 
which,  when  we  try  to  correct  our  pessimism,  would  be  most  efficacious,  it 


456    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

Thus  the  aspect  of  the  whole  is  far  from  cheering.  We  are 
surrounded  and  dominated  by  an  impenetrable  natural  domain  ; 
human  culture  strives  to  rise  above  this,  but  cannot  get  rid  of 
the  antithesis  between  soulless  work  and  petty  human  sub- 
jectivity, and  consequently  fails  to  satisfy  our  desire  for  happi- 
ness. An  increased  application  of  spiritual  power  might  be  able 
to  lift  us  out  of  this  difficulty  and  give  us  a  secure  foundation  in 
our  own  being;  but  our  capacity  does  not  correspond  to  our 
desire,  and  the  attempt  to  liberate  ourselves  only  leaves  us  feeling 
our  tied  condition  more  keenly  than  ever.  The  unspeakable 
effort  and  labour  we  have  put  forth  does  not  return  to  us  as  pure 
profit ;  it  seems,  indeed,  to  have  no  meaning  at  all,  and  this 
affects  us  especially  painfully  in  our  experience  of  life.  The 
whole  construction  of  our  existence  seems  to  force  us  into  seeing 
that  which  is  inwardly  superior  dependent  upon  the  lower.  It  is 
true  that  ascending  power  makes  itself  felt  in  our  existence,  life 
presses  forward  and  new  aspects  open  up.  But  that  which  is 
new  and  ascending  does  not  attain  to  independence,  remaining 
tied  to  exactly  that  which  it  wished  to  rise  above  ;  it  is  thus 
frequently  held  back  and  its  effectiveness  paralysed.  Is  it  any- 
thing wonderful  that  such  experiences  as  these  (especially  when 
the  state  of  affairs  is  looked  upon  as  unalterable)  should  cause 
deeper  souls,  in  particular,  to  lose  courage  and  a  gloomy  pes- 
simism to  spread  amongst  us?  We  hear  much  to-day  of  the 
joyful  acceptation  of  life,  nay,  we  sing  hymns  to  life ;  but  this 
tendency  is  but  one  of  the  many  inwardly  hollow  phases  of  a 
superficial  and  temporary  thought.  It  is  an  artificial  affirmation 

would  be  an  increase  in  individual  self-reliance.  We  are  not  beaten  in  public 
affairs  as  we  imagine  we  are,  and  there  is  no  necessity  in  carrying  out  our 
works  of  philanthropy  for  relying  so  entirely  upon  associations.  We  establish 
far  too  many  societies.  Everybody  seems  to  feel  that  before  he  can  do  anything 
he  needs  the  protection  of  a  crowd.  He  cannot  even  denounce  or  defend  motor- 
cars unless  hundreds  will  join  him  to  protect  him  from  the  consequences  of 
thinking  independently.  The  result  is  that  every  one  who  wants  to  do  something 
good  devotes  to  it  some  fraction  of  his  mind,  some  little  chip  of  his  energy,  and 
that  the  strength  which  we  would  derive  from  the  strong  will  of  a  leader  is  seldom 
or  never  present.  We  develop  some  new  and  small  group,  not  a  Loyola  or  a 
Wesley.  This,  always  the  danger  of  democracy,  is  the  danger  also  of  the 
mental  processes  of  our  time,  and  deprives  us  first  and  foremost  of  all  help 
from  individual  genius." 


THE   VALUE   OF  LIFE  457 

of  life  remote  from  the  real  foundation  of  the  soul,  a  kind  of 
glamour  in  which  we  may  for  a  time  forget  an  unsatisfying 
existence. 

But  any  thorough  consideration  of  pessimism  must  show  that 
it  carries  a  contradiction  within  itself  and  cannot  possibly  be 
regarded  as  final.  Real  pain  cannot  be  felt  unless  there  is 
something  of  value  to  be  lost.  If  all  were  actually  futile  and 
indifferent,  then  loss  and  rejection  would  have  no  power  to  affect 
us.  During  the  latter  days  of  classical  antiquity  and  during 
the  early  Christian  period  it  was  maintained  that  evil  was  not 
an  independent  reality,  but  simply  the  absence  of  good:  for 
example,  only  a  man  possessed  of  sight  can  suffer  the  mis- 
fortune of  going  blind !  This  line  of  argument  was  used  to 
support  the  conviction  of  the  certain  predominance  of  good.* 
However,  the  difficulty  is  certainly  not  quite  so  easily  overcome, 
because  evil  is  more  than  a  mere  deficiency.  But  it  is  true 
that  a  feeling  (and,  moreover,  a  strong  feeling)  of  evil  is  simply 
unthinkable  in  the  absence  of  any  counterbalancing  element. 
"  Who  can  be  unhappy  at  not  being  a  king  except  a  dethroned 
king  ?  "  asks  Pascal,  very  pertinently.  For  example,  would 
people  complain  so  unceasingly  as  they  do  about  the  evan- 
escence of  things  and  the  short  duration  of  life  if  they  were 
really  like  the  insects  that  are  born  and  die  on  the  same  day, 
if  nothing  were  operative  in  them  which  bore  within  itself  the 
demand  for  eternal  duration? 

Thus  in  the  midst  of  all  the  troubles  and  limitations  of  the 
age  there  stands  the  deep  consciousness  of  our  troubles  as  a 
valid  witness  to  the  fact  that  man  is  not  completely  absorbed 
in  his  present  situation,  that  his  being  contains  something  which 
protests  against  it.  Could  we  so  earnestly  desire  a  liberation 
from  the  mere  routine  of  civilisation  if  there  were  not  something 
within  us  superior  to  it  ?  Could  the  lack  of  inner  relationships 
and  pure  objectivity  in  our  culture  cause  us  so  much  pain  as 
it  does  if  our  nature  did  not  demand  them?  Could  the  pro- 
found obscurity  of  the  world  be  felt  as  such  a  limitation  of 

*  Augustine  defended  this  doctrine  with  peculiar  vigour,  especially  in  the 
Enchiridion  ad  Laurentium  de  fide,  spe  et  caritatt.  According  to  his  definition 
evil  is  not  causa  ejfflciens,  but  only  causa  deficient. 


458    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

our  life  if  we  were  not  intended  to  stand  in  some  sort  of  inner 
relationship  to  the  world?  All  this  can  scarcely  be  said  to 
offer  us  anything  positive,  but  it  serves  to  convince  us  that 
the  matter  cannot  be  concluded  by  a  glib  negation,  that  there 
are  many  questions  lying  beyond. 

But  when  we  cast  our  eyes  over  modern  life  as  a  whole  it 
is  possible  to  go  a  step  further.  Just  as  it  lies  before  us, 
something  more  is  present  than  is  allowed  for  in  the  picture 
drawn  for  us  by  a  type  of  thought  dominated  by  the  boundless 
expansion  of  modern  life.  Even  that  which  we  already  possess 
(not  that  which  we  strive  towards)  contains  more  than  is  taken 
into  account  in  this  view  and  valuation.  A  life  upheld  by 
world-encompassing  personality  is  more  to  us  than  a  pious  but 
sterile  wish ;  it  certainly  cannot  be  attained  at  a  single  bound, 
but  we  are  diligently  working  towards  it  and  seeking  for  assist- 
ance in  our  labour.  In  particular,  we  are  trying  to  draw  nearer 
to  the  great  historical  personalities  and  to  connect  our  own 
lives  with  theirs.  Although  all  this  may  be  imperfect  and 
incomplete,  the  fact  remains  that  a  movement  in  this  direction 
is  undoubtedly  in  progress. 

The  limitations  of  the  pessimistic  attitude  towards  culture 
are  even  more  obvious.  It  is  not  true  that  to-day  nothing 
holds  humanity  together  save  the  mechanism  of  work  and  that 
we  have  thus  become  no  more  than  cogs  in  a  great  machine. 
In  the  midst  of  all  our  disputes  we  possess  a  common  thought- 
world  (indeed  in  its  absence  we  could  not  even  dispute !)  ;  a 
common  atmosphere  surrounds  us  with  spiritual  contents  and 
values,  and  by  more  closely  examining  these  we  become  aware 
of  an  inner  enlargement  and  elevation  of  man  through  culture. 
We  become  convinced  that  in  this  culture  a  new  stage  of  reality 
is  arising,  that  the  world  is  here  acquiring  an  inner  relationship 
and  is  not  merely  a  juxtaposition  of  isolated  and  sometimes 
opposed  elements,  and  that  what  is  taking  place  reaches  far 
beyond  the  aims  of  mere  humanity.  Thus  even  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  present  day  cannot  possibly  be  understood  as 
mere  products  of  man's  petty  ego.  The  immense  progress  of 
science  and  the  untiring  formative  activity  of  art  are  con- 
ceivable only  as  the  work  of  inner  necessities,  driving  men 


459 

onward  and  impelling  them  to  creation.  No  matter  how  much 
the  petty  human  element  may  appear  to  be  concerned  in  these 
movements,  their  superior  nature  remains  a  fact.  The  same 
may  he  said  of  the  practical  activities  of  modern  life.  An  age 
which  far  surpasses  all  previous  ones  in  the  exhibition  of  humane 
feeling  and  at  the  same  time  readily  recognises  the  right  of  each 
individual  to  the  development  of  his  spiritual  and  intellectual 
powers  and  to  a  share  in  the  possession  of  the  goods  of  life, 
an  age  which  grants  the  social  idea  so  much  power  over  men's 
minds,  is  by  no  means  altogether,  or  even  predominantly,  domi- 
nated by  mere  egoism.  This  fact  is  not  clearly  perceived  because 
the  separate  phenomena  are  not  adequately  comprehended  as  a 
whole;  but  as  soon  as  the  main  outlines  become  apparent 
through  the  troubled  surface  of  everyday  life  we  are  compelled 
to  recognise  its  truth. 

When  once  we  recognise  a  spiritual  world  growing  up  within 
humanity  our  whole  view  of  the  cosmos  changes,  and  with  it 
our  own  task  in  life.  Nature  no  longer  constitutes  the  whole 
of  reality,  and  the  latter  acquires  a  deeper  significance.  For 
there  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt  that  when  such  a  trend 
towards  inwardness  takes  place  the  whole  of  life  must  be 
fundamentally  more  than  it  would  seem  to  be  at  first  sight. 
Evolution,  too,  assumes  a  different  appearance  when  spiritual 
life  is  recognised  as  being  no  mere  natural  product,  but  a 
thing  which  can  only  result  from  nature  because  the  latter  has 
behind  it  a  deeper  reality.  The  closer  connection  between  man 
and  nature  will  then  appear  rather  to  elevate  nature  than  to 
tower  man.  With  such  a  fundamental  change  in  point  of  view 
our  work  will  find  itself  confronted  with  fresh  tasks.  If  man, 
with  his  spiritual  nature,  is  no  mere  limited  individual  being 
confined  to  a  sphere  of  his  own,  but  if  a  world-life  works  within 
him,  then  his  quest  of  knowledge  becomes  more  hopeful.  For 
it  may  now  be  asked,  Is  it  not  possible  to  distinguish  the  petty 
human  element  in  man  from  the  genuinely  spiritual,  and  cannot 
a  bridge  be  found  from  the  latter  to  connect  us  more  closely  with 
the  world  and  make  it  more  of  a  home  for  us  ? 

However,  we  cannot  now  pursue  this  line  of  thought  any 
further.  At  present  we  are  concerned  solely  to  establish  the 


460    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

fact  that  the  pessimistic  view  of  life  does  not  take  in  the  whole 
of  reality,  but  offers  a  perspective  corresponding  to  a  special 
condition  only,  a  condition  that  by  no  means  finally  binds  us. 
Our  reality  contains  far  more  than  the  average  life  of  the  age 
allows  us  to  perceive. 

It  must  be  admitted  freely  that  this  "  more  "  has  to  be 
linked-up  and  properly  assimilated  before  it  will  be  equal  to 
overcoming  its  resistances.  This  cannot  take  place,  however, 
until  we  have  succeeded  in  again  attaining  to  a  self- concentration 
of  life,  and  therewith  to  a  more  definite  character  and  to  a  more 
active  relationship  towards  reality.*  Making  use  of  Diirer's 
well-known  phrase,  we  may  say :  "  Reason  is  contained  in 
reality ;  he  who  can  pluck  it  forth  may  possess  it."  But  we 
cannot  thus  pluck  it  forth  until  we  have  ourselves  united  life 
into  a  whole  and  our  own  inner  organs  have  thereby  undergone 
development. 

The  positive  element  in  life  and  reality  cannot  possibly 
become  a  united  whole  to  us  without  an  analysis  of  existence, 
a  sharper  separation  of  light  and  darkness,  and  a  conversion 
of  the  whole  life  of  man  and  of  humanity  into  a  thorough- 
going task.  Thus,  when  this  path  is  taken,  irrationality  does 
not  by  any  means  cease  to  exist,  but  we  acquire  the  possibility 
of  becoming  inwardly  superior  to  it  and  thus  escaping  its 
paralysing  pressure.  Where  the  resistance  comes  from  ;  why 
the  higher  is  dragged  down  towards  the  lower ;  why  the  cycle 
of  the  universe  should  appear  indifferent  towards  that  which  it 
itself  seems  to  produce  as  a  goal — these  are  questions  which 
we  men  cannot  possibly  answer.  In  attempting  solutions, 
religion  and  philosophy  alike  have  only  made  the  matter  still 
more  complicated.  It  must  suffice,  and  it  does  suffice,  for  us 
to  know  that  something  important  is  proceeding  within  us ; 
that  we  are  not  called  upon  to  play  the  role  of  passive 
spectators  while  the  fate  of  the  world  is  decided  over  our 
heads,  but  that  we  are  able  to  place  ourselves  on  the  side  of 
reason  and  to  labour  in  its  cause.  This  imparts  a  certain 

*  It  has  already  been  indicated  that  the  activism  which  we  advocate  does  not 
by  any  means  signify  a  mere  devotion  to  practical  reason  or  even  to  moral 
activity. 


THE   VALUE   OF  LIFE  461 

justification  to  Vauvenargue's  saying :  "  The  world  is  full  of 
obstacles,  as  for  an  active  being  it  must  be!"  The  nearer  we 
again  draw  to  a  complete  synthesis  of  life,  the  more  we  can 
regain  living  courage,  the  more  the  inner  structure  of  life  will 
itself  be  able  to  offer  us  a  safe  support  against  the  irrationality 
of  existence. 

If,  thus  laying  hold  of  deeper  relationships  in  reality,  our  age 
must  again  return  to  a  positive  valuation  of  existence,  this  is  not 
in  any  sense  optimism,  nor  does  it  involve  any  minimisation  of 
the  obscure  element  in  life.  In  particular,  we  must  recognise 
no  small  difference  between  this  attitude  towards  life  and  that 
which  prevailed  during  the  height  of  the  German  Classical 
Period :  in  the  latter  case,  the  world  was  looked  upon  as  a 
domain  of  unclouded  reason,  and  man's  chief  glory  was  under- 
stood to  be  the  artistic  contemplation  or  intellectual  compre- 
hension of  the  cosmic  harmony ;  humanity's  first  task  was  to 
bring  to  full  consciousness  that  which  surrounded  us  with 
unconscious  activity  on  every  side.  For  us  moderns  the 
problems  of  nature  and  of  human  life  have  become  so  acute 
that  we  cannot  so  quickly  venture  upon  a  conclusion  and  thus 
withdraw  from  the  conflict.  But  if  these  increased  difficulties 
in  our  existence  have  caused  us  to  lose  much,  one  thing  we 
have  gained,  and  this  more  than  compensates  for  all  that  has 
been  lost.  We  can  ourselves  work  towards  the  advancement  of 
the  whole.  We  have  passed  from  passive  contemplation  to  active 
co-operation  in  the  work  of  the  great  whole. 


2.   THE   RELIGIOUS   PROBLEM 

(IMMANENCE— TRANSCENDENCE) 

A  DISCUSSION  of  the  antithesis  between  immanence  and  tran- 
scendence might  involve  us  in  the  entire  religious  problem. 
We  do  not  propose,  however,  to  do  more  than  briefly  refer  to 
the  characteristic  modern  attitude  towards  this  problem  (more 
especially  as  we  have  recently  published  more  than  one  work 
upon  the  subject).*  It  will  again  be  convenient  to  commence 
with  a  discussion  of  terms. 

(a)  On  the  History  of  the  Terms 

The  now  customary  juxtaposition  of  immanent  and  tran- 
scendent does  not  go  back  further  than  the  time  of  Kant.t 
Until  then  immanens  (also  permanens)  and  transiens  stood  in 
opposition  to  one  another  :  from  the  thirteenth  century  onwards 
an  action  or  a  cause  was  called  immanent  in  so  far  as  it 
remained  within  the  acting  subject  ;  transeunt  in  so  far  as  it 
went  beyond  to  something  else.J  It  is  in  this  sense  that 

*  See  The  Truth  of  Religion,  trans  Dr.  Tudor  Jones,  pub.  Williams  and 
Norgate,  1911,  and  Christianity  and  the  New  Idealism,  trans.  Prof.  Boyce 
Gibson,  pub.  Harpers. 

t  See,  for  example,  iii.  245  (Hart.) :  "  We  will  call  immanent  those  principles 
which  apply  solely  within  the  limits  of  possible  experience;  transcendent 
principles,  on  the  other  hand,  are  those  which  are  intended  to  reach  beyond 
these  limits." 

J  Thus  Thomas  Aquinas,  for  example,  distinguishes  an  actio  manens  and  an 
actio  transiens ;  see  Schutz's  Thomaslexikon  under  actio :  duplex  est  actio,  una 
qua  transit  in  exteriorem  materiam,  ut  calefacere  et  secare,  alia,  qua  manet  in 
agente,  ut  intelligere,  sentire  et  velle.  This  continued  on  into  the  Modern 
World.  Clauberg  puts  the  matter  as  follows  (op.  omn.  (1691),  p.  322) :  si 
ipsiu$  rei,  qua  dicitur  agere,  status  mutetur,  est  actio  immanens,  sin  alterius, 
at  actio  transiens.  This  distinction,  in  common  with  the  whole  groundwork  of 

Ml 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PROBLEM  463 

we  are  to  understand  Spinoza's  famous  saying  that  God 
is  the  immanent  but  not  the  transeunt  cause  of  all  things.* 
It  means  that  God  does  not  go  outside  Himself  when  He 
works  upon  the  things,  but  that  He  remains  by  Himself, 
thus  carrying  the  world  within  Himself.  From  this  point  of 
view  the  world  is  in  God  rather  than  God  in  the  world. 
This  only  differs  from  scholastic  philosophy  in  the  exclu- 
siveness  of  the  immanence,  for  the  former  was  quite  prepared 
to  recognise  an  immanent  activity  parallel  with  the  transeunt. 

Transcendent  and  transcendental  have  another  origin.  Tran- 
scendent (transcendentia)  was  the  term  applied  in  the  second 
half  of  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  most  general  properties  of 
things,  which,  according  to  the  Neo-Platonic  doctrine,  lie 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  particular  categories.!  From  this 
standpoint  there  easily  resulted  a  relationship  to  God  as  the 
Being  superior  to  all  human  concepts.  The  term  was  still 
employed  in  this  sense  in  the  Modern  World.  |  Kant  then 
separated  transcendent  and  transcendental  and,  reversing  their 

the  scholastic  terminology,  is  derived  from  Aristotle.  See,  for  example,  Met. 
1050  a,  24  :  TJ\V  \itv  iayarov  17  xprjffig,  dlov  ItyewQ  17  opvaf,  KM  ovSiv  ytyvtrai 
irapa  ravrnv  ertpov  airo  TTJ£  oi//£<u£  tpyov,  air  iviuiv  £1  ytyverai  ri,  dlov  awi  rye 
otKocopiKijc;  oiKia  Trapd  rtjv  oiKoS6/j.ij<nv.  The  definite  separation  between 
practical  and  artistic  is  founded  upon  this  distinction  between  an  action  which 
is  directed  towards  itself  and  an  action  which  aims  at  producing  a  work.  With 
regard  to  the  expression  "  immanence,"  we  should  like  to  mention,  further,  a 
passage  from  Augustine  (epist.  268  ad  Nebr.)  quoted  by  Heman  (Kantstudien, 
viii.  ;  i.  p.  58) :  In  te  habeat  heec  tria  et  prce  se  gerat,  primo  ut  tit,  deinde  ut 
hoc  vel  illud  sit,  tertio,  ut  in  eo  quod  ett  maneat,  quantum  potett.  Primum 
illud  cautam  ipsam  naturce  ostentat,  ex  qua.  tunt  omnia.  Alterum  tpeciem,  per 
quam  fabricantur  et  quodammodo  formantur  omnia.  Tertium  manentiam  quan- 
dam,  ut  ita  dicam,  in  qua  omnia  tunt. 

*  Ethic,  part.  I,  prop,  xviii :  deus  ett  omnium  rerum  causa  immanent,  non 
vero  transient.  In  the  fundamental  argument  we  read  :  omnia  qua  tunt  in  deo 
sunt  et  per  deum  concipi  debent,  adeoque  deut  rerum,  qua  in  ipso  tunt,  ett  causa. 

t  As  such,  according  to  the  de  cautit,  are  reckoned,  in  the  first  place,  the 
four  concepts  ens,  unum,  verum,  bonum ;  later,  in  addition,  ret  and  aliqiM. 
Thus  it  was  customary  to  speak  of  a  unitaa  or  veritot  tramcendcntolit,  Ac. 

{  Thus,  for  example,  Bayle  says  (ceuv.  div.  (La  Hague,  1727),  iii.  871  a) :  Si 
I'Origeniste  repond  que  let  vertut  de  Dieu  tont  trantcendenteUet,  qu'ellet  ne 
peuvent  point  etre  dans  la  meme  categorie  que  cellet  de  Vhomme.  "Transcen- 
dental" in  the  older  sense  was  still  employed  by  Ch.  Wolff  and  Leasing. 
Lambert  called  "  transcendental"  such  concepts  as  "  include  what  is  common 
to  the  material  and  spiritual  worlds." 


464    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

meanings,  made  them  instruments  of  his  characteristic  mode 
of  thought.* 

(b)  The  Trend  of  the  Modern  World  towards 
Immanence 

The  general  development  of  the  Modern  World  shows  a 
tendency  towards  immanence,  the  specific  nature  of  which 
becomes  particularly  clear  when  a  comparison  is  made  with 
the  chief  movement  of  Greek  civilisation.  The  experiences 
derived  from  its  work  drove  the  Greek  world  further  and 
further  beyond  the  sensuous  world.  From  the  outer  world, 
which  was  the  starting-point  of  the  investigation,  the  chief 
centre  of  interest  shifted  step  by  step  towards  the  inner  world 
until  the  closing  religious  conception  of  reality  (Plotinus) 
relegated  the  external  world  to  the  position  of  a  mere  symbol 
of  an  invisible  world.  The  Modern  World  pursued  exactly  the 
opposite  path :  the  religious  conviction  of  the  Middle  Ages 
regarded  the  other  world  as  the  true  fatherland,  and  only  in 
its  relationship  to  the  other  world  did  this  world  acquire 
value ;  the  Modern  World,  on  the  other  hand,  began  with 
the  desire  to  seek  the  operation  of  the  Divine  more  within 
this  world,  nay,  to  understand  the  latter  as  an  expression  and 
reflection  of  the  Divine  Being.  This  resulted,  in  the  first 
place,  in  a  panentheism,  as  professed  by  the  noblest  spirits 
of  the  Renaissance.  Soon,  however,  this  developed  further, 
the  world  becoming  more  and  more  the  central  thing,  and  the 
idea  of  God  was  employed  not  so  much  to  reveal  a  new  reality 
as  to  give  greater  depth  to  the  world  ;  consider,  for  example,  the 
pantheism  of  Giordano  Bruno  and  Spinoza.  Pantheism  proved 
overwhelmingly  attractive  to  the  German  Classical  Period,  since 
it  promised  to  bridge  every  antithesis  and  in  particular  to 
combine  the  broadest  and  freest  treatment  of  the  visible  world 
with  the  open  recognition  of  an  invisible  one.  Such  a 
pantheistic  mode  of  thought  was  by  no  means  extinct  during 

*  On  "  transcendent"  see  the  second  note  on  p.  462.  On  "  transcendental" 
he  says  (Krit.  d.  R.V.,  iii.  49;  Hart.)  :  "I  call  all  knowledge  transcendental 
which  occupies  itself,  in  any  way,  not  so  much  with  objects  as  with  our 
knowledge  of  objects  in  so  far  as  this  may  be  possible  a  priori." 


THE   RELIGIOUS   PROBLEM  465 

the  nineteenth  century ;  but  when  it  fully  unfolded  its  charac- 
teristic nature  it  inclined  far  more,  if  not  to  atheism,  at 
any  rate  to  agnosticism,*  to  a  rejection  of  all  transcendental 
questions  as  absolutely  insoluble  problems. 

In  practice,  both  these  views  result  in  a  life  devoid  of  religion. 
At  first  the  divine  is  brought  nearer  to  our  existence,  then  it  is 
closely  associated  with  it,  as  an  inspiring  force,  and  finally 
it  totally  disappears  or  vanishes  to  an  unapproachable  distance. 
Thus  religion,  which  was  once  an  omnipotent  power,  has  become, 
for  the  modern  man,  a  thing  of  quite  secondary  importance,  nay, 
a  mere  illusion,  and  the  world  of  immediate  existence  has  more 
and  more  completely  absorbed  his  whole  thought  and  feeling. 
There  is,  and  has  been,  of  course,  no  lack  of  opposition,  if  only 
because  each  older  phase  tends  to  resist  the  phases  replacing  it. 
The  newer  phases  have  nevertheless  not  been  checked. 

Only  a  superficial  consideration  can  attribute  such  profound 
changes  merely  to  the  unbelief  and  evil  disposition  of  indi- 
viduals. The  matter  is  certainly  more  deeply  rooted,  and 
its  causes,  which  must  be  sought  in  the  general  conditions, 
demand  an  impartial  appreciation.  The  older  type  of  religion 
came  sharply  into  conflict,  in  the  first  place,  with  an  essentially 
altered  feeling  towards  life  on  the  part  of  humanity.  It 
corresponded  with  an  age  when  all  courage  in  facing  life  and 
all  belief  in  an  earthly  future  was  broken,  and  when  men  took 
refuge  in  religion  in  order  there  to  find  rest,  peace,  and  security. 
Meanwhile,  in  the  course  of  centuries,  there  had  arisen  in  young 
and  robust  peoples  a  new  spirit  of  life ;  the  cry  was  now  for 
activity,  not  rest,  for  boldness,  danger,  and  struggle,  rather 
than  security  and  shelter  ;  the  former  rejection  of  the  world 
gave  place  to  a  powerful  desire  to  enter  into  it,  for  man  to 
test  and  increase  his  strength  in  contact  with  the  world.  To 
this  fundamental  change  of  mood  must  be  added  the  results 

*  B.  Flint  gives  an  exact  account  of  the  origin  of  the  term  in  his  excellent  work 
Agnotticitm  (1903).  Huxley  was  the  creator  of  the  word  "  agnostic,"  and  this 
soon  gave  rise  to  "agnosticism."  "  According  to  Mr.  B.  H.  Button,  this  latter 
word  (i.e.  agnostic)  was  suggested  by  Professor  Huxley  at  a  party  held  previous 
to  the  now  defunct  Metaphysical  Society,  at  Mr.  James  Knowles'i  house  on 
Clapham  Common,  one  evening  in  1869,  in  my  hearing.  He  took  it  from 
St.  Paul's  mention  of  the  altar  to  •  the  unknowu  God.' ''  (See  Flint,  p.  1  ff.) 

30 


466    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN   THOUGHT 

of  a  labour  which  corresponded  to  it  and  tended  to  strengthen 
it.  In  every  direction  the  immediate  sensuous  world  became 
of  greater  importance  to  man  ;  it  showed  him  greater  depths 
and  revealed  in  itself  a  more  connected  nature ;  it  increasingly 
affected  his  conduct  and  led  him  to  greater  achievements. 
Science  shows  nature  subject  to  general  laws  and  arranged  in 
fixed  relationships :  it  removes  the  miraculous  element  from 
history  and  explains  it  through  its  own  inter-connections.  The 
social  life  of  humanity  takes  more  spiritual  tasks  upon  itself 
and  endeavours,  with  an  immense  output  of  force,  to  convert 
our  existence  into  a  realm  of  reason.  All  these  causes  have 
contributed  to  make  this  world,  more  than  ever  before,  man's 
spiritual  as  well  as  his  material  home.  At  the  same  time, 
man's  unique  position  was  threatened  in  the  severest  possible 
manner.  For  the  larger  and  more  independent  the  world 
becomes,  the  more  it  exhibits  laws  of  its  own  running 
through  all  its  activities,  the  more  man,  by  comparison, 
becomes  insignificant.  But  when  man  is  thus  reduced  in 
importance  his  characteristic  faculties  cannot  possibly  be 
thought  of  as  grasping  reality  and  bringing  it  near  to  the 
soul.  If  the  world,  while  being  brought  outwardly  nearer, 
becomes,  in  an  inward  sense,  exceedingly  remote,  then  all 
inner  relationship  to  its  foundations  must  disappear,  while 
all  religion  threatens  to  become  a  mere  anthropomorphism 
and  to  degenerate  into  mythology.  Moreover,  where  religion 
does  assert  itself  it  easily  slips  from  the  centre  of  life  to  the 
periphery,  and  from  being  a  natural,  almost  matter-of-course, 
conviction  it  becomes  a  bold  assertion,  not  to  be  maintained 
without  serious  difficulty.  Hence  it  is  no  matter  for  surprise 
that  those  who  reject  everything  outside  experience  and  desire 
to  regard  every  problem  from  the  point  of  view  of  immanence 
raise  their  voices  more  and  more  loudly  and  find  an  increasing 
response.  There  is  probably  more  antipathy  against  religion 
to-day  and  a  more  widespread  and  popular  denial  of  it  than 
has  ever  been  the  case  before.  One  regards  it  as  an  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  a  clear  understanding  of  life,  another  as  a 
restriction  of  active  force,  a  third  as  a  suppression  of  joyous 
vital  feeling ;  in  each  case  it  appears  to  be  a  ruinous  delusion 


THE   RELIGIOUS   PROBLEM  467 

demanding  our  every  effort  for  its  removal.  Is  this  the  final 
conclusion  of  the  ancient  problem,  or  is  it  a  mere  passing 
wave  affecting  the  present  age,  a  movement  which  will  perhaps 
produce  an  effect  the  exact  opposite  of  that  intended  ? 

(c)  The  Complications  in  the  Concept  of  Immanence 

The  main  strength  of  the  movement  against  religion  lies  in 
its  attack.  As  soon  as  it  is  called  upon  to  show  its  own  capacity 
and  to  attempt  a  positive  construction  of  life  on  its  own  account, 
it  becomes  involved  in  complication  after  complication.  That 
which  is  offered  us  as  a  substitute  for  religion  is  usually 
miserably  inadequate,  and  even  this  has  been  grown  for  the 
most  part  upon  foreign  soil  and  subsequently  imported.  The 
immanent  system  of  life  and  view  of  the  world  is  very  far,  as  a 
rule,  from  drawing  upon  pure  experience ;  unnoticed,  it  idealises 
experience  and  compounds  it  with  elements  derived  from  quite 
a  different  tendency  of  thought,  namely,  the  pantheistic.  A 
diluted  form  of  pantheism  has  mastered  the  separate  spheres  of 
life  and  is  there  taken  as  a  matter  of  course ;  this  pantheism 
does  not  generally  venture  openly  to  avow  itself  as  such ;  it 
prefers  to  conceal  the  fashion  in  which  it  places  things  upon 
a  higher  plane.  Compared  with  the  convictions  of  Goethe  or 
Spinoza,  this  lack  of  clearness  stamps  it  as  a  deteriorated 
and  sham  pantheism.  We  see  it  in  this  degenerate  form  in 
a  monistic  philosophy  of  nature  which  unquestioningly  spiritual- 
ises nature  and  treats  it  as  a  concept  of  high  value ;  it  is  again 
met  with  in  a  philosophy  of  history  which  considers  the  mere 
movements  of  men  in  masses  to  be  productive  of  reason  and 
expresses  belief  in  an  evolution  towards  reason,  although  the 
concept  of  reason  has  absolutely  no  foundation  in  its  thought- 
world  ;  it  appears,  too,  in  socio-political  movements  which  treat 
man,  just  as  he  is  in  the  flesh,  as  noble  and  great.  In  every 
direction  we  encounter  a  concealed  idealisation  of  experience, 
combined  with  a  smoothing  away  of  contrasts,  a  decay  of 
characteristic  spiritual  nature,  and  a  soporification  of  all 
self- activity. 

Moreover,   from   a   scientific   point  of  view   the   concept  of 


468    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN   THOUGHT 

immanence  is  not  so  simple  as  it  usually  claims  to  be.  What 
is  this  immediate  reality  that  is  to  completely  absorb  us? 
What  is  real  in  ourselves  ?  Is  it  the  immediate  condition  ol 
juxtaposition,  exhibited  in  its  complete  purity  ?  In  this  case 
man  becomes  split  up  into  nothing  more  than  a  bundle  of 
separate  sensations;  and  this  is  impossible,  if  only  for  the 
simple  reason  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  isolated  sen- 
sation ;  we  only  know  of  sensations  attached  to  an  ego — my 
sensations  or  your  sensations — not  sensations  in  themselves. 
We  are  thus  continually  compelled  to  fall  back  upon  the  idea  of 
a  unity  holding  the  sensations  together ;  a  contrast  appears  in 
our  own  sphere  and  it  becomes  a  question,  What  is  the  essence 
of  life  ?  But  if  the  problem  reaches  so  far  back,  and  if  a 
gradation  is  apparent  in  ourselves,  it  is  very  obvious  that 
exceedingly  little  is  gained  by  the  catchword  "  immanent." 

In  the  case  of  the  religious  problem,  in  particular,  the  general 
tendency  of  the  period  goes  against  the  mediaeval  transcendence, 
with  its  duplication  of  the  immediate  world,  and  it  no  doubt  does 
so  with  justice  ;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  our  whole  life 
lies  upon  a  single  plane.  It  may  be  that  gradations  are  neces- 
sary, nay  a  reversal  may  be  necessary,  in  the  sense  that  what 
we  at  first  believe  to  be  the  secure  basis  of  our  life  and  activity 
may  itself  have  first  to  seek  support  in  a  more  deeply  grounded 
world.  What  then  is  the  reality  which  is  to  comprise  our 
whole  life  and  effort?  If  we  explain  it  to  be  the  world  of 
immediate  sensuous  impression,  then  we  place  ourselves  in  sharp 
opposition  to  the  great  pioneers  of  immanence,  Spinoza  and 
Goethe,  then  we  miss  the  spiritual  depth  of  the  whole  modern 
civilisation.  The  recognition  of  a  reality  based  upon  spiritual 
life  at  once  gives  rise  to  the  question  whether  this  reality  at 
once  draws  the  whole  range  of  life  to  itself  or  whether  it 
does  not  come  upon  obstacles,  within  and  without,  the  over- 
coming, nay  the  confronting,  of  which  cannot  be  undertaken 
without  a  further  strengthening  and  assistance  derived  from 
wider  relationships.  This  system  of  exclusively  immanent 
reason,  with  its  pantheism,  suffers  shipwreck  more  particularly 
upon  the  fact  of  the  manifold  unreason  in  human  and  natural 
life.  For,  from  this  point  of  view,  there  are  two  alternatives 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PROBLEM  469 

only ;  either  the  unreason  must  be  minimised,  removed  as  far  as 
possible  from  sight  or  explained  away,  or  it  must  be  recognised 
as  a  basic  element  in  reality  and  hence  held  to  be  unassailable. 
Thus  we  have  either  a  tendency  towards  optimism,  which  in- 
volves shallowness,  or  towards  pessimism,  which  means  negation 
and  finally  despair.  We  see  that  things  are  not  so  simple  as 
the  tendency  towards  immanence  would  represent  them  to  be. 
We  must  be  on  our  guard  against  accepting  as  true  a  conception 
of  the  world  because  it  appears  to  us,  according  to  our  way  of 
looking  at  things,  to  be  the  smoothest  and  easiest.  For  what 
would  this  be  but  a  new  type  of  anthropomorphism — an  exalta- 
tion of  human  will  and  desire  to  be  the  measure  of  reality  ? 

(d)  The  Revival  of  the  Religious  Problem 

Thus,  in  attempting  a  construction  of  life  entirely  withou  the 
assistance  of  religion,  we  are  confronted  by  very  serious  compli- 
cations. This  alone,  however,  would  by  no  means  hinder  such 
a  movement ;  it  is  possible  for  a  great  deal  of  confusion  and 
contradiction  to  be  endured  if  the  trend  of  life  is  powerful  and 
self-conscious.  Now  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  seeing  that,  to-day, 
in  the  midst  of  all  the  passionate  attacks  upon  religion,  the 
religious  problem  is  again  coming  to  the  front ;  the  denial  of 
religion  is  becoming  more  and  more  popular  among  the  masses, 
but  that  does  not  prevent  religion  arousing  a  greatly  increased 
amount  of  thought  and  passion  on  the  highest  level  of  spiritual 
and  intellectual  life.  It  is  a  fact  that,  at  a  given  period, 
different  movements  may  cut  across  or  oppose  one  another,  and 
the  tendency  of  the  surface-movement  may  be  directly  contrary 
to  that  of  the  under-current.  In  order  to  assure  ourselves  of 
the  re-ascent  of  religion  we  need  only  compare  our  age  with  the 
German  Classical  Period.  Religion  was  then  no  more  than  an 
agreeable  adjunct  to  life ;  to-day  it  stands  in  the  very  centre 
of  life,  produces  differences  of  opinion  to  the  point  of  the 
bitterest  conflict,  makes  its  voice  heard  in  the  treatment  of 
every  circumstance,  and  exerts  an  immense  power  alike  in 
affirmation  and  negation.  For  the  modern  denial  is  not  of  the 
kind  which  calmly  shelves  religion  as  something  decayed  and 


470    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

obsolete  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  violently  passionate  nature  of  the 
attack  shows  clearly  enough  that  religion  is  still  something  very 
real,  powerful,  and  effective.  Perhaps  even  the  denial  itself 
frequently  signifies  not  so  much  a  complete  rejection  of  religion 
as  a  desire  for  another  and  simpler  type  of  religion,  more 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  day.  At  any  rate,  religion  cannot 
be  regarded  as  a  slowly  dying  light. 

To  what  are  we  to  attribute  this  sudden  change  ?  It  can 
hardly  be  the  fruit  of  apologetic  work,  for  this  is  usually 
preaching  to  the  converted ;  it  may  confirm  and  consolidate, 
but  it  is  not  in  its  nature  to  press  forward.  In  reality,  the 
movement  is  rooted  in  a  reaction  on  the  part  of  modem  life 
itself.  Just  because  this  life  with  its  delight  in  the  world  has 
been  able  to  develop  itself  freely  and  put  forth  all  its  capacity, 
its  limitations,  nay  its  helplessness,  with  regard  to  ultimate 
questions  has  become  clear.  It  is  another  case  of  that  indirect 
method  of  proof  of  which  the  history  of  humanity  provides  us 
with  so  many  examples,  a  method  according  to  which  the 
indispensability  of  an  assertion  is  convincingly  demonstrated 
as  the  result  of  a  negation,  of  the  unrestricted  expansion  of  the 
opposite  assertion.  The  direction  of  life  towards  immediate 
existence  has  dispelled  much  illusion  and  superstition,  awakened 
much  otherwise  latent  force  and  advanced  and  developed  this 
existence  in  the  most  manifold  fashion.  But  that  which  has 
been  accomplished  in  this  direction  is  predominantly  of  a 
peripheral  nature ;  it  has  improved  the  conditions  of  our  life 
but  has  not  deepened  life  itself.  An  inward  emptiness  is  thus 
the  final  result  of  all  this  immeasurable  work,  and  we  cannot 
but  look  upon  all  the  labour  and  endeavour  as  inadequate.  The 
rejection  of  each  and  every  invisible  relationship  reduced  culture 
more  and  more  to  a  merely  human  culture.  This  was  able 
to  avoid  objection  so  long  as  a  high  ideal  value  was  attached 
to  the  concept  of  human  being  itself  and  the  latter  was  viewed 
in  a  transfigured  form.*  This,  however,  took  place  under  the 
influence  of  that  very  mode  of  thought  which  is  now  rejected  as 
a  falsification  of  reality.  With  its  disappearance  the  transfigura- 

*  Herder,  for  example,  made  of  "  humanity  "  an  all-embracing,  lofty  ideal : 
"  Man  has  no  nobler  word  for  his  destiny  than  that  which  describes  himself." 


THE   RELIGIOUS  PROBLEM  471 

tion  must  also  cease,  man  must  appear  in  his  natural  condition 
without  wrapping  or  adornment  and  become  the  sole  standard  of 
all  truth  and  goodness.  Now,  modern  life,  in  particular,  with 
its  liberation  of  every  force,  has  brought  to  the  surface  so  much 
that  is  impure,  unedifying,  and  unworthy,  and  has  placed  so 
clearly  before  our  eyes  the  pettiness  and  unreality  of  a  merely 
human  culture,  that  it  becomes  continually  more  and  more  hope- 
less to  obtain  a  satisfying  type  of  life  upon  this  basis  and  to 
provide  human  existence  with  a  meaning  and  a  value.  It  ia 
being  increasingly  felt  that  there  is  something  in  man  which 
this  immanent  type  of  life  does  not  bring  out,  and  that  this 
undeveloped  element  is  something  indispensable,  perhaps  the 
oest  of  all ! 

Thus  there  grows  up  a  desire  for  an  inner  transformation  of  man, 
for  a  liberation  from  the  pettiness  which  fetters  and  oppresses 
him.  A  new  age  is  at  hand.  The  trend  is  again  from  a  merely 
humanistic  culture  to  a  transforming  spiritual  culture,  elevating 
man's  essential  being.  This  necessarily  leads  to  the  demand 
for  a  new  reality  and  hence  towards  religion. 

In  the  first  instance  this  gives  rise  to  a  highly  complicated 
situation.  There  is  an  inner  desire  for  a  new  type  of  life  and 
being,  but  at  the  same  time  our  understanding  and  our  work  tie 
us  down  to  immediate  existence.  We  should  like  something 
higher  but  can  find  no  path  leading  to  it;  yet  we  cannot 
surrender  the  aim.  So  we  are  tossed  from  the  one  to  the  other 
and  unceasingly  contradict  ourselves.  But  in  spite  of  all  incom- 
pleteness and  discomfort,  one  thing  at  any  rate  has  been 
attained :  from  a  supposed  possession  we  have  again  come  to  a 
search,  a  diligent  and  eager  search ;  the  ancient  and  eternal 
questions  come  to  the  front  again  with  fresh  force.  What 
further  developments  the  situation  will  undergo  depends  upon 
all  sorts  of  conditions,  appertaining  both  to  man  and  to  destiny. 
The  future  alone  can  decide. 

(e)  The  Demands  made  by  the  Present  Position  of 
Religion 

In  reviewing  the  present  position  of  religion  we  must  be 
peculiarly  struck  by  the  fact  that  a  sharp  division  etists 


472    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

between  the  traditional  ecclesiastical  form  of  religion  and  a 
religious  movement  of  a  more  universal  character  arising  from 
the  aspiration  of  the  age  itself.  There  are  many  to-day  who 
wish  to  be  religious  but  are  not  in  the  least  attracted  by  ecclesi- 
asticism ;  they  are  as  much  repelled  by  the  Church  as  they  are 
attracted  by  religion.  The  first  cause  of  the  foregoing  state  of 
affairs  is  perhaps  to  be  sought  in  the  existence  of  a  wide  gap 
between  the  traditional  form  of  Christianity  and  the  civilised 
life  of  the  present  day,  a  gap  which  makes  a  mutual  understand- 
ing in  the  highest  degree  difficult.  The  whole  conception  of 
the  world  has  essentially  altered,  and  in  particular  it  has  be- 
come larger  and  less  exclusively  human  ;  the  old-fashioned  type 
of  feeling  appears  to  the  modern  man  too  soft  and  too  colourless  ; 
the  age  calls  him  to  new  practical  tasks  demanding  his  whole 
strength.  While  ancient  Christianity  attempted  to  communi- 
cate new  power  and  fresh  living  courage  to  a  tired  and  intimi- 
dated humanity,  religion  has  now  to  do  with  a  humanity  full  of 
strong  desire  for  life  and  restless  activity.  The  principal 
factor  in  the  situation,  however,  and  that  which  more  than  any- 
thing else  gives  the  contradiction  its  sharpness,  is  that  the  age 
no  longer,  out  of  its  own  experience,  comprises  life  in  one 
question,  the  answer  to  which  forms  the  core  of  Christianity 
— the  question  of  moral  salvation,  of  the  inner  liberation  and 
renewal  of  humanity.  Modern  activity  and  creation  in  the 
sense- world  and  the  modern  feeling  of  youthful  freshness  and 
strength  have  driven  this  question  into  the  background  as  far  as 
modern  humanity  is  concerned.  But  when  the  question  is  no 
longer  asked  with  full  vigour  and  spontaneity,  the  answer  must 
fall  upon  indifferent  ears  and  the  right  and  necessity  of  the 
matter  become  obscured,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  every  im- 
perfection in  the  historical  conception  will  at  once  leap  into 
prominence  and  be  very  apt  to  determine  the  valuation. 
Finally,  in  the  case  of  the  German  nation,  the  dependence  of  the 
Church  upon  the  State  and  the  help  afforded  it  by  the  State  have 
also  greatly  contributed  to  an  inner  alienation  of  feeling;  for 
with  the  other  Germanic  peoples  the  alienation  is  seemingly  not 
so  great.  The  action  of  the  newly  uprising  religious  movement 
in  seeking  its  own  paths  is  therefore  easily  understood.  When 


THE   RELIGIOUS   PROBLEM  473 

we  compare  it  with  the  older  type  of  religion  (which  it  regards 
as  too  narrow  and  confined),  we  see  that  it  is  striving  in  the  first 
place  towards  a  greater  width,  towards  the  greatest  possible 
universality,  towards  a  greater  receptivity  with  respect  to  the 
environing  world ;  it  does  not  trouble  so  much  about  the  com- 
plications in  man's  inner  life  as  about  his  relationship  to  the 
whole  ;  it  aims  at  bringing  the  whole  inwardly  nearer  to  him,  and 
permitting  him  to  experience  its  infinity  and  enjoy  its  beauty. 
In  such  artistic  mood  a  liberation  from  everything  pettily 
human  seems  to  be  achieved  and  the  soul  appears  to  float  in 
blissful  security  in  the  pure  ether  of  the  cosmos. 

Such  a  resistance  to  the  absorption  of  man  in  the  merely 
human,  such  a  desire  for  the  whole,  constitutes  an  essential 
aspect  of  religion,  and  has  had  an  important  influence  on  its 
history.  But  it  is  another  question  whether  that  which  here 
manifests  itself  is  capable  of  solving  the  whole  task  of  religion, 
therewith  removing  and  supplanting  the  entire  historical 
element.  If  the  new  were  strictly  confined  to  its  own  capacity 
and  not  silently  complemented  in  all  sorts  of  ways  by  drawing 
upon  the  life  presented  by  historical  religion,  all  its  width  and 
freedom  could  not  well  conceal  a  great  vagueness  and  hollow- 
ness.  This  kind  of  religion  does  not  get  beyond  fine  and 
delicate  moods,  it  attains  no  genuine  actuality.  Instead  of 
revealing  a  new  world  to  man,  it  does  no  more  than  throw  a 
more  amiable  light  upon  the  existing  world,  or  it  surrounds 
man's  life  with  agreeable  moods  suitable  enough  to  the  pleasant 
occupation  of  his  spare  time,  but  miserably  impotent  in  the 
face  of  the  serious  realities  of  life.  It  will  never  be  possible  in 
this  way  to  achieve  a  further  development  of  the  soul,  to  liberate 
forces  capable  of  overcoming  necessity  and  guilt,  to  offer  life  a 
firm  foundation,  to  draw  men  together  by  means  of  an  indepen- 
dent inner  world.  We  have  here  beautiful  pictures  and 
beautiful  prospects,  but  pictures  which  cannot  get  beyond  the 
stage  of  mere  designs !  This  aesthetic-pantheistic  mood  may 
provide  valuable  stimulus  and  serve  a  useful  preparatory  purpose, 
but  it  is  not  equal  to  the  chief  task  of  religion ;  the  truth  which 
it  contains  must  be  amalgamated  with  something  else  and  with 
something  more  solid  if  it  is  to  be  of  real  value  in  the  forward 
movement. 


474    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

But  however  inadequate  this  new  type  of  religion  may  be, 
there  remains  the  fact  of  its  opposition  to  the  ecclesiastical  form, 
there  remains  a  division  in  the  religious  life  and  endeavour  of  the 
day.  Hence  the  question  becomes  inevitable :  Can  we  work 
towards  the  overcoming  of  this  division,  and  if  so,  how?  If 
there  is  again  to  be  harmony  between  the  age  and  religion  then 
the  age  must  put  a  question  to  religion,  and  the  latter  must 
answer  it  in  a  manner  which  it  is  possible  for  the  age  to  accept ; 
before  this  can  come  to  pass,  however,  there  must  be  important 
alterations,  or  at  any  rate  further  developments,  on  both  sides. 
•.he  desire  of  the  age  for  religion  will  not  again  become  strong 
and  overwhelming  until  the  age  recognises  great  inner  com- 
plications in  human  life,  makes  these  into  personal  experience, 
and  at  the  same  time  finds  the  centre  of  these  complications  in 
the  moral  problem.  On  the  other  hand,  religion,  too,  must  not 
understand  and  treat  the  moral  problem  from  the  narrow  point 
of  view  of  the  immediate  impression,  but  must  look  upon  it  as  the 
summit  of  an  all-embracing  movement :  it  will  thus  itself  win  a 
broader  basis  and  escape  the  particularity  which  otherwise 
unavoidably  attaches  to  it.  If  religion,  at  this  central  point,  has 
gained  secure  contact  with  the  innermost  endeavour  of  the  age, 
and  if  at  the  same  time  it  has  become  clear  and  secure  with 
regard  to  its  own  fundamental  fact,  then,  without  danger,  it  can 
subject  its  traditional  content  to  examination  that  men  may  see 
what  is  essential  and  unchangeable,  what  secondary  and  subject 
to  temporal  mutation.  Above  everything  else  religion  must  be 
powerfully  conscious  of  its  own  essential  nature  and  take  up  a 
firm  stand  upon  this  position.  Its  ultimate  object  is  not  to 
provide  man  with  intellectual  information  about  the  world, 
merely  to  arouse  new  feelings  or  to  set  new  practical  tasks  ;  it 
is  to  reveal  a  new  life,  nay,  a  new  world,  and  this  it  does  by 
means  of  a  direct  relation  to  the  deepest  foundation  of  being,  to 
the  dominating  fundamental  life-force.  It  proves  the  new  life, 
in  the  first  place,  through  the  actuality  of  its  world-wide  his- 
torical development,  through  the  re-shaping  of  reality  to  which 
it  is  continually  giving  rise.  It  must  insist  upon  the  recognition 
of  the  life  here  offered  us  as  the  dominating  soul  of  all  life,  as 
the  indispensable  condition  of  all  spirituality.  But  although 


THE   RELIGIOUS  PROBLEM  475 

this  life  is  fundamentally  super-temporal,  its  development  in  the 
human  sphere  is  subject  to  the  conditions  of  time  and  history ; 
it  must  adjust  itself  with  regard  to  them,  and  it  can  do  this, 
without  losing  itself,  only  when  there  is  a  clear  distinction  made 
between  the  substance  of  this  life  and  its  existing  form,  for  then 
it  will  be  possible  to  combine  substantial  unchangeability  with  a 
historical  development  of  the  form  of  existence.  In  this  respect 
the  present  day  is  faced  with  a  particularly  important  and  difficult 
task,  namely  that  of  obtaining  a  form  of  religion  in  the  tphere 
of  human  existence  to  correspond  with  the  historical  position  of 
spiritual  life  (not  with  the  merely  superficial  tendencies  of  the 
age),  without,  in  the  process,  losing  (or  even  in  any  way  diluting) 
the  substance  of  religion.* 

The  creation  of  such  an  understanding  between  Christianity 
and  the  Modern  World  is,  however,  a  more  difficult  matter  than  it 
is  frequently  thought  to  be.  It  is  above  everything  else  neces- 
sary that  there  should  be  a  full  recognition  and  valuation  of  all 
the  great  changes  that  the  ages  have  produced  and  of  the  inner 
necessities  which  have  thus  arisen.  The  usual  type  of  apology 
does  not  do  this.  It  does  not  grasp  the  matter  as  a  whole,  but 
treats  of  isolated  points ;  instead  of  fully  entering  into  the 
opposite  position,  it  approaches  it  entirely  from  the  outside ;  it 
operates  with  mere  possibilities,  showing  that  the  modern  move- 
ment still  leaves  certain  paths  open,  which,  granted  the  will  to 
do  so,  might  lead  to  an  agreement  with  the  faith  of  the  Church. 
In  this  way  it  becomes  more  and  more  artificial  and  even  exposes 
itself  to  the  danger  of  inner  untruthfulness.  One  is  reminded  of 
Hume's  saying,  that  an  ocean  flood  cannot  be  stopped  with 
wisps  of  straw!  Never  in  this  fashion  will  religion  be  able  to 
regain  the  desired  position  in  life  as  a  whole,  never  in  this  way 

*  In  my  works  on  the  philosophy  of  religion  I  have  explained  more  in  detail 
why  Christianity,  in  spite  of  all  those  elements  which  are  transitory,  seems  to 
contain  an  imperishable  core,  rendering  a  breach  with  it  unnecessary.  Here  I 
should  like  merely  to  add  that  I  can  hardly  conceive  of  anything  so  absolutely 
foolish  as  the  attempt  to  elaborate  a  religion  by  conscious  reflection :  in  all 
other  spheres  we  have  happily  overcome  such  a  mode  of  thought,  with  its 
superficial  enlightenment ;  it  is  precisely  in  the  most  inward  region  of  life, 
however,  where  such  thought  ia  peculiarly  intolerable,  that  we  still  need  to  be 
on  the  defensive  against  it. 


476    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF  MODERN  THOUGHT 

will  it  attain  the  directness  and  simplicity,  the  spiritual  nearness, 
the  secure  power  of  conviction,  without  which  its  task  cannot  be 
performed.  It  is  undeniable  that  at  the  present  time  religion  is 
becoming  insecure,  and  this  fact  must  not  be  obscured.  To-day, 
the  Christian  type  of  life  is  far  from  being  present  to  humanity 
with  such  convincing  nearness  as  to  powerfully  influence  the 
whole  construction  of  life  and  at  the  same  time  to  be  an  actual 
experience  and  present  reality  to  every  individual.  When 
religion  is  handicapped  by  so  much  that  is  obsolete  and  foreign, 
when  the  eternal  truths  are  often  obscured  by  the  debris  of 
thousands  of  years,  religion  cannot  develop  its  full  power  with 
confidence  of  victory,  it  cannot  have  any  axiomatic  certainty ;  it 
will  itself  be  disquieted  even  by  the  most  miserably  superficial 
attacks,  attacks  which  would  be  totally  ineffective  in  the  presence 
of  firm  and  self-experienced  conviction.  It  is  thus  seen  that 
religion  urgently  requires  a  thoroughgoing  revision,  an  energetic 
demonstration  of  its  dominating  characteristics,  a  rejection  of 
everything  which  has  become  withered  and  decayed.  This  is 
necessary,  more  particularly  in  its  own  interest.  Such  a  task  as 
this,  however,  cannot  be  successful  except  in  an  atmosphere  of 
perfect  freedom. 

At  the  same  time  the  substance  of  religion  must  be  energetic- 
ally preserved  and  summoned  to  powerful  manifestation  ;  it  must 
be  employed  to  distinguish  between  what  is  genuine  and  what  is 
not,  between  reality  and  sham,  in  the  content  of  the  age. 
Religion  can  accomplish  nothing  important  unless  it  be  indepen- 
dent of  the  mere  position  of  the  age.  Christianity,  in  particular, 
though  not  absolutely  rejecting  the  immediate  world,  rejects  the 
idea  that  it  should  be  accepted  as  a  final  conclusion  and  is  hence 
uncompromisingly  opposed  to  merely  human  culture,  a  culture  con- 
fined to  immediate  existence,  such  as  now  constitutes  the  leading 
tendency  of  modern  life.  In  this  case  no  adjustment  of  differ- 
ences is  possible ;  there  is  room  for  nothing  but  a  straightforward 
conflict.  It  is  true  that  this  conflict  must  be  looked  upon  as 
leading  finally  to  peace,  but  it  makes  an  immense  difference  to 
the  result  whether  the  contrast  is  shown  up  in  the  first  place 
with  full  clearness  or  whether  it  is  weakened  from  the  very 
beginning.  In  this  respect,  there  is  much  weak  connivance  on 


THE   RELIGIOUS  PROBLEM  477 

the  Protestant  side  and  much  anxious  reverence  of  modern 
culture,  which  is  regarded  as  if  it  were  already  a  complete  truth 
in  its  whole  being  and  not  itself  full  of  difficult  problems ;  there 
is  a  fear  of  decisive  negation,  as  if  an  affirmation  which  did  not 
give  rise  to  a  negation  could  be  of  any  value;  people  lack  con- 
fidence in  their  own  position  and  hence  naturally  enough  make 
no  progress.  Modesty  may  adorn  a  man,  but  where  a  cause  is 
concerned  it  may  lead  to  injustice.  A  religion  dependent  upon 
mere  human  culture,  a  religion  trailing  at  the  heels  of  every 
superficial  and  temporary  movement,  is  a  miserable  and  inverte- 
brate thing.  The  desire  for  more  freedom  and  spontaneity  must 
unite  itself  to  the  desire  for  greater  depth.  This  is  quite  possible; 
it  only  remains  for  humanity  to  accomplish  it.  Thus  we  see  in 
this  case,  too,  that  although  the  present  situation  is  full  of  com- 
plications and  contradictions  we  are  by  no  means  left  helplessly 
at  their  mercy ;  on  the  contrary,  by  exerting  spiritual  force  we 
can  rise  above  them. 


CONCLUSION 

WE  have  journeyed  through  the  different  departments  of  life 
and  thought  which  have  come  within  the  scope  of  our  work  and 
have  considered  the  problems  which  they  offer.  We  have  thereby 
become  convinced  of  the  overflowing  fullness  of  life  which  pulses 
through  our  time ;  it  can  be  no  decrepit  age  which  exhibits  such 
important  problems  and  accomplishes  such  remarkable  work. 
But  considering  its  spiritual  content  and  its  general  trend  we 
perceive  it  to  be  an  essentially  incomplete  age.  The  principal 
cause  of  this  is  that  our  synthetic  power  does  not  correspond  to 
the  immeasurable  wealth  of  matter  which  pours  in  upon  us. 
The  concentration  of  life  is  far  outpaced  by  its  expansion.  We 
have  at  the  same  time  seen,  however,  that  we  are  not  compelled 
to  accept  this  state  of  affairs  as  if  it  were  decreed  by  an  inevitable 
destiny ;  on  the  contrary,  the  life  of  to-day  is  full  of  possibilities 
which  can  prepare  and  facilitate  a  synthesis.  It  remains  for  a 
progressive  creative  activity  to  seize  these  possibilities  and  make 
the  most  of  them.  We  have,  moreover,  observed  that  this  cannot 
take  place  as  a  direct  result  of  the  "  given  "  situation ;  what  is 
needed  is  rather  that  we  should  rise  above  this  situation,  that 
we  should  attain  to  a  new  standpoint  for  life,  reversing  our 
immediate  existence.  If  spiritual  life  becomes  independent,  then 
such  a  reversal  is  possible,  but  not  otherwise.  All  paths  have 
been  seen  to  lead  to  this  same  goal.  In  the  case  of  each 
separate  investigation  we  saw  how  the  conviction  of  such  an 
independence  on  the  part  of  spiritual  life  altered  the  problem  and 
prepared  the  way  for  its  solution. 

Following  up  this  line  of  thought,  the  study  of  our  own  age  is 
seen  to  lead  beyond  its  own  content  into  the  future.     We  mua* 


4T8 


480    MAIN  CURRENTS   OF   MODERN  THOUGHT 

endeavour  to  pass  from  a  scattering  of  energy  in  multifarious 
occupations  to  a  central  all-embracing  task,  from  contemplative 
and  analytical  reflection  to  creative  synthesis,  from  a  prevailing 
devotion  to  the  external  world  to  more  personal  and  inner  life 
and  more  inner  independence.  Philosophy  is  called  upon  to 
co-operate  in  this  work  to  the  best  of  its  ability. 


INDEX   OF   SUBJECTS 


Abstraction,  84 
Activism,  79  f.,  460 
J2sthetical  view  of  life,  393  f. 
^Bstheticism,  Modern,  400  f. 
^Esthetics  and  evolution,  262 
Agnosticism  and  term  "Agnostic,"  464 
Altruism  and  morality,  385-7 
Apperception,  Wundt's  Theory  of,  74 
Aristocracy  and  modern  life,  376 
Art,  55-6,  371,  404 f.,  442,  448 

and  civilisation,  304 ;   artistic  type 
of  civilisation,  292-4 

and  evolution,  249-50 

and  idealism,  109 

and  individualism,  364,  400  f. 

and  morality,  393  f . 

and  sex,  407 

and  spiritual  life,  144 
Asceticism,  403-4 


B 


Body  and  Soul,  Problem  of,  216 f. 


Catholicism,  88,  92,  339,  383,  403 
Character  and  personality,  409  f . 
Character,  Concept  of,  422  f . 
Christianity,   96,  108,  170,  275,  277, 
292,  448-9,  457,  462  f. 

Core  of,  472 

and  art,  394-5 

and  democracy,  375,  377,  380 

and  dogma,  67 

and  equality,  348 

and  evolution,  244  f. 

and  free-will,  432 


Christianity  and  intellectualism,  67 

and  modern  life,  475  f . 

and  sex,  403-4 

Church  and  State  in  Germany,  472 
Classic,  Nature  of  the,  322 
Civilisation,  281  f.,  453  f. 

and  character,  426  f . 

and  personality,  419  f . 
Content,  Concept  of,  183-4 
Co-education,  360 
Culture,  Human,  281  f. 

D 

Democracy,  306-7,  374  f. 

Descent,  Theory  of,  257 

Design  (see  Teleology) 

Determinism,  431  f . 

Discontinuity,  Philosophy  of,  187,  484 

Dualism  and  Monism,  215  f. 

Dynamical  view  of  life,  293-4,  448 

E 

Economics — 

and  democracy,  374  f . 

and  law,  206-7 
Ego,  Nature  of  the,  52-3 
Empiricism,  119  f .,  123,  155  f. 
Energetics,  181 
Energy,  Concept  of,  271 
Enlightenment,  68,  134,  145, 190,  208, 
249,  308-9,  316-17,  329,  341, 
348,  376,  383,  397,  432 
Entelechy,  271 
Epicureanism,  295 
Epigenesis,  241 
Equality — 

of  man,  348,  376 

and  Christianity,  348 

and  society,  359-60,  364 


31 


482 


"  Ethic,  The  New,"  401  f. 
Ethical  view  of  life,  393  f . 
Ethics,  385  f. 

Evolution,  180,  227-8,  240  f . 
Experience  and  Thought,  119  f. 


Feminism,  360 

and  the  "  New  Ethic,"  401  f. 
Free  Trade,  178 
Free  Will  Question,  431  f. 
French  Revolution,  222 


Genius,  Concept  of,  3C8 
Germany,  Church  and  State  in,  472 
Germans — 
and  character,  428-9 
and  personality,  422 
and  politicism,  362,  378 
Good,  Idea  of  the,  53 
Greek   Thought  and  Civilisation,  37, 
66-7,    86-7,   145,   242-4,    287, 
393-4,   406,   412,    422-3,    448, 
463 


Hierarchic  view  of  life,  343-4 
"  Higher,"  Concept  of  the,  110 
Histology  and  Society,  179 
Historicism,  316  f . 
History,  61,  236-7,  308  f.,  441 

of  philosophy,  96 f.,  467 

and  evolution,  267-8 

and  law,  207  f. 
Humanism,  75,  114 

German,  101,   175,  240,  249,   397, 
461,  464,  469 


Idealism,  139,  163 

Need  for  a  new,  113  f. 

and  art,  109 

and  realism  >99  f . 

and  religion,  102 

and  society,  347 
Identity,  Philosophy  of,  52 
Immanence,  151,  413 

and  transcendence,  462  f. 


Indian  Thought  and  Civilisation,  137, 

417,  419,  437,  448 
Individual,  Society  and  the,  341  f. 
Individualism,  400  f.,  428-9 
Individualistic    type    of    civilisation. 

363  f. 
Intellectualism,  309 

Criticism  of,  81  f . 

and  Christianity,  67 

and  voluntarism,  64  f. 


Justice,  Idea  of.  190 

K 

Knowledge — 

Problem  of,  119  f.,  132  f.,  149  f. 
Theory  of,  93  f . 
and  spiritual  life,  93  f . 


Law,  195  f. 

Liberalism,  Modern,  178 

Life- 
Problem  of,  185  f. 
Value  of,  447  f . 

Literature,  91,  407-8 

Logic,  87 

M 

Malthusianism,  264-5 
Man — 

Nature  of ;  his  place  in  the  universe, 
&c.,  60,  274  f.,  288,  327,  392, 
439  f.,  465-6 

Equality  of,  348 

The  great,  357-9 

and  civilisation,  294  f 
Manichseism,  403-4 
Materialism,  76,  220  f.,  227-8,  232  f. 
Mechanical     and    organic    views    of 

life,  165  f. 
Metaphysics,  119  f.,  145  f.,  373 

Tendency  towards,  141 

Morality  and,  143,  388  f. 
Microcosmic  view  of  life,  343-4 
Middle  Ages,  170,  245,  464 

Concept  of  the,  333-4 
Modern,  Concept  of  the,  330  f . 
"  Moderns  "  in  Literature,  91 


INDEX   OF  SUBJECTS 


483 


modern  World,  Characteristics  of  the, 

38-40 
Monism,  467 

of  to-day,  230  f.,  385  f. 

and  civilisation,  292-4 

and  dualism,  215  f . 

and  law,  205 

and  metaphysics,  143,  388  f. 

and  religion,  474 
Mutation,  Doctrine  of,  257 
Mysticism,  244-5,  247-8,  417 

N 

Naturalism,  139,  227-8,  232  f. 
Nature — 

and  spiritual  life,  184 

and  spirit,  216  f. 
Neo-Platonism,  38,  344 
Nineteenth  Century,  The,  44 
Nominalism,  331 
Noological  Method,  The,  56,  61 


Objective  and  Subjective,  35  f. 

Ontology,  146-7 

Optimism,  447  f . 

Organic    and    mechanical     views    of 

life,  165  f. 
view  of  societv.  342  f. 


Pantheism,  249,  313-14,  413,  417,  464, 

467 

Permanence,  Doctrine  of,  242  f. 
Person,  Concept  and  Term,  409  f . 
Personality,  143 

and  character,  409  f . 

The,  of  God,  412-14 
Pessimism,  139,  313,  447  f. 
Philosophy — 

History  of,  96  f.,  467 

Eight  of  an  independent,  93  f .,  129  f. 

Indian    and    European,   compared, 
137 

The  task  of,  93  f . 

and  spiritual  life,  136  f . 

philo-wphia  perennis,  336 
Politicism,  361-2 

and  social  democracy,  374  f. 


Population  Question,  The,  264-5 
Positivism,  45,  111-12,  179,  187,  269 
Poverty,  Problem  of,  381-2 
Practical  and  Theoretical,  64  f. 
Pragmatism,  75 f.,  79,  80 
Pre-formation  Theory,  The,  241 
Protestantism,  68,  92 
Psychologism,  45 
Psychology,  216  f. 
and  law,  202-3 
Psycho-physical  Parallelism,  226-7 

B 

Rationalism,  119  f.,  123,  155  f.,  328 
Eealism,  309  f. 

and  idealism,  99  f . 

and  society,  347 
Eeality,  The  Problem  of,  110 
Eeformation,  The,  92,  348,  432 
Beligion,  265,  372-3,  462  f. 

and  art,  394 

and  civilisation,  289,  292 

and  evolution,  244  f. 

and  history,  316 

and  idealism,  102 

and  life,  108 

and  modernity,  337 

and  monism,  232  f. 

and  morality,  474 

and  personality,  417-18 

and  philosophy,  138 

and  socialism,  378-9 

and  social  life,  363 

and  spiritual  life,  144,  474  f. 
Bights  of  Man,  348 
Eitschlianism,  46-9 
Bomans,   Creative  Inactivity  of  the, 

362 

Bomanticism,  250,  266,  285,  310-11, 
346,  398 

8 

Scholasticism,  86  f .,  172,  409,  463 
Selection,  Theory  of,  257  f . 
Self-development,  Modern  Theory  of, 

402  f. 
Sex— 

and  art,  407 

and  modern  individualism,  -103  4 

and  religion,  403-4 


484 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


Spirit  and  Nature,  216  f . 
Spiritualism,  76,  224  f. 
Spiritual  Life — 

Nature  of  the,  57  f.,  132  f.,  141  f., 
149  f.,  229,  235  f.,  273  f.,  298  f, 
302 f.,  322-3,  479-80 

and  civilisation,  298  f.,  302  f. 

and  evolution,  260  f .,  273  f. 

and  history,  315  f . 

and  human  life,  459 

and  knowledge  93,  f. 

and  law,  201 

and  the  modern  world,  193 

and  morality,  390-2 

and  nature,  184 

and  personality,  414  f . 

and  the  state,  361-2 
Social  type  of  civilisation,  351  f . 
Social  Democracy,  374  f . 
Socialism,  222,  341  f.,  374  f. 
Society — 

Structure  of,  189  f . 

and  the  individual,  341  f . 
Sociology,  205-6,  467 
Soul- 
Neglect  of,  in  realism,  107 

and  body,  216  f . 

Sovereign  Method,  The,  56,  421 
State- 
Power  of  the,  349-50 

in  modern  life,  361-2 

and  democracy,  374  f . 

and  church,  472 

Stoic  Thought  and  Influence,  38,  49, 
66, 119  170,  196,  248,  290,  394, 
412,  25,  431-2,  435,  454 


Subjective — Objective,  35  f. 
Subjectivism,  45  f .,  366  f.,  401  f. 
Summation   of    Keason,   Doctrine   of 

the,  355  f. 

Syntheses  of  Life,  134  f. 
Synthesis  of  Life,  Need   for  a  new, 

479-80 


Talent,  Concept  of,  368 

Teleology,  165  f.,  175 

Theoretical  and  Practical,  64  f . 

Thought  and  Experience,  119  f. 

Transcendence  and  Immanence,  462  f . 

Truth- 
Concept  of,  53,  62 
Quest  of,  89 

U 
Utilitarianism,  74,  295 


Values,  Philosophy  of,  49  f. 
Vitalism,  185  f . 
Voluntarism,  70  f. 

and  intellectualism,  64  f. 


W 

Weismannism,  267 

Will- 
Freedom  of  the,  431  f . 
(Voluntarism),  70  f. 


INDEX    OF    NAMES* 


Abelard,  175 

Alarms  de  Insulis,  245 

Alexander  the  Great,  287 

Alexander  of  Hales,  332 

Albert  of  Saxony,  120 

Albertus  Magnus,  120,  332 

Anaxagoras,  121 

Aquinas,  Thomaa,  65,  71,  102,  146, 
241,  332,  409,  463 

Aristotle,  37,  65,  66,  84, 120,  121,  146, 
147,  165,  167,  168,  169,  171, 
188,  191,  192,  196,  218,  242-3, 
245,  248,  271,  287,  331,  344, 
355-6,  372,  412,  423,  431,  452, 
463 

Arrhenius,  255 

Augustine,  67,  97,  102,  108,  197,  247, 
358,  374,  395,  413,  432,  435, 
448,  457,  463 

Avenarius,  52 

Avianensis,  Abbot  Benedict,  331 

B 

Bach,  397 

Bacon,  Francis,  162,  281 

Bacon,  Koger,  332 

Baerwald,  B.,  330 

Barclay,  J.,  330 

Baumgarten,  36,  174 

Bayle,  P.,  36,  69,  215,  233,  282,  431, 

462 
Bergson,   Henri,   185,  186,   188,  258, 

434 

Berkeley,  Bishop,  36,  99,  100,  174 
Bernheim,  210,  334 
Bichat,  179 
Boethius,  341,  409 
Bohme,  Jakob,  240 


Bopp,  203 

Bossuet,  282 

Boutroux,  E.,  186-7,  434 

Boyle,  Bobert,  158,  166,  173,  220 

Brucker,  447 

Bruno,  Giordano,  200,  220,  248,  3*1, 

464 

Burckhardt,  J.,  371,  443 
Buscb,  J.,  332 


Caldwell,  447 

Cambray,  Otto,  Bishop  of,  331 
Carlyle,  Thomas,  209 
Carneades,  412 
Cassiodorus,  331 
Cellarius,  334 
Chamberlain,  Alex.,  411 
Chauvin,  36 
Cicero,  241,  341,  343 
Clauberg,  B.,  146,  197,  251,  409,  463 
Coelius,  423 

Comte,  119,  187,  199,  205,  208,  269, 
348,  357,  385-6,  405 

Criticism  of,  111-12 

and  intellectualism,  88 

and  society,  179 
Cousin,  Victor,  405 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  348 
Cudworth,  175 


Dante,  327 

Darwin,  Charles,  121,  227-8, 381,  287-8 
de  Maistre,  177 
Delbriick,  203 

Democritus,  169,  173,  196,  344 
Descartes,  36,  99,  121,  166,  173,  203, 
217-18,  220,  250,  273,  348 


*  The  more  important  references  are  in  thick  type. 
485 


486 


INDEX   OF  NAMES 


Dewey,  75 

Dilthey,  127,  330,  423 
Dionysius,  247 
Dionysius,  Pseudo  ,  241 
Duns  Scotus,  35,  67,  71 
Diirer,  A.,  460 

E 

Eckhardt,  409 
Empedocles,  253 
Eratosthenes,  287 
Eucken,  Rudolf— 

Introduction  to  his  philosophy,  83  f. 

his  Activism,  79  f. 


Fichte,  65,  101,   284,  286,  348,  398, 

411 

Firmianus,  Pater,  330 
Flint,  E.,  464 
Frederick  the  Great,  69 
Fries,  49 
Froebel,  150 


Galen,  245 
Gellert,  424 
Gidionsen,  271 
Gierke,  190 
Goclen,  36 

Goethe,  37,  53,  55,  56,  144,  227,  240, 
271,  283,  248,  327,  347,  358-9, 
360,  368,  420,  467-8 

and  idealism,  101 

and  morality,  397-8 
Goetze,  36 
Gottsched,  36,  121 
Goyan, 334 
Gregory  of  Nyssa,  395 
Grotenfeldt,  A.,  312 

H 

Hagedorn,  240 
Harms,  65 

Hartmann,  Ed.  v. ,  257 
Haugwitz,  240 

Hegel,  69,  84,  90,  131,  153   208,  216, 
224,    250,   254,   257,  269,  295, 
310-11,  326,  350 
his  system,  43-4 


Herbart,  49,  87,  100,  131,  150,  185, 

203,  226,  346,  410 
Herder,  168,  240,  283,  470 
Herennius,  146 
Hildebrand,  B.,  368,  424 
Hirzel,  B.,  196 
Hobbes,  206 
Hoffding,  H.,  187,  431 

and  problem  of  values,  49 
Hosea,  290 

Hume,  David,  187,  237-8,  475 
Husserl,  46,  157,  204 
|    Huxley,  464 
Hyde,  T.,  215 


Ihering,  326,  345 
Isaiah,  290 
Iselin,  282 


Jacobi,  168,  413 
James,  William,  127 

and  pragmatism,  76 f.,  79 
Jerusalem,  W.,  75,  79 
Jesus,  394-5  (see  Christianity) 
John,  Saint,  Gospel  of,  170 
John  of  Salisbury,  170,  332 

K 

Kant,  49,  50,  55,  84,  87,  110,  114,  119 
130,  134,  146,  147,  158,  167, 
168,  169,  175-6,  187,  191,  193, 
199,  234,  240,  241,  261, 273,  283, 
284,  285,  300,  346,  359,  388, 
397,  424-5,  432,  436,  462-3 
and  problem  of  subject  and  object, 

40  f. 

and  spiritual  life,  59 
and  practical  reason,  66 
and  problem  of  knowledge,  69 
and  voluntarism,  71  f. 
and  idealism,  100 

and  problem  of  knowledge,  121  f. 
and  the  moral  law,  205 
and  personality,  411 
Kepler,  282 

Key,  Ellen  (the  "  New  Ethic  "),  401  f. 
Klopstock,  285 
Kurth,  G.,  334 


INDEX   OF  NAMES 


487 


La  Bruyere,  424 

Lamarck,  252,  258,  348 

Lambert,  120,  462 

Lamprecht,  210,  330 

Lange,  F.  A.,  221 

Lavater,  368 

Leibniz,  81,  87,  97,  99,  124,  145,  167, 
172,  174,  182,  203,  208,  215, 
224,  228,  231,  241,  248,  249, 
282,  320,  336,  342,  344,  410, 
432,  447 
and  problem  of  knowledge,  120 

Lessing,  36,  121,  167,  462 

Lichtenberg,  387 

Locke,  68,  84,  99,  190,  206,  251 

Lodge,  Sir  Oliver,  186,  188,  258 

Lorenz,  264-5 

Lotze,  49, 178,  182,  191,  271-2,  414 

Lucretius,  197 

Luther,   Martin,   68,   121,   193,   332, 

346,  358,  397,  435 
his  spiritual  power,  92 


If 

Mach    and    philosophy    of    identity, 

62-3 

Maistre,  de,  177 
Malthus,  200,  264-5 
Marcus  Aurelius,  170,  372 
Marx,  Karl,  207,  255 
Meinong,  49,  431 
Melancthon,  68 
Michael  Angelo,  396 
Mignot,  Archbishop,  253 
Montesquieu,  202,  264,  282,  349 
Miiller,  Adam,  177 
Miiller,  A.  P.,  36 
Miiller,  Max,  409 
Munsterberg,  50,  51 


N 

Newman,  Cardinal,  206-7,  253 
Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  199 
Nicholas  of  Cusa,  49,  241,  248,  344 
Nietzsche,  360 

incongruity  of  his  works,  91 

and  metaphysics,  373 


Norstrom,  Vitalis — 

and  the  "  New  Ethic,"  408 
and  art,  406 


Occam,  332 

Ostwald,  181 

Otto,  Bishop  of  Cambray,  831 


Pascal,  69,  200,  402,  457 

Paul,  210 

Paul,  Saint,  432 

Paulsen,  64 

Perrault,  333 

Pestalozzi,  285,  346,  381-2,  427 

Petrus  Nigri,  100 

Pierce,  C.,  75 

Plato,  37,  81,  99,  100,  145,  196,  243, 

248,  287,  368,  382,  394,  412 
Plattner,  42 
Plotinus,  43,  66,   71,   131,  344,  394, 

412,  451,  464 
Polybius,  248 
Porphyry,  342 
Poschmann,  49 
Prantl,  35 
Priscianus,  331 
Pseudo-Dionysius,  241 


Quetelet,  206,  348 


Babener,  424 

Reischle,  253 

Benouvier,  187 

Bhodius  Andronicua,  146 

Bickert,  210 

Bitschl,  414 

Bousseau,  J.  J.,  290,  346,  348,  366 

Boux,  181,  186,  189 

Riidiger,  175 

8 

Saint-Simon,  168 
Sauppe,  423 

Schelling,  64,  176,  177,260,  444 
and  intellectualism,  83 


488 


INDEX   OF  NAMES 


Schiller,  75,  100,  333,  39S 

Schlegel,  F.,  203,  346 

Schleicher,  203 

Schleiermacher,  110,  205,  286,  346 

Schopenhauer,  69,  359,  447 

Scotus  Erigena,  121,  241,  247 

Seneca,  341 

Sigwart,  200,  204 

Simon  de  Brion,  332 

Sleidan,  334 

Smith,  Adam,  178,  190,  282,  377 

Spencer,  Herbert,   121,    188,    252-3, 

258 
Spinoza,  81,  167,  203, 226-7,  350,  412- 

18,  417,  432,  435,  447,  462, 464, 

467-8 
and  problem  of  subject  and  object, 

40  f. 

Socrates,  342 
Steffensen,  B.,  141,  209 
Steuco,  A.,  336 
Stieler,  240 
Strabo,  287 
Suarez,  168 


Taine,  348 
Tetens,  240 
Theophrastes,  422-4 
Thomasius,  J.,  342 
Tonnies,  64 


Trendelenburg,  65,  184,  336,  409,  412 
Troltsch,  208 
Turgot,  282 


Vauvenargue,  461 
Vico,  208 
Volkelt,  '262 
Voltaire,  447 

W 

Walch,  330,  410,  413 

Weismann,  257 

Whitney,  203 

Windelband,  50,  157,  204,  210,  434 

Wlassak,  52 

Wolff,  B.,  120 

Wolff,  Ch.,  65,  87,  97,  99,  100,  121, 
146,  166,  167-8,  174,  203,  215, 
216,  241,  248,  410,  462 

Wolff,  P.  A.,  101,  285 

Wundt,  64 

and  apperception,  74 


X 


Xenophon, 196 


Zeller,  205,  413 
Zesen,  409 


DNWIN  BBOTHBBB,  LIMITED,  THE  GBFSHAM  PBKB8,  WOKINQ  AND  LONDON. 


UCSB  LIBRARY 


UC  SOUTHERN  RBaONM.  I 
"I    III    II    I 


